LECTURE 10

OBEDIENCE ENTIRE



The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to

the law of God.



But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever

called in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though

apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may reasonably

excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine-tenths

of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments that

are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. They

maintain that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that there

is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law of God; that all

Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not

one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in short, that God accepts

as virtue that which, in every instance, comes short of obedience to

His law. And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of faith, that

obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence of a change of

heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they will brand as a heretic,

or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to obey the law; and

maintain that men may be, and are pious, and eminently so, who do

not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which every one knows to be

generally held by those who are styled orthodox Christians, must

assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty, besides the moral

law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply obedience to any

law. In this discussion. I shall:



1. Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the

moral law; and, 



2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this

law, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as

virtue or true religion.



There can be no rule of duty but the moral law.



Upon this proposition I remark:



(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the

law of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of

God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the

course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and

relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature and

relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But if

this is right, nothing else can be right If this course is obligatory upon

us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly

be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature and

relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or less, can be right. 

If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no such truths.



(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should He

do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in His

arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can He alter it, or introduce any

other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything else

right than to love Him with all the heart, and our neighbor as

ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of

faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is

not made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from

its very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and

love or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been

said on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can

be, obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his

nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this. 

Nor call any being render anything more than this obligatory Indeed,

there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law. 

There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions,

and in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings us

to the consideration of the second proposition, namely:



That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral

law.



That, every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law,

will appear, if we consider:



(1.) That virtue is identical with true religion:



(2.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than

the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:



(3.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the

law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God. 

"Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law" (Romans 13:10). "Though I

speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity

(love), I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And

though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and

all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove

mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow

all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be

burned, and have not charity (love), it profiteth me nothing" (1 Cor.

13:1-3). Love is repeatedly recognized in the Bible not only as

constituting true religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every

form of true religion is only a form of love or benevolence.



Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of

selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to

obedience to it.



Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and

the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ. 

Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when we

come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God is

love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love, or

the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of Him and of us. 

Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all holy beings. 

Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only benevolence

viewed in particular relations.



Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. 

That is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense,

virtue.



A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to

God by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's

account, is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of

full or entire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow

brought men, that is, Christians, into such relations, that God really

accepts from them an imperfect obedience, something far below what

His law requires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they

render at best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less

at every moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as

can well be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct

inquiries:



(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to

disobey, the moral law at the same time?



(2.) Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present

and full obedience to the moral law?



The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding

lecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral

law cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey,

and partly disobey, at the same time. We will now attend to the

second question, namely:



Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and

full obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can He accept

anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full

obedience, or all that the law requires?



The term justification is used in two senses:



(a.) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:



(b.) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has

sinned, as if he had not sinned.



It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that

Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and accepted,

and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by coming short

of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do

not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at

every moment condemns them for present sin; but that they are

justified by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and

personally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts,

and in this sense justifies them when they are in the present

commission of an indefinite amount of sin; that grace accounts them

righteous while, in fact, they are continually sinning; that they are fully

pardoned and acquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by

coming entirely and perpetually short of the obedience which, under

the circumstances the law of God requires. While voluntarily

withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted, and the

sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the

sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he voluntarily withholds. 

This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, precisely what many

hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose for discussion the

following inquiries, as of fundamental importance.



1. How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every

moment, come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be

accepted and justified?



This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully

withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how

great a part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all

our hearts, and our neighbor less than ourselves, and be accepted,

how much less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our

neighbor, will be accepted?



Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our

neighbor will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our

neighbor? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not

what is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted,

then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be

accepted. We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be

in a state of acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our

neighbor a little, and ourselves more than we love God and all our

neighbors, and yet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God

must be loved supremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme

love a loving with all the heart? But this is full and not partial

obedience; yet the latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or

is supreme love, not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree

of love than we exercise toward any other being? But how much

greater must it be? Barely a little? How are we to measure it? In

what scale are we to weigh, or by what standard are we to measure,

our love, so as to know whether we love God a little more than any

other being? But how much are we to love our neighbor, in order to

our being accepted? If we may love him a little less than ourselves,

how much less, and still be justified? These are certainly questions of

vital importance. But such questions look like trifling. Yet why should

they? If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must not

only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer. The

advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them. And if

they cannot, it is only because their theory is false. Is it possible that

their theory should be true, and yet no one be able to answer such

vital questions as these just proposed? If a partial obedience can be

accepted, it is a momentous question, how partial, or how complete

must that obedience be? I say again, that this is a question of

agonizing interest. God forbid that we should be left in the dark here. 

But again, 



2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which

would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do

not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which

we are forgiven?



The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this

world, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always

withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the very

act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God

and their neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services, fully

forgives and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present and

pertinacious rebellion? Receiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch!

Forgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in! Yes, this

must be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present full

obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents

God as receiving to favor a rebel who has one hand filled with

weapons against His throne.



3. But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe,

by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be

honored by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear,

and honor God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself

to the intelligence of the universe? Will pardon and justification save

the sinner, while he yet continues to withhold a part, at least, of his

heart from God, while he still cleaves to a part of his sins? Can

heaven be edified, or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such

a method of justification?



4. But again: Has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of?



Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a

question which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has

God, as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some

course of conduct which is suitable to Him? Has He not given us

intelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the

propriety of His public acts? Does He not invite and require scrutiny? 

Why has He required an atonement for sin, and why has He required

repentance at all? Who does not know that no executive magistrate

has a right to pardon sin unrepented of? The lowest terms upon which

any ruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same

thing, a return to obedience. Who ever heard, in any government, of a

rebel's being pardoned, while he only renounced a part of his

rebellion? To pardon him while any part of his rebellion is persevered

in, were to sanction by a public act that which is lacking in his

repentance. It were to pronounce a public justification of his refusal to

render full obedience.



5. But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the

sin of withholding a part of our hearts from Him?



God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire Him to

forgive us, while we keep back any part of the condition of forgiveness. 

While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbor, we cannot

profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And

shall God forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even profess

repentance? To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and cease

from sin, is a gross insult to God.



6. But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while

unrepented of? Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is

represented as pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully

forsaken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this

always stands revealed, expressly or impliedly, on every page of

divine inspiration.



7. Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin? Where is

such a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, in every

degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose

heart the vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet not be

condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely,

if the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most

unequivocally teaches this: "If any man keep the whole law, and yet

offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10). What is this but

asserting, that if there could be a partial obedience, it would be

unavailing, since the law would condemn for any degree of sin; that

partial obedience, did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable

obedience at all? The doctrine, that a partial obedience, in the sense

that the law is not at any time fully obeyed, is accepted of God, is

sheer antinomianism. What! A sinner justified while indulging in

rebellion against God!



But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must

intend fully to obey the law, as a condition of justification; that, in his

purpose and intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of

perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is

intended by this language? We have seen in former lectures, that

moral character belongs properly only to the intention. If, then,

perfection of intention be an indispensable condition of justification,

what is this, but an admission, after all, that full present obedience is a

condition of justification? But this is what we hold, and they deny. 

What then can they mean? It is of importance to ascertain what is

intended by the assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a

sinner cannot be justified but upon condition that he fully purposes and

intends to abandon all sin, and to live without sin; unless he seriously

intends to render full obedience to all the commands of God. Intends

to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why, love,

good willing, good-intending. Intending to obey the law is intending to

intend, willing to will, choosing to choose! This is absurd.



What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of

justification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an

intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be intended,

to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. Unless he

intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full obedience to the

law; that he intends to live without sin. The supposition is, that he is

now sinning; that is, for nothing else is sin, voluntarily withholding from

God and man their due. He chooses, wills, and intends this, and yet

the supposition is, that at the same time he chooses, wills, intends,

fully to obey the law. What is this but the ridiculous assertion, that he

at the same time intends full obedience to the law, and intends not

fully to obey, but only to obey in part, voluntarily withholding from God

and man their dues.



But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in

him? Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless

the law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while

there is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can he

be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense,

while sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly not. For the

law, unless it be repealed, continues to condemn him while there is

any degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both

be pardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the

time coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which

the law is not uttering its curses against him. "Cursed is every one

that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to

do them" (Gal. 3:10). The fact is, there never has been, and there

never can be, any such thing as sin without condemnation. "Beloved,

if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20),

that is, He much more condemns us. "But if our heart condemn us

not, then have we confidence towards God" (1 John 3:21). God

cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in His arbitrary will. It is as

unalterable and unrepealable as His own nature. God can never

repeal nor alter it. He can for Christ's sake dispense with the

execution of the penalty, when the subject has returned to full present

obedience to the precept, but in no other case, and upon no other

possible conditions. To affirm that He can, is to affirm that God can

alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral law and moral

government.



8. The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial

repentance of sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to

present full obedience to the law of God?



To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose

a new end, to begin a new life, to turn from self seeking to seeking the

highest good of being, to turn from selfishness to disinterested

benevolence, from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience. 

Certainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a

thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists

in turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former

lecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot coexist, at the same

time, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite

ends. These ends cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of

partial repentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to

overlook the very nature of repentance. What! A man both turn away

from, and hold on to sin at the same time! Serve God and mammon at

one and the same time! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed

both by reason and by Christ. But perhaps it will be objected, that the

sin of those who render but a partial obedience, and whom God

pardons and accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the inquiry:



9. Can there be any other than voluntary sin?



What is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires

benevolence, good willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not willing,

but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing contrary to the

commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists in choosing,

willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it must be intelligent

and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is nonsense to deny that sin

is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no sin, or there is voluntary sin. 

Benevolence is willing the good of being in general, as an end, and, of

course, implies the rejection of self-gratification, as an end. So sin is

the choice of self-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the

rejection of the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness,

naturally and necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal

opposites and antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of

the other in the heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and

there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.



10. Must not present sin be sin unrepented of?



Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that

present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is overlooking

both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance. Sin is selfish

willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent willing. These

two states of will, as has just been said, cannot possibly coexist. 

Whoever, then, is at present falling short of full obedience to the law of

God, is voluntarily sinning against God, and is impenitent. It is

nonsense to say, that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent; that

he is penitent so far as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he

disobeys. This really seems to be the loose idea of many, that a man

can be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time. This

idea, doubtless, is founded on the mistake, that repentance consists in

sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the sensibility. But repentance

consists in a change of ultimate intention a change in the choice of

an end a turning from selfishness to supreme disinterested

benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly impossible for one to be partly

penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time; inasmuch as

penitence and impenitence consist in supreme opposite choices.



So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the

government of God, but present full obedience to His law.



If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen into a

great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present

sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this life. 

If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the very beginning

of true religion in the soul, implies the renunciation of all sin. Sin

ceases where holiness begins. Now, how great and ruinous must that

error be, that teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in conscious

sin; to look upon a sinless state, as not to be expected in this world;

that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning, even for an hour

or a moment, in this world; and yet to hope for heaven!



How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated

upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one may

be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission of

more or less sin! This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all the

universalism that ever cursed the world.



We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die in

his sin, he must sink to hell. Whenever a Christian sins he comes

under condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be

lost.



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LECTURE 11



OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW



We have seen, that all the law requires is summarily expressed in

the single word, love, that this word is synonymous with benevolence;

that benevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of

God and of the universe, as an end, or for its own sake; that this

choice is an ultimate intention. In short, we have seen, that good will

to being in general is obedience to the moral law. Now the question

before us is, what is not implied in this goodwill, or in this benevolent

ultimate intention?



Since the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard, and

the only standard, by which the question in regard to what is not, and

what is, implied in entire sanctification, is to be decided, it is of

fundamental importance, that we understand what is, and what is not,

implied in entire obedience to this law. Our judgment of our own state,

or of the state of others, can never be relied upon, till these inquiries

are settled. Christ was perfect, and yet so erroneous were the notions

of the Jews, in regard to what constituted perfection, that they thought

Him possessed with a devil, instead of being holy, as He claimed to

be. I will state then, what is not implied in entire obedience to the

moral law, as I understand it. The law, as epitomized by Christ, "Thou

shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and

with all thy mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself"

(Deut. 6:5), I understand to lay down the whole duty of man to God,

and to his fellow creatures. Now, the questions are, what is not, and

what is, implied in perfect obedience to this law?



What is not implied in perfect obedience to this law.



1. Entire obedience does not imply any change in the substance of

the soul or body, for this the law does not require; and it would not be

obligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent with

natural justice, and, therefore, not law. Entire obedience is the entire

consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not imply any

change in them, but simply the right use of them.



2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of

character, such as constitutional ardor or impetuosity. There is

nothing, certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional

traits to be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly directed

in their exercise.



3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional

appetites or susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that

the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities are in themselves

sinful, and that a state of entire conformity to the law of God implies

their entire annihilation. I have been not a little surprised to find, that

some persons who, I had supposed, were far enough from embracing

the doctrine of physical moral depravity, were, after all, resorting to this

assumption, in order to set aside the doctrine of entire sanctification in

this life. But let us appeal to the law. Does the law anywhere,

expressly or impliedly, condemn the constitution of man, or require the

annihilation of any thing that is properly a part of the constitution itself? 

Does it require the annihilation of the appetite for food, or is it satisfied

merely with regulating its indulgence? In short, does the law of God

any where require any thing more than the consecration of all the

powers, appetites, and susceptibilities of body and mind to the service

of God?



4. Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural

affection, or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean, that

certain persons may be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to

have had a natural affection for John. By natural resentment I mean,

that, from the laws of our being, we must resent or feel opposed to

injustice or ill treatment. Not that a disposition to retaliate or revenge

ourselves is consistent with the law of God. But perfect obedience to

the law of God does not imply that we should have no sense of injury

and injustice, when we are abused. God has this, and ought to have

it, and so has every moral being. To love your neighbor as yourself,

does not imply, that if he injure you, you should feel no sense of the

injury or injustice, but that you should love him and do him good,

notwithstanding his injurious treatment.



5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind. 

Moral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical law. 

God's laws certainly do not clash with each other. And the moral law

cannot require such a state of constant mental excitement as will

destroy the physical constitution. It cannot require any more mental

excitement than is consistent with all the laws, attributes, and

circumstances of both soul and body. It does not imply that any organ

or faculty is to be at all times exerted to the full measure of its

capacity. This would soon exhaust and destroy any and every organ

of the body. Whatever may be true of the mind, when separated from

the body, it is certain, while it acts through a material organ, that a

constant state of excitement is impossible. When the mind is strongly

excited, there is of necessity a great determination of blood to the

brain. A high degree of excitement cannot long continue, without

producing inflammation of the brain, and consequent insanity. And the

law of God does not require any degree of emotion, or mental

excitement, inconsistent with life and health. Our Lord Jesus Christ

does not appear to have been in a state of continual mental

excitement. When He and His disciples had been in a great

excitement for a time, they would turn aside, "and rest a while" (Mark

6:31).



Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that

the high degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in

revivals of religion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must

become deranged? It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a

high degree of excitement should prevail for a time, to arrest public

and individual attention, and draw off people from their pursuits, to

attend to the concerns of their souls. But if any suppose that this high

degree of excitement is either necessary or desirable, or possible to

be long continued, they have not well considered the matter. And here

is one grand mistake of the church. They have supposed that the

revival consists mostly in this state of excited emotion, rather than in

conformity of the human will to the law of God. Hence, when the

reasons for much excitement have ceased, and the public mind begins

to grow more calm, they begin immediately to say, that the revival is

on the decline; when, in fact, with much less excited emotion, there

may be vastly more real religion in the community. Excitement is often

important and indispensable, but the vigorous actings of the will are

infinitely more important. And this state of mind may exist in the

absence of highly excited emotions.



Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or

intellectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not need the

same strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they are

not produced by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth as

strong a volition to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames of a

burning house? Should a mother, watching over her sleeping nursling,

when all is quiet and secure, put forth as powerful volitions, as might

be required to snatch it from the devouring flames? Now, suppose

that she were equally devoted to God, in watching her sleeping babe,

and in rescuing it from the jaws of death. Her holiness would not

consist in the fact, that she exercised equally strong volitions, in both

cases; but that in both cases the volition was equal to the

accomplishment of the thing required to be done. So that persons

may be entirely holy, and yet continually varying in the strength of their

affections, emotions, or volitions, according to their circumstances, the

state of their physical system, and the business in which they are

engaged.



All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and

disposal of God. Just so much of physical, intellectual, and moral

energy are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature

and the circumstances of the case require. And nothing is further from

the truth than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of

emotion and mental action, on any and every subject alike.



6. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the

direct object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible in

the nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to think of

or love our neighbor as ourselves.



The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is

meant that the mind's supreme preference should be of God that

God should be the great object of its supreme regard. But this state of

mind is perfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary

business of life giving to that business that attention, and exercising

about it all those affections and emotions, which its nature and

importance demand.



If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the

promotion of His glory, if his eye be single, his affections and conduct,

so far as they have any moral character, are entirely holy when

necessarily engaged in the right transaction of his business, although,

for the time being, neither his thoughts nor affections are upon God;

just as a man, who is intensely devoted to his family, may be acting

consistently with his supreme affection, and rendering them the most

important and perfect service, while he does not think of them at all. 

The moral heart is the mind's supreme preference. The natural heart

propels the blood through all the physical system. Now there is a

striking analogy between this and the moral heart. And the analogy

consists in this, that as the natural heart, by its pulsations, diffuses life

through the physical system, so the moral heart, or the supreme

governing preference, or ultimate intention of the mind, is that which

gives life and character to man's moral actions. For example, suppose

that I am engaged in teaching mathematics; in this, my ultimate

intention is to glorify God in this particular calling. Now in

demonstrating some of its intricate propositions, I am obliged, for

hours together, to give the entire attention of my mind to that object. 

While my mind is thus intensely employed in one particular business, it

is impossible that I should have any thoughts about God, or should

exercise any direct affections, or emotions, or volitions, towards Him. 

Yet if, in this particular calling, all selfishness is excluded, and my

supreme design is to glorify God, my mind is in a state of entire

obedience, even though, for the time being, I do not think of God.



It should be understood, that while the supreme preference or

intention of the mind has such efficiency as to exclude all selfishness,

and to call forth just that strength of volition, thought, affection, and

emotion, that is requisite to the right discharge of any duty to which the

mind may be called, the heart is in a right state. By a suitable degree

of thought and feeling, to the right discharge of duty, I mean just that

intensity of thought, and energy of action, that the nature and

importance of the particular duty, to which, for the time being, I am

called, demand, in my honest estimation.



In making this statement, I take it for granted, that the brain together

with all the circumstances of the constitution are such that the requisite

amount of thought, feeling, etc., are possible. If the physical

constitution be in such a state of exhaustion, as to be unable to put

forth that amount of exertion which the nature of the case might

otherwise demand, even in this case, the languid efforts, though far

below the importance of the subject, would be all that the law of God

requires. Whoever, therefore, supposes that a state of entire

obedience implies a state of entire abstraction of mind from everything

but God, labors under a grievous mistake. Such a state of mind is as

inconsistent with duty, as it is impossible, while we are in the flesh.



The fact is that the language and spirit of the law have been and

generally are, grossly misunderstood, and interpreted to mean what

they never did, or can, mean, consistently with natural justice. Many a

mind has been thrown open to the assaults of Satan, and kept in a

state of continual bondage and condemnation, because God was not,

at all times, the direct object of thought, affection, and emotion; and

because the mind was not kept in a state of perfect tension, and

excited to the utmost at every moment.



7. Nor does it imply a state of continual calmness of mind. Christ

was not in a state of continual calmness. The deep peace of His mind

was never broken up, but the surface or emotions of His mind were

often in a state of great excitement, and at other times, in a state of

great calmness. And here let me refer to Christ, as we have His

history in the Bible, in illustration of the positions I have already taken. 

For example: Christ had all the constitutional appetites and

susceptibilities of human nature. Had it been otherwise, He could not

have been "tempted in all points like as we are" (Heb. 4:15), nor could

He have been tempted in any point as we are, any further than He

possessed a constitution similar to our own. Christ also manifested

natural affection for His mother and for other friends. He also showed

that He had a sense of injury and injustice, and exercised a suitable

resentment when He was injured and persecuted. He was not always

in a state of great excitement. He appears to have had His seasons of

excitement and of calm of labor and rest of joy and sorrow, like

other good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obedience to

the law, as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, and as

if every kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feeling of love to

God, were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often manifested a

great degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. In

short, His history would lead to the conclusion that His calmness and

excitement were various, according to the circumstances of the case. 

And although He was sometimes so pointed and severe in His reproof,

as to be accused of being possessed of a devil, yet His emotions and

feelings were only those that were called for, and suited to the

occasion.



8. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind, without

any indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners. Anger at sin is only a

modification of love to being in general. A sense of justice, or a

disposition to have the wicked punished for the benefit of the

government, is only another of the modifications of love. And such

dispositions are essential to the existence of love, where the

circumstances call for their exercise. It is said of Christ, that He was

angry. He often manifested anger and holy indignation. "God is angry

with the wicked every day" (Psalms 7:11). And holiness, or a state of

obedience, instead of being inconsistent with, always implies, the

existence of anger, whenever circumstances occur which demand its

exercise.



9. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no

sense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love. 

Justice, or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is

another of its modifications. God, and Christ, and all holy beings,

exercise all those dispositions that constitute the different

modifications of love, under every possible circumstance.



10. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike,

irrespective of their value, circumstances, and relations. One being

may have a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more

importance to the universe, than another. Impartiality and the law of

love require us not to regard all beings and things alike, but all beings

and things according to their nature, relations, circumstances, and

value.



11. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all our relations. Such

an interpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order to

yield obedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in

us the possession of the attribute of omniscience; for certainly there is

not a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation. 

And a knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite

knowledge. It is plain that the law of God cannot require any such

thing as this.



12. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject whatever. 

It is maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to every

man perfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt him

from any mistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but

would merely say, the law does not expressly or impliedly require

infallibility of judgment in us. It only requires us to make the best use

we can of all the light we have.



13. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge we might have

possessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The

law might require us to love God or man, as well as we might have

been able to love them, had we always improved all our time in

obtaining all the knowledge we could, in regard to their nature,

character, and interests. If this were implied in the requisition of the

law, there is not a saint on earth or in heaven that does, or ever can,

perfectly obey. What is lost in this respect is lost, and past neglect can

never be so remedied, that we shall ever be able to make up in our

acquisitions of knowledge what we have lost. It will no doubt be true to

all eternity, that we shall have less knowledge than we might have

possessed, had we filled up all our time in its acquisition. We do not,

cannot, nor shall we ever be able to, love God as well as we might

have loved Him, had we always applied our minds to the acquisition of

knowledge respecting Him. And if entire obedience is to be

understood as implying that we love God as much we should, had we

all the knowledge we might have had, then I repeat it, there is not a

saint on earth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that is entirely obedient.



14. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have

rendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or

suppose, that our powers are in a perfect state; that our strength of

body or mind is what it would have been, had we never sinned. But it

simply requires us to use what strength we have. The very wording of

the law is proof conclusive, that it extends its demand only to the full

amount of what strength we have. And this is true of every moral

being, however great or small.



The most perfect development and improvement of our powers,

must depend upon the most perfect use of them. And every departure

from their perfect use, is a diminishing of their highest development,

and a curtailing of their capabilities to serve God in the highest and

best manner. All sin then does just so much towards crippling and

curtailing the powers of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so

much, incapable of performing the service they might otherwise have

rendered.



To this view of the subject it has been objected, that Christ taught an

opposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed His feet with

her tears, when He said, "To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth

much" (Luke 7:47). But can it be that Christ intended to be understood

as teaching, that the more we sin the greater will be our love, and our

ultimate virtue? If this be so, I do not see why it does not follow that

the more sin in this life, the better, if so be that we are forgiven. If our

virtue is really to be improved by our sins, I see not why it would not be

good economy, both for God and man, to sin as much as we can while

in this world. Certainly Christ meant to lay down no such principle as

this. He undoubtedly meant to teach that a person who was truly

sensible of the greatness of his sins, would exercise more of the love

of gratitude than would be exercised by one who had a less affecting

sense of ill-desert.



15. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that

might have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin. We

cannot believe anything about God of which we have neither evidence

nor knowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our intellectual

perceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation to believe

in Christ, and thousands of other things of which they have no

knowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than

in a Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and

greater faith than in a child. And perfection in an angel would imply

much greater faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows more

of God than man does. Let it be always understood, that entire

obedience to God never implies that which is naturally impossible. It is

naturally impossible for us to believe that of which we have no

knowledge. Entire obedience implies, in this respect, nothing more

than the heart's faith or confidence in all the truth that is perceived by

the intellect.



16. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our

prayers. It has been maintained by some, that entire obedience

implies the offering of prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men. 

To this I reply: then Christ did not obey, for He offered no such prayer. 

The law of God makes no such demands, either expressly or

impliedly. We have no right to believe that all men will be converted in

answer to our prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise

to that effect. As, therefore, there is no such promise, we are under no

obligation to offer such a prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the

world imply, that there are no saints in the world who fully obey God's

law.



It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not an

express or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas

was not converted in answer to Christ's prayer, does not prove that

Christ did not fully obey.



Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or

impliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers; or, in

other words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant of

the existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect love

implies the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly speaking

can be duty of which the mind has no knowledge. It cannot, therefore,

be our duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely ignorant, or

the application of which to any specific object we do not understand.



If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact, that the soul

neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be

understood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the

neglect of that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is

inconsistent with any present neglect to know the truth; for such

neglect is sin. But it is not inconsistent with our failing to do that of

which we have no knowledge. James says, "He that knoweth to do

good and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (James 4:17). "If ye were blind,"

says Christ, "ye should have no sin, but because ye say, We see,

therefore your sin remaineth" (John 9:41).



17. Entire obedience to the divine law does not imply, that others will

of course regard our state of mind, and our outward life, as entirely

conformed to the law.



It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ

was possessed of a wicked instead of a holy spirit. Such were their

notions of holiness, that they no doubt supposed Him to be actuated

by any other than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on

account of His opposition to the current orthodoxy, and to the

ungodliness of the religious teachers of the day. Now, who does not

see, that when the church is, in a great measure, conformed to the

world, a spirit of holiness in any man would certainly lead him to aim

the sharpest rebukes at the spirit and life of those in this state, whether

in high or low places? And who does not see, that this would naturally

result in His being accused of possessing a wicked spirit? And who

does not know, that where a religious teacher finds himself under the

necessity of attacking a false orthodoxy, he will certainly be hunted,

almost as a beast of prey, by the religious teachers of his day, whose

authority, influence, and orthodoxy are thus assailed?



18. Nor does it imply exemption from sorrow or mental suffering. It

was not so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for our

own past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and

vigor, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had

sinned less; or sorrow for those around us sorrow in view of human

sinfulness, or suffering. These are all consistent with a state of joyful

love to God and man, and indeed are the natural results of it.



19. Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society with

mingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as

some have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of

papists in retiring to monasteries, and convents in taking the veil,

and, as they say, retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state

of voluntary exclusion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent

with any degree of holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love

to our neighbor.



20. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing

is further from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom,

perhaps, few holier men have ever lived, that "he was so cheerful as

often to be accused of being gay." Cheerfulness is certainly the result

of holy love. And entire obedience no more implies moroseness in this

world than it does in heaven.



In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian

holiness, writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry: What does

obedience to the law of God imply, and what does it not imply? 

Instead of bringing everything to this test, they seem to lose sight of it. 

On the one hand, they include things that the law of God never

required of man in his present state. Thus they lay a stumbling-block

and a snare for the saints, to keep them in perpetual bondage,

supposing that this is the way to keep them humble, to place the

standard entirely above their reach. Or, on the other hand, they really

abrogate the law, so as to make it no longer binding. Or they so fritter

away what is really implied in it, as to leave nothing in its requirements,

but a sickly, whimsical, inefficient sentimentalism, or perfectionism,

which in its manifestations and results, appears to me to be anything

but that which the law of God requires.



21. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at, or intend to do

our duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always, or ever,

terminates on duty as an ultimate end. It is our duty to aim at or intend

the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, or

for its own sake. This is the infinitely valuable end at which we are at

all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at this. While we aim at this, we

do our duty, but to aim at duty is not doing duty.



Nor does it imply that we always think, at the time, of its being duty,

or of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation

is a first truth, and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral

agent, and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral

agency. But it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to the

moral law, that moral obligation should at all times be present to the

thoughts as an object of attention.



Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of

benevolence is, at all times, the object of the mind's attention. We

may intend the glory of God and the good of our neighbor, without at

all times thinking of the moral character of this intention. But the

intention is not the less virtuous on this account. The mind

unconsciously, but necessarily, assumes the rightness of

benevolence, or of willing the good of being, just as it assumes other

first truths, without being distinctly conscious of the assumption. It is

not therefore, at all essential to obedience to the law of God, that we

should at all times have before our minds the virtuousness or moral

character of benevolence.



22. Nor does obedience to the moral law imply, that the law itself

should be, at all times, the object of thought, or of the mind's attention. 

The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in the form

of an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which every moral

agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law, as a rule of duty,

is a subjective idea always and necessarily developed in the mind of

every moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily takes along

with him, and he is always and necessarily a law to himself. 

Nevertheless, this law or idea, is not always the object of the mind's

attention and thought. A moral agent may exercise good will or love to

God and man, without at the time being conscious of thinking, that this

love is required of him by the moral law. Nay, if I am not mistaken, the

benevolent mind generally exercises benevolence so spontaneously,

as not, for much of the time, even to think that this love to God is

required of him. But this state of mind is not the less virtuous on this

account. If the infinite value of God's well-being and of His infinite

goodness constrains me to love Him with all my heart, can any one

suppose that this is regarded by him as the less virtuous, because I

did not wait to reflect, that God commanded me to love Him, and that it

was my duty to do so?



The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is the

good of being, and not the law that requires me to will it. When I will

that end, I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether the law

be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may will that

end for a wrong reason, and, therefore, thus willing it is not virtue; that

unless I will it because of my obligation, and intend obedience to moral

law, or to God, it is not virtue; I answer, that the objection involves an

absurdity and a contradiction. I cannot will the good of God and of

being, as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The reason of the

choice and the end chosen are identical, so that if I will the good of

being as an ultimate end, I will it for the right reason.



It is impossible to will God's good as an end, out of regard to His

authority. This is to make His authority the end chosen, for the reason

of a choice is identical with the end chosen. Therefore, to will anything

for the reason that God requires it, is to will God's requirement as an

ultimate end. I cannot, therefore, love God with any acceptable love,

primarily, because He commands it. God never expected to induce

His creatures to love Him, or to will His good, by commanding them to

do so.



23. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should

practically treat all interests that are of equal value according to their

value. For example, the precept, "Love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt.

19:19), cannot mean that I am to take equal care of my own soul, and

the soul of every other human being. This were impossible. Nor does

it mean that I should take the same care and oversight of my own, and

of all the families of the earth. Nor that I should divide what little of

property, or time, or talent I have, equally among all mankind. This

were:



(1.) Impossible.



(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the

universe by each individual's giving his attention particularly to the

promotion of those interests that are within his reach, and that are so

under his influence that he possesses particular advantages for

promoting them. Every interest is to be esteemed according to its

relative value; but our efforts to promote particular interests should

depend upon our relations and capacity to promote them. Some

interests of great value we may be under no obligation to promote, for

the reason that we have no ability to promote them, while we may be

under obligation to promote interests of vastly less value, for the

reason, that we are able to promote them. We are to aim at promoting

those interests that we can most surely and extensively promote, but

always in a manner that shall not interfere with others promoting other

interests, according to their relative value. Every man is bound to

promote his own, and the salvation of his family, not because they

belong to self, but because they are valuable in themselves, and

because they are particularly committed to him, as being directly within

his reach. This is a principle everywhere assumed in the government

of God, and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind, as we proceed in

our investigations, as it will, on the one hand, prevent

misapprehension, and, on the other, avoid the necessity of

circumlocution, when we wish to express the same idea; the true intent

and meaning of the moral law, no doubt, is, that every interest or good

known to a moral being shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic

value, and that, in our efforts to promote good, we are to aim at

securing the greatest practicable amount, and to bestow our efforts

where, as it appears from our circumstances and relations, we can

accomplish the greatest good. This ordinarily can be done, beyond all

question, only by each one attending to the promotion of those

particular interests which are most within the reach of his influence.



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LECTURE 12



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE



It has been shown that the sum and spirit of the whole law is properly

expressed in one word love. It has also been shown, that this love is

benevolence or good willing; that it consists in choosing the highest

good of God and of universal being, for its own intrinsic value, in a

spirit of entire consecration to this as the ultimate end of existence. 

Although the whole law is fulfilled in one word love, yet there are

many things implied in the state of mind expressed by this term. It is,

therefore, indispensable to a right understanding of this subject, that

we inquire into the characteristics or attributes of this love. We must

keep steadily in mind certain truths of mental philosophy. I will,

therefore:



Call attention to certain facts in mental philosophy as they are

revealed in consciousness.



1. Moral agents possess intellect, or the faculty of knowledge.



2. They also possess sensibility, and sensitivity, or in other words,

the faculty or susceptibility of feeling.



3. They also possess will, or the power of choosing or refusing in

every case of moral obligation.



These primary faculties are so correlated to each other, that the

intellect or the sensibility may control the will, or the will may, in a

certain sense, control them. That is, the mind is free to choose in

accordance with the demands of the intellect, which is the lawgiving

faculty, or with the desires and impulses of the sensibility, or to control

and direct them both. The will can directly control the attention of the

intellect, and consequently its perceptions, thoughts, etc. It can

indirectly control the states of the sensibility, or feeling faculty, by

controlling the perceptions and thoughts of the intellect. We also know

from consciousness, as was shown in a former lecture, that the

voluntary muscles of the body are directly controlled by the will, and

that the law which obliges the attention, the feelings, and the actions of

the body to obey the decisions of the will, is physical law, or the law of

necessity. The attention of the intellect and the outward actions are

controlled directly, and the feelings indirectly, by the decisions of the

will. The will can either command or obey. It can suffer itself to be

enslaved by the impulses of the sensibility, or it can assert its

sovereignty and control them. The will is not influenced by either the

intellect, or the sensibility, by the law of necessity or force; so that the

will can always resist either the demands of the intelligence, or the

impulses of the sensibility. But while they cannot lord it over the will,

through the agency of any law of force, the will has the aid of the law

of necessity or force by which to control them.



Again: We are conscious of affirming to ourselves our obligation to

obey the law of the intellect rather than the impulses of the sensibility;

that to act virtuously we must act rationally, or intelligently, and not

give ourselves up to the blind impulses of our feelings.



Now, inasmuch as the love required by the moral law consists in

choice, willing, intention, as before repeatedly shown; and inasmuch

as choice, willing, intending, controls the states of the intellect and the

outward actions directly, by a law of necessity, and by the same law

controls the feelings or states of the sensibility indirectly, it follows that

certain states of the intellect and of the sensibility, and also certain

outward actions, must be implied in the existence of the love which the

law of God requires. I say, implied in it, not as making a part of it, but

as necessarily resulting from it. The thoughts, opinions, judgments,

feelings, and outward actions must be molded and modified by the

state of the heart or will.



Here it is important to remark, that, in common language, the same

word is often used to express either an action or attitude of the will, or

a state of the sensibility, or both. This is true of all the terms that

represent what are called the Christian graces or virtues, or those

various modifications of virtue of which Christians are conscious, and

which appear in their life and temper. Of this truth we shall be

constantly reminded as we proceed in our investigations, for we shall

find illustrations of it at every step of our progress.



Before I proceed to point out the attributes of benevolence, it is

important to remark, that all the moral attributes of God and of all holy

beings, are only attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a term that

comprehensively expresses them all. God is love. This term

expresses comprehensively God's whole moral character. This love,

as we have repeatedly seen, is benevolence. Benevolence is good

willing, or the choice of the highest good of God and the universe, as

an end. But from this comprehensive statement, accurate though it

be, we are apt to receive very inadequate conceptions of what really

belongs to, as implied in, benevolence. To say that love is the fulfilling

of the whole law; that benevolence is the whole of true religion; that

the whole duty of man to God and his neighbor, is expressed in one

word, love these statements, though true, are so comprehensive as

to need with all minds much amplification and explanation. Many

things are implied in love or benevolence. By this is intended, that

benevolence needs to be viewed under various aspects and in various

relations, and its nature considered in the various relations in which it

is called to act. Benevolence is an ultimate intention, or the choice of

an ultimate end. But if we suppose that this is all that is implied in

benevolence, we shall egregiously err. Unless we inquire into the

nature of the end which benevolence chooses, and the means by

which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall understand but little of

the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has many attributes

or characteristics. These must all harmonize in the selection of its

end, and in its efforts to realize it. By this is intended that benevolence

is not a blind, but the most intelligent, choice. It is the choice of the

best possible end in obedience to the demand of the reason and of

God, and implies the choice of the best possible means to secure this

end. Both the end and the means are chosen in obedience to the law

of God, and of reason. An attribute is a permanent quality of a thing. 

The attributes of benevolence are those permanent qualities which

belong to its very nature. Benevolence is not blind, but intelligent,

choice. It is the choice of the highest well-being of moral agents. It

seeks this end by means suited to the nature of moral agents. Hence

wisdom, justice, mercy, truth, holiness, and many other attributes, as

we shall see, are essential elements, or attributes, of benevolence. To

understand what true benevolence is, we must inquire into its

attributes. Not everything that is called love has at all the nature of

benevolence. Nor has all that is called benevolence any title to that

appellation. There are various kinds of love. Natural affection is

called love. Our preference of certain kinds of diet is called love. 

Hence we say we love fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, etc. Benevolence is

also called love, and is the kind of love, beyond all question, required

by the law of God. But there is more than one state of mind that is

called benevolence. There is a constitutional or phrenological

benevolence, which is often mistaken for, and confounded with, the

benevolence which constitutes virtue. This so-called benevolence is in

truth only an imposing form of selfishness; nevertheless it is called

benevolence. Many of its manifestations are like those of true

benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken, in giving religious

instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevolence, let it

be remembered, is the obedience of the will to the law of reason and

of God. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and not to gratify

self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to the impulses

of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The will seeks to

gratify the desires and propensities, for the pleasure of the

gratification. Self-gratification is sought as an end, and as the

supreme end. It is preferred to the claims of God and the good of

being. Phrenological, or constitutional benevolence, is only obedience

to the impulse of the sensibility a yielding to a feeling of compassion. 

It is only an effort to gratify a desire. It is, therefore, as really

selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitutional desire whatever.



It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the

divine law, and what is implied in it, without considering attentively the

various attributes or aspects of benevolence, properly so called. Upon

this discussion we are about to enter. But before I commence the

enumeration and definition of these attributes, it is important further to

remark that the moral attributes of God, as revealed in His works,

providence, and word, throw much light upon the subject before us. 

Also the many precepts of the Bible, and the developments of

benevolence therein revealed, will assist us much, as we proceed in

our inquiries upon this important subject. As the Bible expressly

affirms that love comprehends the whole character of God that it is

the whole that the law requires of man that the end of the

commandment is charity or love we may be assured that every form

of true virtue is only a modification of love or benevolence; that is, that

every state of mind required by the Bible, and recognized as virtue, is,

in its last analysis, resolvable into love or benevolence. In other

words, every virtue is only benevolence viewed under certain aspects,

or in certain relations. In other words still, it is only one of the

elements, peculiarities, characteristics, or attributes of benevolence. 

This is true of God's moral attributes. They are, as has been said,

only attributes of benevolence. They are only the essential qualities

that belong to the very nature of benevolence, which are manifested

and brought into activity wherever benevolence is brought into certain

circumstances and relations. Benevolence is just, merciful, etc. Such

is its nature, that in appropriate circumstances these qualities, together

with many others, will manifest themselves in executive acts. This is

and must be true of every holy being. 



I will now proceed to point out the attributes of that love which

constitutes obedience to the law of God.



As I proceed I will call attention to the states of the intellect and of

the sensibility, and also to the course of outward conduct implied in the

existence of this love in any mind implied in its existence as

necessarily resulting from it by the law of cause and effect. These

attributes are:



1. Voluntariness. That is to say, it is a phenomenon of the will. 

There is a state of the sensibility often expressed by the term love. 

Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a

mere feeling or emotion. The term is often used to express the

emotion of fondness or attachment, as distinct from a voluntary state

of mind, or a choice of the will. This emotion or feeling, as we are all

aware, is purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a

phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind,

it has in itself no moral character. The law of God requires voluntary

love or goodwill, as has been repeatedly shown. This love consists in

choice, intention. It is choosing the highest well-being of God and the

universe of sentient beings as an end. Of course voluntariness must

be one of its characteristics. The word benevolence expresses this

idea.



If it consists in choice, if it be a phenomenon of the will, it must

control the thoughts and states of the sensibility, as well as the

outward action. This love, then, not only consists in a state of

consecration to God and the universe, but also implies deep emotions

of love to God and man. Though a phenomenon of the will, it implies

the existence of all those feelings of love and affection to God and

man, that necessarily result from the consecration of the heart or will

to their highest well-being. It also implies all that outward course of life

that necessarily flows from a state of will consecrated to this end. Let

it be borne in mind, that where these feelings do not arise in the

sensibility, and where this course of life is not, there the true love or

voluntary consecration to God and the universe required by the law, is

not. Those follow from this by a law of necessity. Those, that is,

feelings or emotions of love, and a correct outward life, may exist

without this voluntary love, as I shall have occasion to show in its

proper place; but this love cannot exist without those, as they follow

from it by a law of necessity. These emotions will vary in their

strength, as constitution and circumstances vary, but exist they must,

in some sensible degree, whenever the will is in a benevolent attitude.



2. Liberty is an attribute of this love. The mind is free and

spontaneous in its exercise. It makes this choice when it has the

power at every moment to choose self-gratification as an end. Of this

every moral agent is conscious. It is a free, and therefore a

responsible, choice.



3. Intelligence. That is, the mind makes choice of this end

intelligently. It not only knows what it chooses, and why it chooses,

but also that it chooses in accordance with the dictates of the intellect,

and the law of God; that the end is worthy of being chosen, and that

for this reason the intellect demands that it should be chosen, and

also, that for its own intrinsic value it is chosen.



Because voluntariness, liberty, and intelligence are natural attributes

of this love, therefore, the following are its moral attributes.



4. Virtue is an attribute of it. Virtue is a term that expresses the

moral character of benevolence; it is moral rightness. Moral rightness

is moral perfection, righteousness, or uprightness. The term marks or

designates its relation to moral law, and expresses its conformity to it.



In the exercise of this love or choice, the mind is conscious of

uprightness, or of being conformed to moral law or moral obligation. In

other words, it is conscious of being virtuous or holy, of being like God,

of loving what ought to be loved, and of consecration to the right end.



Because this choice is in accordance with the demands of the

intellect, therefore the mind, in its exercise, is conscious of the

approbation of that power of the intellect which we call conscience. 

The conscience must approve this love, choice, or intention.



Again: Because the conscience approves of this choice, therefore,

there is and must be in the sensibility a feeling of happiness or

satisfaction, a feeling of complacency or delight in the love that is in

the heart or will. This love, then, always produces self-approbation in

the conscience, and a felt satisfaction in the sensibility; and these

feelings are often very acute and joyous, insomuch that the soul, in the

exercise of this love of the heart, is sometimes led to rejoice with joy

unspeakable and full of glory. This state of mind does not always and

necessarily amount to joy. Much depends in this respect on the

clearness of the intellectual views, upon the state of the sensibility, and

upon the manifestation of Divine approbation to the soul. But where

peace, or approbation of conscience, and consequently a peaceful

state of the sensibility are not, this love is not. They are connected

with it by a law of necessity, and must of course appear on the field of

consciousness where this love exists. These, then, are implied in the

love that constitutes obedience to the law of God. Conscious peace of

mind, and conscious joy in God must be where true love to God exists.



5. Disinterestedness is another attribute of this love. By

disinterestedness, it is not intended that the mind takes no interest in

the object loved, for it does take a supreme interest in it. But this term

expresses the mind's choice of an end for its own sake, and not

merely upon condition that the good belongs to self. This love is

disinterested in the sense that the highest well-being of God and the

universe is chosen, not upon condition of its relation to self, but for its

own intrinsic and infinite value. It is this attribute particularly that

distinguishes this love from selfish love. Selfish love makes the

relation of good to self the condition of choosing it. The good of God

and of the universe, if chosen at all, is only chosen as a means or

condition of promoting the highest good of self. But this love does not

make good to self its end; but good to God and being in general, is its

end.



As disinterestedness is an attribute of this love, it does not seek its

own, but the good of others. "Charity (love) seeketh not her own" (1

Cor. 13:5). It grasps in its comprehensive embrace the good of being

in general, and of course, of necessity, secures a corresponding

outward life and inward feeling. The intellect will be employed in

devising ways and means for the promotion of its end. The sensibility

will be tremblingly alive to the good of all and of each; will rejoice in the

good of others as in its own, and will grieve at the misery of others as

in its own. It "will rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with

them that weep" (Romans 12:5). There will not, cannot be envy at the

prosperity of others, but unfeigned joy, joy as real and often as

exquisite as in its own prosperity. Benevolence enjoys everybody's

good things, while selfishness is too envious at the good things of

others even to enjoy its own. There is a Divine economy in

benevolence. Each benevolent soul not only enjoys his own good

things, but also enjoys the good things of all others so far as he knows

their happiness. He drinks at the river of God's pleasure. He not only

rejoices in doing good to others, but also in beholding their enjoyment

of good things. He joys in God's joy, and in the joy of angels and of

saints. He also rejoices in the good things of all sentient existences. 

He is happy in beholding the pleasure of the beasts of the field, the

fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea. He sympathizes with all joy

and all suffering known to him; nor is his sympathy with the sufferings

of others a feeling of unmingled pain. It is a real luxury to sympathize

in the woes of others. He would not be without this sympathy. It so

accords with his sense of propriety and fitness, that, mingled with the

painful emotion, there is a sweet feeling of self-approbation; so that a

benevolent sympathy with the woes of others is by no means

inconsistent with happiness, and with perfect happiness. God has this

sympathy. He often expresses and otherwise manifests it. There is,

indeed, a mysterious and an exquisite luxury in sharing the woes of

others. God and angels and all holy beings know what it is. Where

this result of love is not manifested, there love itself is not. Envy at the

prosperity, influence, or good of others, the absence of sensible joy in

view of the good enjoyed by others, and of sympathy with the

sufferings of others, prove conclusively that this love does not exist. 

There is an expansiveness, an ampleness of embrace, a universality,

and a divine disinterestedness in this love, that necessarily manifests

itself in the liberal devising of liberal things for Zion, and in the copious

outpourings of the floods of sympathetic feeling, both in joys and

sorrows, when suitable occasions present themselves before the

mind.



6. Impartiality is another attribute of this love: By this term is not

intended, that the mind is indifferent to the character of him who is

happy or miserable; that it would be as well pleased to see the wicked

as the righteous eternally and perfectly blessed. But it is intended

that, other things being equal, it is the intrinsic value of their well-being

which is alone regarded by the mind. Other things being equal, it

matters not to whom the good belongs. It is no respecter of persons. 

The good of being is its end, and it seeks to promote every interest

according to its relative value. Selfish love is partial. It seeks to

promote self-interest first, and secondarily those interests that sustain

such a relation to self as will at least indirectly promote the gratification

of self. Selfish love has its favorites, its prejudices, unreasonable and

ridiculous. Color, family, nation, and many other things of like nature,

modify it. But benevolence knows neither Jew nor Greek, neither

bond nor free, white nor black, Barbarian, Scythian, European,

Asiatic, African, nor American, but accounts all men as men, and, by

virtue of their common manhood, calls every man a brother, and seeks

the interests of all and of each. Impartiality, being an attribute of this

love, will of course manifest itself in the outward life, and in the temper

and spirit of its subject. This love can have no fellowship with those

absurd and ridiculous prejudices that are so often rife among nominal

Christians. Nor will it cherish them for a moment in the sensibility of

him who exercises it. Benevolence recognizes no privileged classes

on the one hand, nor proscribed classes on the other. It secures in the

sensibility an utter loathing of those discriminations, so odiously

manifested and boasted of, and which are founded exclusively in a

selfish state of the will. The fact that a man is a man, and not that he

is of our party, of our complexion, or of our town, state, or nation that

he is a creature of God, that he is capable of virtue and happiness,

these are the considerations that are seized upon by this divinely

impartial love. It is the intrinsic value of his interests, and not that they

are the interests of one connected with self, that the benevolent mind

regards.



But here it is important to repeat the remark, that the economy of

benevolence demands, that where two interests are, in themselves

considered, of equal value, in order to secure the greatest amount of

good, each one should bestow his efforts where they can be bestowed

to the greatest advantage. For example: every man sustains such

relations that he can accomplish more good by seeking to promote the

interest and happiness of certain persons rather than of others; his

family, his kindred, his companions, his immediate neighbors, and

those to whom, in the providence of God, he sustains such relations

as to give him access to them, and influence over them. It is not

unreasonable, it is not partial, but reasonable and impartial, to bestow

our efforts more directly upon them. Therefore, while benevolence

regards every interest according to its relative value, it reasonably puts

forth its efforts in the direction where there is a prospect of

accomplishing the most good. This, I say, is not partiality, but

impartiality; for, be it understood, it is not the particular persons to

whom good can be done, but the amount of good that can be

accomplished, that directs the efforts of benevolence. It is not

because my family is my own, nor because their well-being is, of

course, more valuable in itself than that of my neighbors' families, but

because my relations afford me higher facilities for doing them good, I

am under particular obligation to aim first at promoting their good. 

Hence the apostle says: "If any man provide not for his own, especially

for those of his own household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse

than an infidel" (1 Tim. 5:8). Strictly speaking, benevolence esteems

every known good according to its intrinsic and relative value; but

practically treats every interest according to the perceived probability

of securing on the whole the highest amount of good. This is a truth of

great practical importance. It is developed in the experience and

observation of every day and hour. It is manifest in the conduct of God

and of Christ, of apostles and martyrs. It is everywhere assumed in

the precepts of the Bible, and everywhere manifested in the history of

benevolent effort. Let it be understood, then, that impartiality, as an

attribute of benevolence, does not imply that its effort to do good will

not be modified by relations and circumstances. But, on the contrary,

this attribute implies, that the efforts to secure the great end of

benevolence, to wit, the greatest amount of good to God and the

universe, will be modified by those relations and circumstances that

afford the highest advantages for doing good.



The impartiality of benevolence causes it always to lay supreme

stress upon God's interests, because His well-being is of infinite value,

and of course benevolence must be supreme to Him. Benevolence,

being impartial love, of course accounts God's interests and

well-being, as of infinitely greater value than the aggregate of all other

interests. Benevolence regards our neighbor's interests as our own,

simply because they are in their intrinsic value as our own. 

Benevolence, therefore, is always supreme to God and equal to man.



7. Universality is another attribute of this love. Benevolence chooses

the highest good of being in general. It excludes none from its regard;

but on the contrary embosoms all in its ample embrace. But by this it

is not intended, that it practically seeks to promote the good of every

individual. It would if it could; but it seeks the highest practicable

amount of good. The interest of every individual is estimated

according to its intrinsic value, whatever the circumstances or

character of each may be. But character and relations may and must

modify the manifestations of benevolence, or its efforts in seeking to

promote this end. A wicked character, and governmental relations and

considerations, may forbid benevolence to seek the good of some. 

Nay, they may demand that positive misery shall be inflicted on some,

as a warning to others to beware of their destructive ways. By

universality, as an attribute of benevolence, is intended, that good will

is truly exercised towards all sentient beings, whatever their character

and relations may be; and that, when the higher good of the greater

number does not forbid it, the happiness of all and of each will be

pursued with a degree of stress equal to their relative value, and the

prospect of securing each interest. Enemies as well as friends,

strangers and foreigners as well as relations and immediate

neighbors, will be enfolded in its sweet embrace. It is the state of mind

required by Christ in the truly divine precept, "I say unto you. Love

your enemies, pray for them that hate you, and do good unto them

that despitefully use and persecute you" (Matt. 5:44). This attribute of

benevolence is gloriously conspicuous in the character of God. His

love to sinners alone accounts for their being today out of perdition. 

His aiming to secure the highest good of the greatest number, is

illustrated by the display of His glorious justice in the punishment of the

wicked. His universal care for all ranks and conditions of sentient

beings, manifested in His works and providence, beautifully and

gloriously illustrates the truth, that "His tender mercies are over all His

works" (Psalms 145:9).



It is easy to see that universality must be a modification or attribute

of true benevolence. It consists in good willing, that is, in choosing the

highest good of being as such, and for its own sake. Of course it

must, to be consistent with itself, seek the good of all and of each, so

far as the good of each is consistent with the greatest good upon the

whole. Benevolence not only wills and seeks the good of moral

beings, but also the good of every sentient existence, from the

minutest animalcule to the highest order of beings. It of course

produces a state of the sensibility tremblingly alive to all happiness

and to all pain. It is pained at the agony of an insect, and rejoices in

its joy. God does this, and all holy beings do this. Where this

sympathy with the joys and sorrows of universal being is not, there

benevolence is not. Observe, good is its end; where this is promoted

by the proper means, the feelings are gratified. Where evil is

witnessed, the benevolent spirit deeply and necessarily sympathizes.



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LECTURE 13



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE



8. Efficiency is another attribute or characteristic of benevolence. 

Benevolence consists in choice, intention. Now we know from

consciousness that choice or intention constitutes the mind's deepest

source or power of action. If I honestly intend a thing, I cannot but

make efforts to accomplish that which I intend, provided that I believe

the thing possible. If I choose an end, this choice must and will

energize to secure its end. When benevolence is the supreme choice,

preference, or intention of the soul, it is plainly impossible that it should

not produce efforts to secure its end. It must cease to exist, or

manifest itself in exertions to secure its end, as soon as, and

whenever the intelligence deems it wise to do so. If the will has

yielded to the intelligence in the choice of an end, it will certainly obey

the intelligence in pursuit of that end. Choice, intention, is the cause of

all the outward activity of moral agents. They have all chosen some

end, either their own gratification, or the highest good of being; and all

the busy bustle of this world's teeming population, is nothing else than

choice or intention seeking to compass its end.



Efficiency, therefore, is an attribute of benevolent intention. It must,

it will, it does energize in God, in angels, in saints on earth and in

heaven. It was this attribute of benevolence, that led God to give His

only begotten Son, and that led the Son to give Himself, "that

whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting

life" (John 3:16).



If love is efficient in producing outward action, and efficient in

producing inward feelings; it is efficient to wake up the intellect, and

set the world of thought in action to devise ways and means for

realizing its end. It wields all the infinite natural attributes of God. It is

the mainspring that moves all heaven. It is the mighty power that is

heaving the mass of mind, and rocking the world like a smothered

volcano. Look to the heavens above. It was benevolence that hung

them out. It is benevolence that sustains those mighty rolling orbs in

their courses. It was good will endeavoring to realize its end that at

first put forth creative power. The same power, for the same reason,

still energizes, and will continue to energize for the realization of its

end, so long as God is benevolent. And O! What a glorious thought,

that infinite benevolence is wielding, and will forever wield, infinite

natural attributes for the promotion of good! No mind but an infinite

one can begin to conceive of the amount of good that Jehovah will

secure. O blessed, glorious thought! But it is, it must be a reality, as

surely as God and the universe exist. It is no vain imagination; it is

one of the most certain, as well as the most glorious, truths in the

universe. Mountains of granite are but vapor in comparison with it. 

But the truly benevolent on earth and in heaven will sympathize with

God. The power that energizes in Him, energizes in them. One

principle animates and moves them all, and that principle is love, good

will to universal being. Well may our souls cry out, Amen, go on,

God-speed the work; let this mighty power heave and wield universal

mind, until all the ills of earth shall be put away, and until all that can

be made holy are clothed in the garments of everlasting gladness.



Since benevolence is necessarily, from its very nature, active and

efficient in putting forth efforts to secure its end, and since its end is

the highest good of being, it follows that all who are truly religious will,

and must, from the very nature of true religion, be active in

endeavoring to promote the good of being. While effort is possible to

a Christian, it is as natural to him as his breath. He has within him the

very mainspring of activity, a heart set on the promotion of the highest

good of universal being. While he has life and activity at all, it will, and

it must, be directed to this end. Let this never be forgotten. An idle,

an inactive, inefficient Christian is a misnomer. Religion is an

essentially active principle, and when and while it exists, it must

exercise and manifest itself. It is not merely good desire, but it is good

willing. Men may have desires, and hope and live on them, without

making efforts to realize their desires. They may desire without action. 

If their will is active, their life must be. If they really choose an ultimate

end, this choice must manifest itself. The sinner does and must

manifest his selfish choice, and so likewise must the saint manifest his

benevolence.



9. Complacency in holiness or moral excellence, is another attribute

of benevolence. This consists in benevolence contemplated in its

relations to holy beings. This term also expresses both a state of the

intelligence and of the sensibility. Moral agents are so constituted,

that they necessarily approve of moral worth or excellence; and when

even sinners behold right character, or moral goodness, they are

compelled to respect and approve it, by a law of their intelligence. 

This they not infrequently regard as evidence of goodness in

themselves. But this is doubtless just as common in hell as it is on

earth. The vilest sinners on earth or in hell, have, by the unalterable

constitution of their nature, the necessity imposed upon them, of

paying intellectual homage to moral excellence. When a moral agent

is intensely contemplating moral excellence, and his intellectual

approbation is emphatically pronounced, the natural, and often the

necessary result, is a corresponding feeling of complacency or delight

in the sensibility. But this being altogether an involuntary state of

mind, has no moral character. Complacency, as a phenomenon of

will, consists in willing the highest actual blessedness of the holy being

in particular, as a good in itself, and upon condition of his moral

excellence.



This attribute of benevolence is the cause of a complacent state of

the sensibility. It is true, that feelings of complacency may exist, when

complacency of will does not exist. But complacency of feeling surely

will exist, when complacency of will exists. Complacency of will

implies complacency of conscience, or the approbation of the

intelligence. When there is a complacency of intelligence and of will,

there must follow, of course, complacency of the sensibility.



It is highly worthy of observation here, that this complacency of

feeling is that which is generally termed love to God and to the saints,

in the common language of Christians, and often in the popular

language of the Bible. It is a vivid and pleasant state of the sensibility,

and very noticeable by consciousness, of course. Indeed, it is

perhaps the general usage now to call this phenomenon of the

sensibility, love; and, for want of just discrimination, to speak of it as

constituting religion. Many seem to suppose that this feeling of delight

in, and fondness for, God, is the love required by the moral law. They

are conscious of not being voluntary in it, as well they may be. They

judge of their religious state, not by the end for which they live, that is,

by their choice or intention, but by their emotions. If they find

themselves strongly exercised with emotions of love to God, they look

upon themselves as in a state well-pleasing to God. But if their

feelings or emotions of love are not active; they of course judge

themselves to have little or no religion. It is remarkable to what extent

religion is regarded as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and as

consisting in mere feelings. So common is it, indeed, that almost

uniformly, when professed Christians speak of their religion, they

speak of their feelings, or the state of their sensibility, instead of

speaking of their conscious consecration to God, and the good of

being.



It is also somewhat common for them to speak of their views of

Christ, and of truth, in a manner that shows, that they regard the states

of the intellect as constituting a part, at least, of their religion. It is of

great importance that just views should prevail among Christians upon

this momentous subject. Virtue, or religion, as has been repeatedly

said, must be a phenomenon of the will. The attribute of benevolence

which we are considering, that is, complacency of will in God, is the

most common light in which the scriptures present it, and also the

most common form in which it lies revealed on the field of

consciousness. The scriptures often assign the goodness of God as a

reason for loving Him, and Christians are conscious of having much

regard to His goodness in their love to Him; I mean in their good will to

Him. They will good to Him, and ascribe all praise and glory to Him,

upon the condition that He deserves it. Of this they are conscious. 

Now, as was shown in a former lecture, in their love or good will to

God, they do not regard His goodness as the fundamental reason for

willing good to Him. Although His goodness is that, which, at the time,

most strongly impresses their minds, yet it must be that the intrinsic

value of His well-being is assumed, and had in view by them, or they

would no sooner will good than evil to Him. In willing His good they

must assume its intrinsic value to Him, as the fundamental reason for

willing it; and His goodness as a secondary reason or condition; but

they are conscious of being much influenced in willing His good in

particular, by a regard to His goodness. Should you ask the Christian

why he loved God, or why he exercised good will to Him, he would

probably reply, it is because God is good. But, suppose he should be

further asked, why he willed good rather than evil to God; he would

say, because good is good or valuable to Him. Or, if he returned the

same answer as before, to wit, because God is good, he would give

this answer, only because he would think t impossible for any one not

to assume and to know, that good is willed instead of evil, because of

its intrinsic value. The fact is, the intrinsic value of well-being is

necessarily taken along with the mind, and always assumed by it, as a

first truth. When a virtuous being is perceived, this first truth being

spontaneously and necessarily assumed, the mind thinks only of the

secondary reason or condition, or the virtue of the being, in willing

good to him.



Before I dismiss this subject, I must advert again to the subject of

complacent love, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and also as a

phenomenon of the intellect. If I mistake not, there are sad mistakes,

and gross and ruinous delusions, entertained by many upon this

subject. The intellect, of necessity, perfectly approves of the character

of God where it is apprehended. The intellect is so correlated to the

sensibility, that, where it perceives in a strong light the divine

excellence, or the excellence of the divine law, the sensibility is

affected by the perception of the intellect, as a thing of course and of

necessity; so that emotions of complacency and delight in the law, and

in the divine character, may and often do glow and burn in the

sensibility, while the will or heart is unaffected. The will remains in a

selfish choice, while the intellect and the sensibility are strongly

impressed with the perception of the Divine excellence. This state of

the intellect and the sensibility is, no doubt, often mistaken for true

religion. We have undoubted illustrations of this in the Bible, and

similar cases of it in common life. "Yet they seek Me daily, and delight

to know My ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and forsook not

the ordinance of their God: "they ask of Me the ordinances of justice,

they take delight in approaching to God" (Isaiah 58:2). "And, Lo, Thou

art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice,

and can play well on an instrument: for they hear Thy words, but they

do them not" (Ezek. 33:32).



Nothing is of greater importance, than forever to understand, that

religion is always and necessarily a phenomenon of the will; that it

always and necessarily produces outward action and inward feeling;

that, on account of the correlation of the intellect and sensibility,

almost any and every variety of feeling may exist in the mind, as

produced by the perceptions of the intellect, whatever the state of the

will may be; that unless we are conscious of goodwill, or of

consecration to God and the good of being-unless we are conscious of

living for this end, it avails us nothing, whatever our views and feelings

may be.



And also it behooves us to consider that, although these views and

feelings may exist while the heart is wrong, they will certainly exist

when the heart is right; that there may be feeling, and deep feeling,

when the heart is in a selfish attitude, yet, that there will and must be

deep emotion and strenuous action, when the heart is right. Let it be

remembered, that complacency, as a phenomenon of the will, is

always a striking characteristic of true love to God; that the mind is

affected and consciously influenced, in willing the actual and infinite

blessedness of God, by a regard to His goodness. The goodness of

God is not, as has been repeatedly shown, the fundamental reason for

the goodwill, but it is one reason or a condition, both of the possibility

of willing, and of the obligation to will His blessedness in particular. It

assigns to itself, and to others, His goodness as the reason for willing

His good, rather than the intrinsic value of good; because this last is so

universally, and so necessarily assumed, that it thinks not of

mentioning it, taking it always for granted, that this will and must be

understood.



10. Opposition to sin is another attribute or characteristic of true love

to God.



This attribute certainly is implied in the very essence and nature of

benevolence. Benevolence is good willing, or willing the highest good

of being as an end. Now there is nothing in the universe more

destructive of this good than sin. Benevolence cannot do otherwise

than be forever opposed to sin, as that abominable thing which it

necessarily hates. It is absurd and a contradiction to affirm, that

benevolence is not opposed to sin. God is love or benevolence. He

must, therefore, be the unalterable opponent of sin of all sin, in every

form and degree.



But there is a state, both of the intellect and of the sensibility, that is

often mistaken for the opposition of the will to sin. Opposition to all sin

is, and must be, a phenomenon of the will, and on that ground alone it

becomes virtue. But it often exists also as a phenomenon of the

intellect, and likewise of the sensibility. The intellect cannot

contemplate sin without disapprobation. This disapprobation is often

mistaken for opposition of heart, or of will. When the intellect strongly

disapproves of, and denounces sin, there is naturally and necessarily

a corresponding feeling of opposition to it in the sensibility, an emotion

of loathing, of hatred, of abhorrence. This is often mistaken for

opposition of the will, or heart. This is manifest from the fact, that

often the most notorious sinners manifest strong indignation in view of

oppression, injustice, falsehood, and many other forms of sin. This

phenomenon of the sensibility and of the intellect, as I said, is often

mistaken for a virtuous opposition to sin, which-it cannot be unless it

involve an act of the will.



But let it be remembered, that virtuous opposition to sin is a

characteristic of love to God and man or of benevolence. This

opposition to sin cannot possibly coexist with any degree of sin in the

heart. That is, this opposition cannot coexist with a sinful choice. The

will cannot at the same time, be opposed to sin and commit sin. This

is impossible, and the supposition involves a contradiction. Opposition

to sin as a phenomenon of the intellect, or of the sensibility, may exist;

in other words, the intellect may strongly disapprove of sin, and the

sensibility may feel strongly opposed to certain forms of it, while at the

same time, the will may cleave to self indulgence in other forms. This

fact, no doubt, accounts for the common mistake, that we can, at the

same time, exercise a virtuous opposition to sin, and still continue to

commit it.



Many are, no doubt, laboring under this fatal delusion. They are

conscious, not only of an intellectual disapprobation of sin in certain

forms, but also, at times, of strong feelings of opposition to it. And yet

they are also conscious of continuing to commit it. They, therefore

conclude, that they have a principle of holiness in them, and also a

principle of sin, that they are partly holy and partly sinful at the same

time. Their opposition of intellect and of feeling, they suppose to be a

holy opposition, when, no doubt, it is just as common in hell, and even

more so than it is on earth, for the reason that sin is more naked there

than it generally is here.



But now the inquiry may arise, how is it that both the intellect and the

sensibility are opposed to it, and yet that it is persevered in? What

reason can the mind have for a sinful choice, when urged to it neither

by the intellect nor the sensibility? The philosophy of this

phenomenon needs explanation. Let us attend to it.



I am a moral agent. My intellect necessarily disapproves of sin. My

sensibility is so correlated to my intellect, that it sympathizes with it, or

is affected by its perceptions and its judgments. I contemplate sin. I

necessarily disapprove of it, and condemn it. This affects my

sensibility. I loathe and abhor it. I nevertheless commit it. Now how is

this to be accounted for? The usual method is by ascribing it to a

depravity in the will itself, a lapsed or corrupted state of the faculty, so

that it perversely chooses sin for its own sake. Although disapproved

by the intellect, and loathed by the sensibility, yet such, it is said, is the

inherent depravity of the will, that it pertinaciously cleaves to sin

notwithstanding, and will continue to do so, until that faculty is renewed

by the Holy Spirit, and a holy bias or inclination is impressed upon the

will itself



But here is a gross mistake. In order to see the truth upon this

subject, it is of indispensable importance to inquire what sin is. It is

admitted on all hands, that selfishness is sin. Comparatively few seem

to understand that selfishness is the whole of sin, and that every form

of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every form of virtue

may be resolved into benevolence. It is not my purpose now to show

that selfishness is the whole of sin. It is sufficient for the present to

take the admission, that selfishness is sin. But what is selfishness? It

is the choice of self-gratification as an end. It is the preference of our

own gratification to the highest good of universal being. 

Self-gratification is the supreme end of selfishness. This choice is

sinful. That is, the moral of this selfish choice is sin. Now, in no case,

is or can sin be chosen for its own sake, or as an end. Whenever

anything is chosen to gratify self, it is not chosen because the choice is

sinful, but notwithstanding it is sinful. It is not the sinfulness of the

choice upon which the choice fixes, as an end, or for its own sake, but

it is the gratification to be afforded by the thing chosen. For example,

theft is sinful. But the will, in an act of theft, does not aim at and

terminate on the sinfulness of theft, but upon the gain or gratification

expected from the stolen object. Drunkenness is sinful, but the

inebriate does not intend or choose the sinfulness for its own sake, or

as an end. He does not choose strong drink because the choice is

sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. We choose the gratification, but not

the sin, as an end. To choose the gratification as an end is sinful, but

it is not the sin that is the object of choice. Our mother Eve ate the

forbidden fruit. This eating was sinful. But the thing that she chose or

intended, was not the sinfulness of eating, but the gratification

expected from the fruit. It is not, it cannot in any case be true, that sin

is chosen as an end, or for its own sake. Sin is only the quality of

selfishness. Selfishness is the choice, not of sin as an end, or for its

own sake, but of self-gratification; and this choice of self-gratification

as an end is sinful. That is, the moral quality of the choice is sin. To

say that sin is, or can be, chosen for its own sake, is untrue and

absurd. It is the same as saying that a choice can terminate on an

element, quality, or attribute, of itself; that the thing chosen is really an

element of the choice itself.



But it is said, that sinners are sometimes conscious of choosing sin

for its own sake, or because it is sin; that they possess such a

malicious state of mind, that they love sin for its own sake; that they

"roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue"; that "they eat up the

sins of God's people as they eat bread"; (Psalms 14:4), that is, that

they love their own sins and the sins of others, as they do their

necessary food, and choose it for that reason, or just as they do their

food; that they not only sin themselves with greediness, but also have

pleasure in them that do the same. Now all this may be true, yet it

does not at all disprove the position which I have taken, namely, that

sin never is, and never can be chosen as an end, or for its own sake. 

Sin may be sought and loved as a means, but never as an end. The

choice of food will illustrate this. Food is never chosen as an ultimate

end; it never can be so chosen. It is always as a means. It is the

gratification, or the utility of it, in some point of view, that constitutes

the reason for choosing it. Gratification is always the end for which a

selfish man eats. It may not be merely the present pleasure of eating

which he alone or principally seeks. But, nevertheless, if a selfish

man, he has his own gratification in view as an end. It may be that it is

not so much a present, as a remote gratification he has in view. Thus

he may choose food to give him health and strength to pursue some

distant gratification, the acquisition of wealth, or something else that

will gratify him.



It may happen that a sinner may get into a state of rebellion against

God and the universe, of so frightful a character, that he shall take

pleasure in willing, and in doing, and saying, things that are sinful, just

because they are sinful and displeasing to God and to holy beings. 

But, even in this case, sin is not chosen as an end, but as a means of

gratifying this malicious feeling. It is, after all, self-gratification that is

chosen as an end, and not sin. Sin is the means, and self-gratification

is the end.



Now we are prepared to understand how it is that both the intellect

and sensibility can often be opposed to sin, and yet the will cleave to

the indulgence. An inebriate is contemplating the moral character of

drunkenness. He instantly and necessarily condemns the

abomination. His sensibility sympathizes with the intellect. He loathes

the sinfulness of drinking strong drink, and himself on account of it. 

He is ashamed, and were it possible, he would spit in his own face. 

Now, in this state, it would surely be absurd to suppose that he could

choose sin, the sin of drinking, as an end, or for its own sake. This

would be choosing it for an impossible reason, and not for no reason. 

But still he may choose to continue his drink, not because it is sinful,

but notwithstanding it is so. For while the intellect condemns the sin of

drinking strong drink, and the sensibility loathes the sinfulness of the

indulgence, nevertheless there still exists so strong an appetite, not for

the sin, but for the liquor, that the will seeks the gratification,

notwithstanding the sinfulness of it. So it is, and so it must be, in every

case where sin is committed in the face of the remonstrances of the

intellect and the loathing of the sensibility. The sensibility loathes the

sinfulness, but more strongly desires the thing the choice of which is

sinful. The will in a selfish being yields to the strongest impulse of the

sensibility, and the end chosen is, in no case, the sinfulness of the act,

but the self-gratification. Those who suppose this opposition of the

intellect, or of the sensibility, to be a holy principle, are fatally deluded. 

It is this kind of opposition to sin, that often manifests itself among

wicked men, and that leads them to take credit for goodness or virtue,

not an atom of which do they possess. They will not believe

themselves to be morally and totally depraved, while they are

conscious of so much hostility to sin within them. But they should

understand, that this opposition is not of the will, or they cold not go on

in sin; that it is purely an involuntary state of mind, and has no moral

character whatever. Let it be ever remembered, then, that a virtuous

opposition to sin is always and necessarily an attribute of

benevolence, a phenomenon of the will; and that it is naturally

impossible, that this opposition of will should coexist with the

commission of sin.



As this opposition to sin is plainly implied in, and is an essential

attribute of, benevolence, or true love to God, it follows, that obedience

to the law of God cannot be partial, in the sense that we both love God

and sin at the same time.



11. Compassion for the miserable is also an attribute of

benevolence, or of pure love to God and man. This is benevolence

viewed in its relations to misery and to guilt.



There is a compassion also which is a phenomenon of the

sensibility. It may, and does often, exist in the form of an emotion. 

But this emotion being involuntary, has no moral character in itself. 

The compassion which is a virtue, and which is required of us as a

duty, is a phenomenon of the will, and is of course an attribute of

benevolence. Benevolence, as has been often said, is good willing, or

willing the highest happiness and well-being of God and the universe

for its own sake, or as an end. It is impossible, therefore, from its own

nature, that compassion for the miserable should not be one of its

attributes. Compassion of will to misery is the choice or wish that it

might not exist. Benevolence wills that happiness should exist for its

own sake. It must, therefore, wish that misery might not exist. This

attribute or peculiarity of benevolence consists in wishing the

happiness of the miserable. Benevolence, simply considered, is

willing the good or happiness of being in general. Compassion of will

is a willing particularly that the miserable should be happy.



Compassion of sensibility is simply a feeling of pity in view of misery. 

As has been said, it is not a virtue. It is only a desire, but not willing;

consequently, does not benefit its object. It is the state of mind of

which James speaks: "If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of

daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye

warmed and filled; notwithstanding ye give them not those things

which are needful to the body, what doth it profit?" (James 2:15, 16). 

This kind of compassion may evidently coexist with selfishness. But

compassion of heart or will cannot; for it consists in willing the

happiness of the miserable for its own sake, and of course impartially. 

It will, and from its very nature must, deny self to promote its end,

whenever it wisely can, that is, when it is seen to be demanded by the

highest general good. Circumstances may exist that render it unwise

to express this compassion by actually extending relief to the

miserable. Such circumstances forbid that God should extend relief to

the lost in hell. But for their character and governmental relations,

God's compassion would no doubt make immediate efforts for their

relief.



Many circumstances may exist in which, although compassion would

hasten to the relief of its object, yet, on the whole, the misery that

exists is regarded as the less of two evils, and therefore, the wisdom

of benevolence forbids it to put forth exertions to save its object.



But it is of the last importance to distinguish carefully between

compassion, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or as a mere feeling,

and compassion considered as a phenomenon of the will. This, be it

remembered, is the only form of virtuous compassion. Many, who,

from the laws of their mental constitution, feel quickly and deeply,

often take credit to themselves for being compassionate, while they

seldom do much for the downtrodden and the miserable. Their

compassion is a mere feeling. It says, "Be ye warmed and filled," but

does not that for them which is needful. It is this particular attribute of

benevolence that was so conspicuous in the life of Howard,

Wilberforce, and many other Christian philanthropists.



It should be said, before I leave the consideration of this attribute,

that the will is often influenced by the feeling of compassion. In this

case, the mind is no less selfish in seeking to promote the relief and

happiness of its object than it is in any other form of selfishness. In

such cases, self-gratification is the end sought, and the relief of the

suffering is only a means. Pity is stirred, and the sensibility is deeply

pained and excited by the contemplation of misery. The will is

influenced by this feeling, and makes efforts to relieve the painful

emotion on the one hand, and to gratify the desire to see the sufferer

happy on the other. This is only an imposing form of selfishness. We,

no doubt, often witness displays of this kind of self-gratification. The

happiness of the miserable is not in this case sought as an end, or for

its own sake, but as a means of gratifying our own feelings. This is not

obedience of will to the law of the intellect, but obedience to the

impulse of the sensibility. It is not a natural and intelligent

compassion, but just such compassion as we often see mere animals

exercise. They will risk, and even lay down, their lives, to give relief to

one of their number, or to a man who is in misery. In them this has no

moral character having no reason, it is not sin for them to obey their

sensibility; nay, this is a law of their being. This they cannot but do. 

For them, then, to seek their own gratification as an end is not sin. But

man has reason; he is bound to obey it. He should will and seek the

relief and the happiness of the miserable, for its own sake, or for its

intrinsic value. When he seeks it for no higher reason than to gratify

his feelings, he denies his humanity He seeks it, not out of regard to

the sufferer, but in self-defense, or to relieve his own pain, and to

gratify his own desires. This in him is sin.



Many, therefore, who take to themselves much credit for

benevolence, are, after all, only in the exercise of this imposing form of

selfishness. They take credit for holiness, when their holiness is only

sin. What is especially worthy of notice here, is, that this class of

persons appear to themselves and others, to be all the more virtuous

by how much more manifestly and exclusively they are led on by the

impulse of feeling. They are conscious of feeling deeply, of being

more sincere and earnest in obeying their feelings. Every body who

knows them can also see, that they feel deeply, and are influenced by

the strength of their feelings, rather than by their intellect. Now, so

gross is the darkness of most persons upon this subject, that they

award praise to themselves and to others, just in proportion as they

are sure that they are actuated by the depth of their feelings, rather

than by their sober judgment.



But I must not leave this subject without observing, that when

compassion exists as a phenomenon of the will, it will certainly also

exist as a feeling of the sensibility. A man of a compassionate heart

will also be a man of compassionate sensibility. He will feel and he will

act. Nevertheless, his actions will not be the effect of his feelings, but

will be the result of his sober judgment. Three classes of persons

suppose themselves, and are generally supposed by others, to be

truly compassionate. The one class exhibit much feeling of

compassion; but their compassion does not influence their will, hence

they do not act for the relief of suffering. These content themselves

with mere desires and tears. They say, Be ye warmed and clothed,

but give not the needed relief. Another class feel deeply, and give up

to their feelings. Of course they are active and energetic in the relief

of suffering. But being governed by feeling, instead of being

influenced by their intellect, they are not virtuous, but selfish. Their

compassion is only an imposing form of selfishness. A third class feel

deeply, but are not governed by blind impulses of feeling. They take a

rational view of the subject, act wisely and energetically. They obey

their reason. Their feelings do not lead them, neither do they seek to

gratify their feelings. But these last are truly virtuous, and altogether

the most happy of the three. Their feelings are all the more gratified

by how much less they aim at the gratification. They obey their

intellect, and, therefore have the double satisfaction of the applause of

conscience, while their feelings are also fully gratified by seeing their

compassionate desire accomplished.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 14



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE



12. Mercy is also an attribute of benevolence. This term expresses a

state of feeling, and represents a phenomenon of the sensibility. 

Mercy is often understood to be synonymous with compassion, but

then it is not rightly understood.



Mercy, considered as a phenomenon of the will, is a disposition to

pardon crime. Such is the nature of benevolence, that it will seek the

good even of those who deserve evil, when this can be wisely done. It

is "ready to forgive" (Psalms 86:5), to seek the good of the evil and

unthankful, and to pardon when there is repentance. It is good will

viewed in relation to one who deserves punishment. Mercy,

considered as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a desire

for the pardon or good of one who deserves punishment. It is only a

feeling, a desire; of course it is involuntary, and has, in itself, no moral

character.



Mercy will, of course, manifest itself in action, and in effort to pardon,

or to procure a pardon, unless the attribute of wisdom prevent. It may

be unwise to pardon, or to seek the pardon of a guilty one. In such

cases, as all the attributes of benevolence must necessarily

harmonize, no effort will be made to realize its end. It was this

attribute of benevolence, modified and limited in its exercise by

wisdom and justice, that energized in providing the means, and in

opening the way, for the pardon of our guilty race.



As wisdom and justice are also attributes of benevolence, mercy can

never manifest itself by efforts to secure its end, except in a manner

and upon conditions that do not set aside justice and wisdom. No one

attribute of benevolence is or can be exercised at the expense of

another, or in opposition to it. The moral attributes of God, as has

been said, are only attributes of benevolence, for benevolence

comprehends and expresses the whole of them. From the term

benevolence we learn, that the end upon which it fixes is good. And

we must infer, too, from the term itself, that the means are

unobjectionable; because it is absurd to suppose that good would be

chosen because it is good, and yet that the mind that makes this

choice should not hesitate to use objectionable and injurious means to

obtain its end. This would be a contradiction, to will good for its own

sake, or out of regard to its intrinsic value, and then choose injurious

means to accomplish this end. This cannot be. The mind that can fix

upon the highest well-being of God and the universe as an end, can

never consent to use efforts for the accomplishment of this end that

are seen to be inconsistent with it, that is, that tend to prevent the

highest good of being.



Mercy, I have said, is the readiness of benevolence to pardon the

guilty. But this attribute cannot go out in exercise, but upon conditions

that consist with the other attributes of benevolence. Mercy as a mere

feeling would pardon without repentance or condition; would pardon

without reference to public justice. But viewed in connection with the

other attributes of benevolence, we learn that, although a real attribute

of benevolence, yet it is not and cannot be exercised, without the

fulfillment of those conditions that will secure the consent of all the

other attributes of benevolence. This truth is beautifully taught and

illustrated in the doctrine and fact of atonement, as we shall see. 

Indeed, without consideration of the various attributes of benevolence,

we are necessarily all in the dark, and in confusion, in respect to the

character and government of God, the spirit and meaning of His law,

the spirit and meaning of the gospel, our own spiritual state, and the

developments of character around us. Without an acquaintance with

the attributes of love or benevolence, we shall not fail to be

perplexed to find apparent discrepancies in the Bible and in the

divine administration and in the manifestation of Christian character,

both as revealed in the Bible, and as exhibited in common life. For

example: how universalists have stumbled for want of consideration

upon this subject! God is love! Well, without considering the attributes

of this love, they infer that if God is love, He cannot hate sin and

sinners. If He is merciful, He cannot punish sinners in hell, etc. 

Unitarians have stumbled in the same way. God is merciful; that is,

disposed to pardon sin. Well, then, what need of an atonement? If

merciful He can and will pardon upon repentance without atonement. 

But we may inquire, if He is merciful, why not pardon without

repentance? If His mercy alone is to be taken into view, that is, simply

a disposition to pardon, that by itself would not wait for repentance. 

But if repentance is, and must be, a condition of the exercise of mercy,

may there not be, nay, must there not be, other conditions of its

exercise? If wisdom and public justice are also attributes of

benevolence, and conditionates the exercise of mercy, and forbid that

it should be exercised but upon condition of repentance, why may they

not, nay, why must they not, equally conditionates its exercise upon

such a satisfaction of public justice, as would secure as full and as

deep a respect for the law, as the execution of its penalty would do? 

In other words, if wisdom and justice be attributes of benevolence, and

conditionates the exercise of mercy upon repentance, why may and

must they not also conditionate its exercise upon the fact of an

atonement? As mercy is an attribute of benevolence, it will naturally

and inevitably direct the attention of the intellect to devising ways and

means to render the exercise of mercy consistent with the other

attributes of benevolence. It will employ the intelligence in devising

means to secure the repentance of the sinner, and to remove all the

obstacles out of the way of its free and full exercise. It will also secure

the state of feeling which is called mercy, or compassion. Hence it is

certain, that mercy will secure efforts to procure the repentance and

pardon of sinners. It will secure a deep yearning in the sensibility over

them, and energetic action to accomplish its end, that is, to secure

their repentance and pardon. This attribute of benevolence led the

Father to give His only-begotten and well-beloved Son, and it led the

Son to give Himself to die, to secure the repentance and pardon of

sinners. It is this attribute of benevolence that leads the Holy Spirit to

make such mighty and protracted efforts to secure the repentance of

sinners. It is also this attribute that energized in prophets, and

apostles, and martyrs, and saints of every age, to secure the

conversion of the lost in sin. It is an amiable attribute. All its

sympathies are sweet, and tender, and kind as heaven.



13. Justice is an attribute of benevolence.



This term also expresses a state or phenomenon of the sensibility. 

As an attribute of benevolence, it is the opposite of mercy, when

viewed in its relations to crime. It consists in a disposition to treat

every moral agent according to his intrinsic desert or merit. In its

relations to crime, the criminal, and the public, it consists in a tendency

to punish according to law. Mercy would pardon justice would punish

for the public good.



Justice, as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a feeling

that the guilty deserves punishment, and a desire that he may be

punished. This is an involuntary feeling, and has no moral character. 

It is often strongly excited, and is frequently the cause of mobs and

popular commotions. When it takes the control of the will, as it often

does with sinners, it leads to what is popularly called lynching, and a

resort to those summary methods of executing vengeance which are

so appalling.



I have said that the mere desire has no moral character. But when

the will is governed by this desire, and yields itself up to seek its

gratification, this state of will is selfishness under one of its most

odious and frightful forms. Under the providence of God, however,

this form of selfishness, like every other in its turn, is overruled for

good, like earthquakes, tornadoes, pestilence, and war, to purify the

moral elements of society, and scourge away those moral nuisances

with which communities are sometimes infested. Even war itself is

often but an instance and an illustration of this.



Justice, as an attribute of benevolence, is virtue, and exhibits itself in

the execution of the penalties of the law, and in support of public

order, and in various other ways for the well-being of mankind. There

are several modifications of this attribute. That is, it may and must be

viewed under various aspects, and in various relations. One of these

is public justice. This is a regard to the public interests, and secures a

due administration of law for the public good. It will in no case suffer

the execution of the penalty to be set aside, unless something be done

to support the authority of the law and of the lawgiver. It also secures

the due administration of rewards, and looks narrowly after the public

interests, always insisting that the greater interest shall prevail over

the lesser; that private interest shall never set aside or prejudice a

public one of greater value. Public justice is modified in its exercise by

the attribute of mercy. It conditionates the exercise of mercy, and

mercy conditionates its exercise. Mercy cannot, consistently with this

attribute, extend a pardon but upon conditions of repentance, and an

equivalent being rendered to the government. So, on the other hand,

justice is conditionated by mercy, and cannot, consistently with that

attribute, proceed to take vengeance when the highest good does not

require it, when punishment can be dispensed with without public loss. 

Thus these attributes mutually limit each other's exercise, and render

the whole character of benevolence perfect, symmetrical, and

heavenly.



Justice is reckoned among the sterner attributes of benevolence; but

it is indispensable to the filling up of the entire circle of moral

perfections. Although solemn and awful, and sometimes inexpressibly

terrific in its exercise, it is nevertheless one of the glorious

modifications and manifestations of benevolence. Benevolence

without justice would be anything but morally lovely and perfect. Nay,

it could not be benevolence. This attribute of benevolence appears

conspicuous in the character of God as revealed in His law, in His

gospel, and sometimes as indicated most impressively by His

providence.

It is also conspicuous in the history of inspired men. The Psalms

abound with expressions of this attribute. We find many prayers for

the punishment of the wicked. Samuel hewed Agag in pieces; and

David's writings abound in expressions that show, that this attribute

was strongly developed in his mind; and the circumstances under

which he was placed, often rendered it proper to express and manifest

in various ways the spirit of this attribute. Many have stumbled at such

prayers, expressions, and manifestations as are here alluded to. But

this is for want of due consideration. They have supposed that such

exhibitions were inconsistent with a right spirit. Oh, they say, how

unevangelical! How un-Christ-like! How inconsistent with the sweet

and heavenly spirit of Christ and of the gospel! But this is all a

mistake. These prayers were dictated by the Spirit of Christ. Such

exhibitions are only the manifestations of one of the essential

attributes of benevolence. Those sinners deserved to die. It was for

the greatest good that they should be made a public example. This

the Spirit of inspiration knew, and such prayers, under such

circumstances, are only an expression of the mind and will of God. 

They are truly the spirit of justice pronouncing sentence upon them. 

These prayers and such-like things found in the Bible, are no

vindication of the spirit of fanaticism and denunciation that so often

have taken shelter under them. As well might fanatics burn cities and

lay waste countries, and seek to justify themselves by an appeal to the

destruction of the old world by flood, and the destruction of the cities of

the plain by fire and brimstone.



Retributive justice is another modification of this attribute. This

consists in a disposition to visit the offender with that punishment

which he deserves, because it is fit and proper that a moral agent

should be dealt with according to his deeds. In a future lecture I shall

enlarge upon this modification of justice.



Another modification of this attribute is commercial justice. This

consists in willing exact equivalents, and uprightness in business and

all secular transactions. There are some other modifications of this

attribute, but the foregoing may suffice to illustrate sufficiently the

various departments over which this attribute presides.



This attribute, though stern in its spirit and manifestations, is

nevertheless one of prime importance in all governments by moral

agents, whether human or divine. Indeed, without it government could

not exist. It is vain for certain philosophers to think to disparage this

attribute, and to dispense with it altogether in the administration of

government. They will, if they try the experiment, find to their cost and

confusion, that no one attribute of benevolence can say to another, "I

have no need of thee" (1 Cor. 12:21). In short, let any one attribute of

benevolence be destroyed or overlooked, and you have destroyed its

perfection, its beauty, its harmony, its propriety, its glory. You have, in

fact, destroyed benevolence; it is no longer benevolence, but a sickly,

and inefficient, and limping sentimentalism, that has no God, no virtue,

no beauty, nor form, nor comeliness in it, that when we see it we

should desire it.



This attribute stands by, nay, it executes law. It aims to secure

commercial honesty. It aims to secure public and private integrity and

tranquillity. It says to violence, disorder, and injustice, Peace, be still,

and there must be a great calm. We see the evidence and the

illustrations of this attribute in the thunderings of Sinai, and in the

agony of Calvary. We hear it in the wail of a world when the fountains

of the great deep were broken up, and when the windows of heaven

were opened, and the floods descended, and the population of a globe

was swallowed up. We see its manifestations in the descending

torrent that swept over the cities of the plain; and lastly, we shall

forever see its bright, but awful and glorious displays, in the dark and

curling folds of that pillar of smoke of the torment of the damned, that

ascends up before God forever and ever.



Many seem to be afraid to contemplate justice as an attribute of

benevolence. Any manifestation of it among men, causes them to

recoil and shudder as if they saw a demon. But let it have its place in

the glorious circle of moral attributes; it must have it will have it

cannot be otherwise. Whenever any policy of government is adopted,

in family or state, that excludes the exercise of this attribute, all must

be failure, defeat, and ruin.



Again: Justice being an attribute of benevolence, will prevent the

punishment of the finally impenitent from diminishing the happiness of

God and of holy beings. They will never delight in misery for its own

sake; but they will take pleasure in the administration of justice. So

that when the smoke of the torment of the damned comes up in the

sight of heaven, they will, as they are represented, shout "Alleluia! The

Lord God Omnipotent reigneth" (Rev. 19:6): "Just and righteous are

Thy ways, Thou King of saints!" (Rev. 15:3).



Before I pass from the consideration of this topic, I must not omit to

insist, that where true benevolence is, there must be exact commercial

justice, or business honesty and integrity. This is as certain as that

benevolence exists. The rendering of exact equivalents, or the

intention to do so, must be a characteristic of a truly benevolent mind. 

Impulsive benevolence may exist; that is, phrenological or

constitutional benevolence, falsely so called, may exist to any extent,

and yet justice not exist. The mind may be much and very often

carried away by the impulse of feeling, so that a man may at times

have the appearance of true benevolence, while the same individual is

selfish in business, and overreaching in all his commercial relations. 

This has been a wonder and an enigma to many, but the case is a

plain one. The difficulty is, the man is not just, that is, not truly

benevolent. His benevolence is only an imposing species of

selfishness. "He that hath an ear to hear, let him hear" (Rev. 2:7). His

benevolence results from feeling, and is not true benevolence.



Again: Where benevolence is, the golden rule will surely be

observed: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye

even so to them" (Matt. 7:12). The justice of benevolence cannot fail

to secure conformity to this rule. Benevolence is a just state of the will. 

It is a willing justly. It must then, by a law of necessity, secure just

conduct. If the heart is just, the life must be.



This attribute of benevolence must secure its possessor against

every species and degree of injustice; he cannot be unjust to his

neighbor's reputation, his person, his property, his soul, his body, nor

indeed be unjust in any respect to man or God. It will and must secure

confession and restitution, in every case of remembered wrong, so far

as this is practicable. It should be distinctly understood, that a

benevolent or a truly religious man cannot be unjust. He may indeed

appear to be so to others; but he cannot be truly religious or

benevolent, and unjust at the same time. If he appears to be so in any

instance, he is not and cannot be really so, if he is at the time in a

benevolent state of mind. The attributes of selfishness, as we shall

see in the proper place, are the direct opposite of those of

benevolence. The two states of mind are as contrary as heaven and

hell, and can no more coexist in the same mind, than a thing can be

and not be at the same time. I said, that if a man, truly in the exercise

of benevolence, appears to be unjust in any thing, he is only so in

appearance, and not in fact. Observe, I am speaking of one who is

really at the time in a benevolent state of mind. He may mistake, and

do that which would be unjust, did he see it differently and intend

differently. Justice and injustice belong to the intention. No outward

act can in itself be either just or unjust. To say that a man, in the

exercise of a truly benevolent intention, can at the same time be

unjust, is the same absurdity as to say, that he can intend justly and

unjustly at the same time, and in regard to the same thing; which is a

contradiction. It must all along be borne in mind, that benevolence is

one identical thing, to wit, goodwill, willing for its own sake the highest

good of being and every known good according to its relative value. 

Consequently, it is impossible that justice should not be an attribute of

such a choice. Justice consists in regarding and treating, or rather in

willing, every thing just agreeably to its nature, or intrinsic and relative

value and relations. To say, therefore, that present benevolence

admits of any degree of present injustice, is to affirm a palpable

contradiction. A just man is a sanctified man, is a perfect man, in the

sense that he is at present in an upright state.



14. Veracity is another attribute of benevolence.



Veracity, as an attribute of benevolence, is that quality that adheres

to truth. In the very act of becoming benevolent, the mind embraces

truth, or the reality of things. Then veracity must be one of the

qualities of benevolence. Veracity is truthfulness. It is the conformity

of the will to the reality of things. Truth in statement is conformity of

statement to the reality of things. Truth in action is action conformed

to the nature and relations of things. Truthfulness is a disposition to

conform to the reality of things. It is willingness in accordance with the

reality of things. It is willing the right end by the right means. It is

willing the intrinsically valuable as an end, and the relatively valuable

as a means. In short, It is the willing of everything according to the

reality or facts in the case.



Veracity, then, must be an attribute of benevolence. It is, like all the

attributes, only benevolence viewed in a certain aspect or relation. It

cannot be distinguished from benevolence, for it is not distinct from it,

but only a phase or form of benevolence. The universe is so

constituted that if every thing proceeded and were conducted, and

willed according to its nature and relations, the highest possible good

must result. Veracity seeks the good as an end, and truth as a means

to secure this end. It wills the good, and that it shall be secured only

by means of truth. It wills truth in the end, and truth in the means. The

end is truly valuable, and chosen for that reason. The means are

truth, and truth is the only appropriate or possible means.



Truthfulness of heart begets, of course, a state of the sensibility

which we call the love of truth. It is a feeling of pleasure that

spontaneously arises in the sensibility of one whose heart is truthful, in

contemplating truth; this feeling is not virtue, it is rather a part of the

reward of truthfulness of heart.



Veracity, as a phenomenon of the will, is also often called, and

properly called, a love of the truth. It is a willing in accordance with

objective truth. This is virtue, and is an attribute of benevolence. 

Veracity, as an attribute of the divine benevolence, is the condition of

confidence in God as a moral governor. Both the physical and moral

laws of the universe evince, and are instances and illustrations of the

truthfulness of God. Falsehood, in the sense of lying, is naturally

regarded by a moral agent with disapprobation, disgust, and

abhorrence. Veracity is as necessarily regarded by him with

approbation, and, if the will be benevolent, with pleasure. We

necessarily take pleasure in contemplating objective truth, as it lies in

idea on the field of consciousness. We also take pleasure in the

perception and contemplation of truthfulness, in the concrete

realization of the idea of truth. Veracity is morally beautiful. We are

pleased with it just as we are with natural beauty, by a law of

necessity, when the necessary conditions are fulfilled. This attribute of

benevolence secures it against every attempt to promote the ultimate

good of being by means of falsehood. True benevolence will no more,

can no more, resort to falsehood as a means of promoting good, than

it can contradict or deny itself. The intelligence affirms, that the

highest ultimate good can be secured only by a strict adherence to

truth. The mind cannot be satisfied with anything else. Indeed, to

suppose the contrary is to suppose a contradiction. It is the same

absurdity as to suppose, that the highest good could be secured only

by the violation and setting aside of the nature and relations of things. 

Since the intellect affirms this unalterable relation of truth to the

highest ultimate good, benevolence, or that attribute of benevolence

which we denominate veracity or love of the truth, can no more

consent to falsehood, than it can consent to relinquish the highest

good of being as an end. Therefore, every resort to falsehood every

pious fraud, falsely so called, presents only a specious but real

instance of selfishness. A moral agent cannot lie for God; that is, he

cannot tell a sinful falsehood, thinking and intending thereby to please

God. He knows, by intuition, that God cannot be pleased or truly

served by a resort to lying. There is a great difference between

concealing or withholding the truth for benevolent purposes, and telling

a willful falsehood. An innocent, persecuted and pursued man, has

taken shelter under my roof from one who pursued him to shed his

blood. His pursuer comes and inquires after him. I am not under

obligation to declare to him the fact that he is in my house. I may, and

indeed ought to withhold the truth in this instance, for the wretch has

no right to know it. The public and highest good demands that he

should not know it. He only desires to know it for selfish and bloody

purposes. But in this case I should not feel or judge myself at liberty to

state a known falsehood. I could not think that this would ultimately

conduce to the highest good. The person might go away deceived, or

under the impression that his victim was not there. But he could not

accuse me of telling him a lie. He might have drawn his own inference

from my refusing to give the desired information. But even to secure

my own life or the life of my friend, I am not at liberty to tell a lie. If it

be said that lying implies telling a falsehood for selfish purposes, and

that, therefore, it is not lying to tell a falsehood for benevolent

purposes, I reply, that our nature is such that we can no more state a

willful falsehood with a benevolent intention, than we can commit a sin

with a benevolent intention. We necessarily regard falsehood as

inconsistent with the highest good of being, just as we regard sin as

inconsistent with the highest good of being, or just as we regard

holiness and truthfulness as the indispensable condition of the highest

good of being. The correlation of the will and the intellect forbids the

mistake that willful falsehood is, or can be, the means or condition of

the highest good. Universal veracity, then, will always characterize a

truly benevolent man. While he is truly benevolent, he is, he must be,

faithful, truthful. So far as his knowledge goes, his statements may be

depended upon with as much safety as the statements of an angel. 

Veracity is necessarily an attribute of benevolence in all beings. No

liar has, or can have, a particle of true virtue or benevolence in him.

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LECTURE 15



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE



15. Patience is another attribute of benevolence.



This term is frequently used to express a phenomenon of the

sensibility. When thus used, it designates a calm and unruffled state

of the sensibility or feelings, under circumstances that tend to excite

anger or impatience of feeling. The calmness of the sensibility, or

patience as a phenomenon of the sensibility, is purely an involuntary

state of mind, and although it is a pleasing and amiable manifestation,

yet it is not properly virtue. It may be, and often is, an effect of

patience as a phenomenon of the will, and therefore an effect of virtue. 

But it is not itself virtue. This amiable temper may, and often does,

proceed from constitutional temperament, and from circumstances and

habits.



Patience as a virtue must be a voluntary state of mind. It must be an

attribute of love or benevolence; for all virtue, as we have seen, and as

the Bible teaches, is resolvable into love or benevolence. The Greek

term, upomone, so often rendered patience in the New Testament,

means perseverance under trials, continuance, bearing up under

affliction, or privations, steadfastness of purpose in despite of

obstacles. The word may be used in a good or in a bad sense. Thus

a selfish man may patiently, that is perseveringly, pursue his end, and

may bear up under much opposition to his course. This is patience as

an attribute of selfishness, and patience in a bad sense of the term. 

Patience in the good sense, or in the sense in which I am considering

it, is an attribute of benevolence. It is the quality of constancy, a

fixedness, a bearing up under trials, afflictions, crosses, persecutions,

or discouragements. This must be an attribute of benevolence. 

Whenever patience ceases, when it holds out no longer, when

discouragement prevails, and the will relinquishes its end,

benevolence ceases, as a matter of course.



Patience as a phenomenon of the will, tends to patience as a

phenomenon of the sensibility. That is, the quality of fixedness and

steadfastness in the intention naturally tends to keep down and allay

impatience of temper. As, however, the states of the sensibility are

not directly under the control of the will, there may be irritable or

impatient feelings, when the heart remains steadfast. Facts or

falsehoods may be suggested to the mind which may, in despite of the

will, produce a ruffling of the sensibility, even when the heart remains

patient. The only way in which a temptation, for it is only a temptation

while the will abides firm to its purpose, I say the only way in which a

temptation of this kind can be disposed of, is by diverting the attention

from that view of the subject that creates the disturbance in the

sensibility. I should have said before, that although the will controls

the feelings by a law of necessity, yet, as it does not do so directly, but

indirectly, it may, and does often happen, that feelings corresponding

to the state of the will do not exist in the sensibility. Nay, for a time, a

state of the sensibility may exist which is the opposite of the state of

the will. From this source arise many, and indeed most, of our

temptations. We could never be properly tried or tempted at all, if the

feelings must always, by a law of necessity, correspond with the state

of the will. Sin consists in willing to gratify our feelings or constitutional

impulses, in opposition to the law of our reason. But if these desires

and impulses could never exist in opposition to the law of the reason,

and, consequently, in opposition to a present holy choice, then a holy

being could not be tempted. He could have no motive or occasion to

sin. If our mother Eve could have had no feelings of desire in

opposition to the state of her will, she never could have desired the

forbidden fruit, and of course would not have sinned. I wish now, to

state distinctly what I should have said before, that the state or choice

of the will does not necessarily so control the feelings, desires, or

emotions, that these may never be strongly excited by Satan or by

circumstances, in opposition to the will, and thus become powerful

temptations to seek their gratification, instead of seeking the highest

good of being. Feelings, the gratification of which would be opposed

to every attribute of benevolence, may at times coexist with

benevolence, and be a temptation to selfishness; but opposing acts of

will cannot coexist with benevolence. All that can be truly said is, that

as the will has an indirect control of the feelings, desires, appetites,

passions, etc., it can suppress any class of feelings when they arise,

by diverting the attention from their causes, or by taking into

consideration such views and facts as will calm or change the state of

the sensibility. Irritable feelings, or what is commonly called

impatience, may be directly caused by ill health, irritable nerves, and

by many things over which the will has no direct control. But this is not

impatience in the sense of sin. If these feelings are not suffered to

influence the will; if the will abides in patience; if such feelings are not

cherished, and are not suffered to shake the integrity of the will; they

are not sin. That is, the will does not consent to them, but the

contrary. They are only temptations. If they are allowed to control the

will, to break forth in words and actions, then there is sin; but the sin

does not consist in the feelings, but in the consent of the will to gratify

them. Thus the apostle says, "Be ye angry, and sin not: let not the sun

go down upon your wrath" (Eph. 4:26). That is, if anger arise in the

feelings and sensibility, do not sin by suffering it to control your will. 

Do not cherish the feeling, and let not the sun go down upon it. For

this cherishing it is sin. When it is cherished, the will consents and

broods over the cause of it; this is sin. But if it be not cherished, it is

not sin.



That the outward actions will correspond with the states and actions

of the will, provided no physical obstacle be opposed to them, is a

universal truth. But that feelings and desires cannot exist contrary to

the states or decisions of the will, is not true. If this were a universal

truth, temptation, as I have said, could not exist. The outward actions

will be as the will is, always; the feelings, generally. Feelings

corresponding to the choice of the will, will be the rule, and opposing

feelings the exception. But these exceptions may and do exist in

perfectly holy beings. They existed in Eve before she consented to

sin, and had she resisted them she had not sinned. They doubtless

existed in Christ, or He could not have been tempted in all points like

as we are. If there be no desires or impulses of the sensibility contrary

to the state of the will, there is not properly any temptation. The desire

or impulse must appear on the field of consciousness, before it is a

motive to action, and of course before it is a temptation to

self-indulgence. Just as certainly then as a holy being may be

tempted, and not sin, just so certain it is that emotions of any kind, or

of any strength, may exist in the sensibility without sin. If they are not

indulged, if the will does not consent to them, and to their indulgence

or gratification, the soul is not the less virtuous for their presence. 

Patience as a phenomenon of the will must strengthen and gird itself

under such circumstances, so that patience of will may be, and if it

exist at all, must be, in exact proportion to the impatience of the

sensibility. The more impatience of sensibility there is, the more

patience of will there must be, or virtue will cease altogether. So that it

is not always true, that virtue is strongest when the sensibility is most

calm, placid, and patient. When Christ passed through His greatest

conflicts, His virtue as a man was undoubtedly most intense. When in

His agony in the garden, so great was the anguish of His sensibility,

that He sweat as it were great drops of blood. This, He says, was the

hour of the prince of darkness. This was His great trial. But did He

sin? No, indeed. But why? Was He calm and placid as a summer's

evening? As far from it as possible.



Patience, then, as an attribute of benevolence, consists, not in placid

feeling, but in perseverance under trials and states of the sensibility

that tend to selfishness. This is only benevolence viewed in a certain

aspect. It is benevolence under circumstances of discouragement, of

trial, or temptation. "This is the patience of the saints" (Rev. 13:10).



Before dismissing the subject of patience as an emotion, I would

observe that, the steadfastness of the heart tends so strongly to

secure patience, that if an opposite state of the sensibility is more than

of momentary duration, there is strong presumption that the heart is

not steadfast in love. The first risings of it will produce an immediate

effort to suppress it. If it continues, this is evidence that the attention

is allowed to dwell upon the cause of it. This shows that the will is in

some sense indulging it.



If it so far influences the will as to manifest itself in impatient words

and actions, there must be a yielding of the will. Patience, as an

attribute of benevolence, is overcome. If the sensibility were perfectly

and directly under the control of the will, the least degree of impatience

would imply sin. But as it is not directly, but indirectly under the control

of the will, momentary impatience of feeling, when it does not at all

influence the will, and when it is not at all indulged, is not sure

evidence of a sinful state of the will. It should always be borne in

mind, that neither patience nor impatience, in the form of mere feeling,

existing for any length of time, and in any degree, is in itself either holy

on the one hand, or sinful on the other. All that can be said of these

states of the sensibility is, that they indicate, as a general thing, the

attitude of the will. When the will is for a long time steadfast in its

patience, the result is great equanimity of temper, and great patience

of feeling. This comes to be a law of the sensibility, insomuch that

very advanced saints may, and doubtless do, experience the most

entire patience of feeling for many years together. This does not

constitute their holiness, but is a sweet fruit of it. It is to be regarded

rather in the light of a reward of holiness, than as holiness itself.



16. Another attribute of benevolence is Meekness.



Meekness, considered as a virtue, is a phenomenon of the will. This

term also expresses a state of the sensibility. When used to designate

a phenomenon of the sensibility, it is nearly synonymous with

patience. It designates a sweet and forbearing temper under

provocation. Meekness, a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute

of benevolence, is the opposite both of resistance to injury and

retaliation. It is properly and strictly forbearance under injurious

treatment. This certainly is an attribute of God, as our existence and

our being out of hell plainly demonstrate. Christ said of Himself that

He was "meek and lowly in heart" (Matt. 11:29), and this surely was no

vain boast. How admirably, and how incessantly did this attribute of

His love manifest itself! The fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is a prophecy

exhibiting this attribute in a most affecting light. Indeed, scarcely any

feature of the character of God and of Christ is more strikingly

exhibited than this. It must evidently be an attribute of benevolence. 

Benevolence is good will to all beings. We are naturally forbearing

toward those whose good we honestly and diligently seek. If our

hearts are set upon doing them good, we shall naturally exercise great

forbearance toward them. God has greatly commended His

forbearance to us, in that, while we were yet His enemies, He forbore

to punish us, and gave His Son to die for us. Forbearance is a sweet

and amiable attribute. How affectingly it displayed itself in the hall of

Pilate, and on the cross. "He is led as a lamb to the slaughter, and as

a sheep before its shearers is dumb, so He opened not His mouth"

(Isaiah 53:7).



This attribute has in this world abundant opportunity to develop and

display itself in the saints. There are daily occasions for the exercise

of this form of virtue. Indeed, all the attributes of benevolence are

called into frequent exercise in this school of discipline. This is indeed

a suitable world in which to train God's children, to develop and

strengthen every modification of holiness. This attribute must always

appear where benevolence exists, and wherever there is an occasion

for its exercise.



It is delightful to contemplate the perfection and glory of that love

which constitutes obedience to the law of God. As occasions arise, we

behold it developing one attribute after another, and there may be

many of its attributes and modifications of which we have as yet no

idea whatever. Circumstances will call them into exercise. It is

probable, if not certain, that the attributes of benevolence were very

imperfectly known in heaven previous to the existence of sin in the

universe, and that but for sin many of these attributes would never

have been manifested in exercise. But the existence of sin, great as

the evil is, has afforded an opportunity for benevolence to manifest its

beautiful phases, and to develop its sweet attributes in a most

enchanting manner Thus the divine economy of benevolence brings

good out of so great an evil.



A hasty and unforbearing spirit is always demonstrative evidence of

a want of benevolence, or of true religion. Meekness is, and must be,

a peculiar characteristic of the saints in this world, where there is so

much provocation. Christ frequently and strongly enforced the

obligation to forbearance. "But I say unto you that ye resist not evil;

but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the

other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy

coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to

go a mile, go with him twain" (Matt. 5:41). How beautiful!



17. Humility is another modification or attribute of love.



This term seems often to be used to express a sense of

unworthiness, of guilt, of ignorance, and of nothingness, to express a

feeling of ill-desert. It seems to be used in common language to

express sometimes a state of the intelligence, when it seems to

indicate a clear perception of our guilt. When used to designate a

state of the sensibility, it represents those feelings of shame and

unworthiness, of ignorance, and of nothingness, of which those are

most deeply conscious who have been enlightened by the Holy Spirit,

in respect to their true character.



But as a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute of love, it

consists in a willingness to be known and appreciated according to our

real character. Humility, as a phenomenon either of the sensibility or

of the intelligence, may coexist with great pride of heart. Pride is a

disposition to exalt self, to get above others, to hide our defects, and to

pass for more than we are. Deep conviction of sin, and deep feelings

of shame, of ignorance, and of desert of hell, may coexist with a great

unwillingness to confess and be known just as we are, and to be

appreciated just according to what our real character has been and is. 

There is no virtue in such humility. But humility, considered as a

virtue, consists in the consent of the will to be known, to confess, and

to take our proper place in the scale of being. It is that peculiarity of

love that wills the good of being so disinterestedly, as to will to pass for

no other than we really are. This is an honest, a sweet, and amiable

feature of love. It must, perhaps, be peculiar to those who have

sinned. It is only love acting under or in a certain relation, or in

reference to a peculiar set of circumstances. It would, under the same

circumstances, develop and manifest itself in all truly benevolent

minds. This attribute will render confession of sin to God and man

natural, and even make it a luxury. It is easy to see that, but for this

attribute, the saints could not be happy in heaven. God has promised

to bring into judgment every work and every secret thing, whether it be

good, or whether it be evil. Now while pride exists, it would greatly

pain the soul to have all the character known; so that, unless this

attribute really belongs to the saints, they would be ashamed at the

judgment, and filled with confusion even in heaven itself. But this

sweet attribute will secure them against that shame and confusion of

face that would otherwise render heaven itself a hell to them. They

will be perfectly willing and happy to be known and estimated

according to their characters. This attribute will secure in all the saints

on earth that confession of faults one to another, which is so often

enjoined in the Bible. By this it is not intended, that Christians always

think it wise and necessary to make confession of all their secret sins

to man. But it is intended, that they will confess to those whom they

have injured, and to all to whom benevolence demands that they

should confess. This attribute secures its possessor against spiritual

pride, against ambition to get above others. It is a modest and

unassuming state of mind.



18. Self-denial is another attribute of love.



If we love any being better than ourselves, we of course deny

ourselves when our own interests come in competition with his. Love

is goodwill. If I will good to others more than to myself, it is absurd to

say that I shall not deny myself when my own inclinations conflict with

their good. Now the love required by the law of God, we have

repeatedly seen to be good will, or willing the highest good of being for

its own sake, or as an end. As the interests of self are not at all

regarded because they belong to self, but only according to their

relative value, it must be certain, that self-denial for the sake of

promoting the higher interests of God and of the universe, is and must

be a peculiarity or attribute of love.



But again: the very idea of disinterested benevolence, and there is

no other true benevolence, implies the abandonment of the spirit of

self-seeking, or of selfishness. It is impossible to become benevolent,

without ceasing to be selfish. In other words, perfect self-denial is

implied in beginning to be benevolent. Self-indulgence ceases where

benevolence begins. This must be. Benevolence is the consecration

of our powers to the highest good of being in general as an end. This

is utterly inconsistent with consecration to self-interest or

self-gratification. Selfishness makes good to self the end of every

choice. Benevolence makes good to being in general the end of every

choice. Benevolence, then, implies complete self-denial. That is, it

implies that nothing is chosen merely because it belongs to self, but

only because of its relative value, and in proportion to it.



I said there was no true benevolence, but disinterested benevolence;

no true love, but disinterested love. There is such a thing as

interested love or benevolence. That is, the good of others is willed,

though not as an end, or for its intrinsic value to them, but as a means

of our own happiness, or because of its relative value to us. Thus a

man might will the good of his family, or of his neighborhood, or

country, or of anybody, or anything that sustained such relations to self

as to involve his own interests. When the ultimate reason of his willing

good to others is, that his own may be promoted, this is selfishness. It

is making good to self his end. This a sinner may do toward God,

toward the church, and toward the interests of religion in general. This

is what I call interested benevolence. It is willing good as an end only

to self, and to all others only as a means of promoting our own good.



But again: when the will is governed by mere feeling in willing the

good of others, this is only the spirit of self-indulgence, and is only

interested benevolence. For example: the feeling of compassion is

strongly excited by the presence of misery. The feeling is intense, and

constitutes, like all the feelings, a strong impulse or motive to the will to

consent to its gratification. For the time being, this impulse is stronger

than the feeling of avarice, or any other feeling. I yield to it, and then

give all the money I have to relieve the sufferer. I even take my

clothes from my back, and give them to him. Now in this case, I am

just as selfish as if I had sold my clothes to gratify my appetite for

strong drink. The gratification of my feelings was my end. This is one

of the most specious and most delusive forms of selfishness.



Again: when one makes his own salvation the end of prayer, of

almsgiving, and of all his religious duties, this is only selfishness and

not true religion, however much he may abound in them. This is only

interested benevolence, or benevolence to self.



Again: from the very nature of true benevolence, it is impossible that

every interest should not be regarded according to its relative value.

When another interest is seen by me to be more valuable in itself, or of

more value to God and the universe than my own, and when I see

that, by denying myself, I can promote it, it is certain, if I am

benevolent, that I shall do it. I cannot fail to do it, without failing to be

benevolent. Benevolence is an honest and disinterested consecration

of the whole being to the highest good of God and of the universe. 

The benevolent man will, therefore, and must, honestly weigh each

interest as it is perceived in the balance of his own best judgment, and

will always give the preference to the higher interest, provided he

believes, that he can by endeavor, and by self-denial, secure it.



That self-denial is an attribute of the divine love, is manifested most

gloriously and affectingly in God's gift of his Son to die for men. This

attribute was also most conspicuously manifested by Christ, in denying

himself, and taking up his cross, and suffering for his enemies. 

Observe, it was not for friends that Christ gave himself. It was not

unfortunate nor innocent sufferers for whom God gave his Son, or for

whom he gave himself. It was for enemies. It was not that he might

make slaves of them that he gave his Son, nor from any selfish

consideration whatever, but because he foresaw that, by making this

sacrifice himself, he could secure to the universe a greater good than

he should sacrifice. It was this attribute of benevolence that caused

him to give his Son to suffer so much. It was disinterested

benevolence alone that led him to deny himself, for the sake of a

greater good to the universe. Now observe, this sacrifice would not

have been made, unless it had been regarded by God as the less of

two natural evils. That is, the sufferings of Christ, great and

overwhelming as they were, were considered as an evil of less

magnitude than the eternal sufferings of sinners. This induced him to

make the sacrifice, although for his enemies. It mattered not whether

for friends or for enemies, if so be he could, by making a less sacrifice,

secure a greater good to them.



Let it be understood, that a self-indulgent spirit is never, and can

never be, consistent with benevolence. No form of self-indulgence,

properly so called, can exist where true benevolence exists. The fact

is, self-denial must be, and universally is, wherever benevolence

reigns. Christ has expressly made whole-hearted self-denial a

condition of discipleship; which is the same thing as to affirm, that it is

an essential attribute of holiness or love; that there cannot be the

beginning of true virtue without it.



Again: much that passes for self-denial is only a specious form of

self-indulgence. The penances and self-mortifications, as they are

falsely called, of the superstitious, what are they after all but a

self-indulgent spirit? A popish priest abstains from marriage to obtain

the honor, and emoluments, and the influence of the priestly office

here, and eternal glory hereafter. A nun takes the veil and a monk

immures himself in a monastery; a hermit forsakes human society, and

shuts himself up in a cave; a devotee makes a pilgrimage to Mecca,

and a martyr goes to the stake. Now if these things are done with an

ultimate reference to their own glory and happiness, although

apparently instances of great self-denial, yet they are, in fact, only a

spirit of self-indulgence and self-seeking. They are only following the

strongest desire of good to self.



There are many mistakes upon this subject. For example: it is

common for persons to deny self in one form, for the sake of gratifying

self in another form. In one man avarice is the ruling passion. He will

labor hard, rise early, and sit up late, eat the bread of carefulness and

deny himself even the necessaries of life, for the sake of accumulating

wealth. Every one can see, that this is denying self in one form merely

for the sake of gratifying self in another form. Yet this man will

complain bitterly of the self-indulgent spirit manifested by others, their

extravagance and want of piety. One man will deny all his bodily

appetites and passions, for the sake of a reputation with men. This is

also an instance of the same kind. Another will give the fruit of his

body for the sin of his soul will sacrifice everything else to obtain an

eternal inheritance, and be just as selfish as the man who sacrifices to

the things of time, his soul and all the riches of eternity.



But it should be remarked, that this attribute of benevolence does

and must secure the subjugation of all the propensities. It must, either

suddenly or gradually, so far subdue and quiet them, that their

imperious clamor must cease. They will, as it were, be slain, either

suddenly or gradually, so that the sensibility will become, in a great

measure, dead to those objects that so often and so easily excited it. 

It is a law of the sensibility of all the desires and passions, that their

indulgence develops and strengthens them, and their denial

suppresses them. Benevolence consists in a refusal to gratify the

sensibility, and in obeying the reason. Therefore it must be true, that

this denial of the propensities will greatly suppress them; while the

indulgence of the intellect and of the conscience will greatly develop

them. Thus selfishness tends to stultify, while benevolence tends

greatly to strengthen the intellect.



19. Condescension is another attribute of love.



This attribute consists in a tendency to descend to the poor, the

ignorant, or the vile, for the purpose of securing their good. It is a

tendency to seek the good of those whom Providence has placed in

any respect below us, by stooping, descending, coming down to them

for this purpose. It is a peculiar form of self-denial. God the Father,

the Son, and the Holy Spirit, manifest infinite condescension in efforts

to secure the well-being of sinners, even the most vile and degraded. 

This attribute is called by Christ lowliness of heart. God is said to

humble Himself, that is, to condescend, when He beholds the things

that are done in heaven. This is true, for every creature is, and must

forever be, infinitely below Him in every respect. But how much

greater must that condescension be, that comes down to earth, and

even to the lowest and most degraded of earth's inhabitants, for

purposes of benevolence! This is a lovely modification of benevolence. 

It seems to be entirely above the gross conceptions of infidelity. 

Condescension seems to be regarded by most people, and especially

by infidels, as rather a weakness than a virtue. Skeptics clothe their

imaginary God with attributes in many respects the opposite of true

virtue. They think it entirely beneath the dignity of God to come down

even to notice, and much more to interfere with, the concerns of men. 

But hear the word of the Lord: "Thus saith the High and Lofty One,

who inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and

holy place; with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to

revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite

one" (Isaiah 57:15). And again, "Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is

My throne and the earth is My footstool, where is the house that ye

build unto Me? and where is the place of My rest? For all those

things hath My hand made, and all those things have been, saith the

Lord. But to this man will I look, even to him that is poor and of a

contrite spirit, and that trembleth at My word" (Isaiah 66:1-2). Thus the

Bible represents God as clothed with condescension as with a cloak.



This is manifestly an attribute both of benevolence and of true

greatness. The natural perfections of God appear all the more

wonderful, when we consider, that He can and does know and

contemplate and control, not only the highest, but the lowest of all His

creatures; that He is just as able to attend to every want and every

creature, as if this were the sole object of attention with Him. So His

moral attributes appear all the more lovely and engaging when we

consider that His "tender mercies are over all His works" (Psalms

145:9), "that not a sparrow falleth to the ground without Him" (Matt.

10:29), that He condescends to number the very hairs of the heads of

His servants, and that not one of them can fall without Him. When we

consider that no creature is too low, too filthy, or too degraded for Him

to condescend to, this places His character in a most ravishing light. 

Benevolence is good will to all beings. Of course one of its

characteristics must be condescension to those who are below us. 

This in God is manifestly infinite. He is infinitely above all creatures. 

For Him to hold communion with them is infinite condescension.



This is an attribute essentially belonging to benevolence or love in all

benevolent beings. With the lowest of moral beings it may have no

other development, than in its relations to sentient existences below

the rank of moral agents, for the reason, that there are no moral

agents below them to whom they can stoop. God's condescension

stoops to all ranks of sentient existences. This is also true with every

benevolent mind, as to all inferiors. It seeks the good of being in

general, and never thinks any being too low to have his interests

attended to and cared for, according to their relative value. 

Benevolence cannot possibly retain its own essential nature, and yet

be above any degree of condescension that can effect the greatest

good. Benevolence does not, cannot know anything of that loftiness of

spirit that considers it too degrading to stoop anywhere, or to any

being whose interests need to be, and can be, promoted by such

condescension. Benevolence has its end, and it cannot but seek this,

and it does not, cannot think anything below it that is demanded to

secure that end. O the shame, the infinite folly and madness of pride,

and every form of selfishness! How infinitely unlike God it is! Christ

could condescend to be born in a manger; to be brought up in humble

life; to be poorer than the fox of the desert, or the fowls of heaven; to

associate with fishermen; to mingle with and seek the good of all

classes; to be despised in life, and die between two thieves on the

cross. His benevolence "endured the cross and despised the shame"

(Heb. 12:2). He was "meek and lowly in heart" (Matt. 11:29). The

Lord of heaven and earth is as much more lowly in heart than any of

His creatures, as he is above them in His infinity. He can stoop to

anything but to commit sin. He can stoop infinitely low.



20. Stability is another attribute of benevolence.



This love is not a mere feeling or emotion, that effervesces for a

moment, and then cools down and disappears. But it is choice, not a

mere volition which accomplishes its object, and then rests. It is the

choice of an end, a supreme end. It is an intelligent choice the most

intelligent choice that can be made. It is considerate choice none so

much so; a deliberate choice, a reasonable choice, which will always

commend itself to the highest perceptions and intuitions of the

intellect. It is intelligent and impartial, and universal consecration to an

end, above all others the most important and captivating in its

influence. Now, stability must be a characteristic of such a choice as

this. By stability, it is not intended that the choice may not be

changed. Nor that it never is changed; but that when the attributes of

the choice are considered, it appears as if stability, as opposed to

instability, must be an attribute of this choice. It is a new birth, a new

nature, a new creature, a new heart, a new life. These and such like

are the representations of scripture. Are these representations of an

evanescent state? The beginning of benevolence in the soul this

choice is represented as the death of sin, as a burial, being planted, a

crucifixion of the old man, and many such like things. Are these

representations of what we so often see among professed Christians? 

Nay, verily. The nature of the change itself would seem to be a

guarantee of its stability. We might reasonably suppose, that any

other choice would be relinquished sooner than this; that any other

state of mind would fail sooner than benevolence. It is vain to reply to

this, that facts prove the contrary to be true. I answer what facts? 

Who can prove them to be facts? Shall we appeal to the apparent

facts in the instability of many professors of religion; or shall we appeal

to the very nature of the choice, and to the scriptures? To these

doubtless. So far as philosophy can go, we might defy the world to

produce an instance of choice which has so many chances for

stability. The representations of scripture are such as I have

mentioned above. What then shall we conclude of those effervescing

professors of religion, who are soon hot and soon cold; whose religion

is a spasm; "whose goodness is as the morning cloud and the early

dew, which goeth away?" (Hosea 6:4). Why, we must conclude, that

they never had the root of the matter in them. That they are not dead

to sin and to the world, we see. That they are not new creatures, that

they have not the spirit of Christ, that they do not keep His

commandments, we see. What then shall we conclude, but this, that

they are stony-ground hearers?



21. Holiness is another attribute of benevolence. This term is used

in the Bible, as synonymous with moral purity. In a ceremonial sense

it is applied to both persons and things; to make holy and to sanctify

are the same thing. To sanctity and to consecrate, or set apart to

sacred use, are identical. Many things were, in this sense, sanctified,

or made holy, under the Jewish economy. The term holiness may, in

a general sense, be applied to anything whatever which is set apart to

a sacred use. It may be applied to the whole being of a moral agent,

who is set apart to the service of God.



As an attribute of benevolence, it denotes that quality which tends to

seek to promote the happiness of moral agents, by means of

conformity to moral law. As a moral attribute of God, it is that

peculiarity of His benevolence which secures it against all efforts to

obtain its end by other means than those that are morally and perfectly

pure. His benevolence aims to secure the happiness of the universe

of moral agents, by means of moral law and moral government, and of

conformity to His own subjective idea of right. In other words, holiness

in God is that quality of His love that secures its universal conformity,

in all its efforts and manifestations, to the Divine idea of right, as it lies

in eternal development in the Infinite Reason. This idea is moral law. 

It is sometimes used to express the moral quality, or character of His

benevolence generally, or to express the moral character of the

Godhead. It sometimes seems to designate an attribute, and

sometimes a quality of His moral attributes. Holiness is, doubtless, a

characteristic, or quality of each and all of His moral attributes. They

will harmonize in this, that no one of them can consent to do otherwise

than conform to the law of moral purity, as developed and revealed in

the Divine Reason.



That holiness is an attribute of God is everywhere assumed, and

frequently asserted in the Bible. If an attribute of God, it must be an

attribute of love; for God is love. This attribute is celebrated in heaven

as one of those aspects of the divine character that give ineffable

delight. Isaiah saw the seraphim standing around the throne of

Jehovah, and crying one to another, "Holy! Holy! Holy!" (Isaiah 6:3). 

John also had a vision of the worship of heaven, and says "They rest

not day nor night, saying, Holy! Holy! Holy! Lord God Almighty" (Rev.

4:8). When Isaiah beheld the holiness of Jehovah, he cried out "Woe

is me! I am undone. I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the

midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King,

the Lord of hosts!" (Isaiah 6:5). God's holiness is infinite, and it is no

wonder that a perception of it should thus affect the prophet.



Finite holiness must forever feel itself awed in the presence of infinite

holiness. Job says, "I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear,

but now mine eye seeth Thee: wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in

dust and ashes" (Job 42:5). There is no comparing finite with infinite. 

The time will never come when creatures can with open face

contemplate the infinite holiness of Jehovah, without being like

persons overcome with a harmony too intensely delightful to be calmly

borne. Heaven seems not able to endure it without breaking forth into

strains of inexpressible rapture.



The expressions of Isaiah and Job do not necessarily imply that at

the time they were in a sinful state, but their expressions no doubt

related to whatever of sin they had at any time been guilty of. In the

light of Jehovah's holiness they saw the comparative pollution of their

character taken as a whole. This view will always, doubtless, much

affect the saints. This must be; and yet in another sense they may be,

and are, as holy, in their measure as He is. They may be as perfectly

conformed to what light or truth they have, as He is. This is doubtless

what Christ intended when He said, "Be ye perfect, even as your

Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matt. 5:48). The meaning is,

that they should live to the same end, and be as entirely consecrated

to it as He is. This they must be, to be truly virtuous or holy in any

degree. But when they are so, a full view of the holiness of God would

confound and overwhelm them. If any one doubts this, he has not

considered the matter in a proper light. He has not lifted up his

thoughts, as he needs to do, to the contemplation of infinite holiness. 

No creature, however benevolent, can witness the divine benevolence

without being overwhelmed with a clear vision of it. This is no doubt

true of every attribute of the divine love. However perfect creature

virtue may be, it is finite, and, brought into the light of the attributes of

infinite virtue, it will appear like the dimmest star in the presence of the

sun, lost in the blaze of His glory. Let the most just man on earth or in

heaven witness, and have a clear apprehension of, the infinite justice

of Jehovah, and it would no doubt fill him with unutterable awe. So,

could the most merciful saint on earth, or in heaven, have a clear

perception of the divine mercy in its fullness, it would swallow up all

thought and imagination, and, no doubt, overwhelm him. And so also

of every attribute of God. Oh! When we speak of the attributes of

Jehovah, we often do not know what we say. Should God unveil

Himself to us, or bodies would instantly perish "No man," says He,

"can see My face and live" (Exodus 33:20). When Moses prayed,

"Show me Thy glory" (Exodus 33:18). God condescendingly hid him in

the cleft of a rock, and covering him with His hand, He passed by, and

let Moses see only His back parts, informing him that he could not

behold His face, that is, His unveiled glories, and live.



Holiness, or moral harmony of character is, then, an essential

attribute of disinterested love. It must be so from the laws of our

being, and from the very nature of benevolence. In man it manifests

itself in great purity of conversation and deportment, in a great loathing

of all impurity of flesh and spirit. Let no man profess piety who has not

this attribute developed. The love required by the law of God is pure

love. It seeks to make its object happy only by making him holy. It

manifests the greatest abhorrence of sin and all uncleanness. In

creatures it pants, and doubtless ever will pant and struggle, toward

infinite purity or holiness. It will never find a resting place in such a

sense as to desire to ascend no higher. As it perceives more and

more of the fullness and infinity of God's holiness, it will no doubt pant

and struggle to ascend the eternal heights where God sits in light too

intense for the strongest vision of the highest cherub.



Holiness of heart or of will, produces a desire or feeling of purity in

the sensibility. The feelings become exceedingly alive to the beauty of

holiness and to the hatefulness and deformity of all spiritual, and even

physical impurity. This is called the love of holiness. The sensibility

becomes ravished with the great loveliness of holiness, and

unutterably disgusted with the opposite. The least impurity of

conversation or of action exceedingly shocks one who is holy. Impure

thoughts, if suggested to the mind of a holy being, are instantly felt to

be exceedingly offensive and painful. The soul heaves and struggles

to cast them out as the most loathsome abominations.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 16



WHAT CONSTITUTES DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW



In discussing this question, I will, 



Show in what disobedience to moral law cannot consist.



1. It cannot consist in malevolence, or in the choice of evil or misery

as an ultimate end. This will appear, if we consider, that the choice of

an end implies the choice of it, not for no reason, but for a reason, and

for its own intrinsic value, or because the mind prizes it on its own

account. But moral agents are so constituted, that they cannot regard

misery as intrinsically valuable. They cannot, therefore, choose it as

an ultimate end, nor prize it on its own account.



2. Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in the constitution of

soul or body. The law does not command us to have a certain

constitution, nor forbid us to have the constitution with which we came

into being.



3. It cannot consist in any unavoidable state, either of the sensibility

or of the intelligence; for these, as we have seen, are involuntary, and

are dependent upon the actings of the will.



4. It cannot consist in outward actions, independent of the design

with which they are put forth; for these, we have seen, are controlled

by the actions of the will, and, therefore, can have no moral character

in themselves.



5. It cannot consist in inaction; for total inaction is to a moral agent

impossible. Moral agents are necessarily active. That is, they cannot

exist as moral agents without choice. They must, by a law of

necessity, choose either in accordance with, or in opposition to, the

law of God. They are free to choose in either direction, but they are

not free to abstain from choice altogether. Choose they must. The

possession of free will, and the perception of opposing objects of

choice, either exciting desire, or developing the rational affirmation of

obligation to choose, render choice one way or the other inevitable. 

The law directs how they ought to choose. If they do not choose thus,

it must be because they choose otherwise, and not because they do

not choose at all.



6. It cannot consist in the choice of moral evil, or sin, as an ultimate

end. Sin is but an element or attribute of choice or intention, or it is

intention itself. If it be intention itself, then to make sin an end of

intention, would be to make intention or choice terminate on itself, and

the sinner must choose his own choice, or intend his own intention as

an end: this is absurd.



7. Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in self-love. Self-love is

simply the constitutional desire of happiness. It is altogether an

involuntary state. It has, as a desire, no moral character, any more

than has the desire of food. It is no more sinful to desire happiness,

and properly to seek it, than it is wrong to desire food, and properly to

seek that.



What disobedience to moral law must consist in.



Disobedience to God's law must consist in the choice of

self-gratification as an end. In other words, it must consist essentially

in committing the will, and through the will committing the whole being,

to the indulgence of self-love, as the supreme and ultimate end of life. 

This is selfishness. In other words, it is seeking to gratify the desire of

personal good, in a manner prohibited by the law of God.



It consists in choosing self-gratification as an end, or for its own

sake, instead of choosing, in accordance with the law of the reason

and of God, the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an

ultimate end. In other words still, sin or disobedience to the moral law,

consists in the consecration of the heart and life to the gratification of

the constitutional and artificial desires, rather than in obedience to the

law of the intelligence. Or, once more, sin consists in being governed

by impulses of the sensibility, instead of being governed by the law of

God, as it lies revealed in the reason.



That this is sin, and the whole of sin viewed in its germinating

principles, will appear, if we consider:



1. That this state of mind, or this choice, is the "carnal mind," or the

minding of the flesh, which the apostle affirms to be "enmity against

God" (Romans 8:7). It is the universal representation of scripture, that

sin consists in the spirit of self-seeking. This spirit of self-seeking is

always in the Bible represented as the contrast or opposite of

disinterested benevolence, or the love which the law requires. 

"Ephraim bringeth forth fruit to himself" (Hosea 9:16), is the sum of

God's charges against sinners.



2. When we come to the consideration of the attributes of
selfishness, it will be seen that every form of sin, not only may, but

must resolve itself into selfishness, just as we have seen that every

form of virtue does and must resolve itself into love or benevolence.



3. From the laws of its constitution, the mind is shut up to the

necessity of choosing that, as an ultimate end, which is regarded by

the mind as intrinsically good or valuable in itself. This is the very idea

of choosing an end, to wit, something chosen for its own sake, or for

what it is in and of itself, or, because it is regarded by the mind as

intrinsically valuable to self, or to being in general, or to both.



4. Moral agents are, therefore, shut up to the necessity of willing the

good of being, either partially or impartially, either good to self, or good

to being in general. Nothing else can possibly be chosen as an end or

for its own sake. Willing the good of being impartially, we have seen,

is virtue. To will it partially is to will it, not for its own sake, except upon

condition of its relation to self. That is, it is to will good to self. In other

words, it is to will the gratification of self as an end, in opposition to

willing the good of universal being as an end, and every good, or the

good of every being, according to its intrinsic value.



5. But may not one will the good of a part of being as an end, or for

the sake of the intrinsic value of their good? This would not be

benevolence; for that, as we have seen, must consist in willing good

for its own sake, and implies the willing of every good, and of the

highest good of universal being. It would not be selfishness, as it

would not be willing good to, or the gratification of, self. It would be

sin, for it would be the partial love or choice of good. It would be

loving some of my neighbors, but not all of them. It would, therefore,

be sin, but not selfishness. If this can be, then there is such a thing

possible, whether actual or not, as sin that does not consist in

selfishness. But let us examine whether this supposition would not

resolve itself into selfishness.



To say that I choose good for its own sake, or because it is valuable

to being, that is, in obedience to the law of my reason, and of God,

implies that I choose all possible good, and every good according to its

relative value. If, then, a being chooses his own good, or the good of

any being as an ultimate end, in obedience to the law of reason, it

must be that he chooses, for the same reason, the highest possible

good of all sentient being.



The partial choice of good implies the choice of it, not merely for its

own sake, but upon condition of its relations to self, or to certain

particular persons. Its relations conditionate the choice. When its

relations to self conditionate the choice, so that it is chosen, not for its

intrinsic value, irrespective of its relations, but for its relations to self,

this is selfishness. It is the partial choice of good. If I choose the good

of others besides myself, and choose good because of its relations to

them, it must be either:



(1.) Because I love their persons with the love of fondness, and will

their good for that reason, that is, to gratify my affection for them,

which is selfishness; or:



(2.) Because of their relations to me, so that good to them is in some

way a good to me, which also is selfishness; or:



(3.) Upon condition that they are worthy, which is benevolence; for if

I will good to a being upon condition that he is worthy, I must value the

good for its own sake, and will it particularly to him, because he

deserves it. This is benevolence, and not the partial choice of good,

because it is obeying the law of my reason.



Again: If I will the good of any number of beings, I must do it in

obedience to the law either of my intelligence and of God, or of my

sensibility. But, if I will in obedience to the law of my intelligence, it

must be the choice of the highest good of universal being. But if I will

in obedience to the law or impulse of my sensibility, it must be to

gratify my feelings or desires. This is selfishness.



Again: As the will must either follow the law of the reason and of

God, or the impulses of the sensibility, it follows that moral agents are

shut up to the necessity of being selfish or benevolent, and that there

is no third way, because there is no third medium, through which any

object of choice can be presented. The mind can absolutely know

nothing as an object of choice, that is not recommended by one of

these faculties. Selfishness, then, and benevolence, are the only two

alternatives.



Let it be remembered, then, that sin is a unit, and always and

necessarily consists in selfish ultimate intention, and in nothing else. 

This intention is sin; and thus we see that every phase of sin resolves

itself into selfishness. This will appear more and more, as we proceed

to unfold the subject of moral depravity.



LECTURE 17



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS



Formerly we considered the attributes of benevolence, and also what

states of the sensibility and of the intellect, and also what outward

actions, were implied in it, as necessarily resulting from it. We are now

to take the same course with selfishness.



1. Voluntariness is an attribute of selfishness.



Selfishness has often been confounded with mere desire. But these

things are by no means identical. Desire is constitutional. It is a

phenomenon of the sensibility. It is a purely involuntary state of mind,

and can in itself produce no action, not can it, in itself, have moral

character. Selfishness is a phenomenon of the will, and consists in

committing the will to the gratification of the desires. The desire itself

is not selfishness, but submitting the will to be governed by the desire,

is selfishness. It should be understood, that no kind of mere desires,

and no strength of mere desire, constitutes selfishness. Selfishness

commences when the will yields to the desire, and seeks to obey it, in

opposition to the law of the intelligence. It matters not what kind of

desire it is; if it is the desire that governs the will this is selfishness. It

must be the will in a state of committal to the gratification of the desire.



2. Liberty is another attribute of selfishness.



That is, the choice of self-gratification is not necessitated by desire. 

But the will is always free to choose in opposition to desire. This every

moral agent is as conscious of as of his own existence. The desire is

not free, but the choice to gratify it is and must be free. There is a

sense, as I shall have occasion to show, in which slavery is an

attribute of selfishness, but not in the sense that the will chooses, by a

law of necessity, to gratify desire. Liberty, in the sense of ability to

make an opposite choice, must ever remain an attribute of selfishness,

while selfishness continues to be a sin, or while it continues to sustain

any relation to moral law.



3. Intelligence is another attribute of selfishness.



By this it is not intended that intelligence is an attribute or

phenomenon of will, nor that the choice of self-gratification is in

accordance with the demands of the intellect. But it is intended that

the choice is made with the knowledge of the moral character that will

be involved in it. The mind knows its obligation to make an opposite

choice. It is not a mistake. It is not a choice made in ignorance of

moral obligation to choose the highest good of being, as an end, in

opposition to self-gratification. It is an intelligent choice in the sense,

that it is a known resistance of the demands of the intellect. It is a

known rejection of its claims. It is a known setting up of

self-gratification, and preferring to all higher interests.



4. Unreasonableness is another attribute of selfishness.



By this it is intended, that the selfish choice is in direct opposition to

the demands of the reason The reason was given to rule, that is, to

affirm obligation, and thus announce the law of God. It affirms law and

moral obligation. Obedience to moral law, as it is revealed in the

reason, is virtue. Obedience to the sensibility in opposition to the

reason, is sin. Selfishness consists in this. It is a dethroning of reason

from the seat of government, and an enthroning of blind desire in

opposition to it. Selfishness is always and necessarily unreasonable. 

It is a denial of that divine attribute that allies man to God, makes him

capable of virtue, and is a sinking him to the level of a brute. It is a

denial of his manhood, of his rational nature. It is a contempt of the

voice of God within him, and a deliberate trampling down the

sovereignty of his own intellect. Shame on selfishness! It dethrones

human reason, and would dethrone the divine, and place mere blind

lust upon the throne of the universe.



The very definition of selfishness implies that unreasonableness is

one of its attributes. Selfishness consists in the will's yielding itself to

the impulses of the sensibility in opposition to the demands of the

intelligence. Therefore, every act or choice of the will is necessarily

altogether unreasonable. Sinners, while they continue such; never

say nor do one thing that is in accordance with right reason. Hence

the Bible says, that "madness is in their heart while they live" (Eccl.

9:3). They have made an unreasonable choice of an end, and all their

choices of means to secure their end are only a carrying out of their

ultimate choice. They are, every one of them, put forth to secure an

end contrary to reason. Therefore, no sinner, who has never been

converted, has, even in a single instance, chosen otherwise than in

direct opposition to reason. They are not merely sometimes

unreasonable, but uniformly, and, while they remain selfish,

necessarily so. The very first time that a sinner acts or wills

reasonably, is when he turns to God, or repents and becomes a

Christian. This is the first instance in which he practically

acknowledges that he has reason. All previous to this, every one of

the actions of his will and of his life, is a practical denial of his

manhood, of his rational nature, of his obligation to God or his

neighbor. We sometimes hear impenitent sinners spoken of as being

unreasonable, and in such a manner as to imply that all sinners are

not so. But this only favors the delusion of sinners by leaving them to

suppose that they are not all of them, at all times, altogether

unreasonable. But the fact is, that there is not, and there never can

be, in earth or hell, one impenitent sinner who, in any instance, acts

otherwise than in direct and palpable opposition to his reason. It had,

therefore, been infinitely better for sinners if they had never been

endowed with reason. They do not merely act without consulting their

reason, but in stout and determined opposition to it.



Again: They act as directly in opposition to it as they possibly can. 

They not only oppose it, but they oppose it as much, and in as

aggravated a manner, as possible. What can be more directly and

aggravatedly opposed to reason than the choice which the sinner

makes of an end? Reason was given him to direct him in regard to the

choice of the great end of life. It gives him the idea of the eternal and

the infinite. It spreads out before him the interests of God and of the

universe as of absolutely infinite value. It affirms their value, and the

infinite obligation of the sinner to consecrate himself to these interests;

and it promises him endless rewards if he will do so. On the contrary,

it lays before him the consequences of refusal. It thunders in his ear

the terrible sanctions of the law. It points him to the coming doom that

awaits his refusal to comply with its demands. But behold, in the face

of all this, the sinner, unhesitatingly, in the face of these affirmations,

demands, and threatenings, turns away and consecrates himself to

the gratification of his desires with the certainty that he could not do

greater despite to his own nature than in this most mad, most

preposterous, most blasphemous choice. Why do not sinners

consider that it is impossible for them to offer a greater insult to God,

who gave them reason, or more truly and deeply to shame and

degrade themselves, than they do in their beastly selfishness? Total,

universal, and shameless unreasonableness, is the universal

characteristic of every selfish mind.



5. Interestedness is another attribute of selfishness.



By interestedness is meant self-interestedness. It is not the

disinterested choice of good, that is, it is not the choice of the good of

being in general as an end, but it is the choice of self-good, of good to

self. Its relation to self is the condition of the choice of this good. But

for its being the good of self, it would not be chosen. The fundamental

reason, or that which should induce choice, to wit, the intrinsic value of

good, is rejected as insufficient; and the secondary reason, namely, its

relation to self, is the condition of determining the will in this direction. 

This is really making self-good the supreme end. In other words, it is

making self-gratification the end. Nothing is practically regarded as

worthy of choice, except as it sustains to self the relation of a means of

self-gratification.



This attribute of selfishness secures a corresponding state of the

sensibility. The sensibility, under this indulgence, attains to a

monstrous development, either generally, or in some particular

directions. Selfishness is the committal of the will to the indulgence of

the propensities. But from this it by no means follows, that all of the

propensities will be indiscriminately indulged, and thereby greatly

developed. Sometimes one propensity, and sometimes another, has

the greatest natural strength, and thereby gains the ascendancy in the

control of the will. Sometimes circumstances tend more strongly to the

development of one appetite or passion than another. Whatever

propensity is most indulged, will gain the greatest development. The

propensities cannot all be indulged at once, for they are often opposed

to each other. But they may all be indulged and developed in their

turn. For example, the licentious propensities, and various other

propensities, cannot be indulged consistently with the simultaneous

indulgence of the avaricious propensities, the desire of reputation and

of ultimate happiness. Each of these, and even all the propensities,

may come in for a share, and in some instances may gain so equal a

share of indulgence, as upon the whole to be about equally developed. 

But in general, either from constitutional temperament, or from

circumstances, some one or more of the propensities will gain so

uniform a control of the will, as to occasion its monstrous

development. It may be the love of reputation; and then there will be

at least a public decent exterior, more or less strict, according to the

state of morals in the society in which the individual dwells. If it be

amativeness that gains the ascendancy over the other propensities,

licentiousness will be the result. If it be alimentiveness, then gluttony

and Epicurianism will be the result. The result of selfishness must be,

to develop in general, or in particular, the propensities of the

sensibility, and to beget a corresponding exterior. f avarice take the

control of the will, we have the haggard and ragged miser. All the

other propensities wither under the reign of this detestable one. 

Where the love of knowledge prevails, we have the scholar, the

philosopher, the man of learning. This is one of the most decent and

respectable forms of selfishness, but is nevertheless as absolutely

selfishness as any other form. When compassion, as a feeling,

prevails, we have, as a result, the philanthropist, and often the

reformer; not the reformer in a virtuous sense, but the selfish reformer. 

Where love of kindred prevails, we often have the kind husband, the

affectionate father, mother, brother, sister, and so on. These are the

amiable sinners, especially among their own kindred. When the love

of country prevails, we have the patriot, the statesman, and the

soldier. The picture might be drawn at full length, but with these traits I

must leave you to fill up the outline. I would only add, that several of

these forms of selfishness so nearly resemble certain forms of virtue,

as often to be confounded with them, and mistaken for them. Indeed,

so far as the outward life is concerned, they are right, in the letter, but

as they do not proceed from disinterestedly benevolent intention, they

are only specious forms of selfishness.



6. Partiality is another attribute of selfishness. It consists in giving

the preference to certain interests, on account of their being either

directly the interests of self, or so connected with self-interest as to be

preferred on that account. It matters not, whether the interest to which

the preference is given be of greater or of lesser value, if so be it is

preferred, not for the reason of its greater value, but because of its

relation to self. In some instances the practical preference may justly

be given to a lesser interest, on account of its sustaining such a

relation to us that we can secure it, when the greater interest could not

be secured by us. If the reason of the preference, in such case, be,

not that it is self-interest, but an interest that can be secured while the

greater cannot, the preference is a just one, and not partiality. My

family for example, sustain such relations to me, that I can more

readily and surely secure their interests, than I can those of my

neighbor, or of a stranger. For this reason I am under obligation to

give the practical preference to the interests of my own family, not

because they are my own, nor because their interests sustain such a

relation to my own, but because I can more readily secure their

interests than those of any other family.



The question in such a case turns upon the amount I am able to

secure, and not on the intrinsic value merely. It is a general truth, that

we can secure more readily and certainly the interests of those to

whom we sustain certain relations; and therefore, God and reason

point out these interests as particular objects of our attention and

effort. This is not partiality but impartiality. It is treating interests as

they should be treated.



But selfishness is always partial. If it gives any interest whatever, the

preference, it is because of its relation to self. It always, and,

continuing to be selfishness, necessarily, lays the greatest stress

upon, and gives the preference to, those interests the promotion of

which will gratify self.



Here care should be taken to avoid delusion. Oftentimes selfishness

appears to be very disinterested and very impartial. For example:

here is a man whose compassion, as a mere feeling or state of the

sensibility, is greatly developed. He meets a beggar, an object that

strongly excites his ruling passion. He empties his pockets, and even

takes off his coat and gives it to him, and in his paroxysm he will divide

his all with him, or even give him all. Now this would generally pass

for most undoubted virtue, as a rare and impressive instance of moral

goodness. But there is no virtue, no benevolence in it. It is a mere

yielding of the will to the control of feeling, and has nothing in it of the

nature of virtue. Innumerable examples of this might be adduced, as

illustrations of this truth. It is only an instance and an illustration of

selfishness. It is the will seeking to gratify the feeling of compassion,

which for the time is the strongest desire.



We constitutionally desire not only our own happiness, but also that

of men in general, when their happiness in no way conflicts with our

own. Hence selfish men will often manifest a deep interest in the

welfare of those, whose welfare will not interfere with their own. Now,

should the will be yielded up to the gratification of this desire, this

would often be regarded as virtue. For example: a few years since

much interest and feeling were excited in this country by the cause

and sufferings of the Greeks, in their struggle for liberty; and since in

the cause of the Poles. A spirit of enthusiasm appeared, and many

were ready to give and do almost anything for the cause of liberty. 

They gave up their will to the gratification of this excited state of

feeling. This, they may have supposed, was virtue; but it was not, nor

was there a semblance of virtue about it, when it is once understood,

that virtue consists in yielding the will to the law of the intelligence, and

not to the impulse of excited feelings.



Some writers have fallen into the strange mistake of making virtue to

consist in seeking the gratification of certain desires, because, as they

say, these desires are virtuous. They make some of the desires

selfish, and some benevolent. To yield the will to the control of the

selfish propensities is sin; to yield to the control of the benevolent

desires, such as the desire of my neighbor's happiness and of the

public happiness, is virtue, because these are good desires, while the

selfish desires are evil. Now this is, and has been, a very common

view of virtue and vice. But it is fundamentally erroneous. None of the

constitutional desires are good or evil in themselves; they are alike

involuntary, and all alike terminate on their correlated objects. To yield

the will to the control of any one of them, no matter which, is sin; it is

following a blind feeling, desire, or impulse of the sensibility, instead of

yielding to the demands of the intelligence, as the law affirming power. 

To will the good of my neighbor, or of my country, and of God,

because of the intrinsic value of those interests, that is to will them as

an end, and in obedience to the law of the reason, is virtue; but to will

them to gratify a constitutional but blind desire, is selfishness and sin. 

The desires terminate on their respective objects; but the will, in this

case, seeks the objects, not for their own sake, but because they are

desired, that is, to gratify the desires. This is choosing them, not as an

end, but as a means of self-gratification. This is making

self-gratification the end after all. This must be a universal truth, when

a thing is chosen merely in obedience to desire. The benevolence of

these writers is sheer selfishness, and their virtue is vice.



The choice of any thing whatever, because it is desired, irrespective

of the demands of the reason, is selfishness and sin. It matters not

what it is. The very statement, that I choose a thing because I desire

it, is only another form of saying, that I choose it for my own sake, or

for the sake of appeasing the desire, and not on account of its own

intrinsic value. All such choice is always and necessarily partial. It is

giving one interest the preference over another, not because of its

perceived intrinsic and superior value, but because it is an object of

desire. If I yield to mere desire in any case, it must be to gratify the

desire. This is, and in the case supposed must be, the end for which

the choice is made. To deny this is to deny that the will seeks the

object because it is desired. Partiality consists in giving one thing the

preference of another for no good reason. That is, not because the

intelligence demands this preference, but because the sensibility

demands it. Partiality is therefore always and necessarily an attribute

of selfishness.



7. Efficiency is another attribute of selfishness. Desire never

produces action until it influences the will. It has no efficiency or

causality in itself. It cannot, without the concurrence of the will,

command the attention of the intellect, or move a muscle of the body. 

The whole causality of the mind resides in the will. In it resides the

power of accomplishment.



Again: the whole efficiency of the mind, as it respects

accomplishment, resides in the choice of an end, or in the ultimate

intention. All action of the will, or all willing, must consist in choosing

either an end, or the means of accomplishing an end. If there is

choice, something is chosen. That something is chosen for some

reason. To deny this is a denial that any thing is chosen. The ultimate

reason for the choice and the thing chosen, are identical. This we

have repeatedly seen.



Again: we have seen that the means cannot be chosen until the end

is chosen. The choice of the end is distinct from the volitions or

endeavors of the mind to secure the end. But although the choice of

an end is not identical with the subordinate choices and volitions to

secure the end, yet it necessitates them. The choice once made,

secures or necessitates the executive volitions to secure the end. By

this it is not intended that the mind is not free to relinquish its end, and

of course to relinquish the use of the means to accomplish it; but only

that, while the choice or intention remains, the choice of the end by the

will is efficient in producing volitions to realize the end. This is true

both of benevolence and selfishness. They are both choices of an

end, and are necessarily efficient in producing the use of the means to

realize this end. They are choices of opposite ends, and, of course,

will produce their respective results.



The Bible represents sinners as having eyes full of adultery, and that

cannot cease from sin; that while the will is committed to the

indulgence of the propensities, they cannot cease from the indulgence. 

There is no way, therefore, for the sinner to escape from the

commission of sin, but to cease to be selfish. While selfishness

continues, you may change the form of outward manifestation, you

may deny one appetite or desire for the sake of indulging another; but

it is and must be sin still. The desire to escape hell, and to obtain

heaven may become the strongest, in which case, selfishness will take

on a most sanctimonious type. But if the will is following desire, it is

selfishness still; and all your religious duties, as you call them, are only

selfishness robed in the stolen habiliments of loving obedience to God.



Be it remembered, then, that selfishness is, and must be, efficient in

producing its effects. It is cause; the effect must follow. The whole life

and activity of sinners is founded in it. It constitutes their life, or rather

their spiritual death. They are dead in trespasses and in sins. It is in

vain for them to dream of doing anything good, until they relinquish

their selfishness. While this continues, they cannot act at all, except

as they use the means to accomplish a selfish end. It is impossible,

while the will remains committed to a selfish end, or to the promotion

of self-interest or self-gratification, that it should use the means to

promote a benevolent end. The first thing is to change the end, and

then the sinner can cease from outward sin. Indeed, if the end be

changed, many of the same acts which were before sinful will become

holy. While the selfish end continues, whatever a sinner does, is

selfish. Whether he eats, or drinks, or labors, or preaches, or, in short,

whatever he does, is to promote some form of self-interest. The end

being wrong, all is, and must be, wrong.



This is the philosophy of Christ. "Either make the tree good, and his

fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the

tree is known by his fruit. A good man out of the good treasure of the

heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil

treasure bringeth forth evil things" (Matt. 12:33, 35). "Doth a fountain

send forth at the same place sweet water and bitter? Can the fig-tree,

My brethren, bear olive berries? Either a vine figs? So can no

fountain both yield salt water and fresh" (James 3:11, 12). "For a good

tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; neither doth a corrupt tree bring

forth good fruit. For every tree is known by his own fruit: for of thorns

men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes. A

good man out of the good treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that

which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart

bringeth forth that which is evil; for out of the abundance of the heart

his mouth speaketh" (Luke 6:43-45).



8. Opposition to benevolence or to virtue, or to holiness and true

religion, is one of the attributes of selfishness.



Selfishness is not, in its relations to benevolence, a mere negation. 

It cannot be. It is the choice of self-gratification as the supreme and

ultimate end of life. While the will is committed to this end, and

benevolence, or a mind committed to an opposite end, is

contemplated, the will cannot remain in a state of indifference to

benevolence. It must either yield its preference of self-indulgence, or

resist the benevolence which the intellect perceives. The will cannot

remain in the exercise of this selfish choice, without as it were bracing

and girding itself against that virtue, which it does not imitate. If it does

not imitate it, it must be because it refuses to do so. The intellect

does, and must, strongly urge the will to imitate benevolence, and to

seek the same end. The will must yield or resist, and the resistance

must be more or less resolute and determined, as the demands of the

intellect are more or less emphatic. This resistance to benevolence or

to the demands of the intellect in view of it is what the Bible calls,

hardening the heart. It is obstinacy of will, under the light and the

presence of true religion, and the admitted claims of benevolence.



This opposition to benevolence or true religion, must be developed in

specific action, whenever the mind apprehends true religion, or

selfishness must be abandoned. Not only must this opposition be

developed, or selfishness abandoned, under such circumstances, but

it must be increased as true religion displays more and more of its

loveliness. As the light from the radiant sun of benevolence is poured

more and more upon the darkness of selfishness, the opposition of

this principle of action must of necessity manifest itself in the same

proportion, or selfishness must be abandoned. Thus selfishness

remaining under light, must manifest more and more opposition, just in

proportion as light increases, and the soul has less the color of an

apology for its opposition.



This peculiarity of selfishness has always been manifested just in

proportion as it has been brought into the light of true religion. This

accounts for all the opposition that has been made to true religion

since the world began. It also proves that where there are impenitent

sinners, and they retain their impenitence, and manifest no hostility to

the religion which they witness, that there is something defective in the

professed piety which they behold; or at least they do not contemplate

all the attributes of true piety. It also proves, that persecution will

always exist where much true religion is manifested to those who hold

fast their selfishness.



It is indeed true, that selfishness and benevolence are just as much

opposed to each other, and just as much and as necessarily at war

with each other, as God and Satan, as heaven and hell. There can

never be a truce between them; they are essential and eternal

opposites. They are not merely opposites, but they are opposite

efficient causes. They are essential activities. They are the two, and

the only two, great antagonistic principles in the universe of mind. 

Each is heaving and energizing like an earthquake to realize its end. 

A war of mutual and uncompromising extermination necessarily exists

between them. Neither can be in the presence of the other, without

repulsion and opposition. Each puts forth all its energy to subdue and

overcome the other; and already selfishness has shed an ocean of the

blood of saints, as well as the precious blood of the Prince of life. 

There is not a more gross and injurious mistake, than to suppose that

selfishness ever, under any circumstances, becomes reconciled to

benevolence. The supposition is absurd and contradictory; since for

selfishness to become reconciled to benevolence, were the same

thing as for selfishness to become benevolence. Selfishness may

change the mode of attack or of its opposition, but its real opposition it

can never change, while it retains its own nature and continues to be

selfishness.



This opposition of the heart to benevolence often begets deep

opposition of feeling. The opposition of the will engages the intellect in

fabricating excuses, and cavils, and lies, and refuges, and often

greatly perverts the thoughts, and excites the most bitter feelings

imaginable toward God and toward the saints. Selfishness will strive

to justify its opposition, and to shield itself against the reproaches of

conscience, and will resort to every possible expedient to cover up its

real hostility to holiness. It will pretend that it is not holiness, but sin

that it opposes. But the fact is, it is not sin but holiness to which it

stands forever opposed. The opposition of feeling is only developed

when the heart is brought into a strong light, and makes deep and

strong resistance. In such cases, the sensibility sometimes boils over

with feelings of bitter opposition to God, and Christ, and all good.



The question is often asked, May not this opposition exist in the

sensibility, and those feelings of hostility to God exist, when the heart

is in a truly benevolent state? To this inquiry, I would reply: If it can, it

must be produced by infernal or some other influence that

misrepresents God, and places His character before the mind in a

false light. Blasphemous thoughts may be suggested, and, as it were,

injected into the mind. These thoughts may have their natural effect in

the sensibility, and feelings of bitterness and hostility may exist without

the consent of the will. The will may all the while be endeavoring to

repel these suggestions, and divert the attention from such thoughts,

yet Satan may continue to hurl his fiery darts, and the soul may be

racked with torture under the poison of hell, which seems to be taking

effect in the sensibility. The mind, at such times, seems to itself to be

filled, so far as feeling is concerned, with all the bitterness of hell. And

so it is, and yet it may be, that in all this there is no selfishness. If the

will holds fast its integrity; if it holds out in the struggle, and where God

is maligned and misrepresented by the infernal suggestions, it says

with Job, "Although He slay me, yet will I trust in Him," however sharp

the conflict in such cases, we can look back and say, "We are more

than conquerors through Him that loved us" (Job 13:15, Romans

8:37). In such cases it is the selfishness of Satan, and not our own

selfishness, that kindled up those fires of hell in our sensibility. 

"Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he is tried he

shall receive the crown of life" (James 1:12).



9. Cruelty is another attribute of selfishness.



This term is often used to designate a state of the sensibility. It then

represents that state of feeling which has a barbarous or savage

pleasure in the misery of others. Cruelty, as a phenomenon of the will

or as an attribute of selfishness, consists, first, in a reckless disregard

of the well-being of God and the universe, and secondly, in

persevering in a course that must ruin the souls of the subjects of it,

and, so far as they have influence, ruin the souls of others. What

should we think of a man who was so intent on securing some petty

gratification, that he would not give the alarm if a city were on fire, and

the sleeping citizens in imminent danger of perishing in the flames? 

Suppose that sooner than deny himself some momentary gratification,

he would jeopard many lives. Should we not call this cruelty? Now

there are many forms of cruelty. Because sinners are not always

brought into circumstances where they exercise certain forms of it,

they flatter themselves that they are not cruel. But selfishness is,

always and necessarily cruel to the soul and highest interests

of the subject of it; cruel to the souls of others, in neglecting to care

and act for their salvation; cruel to God, in abusing Him in ten

thousand ways; cruel to the whole universe. If we should be shocked

at the cruelty of him who should see his neighbor's house on fire, and

the family asleep, and neglect to give them warning, because too

self-indulgent to rise from his bed, what shall we say of the cruelty of

one, who shall see his neighbor's soul in peril of eternal death, and yet

neglect to give him warning?



Sinners are apt to possess very good dispositions, as they express

it. They suppose they are the reverse of being cruel. They possess

tender feelings, are often very compassionate in their feelings toward

those who are sick and in distress, and who are in circumstances of

any affliction. They are ready to do many things for them. Such

persons would be shocked, should they be called cruel. And many

professors would take their part, and consider them abused. 

Whatever else, it would be said, is an attribute of their character,

surely cruelty is not. Now, it is true that there are certain forms of

cruelty with which such persons are not chargeable. But this is only

because God has so molded their constitution, that they are not

delighted with the misery of their fellow men. However, there is no

virtue in their not being gratified at the sight of suffering, nor in their

painstaking to prevent it while they continue selfish. They follow the

impulses of their feelings, and if their temperament were such that it

would gratify them to inflict misery on others if this were the strongest

tendency of their sensibility, their selfishness would instantly take on

that type. But though cruelty, in all its forms, is not common to all

selfish persons, it is still true that some form of cruelty is practiced by

every sinner. God says, "The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel"

(Prov. 12:10). The fact that they live in sin, that they set an example of

selfishness, that they do nothing for their own souls, nor for the souls

of others; these are really most atrocious forms of cruelty, and infinitely

exceed all those comparatively petty forms that relate to the miseries

of men in this life.



10. Injustice is another attribute of selfishness.



Justice, as an attribute of benevolence, is that quality that disposes it

to regard and treat every being and interest with exact equity. 

Injustice is the opposite of this. It is that quality of selfishness which

disposes it to treat the persons and interests of others inequitably, and

a disposition to give the preference to self-interest, regardless of the

relative value of the interests. The nature of selfishness

demonstrates, that injustice is always and necessarily one of its

attributes, and one that is universally and constantly manifested.



There is the utmost injustice in the end chosen. It is the practical

preference of a petty self-interest over infinite interests. This is

injustice as great as possible. This is universal injustice to God and

man. It is the most palpable and most flagrant piece of injustice

possible to every being in the universe. Not one known by him to exist

who has not reason to bring against him the charge of most flagrant

and shocking injustice. This injustice extends to every act and to

every moment of life. He is never, in the least degree, just to any

being in the universe. Nay, he is perfectly unjust. He cares nothing

for the rights of others as such; and never, even in appearance,

regards them except for selfish reasons. This, then, is, and can be,

only the appearance of regarding them, while in fact, no right of any

being in the universe is, or can be, respected by a selfish mind, any

further than in appearance. To deny this is to deny his selfishness. 

He performs no act whatever but for one reason, that is, to promote

his own gratification. This is his end. For the realization of this end

every effort is made, and every individual act and volition put forth. 

Remaining selfish, it is impossible that he should act at all, but with

reference directly or indirectly to this end. But this end has been

chosen, and must be pursued, if pursued at all, in the most palpable

and outrageous violation of the rights of God and of every creature in

the universe. Justice demands that he should devote himself to the

promotion of the highest good of God and the universe, that he should

love God with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself. Every sinner

is openly, and universally, and as perfectly, unjust as possible, at

every moment of his impenitence. It should, therefore, always be

understood, that no sinner at any time is at all just to any being in the

universe. All his paying of his debts, and all his apparent fairness and

justice, are only a specious form of selfishness. He has, and, if a

sinner, it is impossible that he should not have, some selfish reason for

all he does, is, says, or omits. His entire activity is selfishness, and

while he remains impenitent, it is impossible for him to think, or act, or

will, or do, or be, or say, anything more or less than he judges

expedient to promote his own interests. He is not just. He cannot be

just, nor begin in any instance, or in the least degree, to be truly just,

either to God or man, until he begins life anew, gives God his heart,

and consecrates his entire being to promotion of the good of universal

being. This, all this, justice demands. There is no beginning to be

just, unless the sinner begins here. Begin and be just in the choice of

the great end of life, and then you cannot but be just in the use of

means. But be unjust in the choice of an end, and it is impossible for

you, in any instance, to be otherwise than totally unjust in the use of

means. In this case your entire activity is, and can be, nothing else

than a tissue of the most abominable injustice.



The only reason why every sinner does not openly and daily practice

every species of outward commercial injustice is, that he is so

circumstanced that, upon the whole, he judges it not for his interest to

practice this injustice. This is the reason universally, and no thanks to

any sinner for abstaining, in any instance, from any kind or degree of

injustice in practice, for he is only restrained and kept from it by selfish

considerations. That is, he is too selfish to do it. His selfishness, and

not the love of God or man, prevents. He may be prevented by a

constitutional or phrenological conscientiousness, or sense of justice. 

But this is only a feeling of the sensibility, and, if restrained only by

this, he is just as absolutely selfish as if he had stolen a horse in

obedience to acquisitiveness. God so tempers the constitution as to

restrain men, that is, that one form of selfishness shall prevail over and

curb another. Approbativeness is, in most persons, so large, that a

desire to be applauded by their fellow-men so modifies the

developments of their selfishness, that it takes on a type of outward

decency and appearance of justice. But this is no less selfishness

than if it took on altogether a different type.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 18



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS



11. Falsehood, or lying, is another attribute of selfishness.



Falsehood may be objective or subjective. Objective falsehood is

that which stands opposed to truth. Subjective falsehood is a heart

conformed to error and to objective falsehood. Subjective falsehood is

a state of mind, or an attribute of selfishness. It is the will in the

attitude of resisting truth, and embracing error and lies. This is always

and necessarily an attribute of selfishness.



Selfishness consists in the choice of an end opposed to all truth, and

cannot but proceed to the realization of that end, in conformity with

error or falsehood instead of truth. If at any time it seizes upon

objective truth, as it often does, it is with a false intention. It is with an

intention at war with the truth, the nature, and the relations of things.



If any sinner, at any time, and under any circumstances, tells the

truth, it is for a selfish reason; it is to compass a false end. He has a

lie in his heart, and a lie in his right hand. He stands upon falsehood. 

He lives for it, and if he does not uniformly and openly falsify the truth,

it is because objective truth is consistent with subjective falsehood. 

His heart is false, as false as it can be. It has embraced and sold itself

to the greatest lie in the universe. The selfish man has practically

proclaimed that his good is the supreme good; nay, that there is no

other good but his own; that there are no other rights but his own, that

all are bound to serve him, and that all interests are to yield to his. 

Now all this, as I said, is the greatest falsehood that ever was or can

be. Yet this is the solemn practical declaration of every sinner. His

choice affirms that God has no rights, that He ought not to be loved

and obeyed, that He has no right to govern the universe, but that God

and all beings ought to obey and serve the sinner. Can there be a

greater, a more shameless falsehood than all this? And shall such an

one pretend to regard the truth? Nay, verily. The very pretense is

only an instance and an illustration of the truth, that falsehood is an

essential element of his character.



If every sinner on earth does not openly and at all times falsify the

truth, it is not because of the truthfulness of his heart, but for some

purely selfish reason. This must be. His heart is utterly false. It is

impossible that, remaining a sinner, he should have any true regard to

the truth. He is a liar in his heart; this is an essential and an eternal

attribute of his character. It is true that his intellect condemns

falsehood and justifies truth, and that oftentimes through the intellect,

a deep impression is or may be made on his sensibility, in favor of the

truth; but if the heart is unchanged, it holds on to lies, and perseveres

in the practical proclamation of the greatest lies in the universe, to wit,

that God ought not to be trusted; that Christ is not worthy of

confidence; that one's own interest is the supreme good; and that all

interests ought to be accounted of less value than one's own.



12. Pride is another attribute of selfishness.



Pride is a disposition to exalt self above others, to get out of one's

proper place in the scale of being, and to climb up over the heads of

our equals or superiors. Pride is a species of injustice, on the one

hand, and is nearly allied to ambition on the other. It is not a term of

so extensive an import as either injustice or ambition. It sustains to

each of them a near relation, but is not identical with either. It is a kind

of self-praise, self-worship, self-flattery, self-adulation, a spirit of

self-consequence, of self-importance. It is a tendency to exalt, not

merely one's own interest, but one's person above others, and above

God, and above all other beings. A proud being supremely regards

himself. He worships and can worship no one but self. He does not,

and remaining selfish, he cannot, practically admit that there is any

one so good and worthy as himself. He aims at conferring supreme

favor upon himself, and practically, admits no claim of any being in the

universe to any good or interest, that will interfere with his own. He

can stoop to give preference to the interest, the reputation, the

authority of no one, no, not of God Himself, except outwardly and in

appearance. His inward language is, "Who is Jehovah, that I should

bow down to Him?" It is impossible that a selfish soul should be

humble. Sinners are represented in the Bible as proud, as "flattering

themselves in their own eyes" (Isaiah 5:21).



Pride is not a vice distinct from selfishness, but is only a modification

of selfishness. Selfishness is the root, or stock, in which every form of

sin inheres. This it is important to show. Selfishness has been

scarcely regarded by many as a vice, much less as constituting the

whole of vice; consequently, when selfishness has been most

apparent, it has been supposed and assumed that there might be

along with it many forms of virtue. It is for this reason that I make this

attempt to allow what are the essential elements of selfishness. It has

been supposed that selfishness might exist in any heart without

implying every form of sin; that a man might be selfish and yet not

proud. In short, it has been overlooked, that, where selfishness is,

there must be every form of sin; that where there is one form of

selfishness manifested, it is virtually a breach of every commandment

of God, and implies, in fact, the real existence of every possible form

of sin and abomination in the heart. My object is fully to develop the

great truth that where selfishness is, there must be, in a state either of

development or of undevelopment, every form of sin that exists in

earth or hell; that all sin is a unit, and consists of some form of

selfishness; and that where this is, all sin virtually is and must be.



The only reason that pride, as a form of selfishness, does not appear

in all sinners, in the most disgusting forms, is only this, that their

constitutional temperament, and providential circumstances, are such

as to give a more prominent development to some other attribute of

selfishness. It is important to remark, that where any one form of

unqualified sin exists, there selfishness must exist, and there of course

every form of sin must exist, at least in embryo, and waiting only for

circumstances to develop it. When therefore, you see any form of sin,

know assuredly that selfishness, the root, is there; and expect nothing

else, if selfishness continues, than to see developed, one after

another, every form of sin as the occasion shall present itself. 

Selfishness is a volcano, sometimes smothered, but which must have

vent. The providence of God cannot but present occasions upon

which its lava-tides will burst forth and carry desolation before them.



That all these forms of sin exist, has been known and admitted. But

it does not appear to me, that the philosophy of sin has been duly

considered by many. It is important that we should get at the

fundamental or generic form of sin, that form which includes and

implies all others, or, more properly, which constitutes the whole of sin. 

Such is selfishness. "Let it be written with the point of a diamond and

engraved in the rock forever" (Jere. 17:1), that it may be known, that

where selfishness is, there every precept of the law is violated, there is

the whole of sin. Its guilt and ill desert must depend upon the light with

which the selfish mind is surrounded. But sin, the whole of sin, is

there. Such is the very nature of selfishness that it only needs the

providential occasions, and to be left without restraint, and it will show

itself to have embodied, in embryo, every form of iniquity.



13. Enmity against God is also an attribute of selfishness.



Enmity is hatred. Hatred may exist either as a phenomenon of the

sensibility, or as a state or attitude of the will. Of course I am now to

speak of enmity of heart or will. It is selfishness viewed in its relations

to God. That selfishness is enmity against God will appear:



(1.) From the Bible. The apostle Paul expressly says that "the carnal

mind (minding the flesh) is enmity against God" (Romans 8:7). It is

fully evident that the apostle, by the carnal mind, means obeying the

propensities or gratifying the desires. But this, as I have defined it, is

selfishness.



(2.) Selfishness is directly opposed to the will of God as expressed in

His law. That requires benevolence. Selfishness is its opposite, and

therefore enmity against the Lawgiver.



(3.) Selfishness is as hostile to God's government as it can be. It is

directly opposed to every law, and principle, and measure of His

government.



(4.) Selfishness is opposition to God's existence. Opposition to a

government, is opposition to the will of the governor. It is opposition to

his existence in that capacity. It is, and must be, enmity against the

existence of the ruler, as such. Selfishness must be enmity against

the existence of God's government, and as He does and must sustain

the relation of Sovereign Ruler, selfishness must be enmity against His

being. Selfishness will brook no restraint in respect to securing its

end. There is nothing in the universe it will not sacrifice to self. This is

true, or it is not selfishness. If then God's happiness, or government,

or being, come into competition with it, they must be sacrificed, were it

possible for selfishness to effect it. But God is the uncompromising

enemy of selfishness. It is the abominable thing His soul hateth. He is

more in the way of selfishness than all other beings. The opposition of

selfishness to Him is, and must be, supreme and perfect. That

selfishness is mortal enmity against God, is not left to conjecture, nor

to a mere deduction or inference. God once took to Himself human

nature, and brought Divine benevolence into conflict with human

selfishness. Men could not brook His presence upon earth, and they

rested not until they had murdered Him.



Enmity against any body or thing besides God, can be overcome

more easily than against Him. All earthly enmities can be overcome

by kindness, and change of circumstances; but what kindness, what

change of circumstances, can change the human heart, can overcome

the selfishness or enmity to God that reigns there? Selfishness offers

all manner and every possible degree of resistance to God. It

disregards God's commands. It condemns His authority. It spurns His

mercy. It outrages His feelings. It provokes His forbearance. 

Selfishness, in short, is the universal antagonist and adversary of God. 

It can no more be reconciled to His law, than it can cease to be selfish.



14. Intemperance is also a form or attribute of selfishness.



Selfishness is self-indulgence not sanctioned by the reason. It

consists in the committal of the will to the indulgence of the

propensities. Of course some one, or more, of the propensities must

have taken the control of the will. Generally, there is some ruling

passion or propensity, the influence of which becomes overshadowing,

and overrules the will for its own gratification. Sometimes it is

acquisitiveness or avarice, the love of gain; sometimes alimentiveness

or Epicureanism; sometimes it is amativeness or sexual love;

sometimes philoprogenitiveness or the love of our own children;

sometimes self-esteem or a feeling of confidence in self; sometimes

one and sometimes another of the great variety of the propensities, is

so largely developed, as to be the ruling tyrant, that lords it over the

will and over all the other propensities. It matters not which of the

propensities, or whether their united influence gains the mastery of the

will: whenever the will is subject to them, this is selfishness. It is the

carnal mind.



Intemperance consists in the undue or unlawful indulgence of any

propensity. It is, therefore, an essential element or attribute of

selfishness. All selfishness is intemperance: of course it is an unlawful

indulgence of the propensities. Intemperance has as many forms as

there are constitutional and artificial appetites to gratify. A selfish mind

cannot be temperate. If one or more of the propensities is restrained,

it is only restrained for the sake of the undue and unlawful indulgence

of another. Sometimes the tendencies are intellectual, and the bodily

appetites are denied, for the sake of gratifying the love of study. But

this is no less intemperance and selfishness, than the gratification of

amativeness or alimentiveness. Selfishness is always, and

necessarily, intemperate. It does not always or generally develop

every form of intemperance in the outward life, but a spirit of

self-indulgence must manifest itself in the intemperate gratification of

some one or more of the propensities.



Some develop self-indulgence most prominently in the form of

intemperance in eating; others in sleeping; others in lounging and

idleness; others are gossipers; others love exercise, and indulge that

propensity; others study and impair health, and induce derangement,

or seriously impair the nervous system. Indeed, there is no end to the

forms which intemperance assumes, arising from the fact of the great

number of propensities, natural and artificial, that in their turn seek and

obtain indulgence.



It should be always borne in mind, that any form of self-indulgence,

properly so called, is equally an instance of selfishness and wholly

inconsistent with any degree of virtue in the heart. But it may be

asked, are we to have no regard whatever to our tastes, appetites and

propensities? I answer, we are to have no such regard to them, as to

make their gratification the end for which we live, even for a moment. 

But there is a kind of regard to them which is lawful, and therefore, a

virtue. For example: I am on a journey for the service and glory of

God. Two ways are before me. One affords nothing to regale the

senses; the other conducts me through variegated scenery, sublime

mountain passes, deep ravines; beside bubbling brooks, and

meandering rivulets; through beds of gayest flowers and woods of

richest foliage; through aromatic groves and forests vocal with

feathered songsters. The two paths are equal in distance, and in all

respects that have a bearing upon the business I have in hand. Now,

reason dictates and demands, that I should take the path that is most

agreeable and suggestive of useful thoughts. But this is not being

governed by the propensities, but by the reason. It is its voice which I

hear and to which I listen, when I take the sunny path. The delights of

this path are a real good. As such they are not to be despised or

neglected. But if taking this path would embarrass and hinder the end

of my journey, I am not to sacrifice the greater public good for a lesser

one of my own. I must not be guided by my feelings, but by my reason

and honest judgment in this and in every case of duty. God has not

given us propensities to be our masters and to rule us, but to be our

servants and to minister to our enjoyment, when we obey the biddings

of reason and of God. They are given to render duty pleasant, and as

a reward of virtue; to make the ways of wisdom pleasurable. The

propensities are not, therefore, to be despised, nor is their annihilation

to be desired. Nor is it true that their gratification is always selfish, but

when their gratification is sanctioned and demanded by the intellect,

as in the case just supposed, and in myriads of other cases that occur,

the gratification is not a sin but a virtue. It is not selfishness but

benevolence. But let it be remembered that the indulgence must not

be sought in obedience to the propensity itself, but in obedience to the

law of reason and of God. When reason and the will of God are not

only not consulted, but even violated, it must be selfishness.



Intemperance, as a sin, does not consist in the outward act of

indulgence, but in the inward disposition. A dyspeptic who can eat but

just enough to sustain life, may be an enormous glutton at heart. He

may have a disposition, that is, he may not only desire, but he may be

willing, to eat all before him, but for the pain indulgence occasions him. 

But this is only the spirit of self-indulgence. He denies himself the

amount of food he craves in order to gratify a stronger propensity, to

wit, the dread of pain. So a man who was never intoxicated in his life,

may be guilty of the crime of drunkenness every day. He may be

prevented from drinking to inebriation only by a regard to reputation or

health, or by an avaricious disposition. It is only because he is

prevented by the greater power of some other propensity. If a man is

in such a state of mind that he would indulge all his propensities

without restraint, were it not that it is impossible, on account of the

indulgence of some being inconsistent with the indulgence of the

others, he is just as guilty as if he did indulge them all. For example:

he has a disposition, that is a will, to accumulate property. He is

avaricious in heart. He also has a strong tendency to luxury, to

licentiousness, and prodigality. The indulgence of these propensities

is inconsistent with the indulgence of avarice. But for this contrariety,

he would in his state of mind indulge them all. He wishes to do so, but

it is impossible. Now he is really guilty of all those forms of vice, and

just as blameworthy as if he indulged in them.



Intemperance, as a crime, is a state of mind. It is the attitude of the

will. It is an attribute of selfishness. It consists in the choice or

disposition to gratify the propensities, regardless of the law of

benevolence. This is intemperance; and so far as the mind is

considered, it is the whole of it. Now, inasmuch as the will is

committed to self-indulgence, and nothing but the contrariety there is

between the propensities prevents the unlimited indulgence of them

all, it follows, that every selfish person, or in other words every sinner,

is chargeable in the sight of God with every species of intemperance,

actual or conceivable. His lusts have the reign. They conduct him

whithersoever they list. He has sold himself to self-indulgence. If

there is any form of self-indulgence that is not actually developed in

him, no thanks to him. The providence of God has restrained the

outward indulgence, while there has been in him a readiness to

perpetrate any sin and every sin, from which he was not deterred by

some overpowering fear of consequences.



15. Total moral depravity is implied in selfishness as one of its

attributes. By this I intend that every selfish being is at every moment

as wicked and as blameworthy as with his knowledge he can be.



It is affirmed, both by reason and revelation, that there are degrees

of guilt; that some are more guilty than others; and that the same

individual may be more guilty at one time than at another. The same

is true of virtue. One person may be more virtuous than another,

when both are truly virtuous. And also the same person may be more

virtuous at one time than at another, although he may be virtuous at all

times. In other words, it is affirmed, both by reason and revelation,

that there is such a thing as growth, both in virtue and vice.



It is matter of general belief, also, that the same individual, with the

same degree of light or knowledge, is more or less praise or

blameworthy, as he shall do one thing or another; or, in other words,

as he shall pursue one course or another, to accomplish the end he

has in view; or, which is the same thing, that the same individual, with

the same knowledge or light, is more or less virtuous or vicious,

according to the course of outward life which he shall pursue. This I

shall attempt to show is human prejudice, and a serious and most

injurious error.



It is also generally held that two or more individuals, having precisely

the same degree of light or knowledge, and being both equally

benevolent or selfish, may, nevertheless, differ in their degree of virtue

or vice, according as they pursue different courses of outward

conduct. This also, I shall attempt to show, is fundamental error.



We can arrive at the truth upon this subject only by clearly

understanding how to measure moral obligation, and of course how to

ascertain the degree of virtue and sin. The amount or degree of virtue

or vice, or of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, is and must be

decided by reference to the degree of obligation. And here I would

remind you:



(1.) That moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of the

highest well-being of God and the universe, and:



(2.) That the conditions of the obligation are the possession of the

powers of moral agency and light, or the knowledge of the end to be

chosen.



(3.) Hence it follows that the obligation is to be measured by the

mind's honest apprehension or judgment of the intrinsic value of the

end to be chosen. That this, and nothing else, is the rule or standard

by which the obligation, and, consequently, the guilt of violating it, is to

be measured, will appear if we consider:



(1.) That the obligation cannot be measured by the infinity of God,

apart from the knowledge of the infinite value of His interests. He is an

infinite being, and His well-being must be of intrinsic and of infinite

value. But unless this be known to a moral agent, he cannot be under

obligation to will it as an ultimate end. If he knows it to be of some

value, he is bound to choose it for that reason. But the measure of his

obligation must be just equal to the clearness of his apprehension of

its intrinsic value.



Besides, if the infinity of God were alone, or without reference to the

knowledge of the agent, the rule by which moral obligation is to be

measured, it would follow, that obligation is in all cases the same, and

of course that the guilt of disobedience would also in all cases be the

same. But this, as has been said, contradicts both reason and

revelation. Thus it appears, that moral obligation, and of course guilt,

cannot be measured by the infinity of God, without reference to the

knowledge of the agent.



(2.) It cannot be measured by the infinity of His authority, without

reference to the knowledge of the agent, for the same reasons as

above.



(3.) It cannot be measured by the infinity of His moral excellence,

without reference, both to the infinite value of His interests, and of the

knowledge of the agent; for His interests are to be chosen as an end,
or for their own value, and without knowledge of their value there can

be no obligation; nor can obligation exceed knowledge.



(4.) If, again, the infinite excellence of God were alone, or without

reference to the knowledge of the agent, to be the rule by which moral

obligation is to be measured, it would follow, that guilt in all cases of

disobedience, is and must be equal. This we have seen cannot be.



(5.) It cannot be measured by the intrinsic value of the good, or

well-being of God and the universe, without reference to the

knowledge of the agent, for the same reason as above.



(6.) It cannot be measured by the particular course of life pursued by

the agent. This will appear, if we consider that moral obligation has

directly nothing to do with the outward life. It directly respects the

ultimate intention only, and that decides the course of outward action

or life. The guilt of any outward action cannot be decided by reference

to the kind of action, without regard to the intention; for the moral

character of the act must be found in the intention, and not in the

outward act or life. This leads me to remark that:



(7.) The degree of moral obligation, and of course the degree of the

guilt of disobedience, cannot be properly estimated by reference to the

nature of the intention, without respect to the degree of the knowledge

of the agent. Selfish intention is, as we have seen, a unit, always the

same; and if this were the standard by which the degree of guilt is to

be measured, it would follow that it is always the same.



(8.) Nor can obligation, nor the degree of guilt, be measured by the

tendency of sin. All sin tends to infinite evil, to ruin the sinner and from

its contagious nature, to spread and ruin the universe. Nor can any

finite mind know what the ultimate results of any sin may be, nor to

what particular evil it may tend. As all sin tends to universal and

eternal evil, if this were the criterion by which the guilt is to be

estimated, all sin would be equally guilty, which cannot be.



Again: That the guilt of sin cannot be measured by the tendency of

sin, is manifest from the fact, that moral obligation is not founded in the

tendency of action or intention, but in the intrinsic value of the end to

be intended. Estimating moral obligation, or measuring sin or

holiness, by the mere tendency of actions, is the utilitarian philosophy,

which we have shown to be false. Moral obligation respects the

choice of an end, and is founded upon the intrinsic value of the end,

and is not so much as conditionated upon the tendency of the ultimate

choice to secure its end. Therefore, tendency can never be the rule by

which obligation can be measured, nor, of course, the rule by which

guilt can be estimated.



(9.) Nor can moral obligation be estimated by the results of a moral

action or course of action. Moral obligation respects intention and

respects results no further than they were intended. Much good may

result, as from the death of Christ, without any virtue in Judas, but with

much guilt. So, much evil may result, as from the creation of the

world, without guilt in the Creator, but with great virtue. If moral

obligation is not founded or conditionated on results, it follows that guilt

cannot be duly estimated by results, without reference to knowledge

and intention.



(10.) What has been said has, I trust, rendered it evident, that moral

obligation is to be measured by the mind's honest apprehension or

judgment of the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen, to wit, the

highest well-being of God and the universe.



It should be distinctly understood, that selfishness involves the

rejection of the interests of God and of the universe, for the sake of

one's own. It refuses to will good, but upon condition that it belongs to

self. It spurns God's interests and those of the universe, and seeks

only self-interest as an ultimate end. It must follow, then, that the

selfish man's guilt is just equal to his knowledge of the intrinsic value

of those interests that he rejects. This is undeniably the doctrine of the

Bible.



Acts affords a plain instance. The apostle alludes to those past ages

when the heathen nations had no written revelation from God, and

remarks that "those times of ignorance God winked at" (Acts 17:30). 

This does not mean that God did not regard their conduct as criminal

in any degree, but it does mean that He regarded it as a sin of far less

aggravation, than that which men would now commit, if they turned

away when God commanded them all to repent. True, sin is never

absolutely a light thing; but some sins incur small guilt, when

compared with the great guilt of other sins. This is implied in the text

quoted above. "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to

him it is sin" (James 4:17). This plainly implies that knowledge is

indispensable to moral obligation; and even more than this is implied,

namely, that the guilt of any sinner is always equal to the amount of

his knowledge on the subject. It always corresponds to the mind's

perception of the value of the end which should have been chosen, but

is rejected. If a man knows he ought, in any given case, to do good,

and yet does not do it, to him this is sin the sin plainly lying in the fact

of not doing good when he knew that he could do it, and being

measured as to its guilt by the degree of that knowledge.



"Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind, ye should have no sin: but

now ye say, We see; therefore, your sin remaineth" (John 9:41). Here

Christ asserts that men without knowledge would be without sin; and

that men who have knowledge, and sin notwithstanding, are held

guilty. This plainly affirms, that the presence of light or knowledge is

requisite to the existence of sin, and obviously implies that the amount

of knowledge possessed is the measure of the guilt of sin.



It is remarkable that the Bible everywhere assumes first truths. It

does not stop to prove them, or even assert them but seems to

assume, that every one knows and will admit them. As I have been

recently writing on moral government, and studying the Bible as to its

teachings on this class of subjects, I have been often struck with this

remarkable fact.



"And that servant which knew his lord's will, and prepared not

himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many

stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes,

shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given,

of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed

much, of him will they ask the more" (Luke 12:47, 48). Here we have

the doctrine laid down and the truth assumed, that men shall be

punished according to knowledge. To whom much light is given, of

him shall much obedience be required. This is precisely the principle,

that God requires of men according to the light they have.



Selfishness is the rejection of all obligation. It is the violation of all

obligation. The sin of selfishness is then complete; that is, the guilt of

selfishness is as great as with its present light it can be. What can

make it greater with present light? Can the course that it takes to

realize its end mitigate its guilt? No; for whatever course it takes, it is

for a selfish reason, and, therefore, it can in nowise lessen the guilt of

the intention. Can the course it takes to realize its end without more

light, increase the guilt of the sin? No; for the sin lies exclusively in

having the selfish intention, and the guilt can be measured only by the

degree of illumination or knowledge under which the intention is

formed and maintained. The intention necessitates the use of the

means; and whatever means the selfish person uses, it is for one and

the same reason, to gratify himself. As I said in a former lecture, if the

selfish man were to preach the gospel, it would be only because, upon

the whole, it was most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all

for the sake of the good of being, as an end. If he should become a

pirate, it would be for exactly the same reason, to wit, that this course

is, upon the whole, most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all

for the reason that course is evil in itself. Whichever course he

takes, he takes it for precisely the same ultimate reason; and with the

same degree of light it must involve the same degree of guilt. If light

increase, his guilt must increase, but not otherwise. The proposition

is, that every selfish being is, at every moment, as blameworthy as

with his present knowledge he can be. Which of these courses may

tend ultimately to the most evil, no finite being can say, nor which shall

result in the greatest evil. Guilt is not to be measured by unknown

tendencies or results, but belongs to the intention; and its degree is to

be measured alone by the mind's apprehension of the reason of the

obligation violated, namely, the intrinsic value of the good of God and

the universe, which selfishness rejects. Now, it should be

remembered, that whichever course the sinner takes to realize his

end, it is the end at which he aims. He intends the end. If he become

a preacher of the gospel for a selfish reason, he has no right regard to

the good of being. If he regards it at all, it is only as a means of his

own good. So, if he becomes a pirate, it is not from malice, or a

disposition to do evil for its own sake, but only to gratify himself. If he

has any regard at all to the evil he may do, it is only to gratify himself

that he regards it. Whether, therefore, he preach or pray, or rob and

plunder upon the high seas, he does it only for one end, that is, for

precisely the same ultimate reason; and of course his sinfulness is

complete, in the sense that it can be varied only by varying light. This

I know is contrary to common opinion, but it is the truth, and must be

known; and it is of the highest importance that these fundamental

truths of morality and of immorality should be held up to the minds of

all.



Should the sinner abstain from any course of vice because it is

wicked, it cannot be because he is benevolent, for this would

contradict the supposition that he is selfish, or that he is a sinner. If, in

consideration that an act or course is wicked, he abstains from it, it

must be for a selfish reason. It may be in obedience to phrenological

conscientiousness, or it may be from fear of hell, or of disgrace, or

from remorse; at all events, it cannot but be for some selfish reason.



Total moral depravity is an attribute of selfishness, in the sense, that

every selfish person is at all times just as wicked and blameworthy as

with his present light he can be.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 19



SANCTIONS OF MORAL LAW, NATURAL AND GOVERNMENTAL



In the discussion of this subject, I shall show:



What constitutes the sanctions of law.



1. The sanctions of law are the motives to obedience, the natural

and the governmental consequences or results of obedience and of

disobedience.



2. They are remuneratory, that is, they promise reward to obedience.



3. They are vindicatory, that is, they threaten the disobedient with

punishment.



4. They are natural, that is, happiness is to some extent naturally

connected with, and the necessary consequence of, obedience to

moral law, and misery is naturally and necessarily connected with, and

results from, disobedience to moral law, or from acting contrary to the

nature and relations of moral beings.



5. Sanctions are governmental. By governmental sanctions are

intended:



(1.) The favor of the government as due to obedience.



(2.) A positive reward bestowed upon the obedient by government. 



(3.) The displeasure of government towards the disobedient.



(4.) Direct punishment inflicted by the government as due to

disobedience.



All happiness and misery resulting from obedience or disobedience,

either natural, or from the favor, or frown of government, are to be

regarded as constituting the sanctions of law.



In what light sanctions are to be regarded.



1. Sanctions are to be regarded as an expression of the benevolent

regard of the lawgiver for his subjects: the motives which he exhibits to

induce in the subjects the course of conduct that will secure their

highest well-being.



2. They are to be regarded as an expression of his estimation of the

justice, necessity, and value of the precept to the subjects of his

government.



3. They are to be regarded as an expression of the amount or

strength of his desire to secure the happiness of his subjects.



4. They are to be regarded as an expression of his opinion in respect

to the desert of disobedience.



The natural sanctions are to be regarded as a demonstration of the

justice, necessity and perfection of the precept.



By what rule sanctions ought to be graduated.



1. We have seen that moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic

value of the well-being of God and of the universe, and conditionated

upon the perception of its value; and,



2. That guilt is always to be measured by the perceived value of the

end which moral beings ought to choose.



3. The sanctions of law should be graduated by the intrinsic merit

and demerit of holiness and sin.



God's law has sanctions.



1. That sin, or disobedience to the moral law, is attended with, and

results in, misery, is a matter of consciousness.



2. That virtue or holiness is attended with, and results in happiness,

is also attested by consciousness.



3. Therefore that God's law has natural sanctions, both remuneratory

and vindicatory, is a matter of fact.



4. That there are governmental sanctions added to the natural, must

be true, or God, in fact, has no government but that of natural

consequences.



5. The Bible expressly, and in every variety of form, teaches that

God will reward the righteous and punish the wicked.



The perfection and duration of the remuneratory sanctions of the law

of God.



1. The perfection of the natural reward is, and must be, proportioned

to the perfection of virtue.



2. The duration of the remuneratory sanction must be equal to the

duration of obedience. This cannot possibly be otherwise.



3. If the existence and virtue of men are immortal, his happiness

must be endless.



4. The Bible most unequivocally asserts the immortality both of the

existence and virtue of the righteous, and also that their happiness

shall be endless.



5. The very design and end of government make it necessary that

governmental reward should be as perfect and unending as virtue.



Penal inflictions under the government of God must be endless.



Here the inquiry is, what kind of death is intended, where death is

denounced against the transgressor, as the penalty of the law of God?



1. It is not merely natural death for:



(1.) This would, in reality, be no penalty at all. But it would be

offering a reward to sin. If natural death is all that is intended, and if

persons, as soon as they are naturally dead, have suffered the penalty

of the law, and their souls go immediately to heaven, the case stands

thus: if your obedience is perfect and perpetual, you shall live in this

world forever; but if you sin, you shall die and go immediately to

heaven. "This would be hire and salary," and not punishment.



(2.) If natural death be the penalty of God's law, the righteous, who

are forgiven, should not die a natural death.



(3.) If natural death be the penalty of God's law, there is no such

thing as forgiveness, but all must actually endure the penalty.



(4.) If natural death be the penalty, then infants and animals suffer

this penalty, as well as the most abandoned transgressors.



(5.) If natural death be the penalty, and the only penalty, it sustains

no proportion whatever to the guilt of sin.



(6.) Natural death would be no adequate expression of the

importance of the precept.



2. The penalty of God's law is not spiritual death.



(1.) Because spiritual death is a state of entire sinfulness.



(2.) To make a state of entire sinfulness the penalty of the law of

God, would be to make the penalty and the breach of the precept

identical.



(3.) It would be making God the author of sin, and would represent

Him as compelling the sinner to commit one sin as the punishment for

another, as forcing him into a state of total and perpetual rebellion, as

the reward of his first transgression.



3. But the penal sanction of the law of God is endless death, or that

state of endless suffering which is the natural and governmental result

of sin or of spiritual death.



Before I proceed to the proof of this, I will notice an objection which

is often urged against the doctrine of endless punishment. The

objection is one, but it is stated in three different forms. This, and

every other objection to the doctrine of endless punishment, with

which I am acquainted, is leveled against the justice of such a

governmental infliction.



(1.) It is said that endless punishment is unjust, because life is so

short, that men do not live long enough in this world to commit so

great a number of sins as to deserve endless punishment. To this I

answer that it is founded in ignorance or disregard of a universal

principle of government, viz., that one breach of the precept always

incurs the penalty of the law, whatever that penalty is. The length of

time employed in committing a sin, has nothing to do with its

blameworthiness or guilt. It is the design which constitutes the moral

character of the action, and not the length of the time required for its

accomplishment. This objection takes for granted, that it is the

number of sins, and not the intrinsic guilt of sin, that constitutes its

blameworthiness, whereas it is the intrinsic desert or guilt of sin, as we

shall soon see, that renders it deserving of endless punishment.



(2.) Another form of the objection is, that a finite creature cannot

commit an infinite sin. But none but an infinite sin can deserve

endless punishment: therefore endless punishments are unjust.



This objection takes for granted that man is so diminutive a creature,

so much less than the Creator, that he cannot deserve His endless

frown. Which is the greater crime, for a child to insult his playfellow, or

his parent? Which would involve the most guilt, for a man to smite his

neighbor and his equal, or his lawful sovereign? The higher the ruler

is exalted above the subject in his nature, character, and rightful

authority, the greater is the obligation of the subject to will his good, to

render to him obedience, and the greater is the guilt of the

transgression in the subject. Therefore, the fact that man is so

infinitely below his Maker, does but enhance the guilt of his rebellion,

and render him all the more worthy of His endless frown.



(3.) A third form of the objection is, that sin is not an infinite evil; and

therefore, does not deserve endless punishment.



This objection may mean either, that sin would not produce infinite

mischief if unrestrained, or that it does not involve infinite guilt. It

cannot mean the first, for it is agreed on all hands, that misery must

continue as long as sin does, and therefore, that sin unrestrained

would produce endless evil. The objection, therefore, must mean, that

sin does not involve infinite guilt. Observe, then, the point at issue is,

what is the intrinsic demerit or guilt of sin? What does all sin in its own

nature deserve? They who deny the justice of endless punishment,

manifestly consider the guilt of sin as a mere trifle. They who maintain

the justice of endless punishment, consider sin as an evil of

immeasurable magnitude, and, in its own nature, deserving of endless

punishment. Proof:



Should a moral agent refuse to choose that as an ultimate end which

is of no intrinsic value, he would thereby contract no guilt, because he

would violate no obligation. But should he refuse to will the good of

God and of his neighbor, he would violate an obligation, and of course

contract guilt. This shows that guilt attaches to the violation of

obligation, and that a thing is blameworthy because it is the violation of

an obligation.



We have seen that sin is selfishness, that it consists in preferring

self-gratification to the infinite interests of God and of the universe. 

We have also seen that obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of

that good which moral agents ought to will to God and to the universe,

and is equal to the affirmed value of that good. We have also seen

that every moral agent, by a law of his own reason, necessarily affirms

that God is infinite, and that the endless happiness and well-being of

God and of the universe, is of infinite value. Hence it follows, that

refusal to will this good is a violation of infinite or unlimited obligation,

and, consequently involves unlimited guilt. It is as certain that the guilt

of any sin is unlimited, as that obligation to will the good of God and of

the universe is unlimited. To deny consistently that the guilt of sin is

unlimited, it must be shown, that obligation to will good to God is

unlimited. To maintain consistently this last, it must be shown, that

moral agents have not the idea that God is infinite. Indeed, to deny

that the guilt of sin is in any instance less than boundless, is as absurd

as to deny the guilt of sin altogether.



Having shown that moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value

of the highest well-being of God and of the universe, that it is always

equal to the soul's knowledge of the value of those interests, and

having shown also, that every moral agent necessarily has the idea

more or less clearly developed, that the value of those interests is

infinite, it follows that the law is infinitely unjust, if its penal sanctions

are not endless. Law must be just in two respects: the precept must

be in accordance with the law of nature, and the penalty must be equal

to the importance of the precept. That which has not these two

peculiarities is not just, and therefore, is not and cannot be law. 

Either, then, God has no law, or its penal sanctions are endless. That

the penal sanctions of the law of God are endless, is evident from the

fact, that a less penalty would not exhibit as high motives as the nature

of the case admits, to restrain sin and promote virtue. Natural justice

demands that God should exhibit as high motives to secure obedience

as the value of the law demands and the nature of the case admits.



The tendency of sin to perpetuate and aggravate itself, affords

another strong inference, that the sinfulness and misery of the wicked

will be eternal.



The fact, that punishment has no tendency to originate disinterested

love in a selfish mind towards him who inflicts the punishment, also

affords a strong presumption, that future punishment will be eternal.



But let us examine this question in the light of revelation.



The Bible, in a great many ways, represents the future punishment

of the wicked as eternal, and never once represents it otherwise. It

expresses the duration of the future punishment of the wicked by the

same terms, and, in every way, as forcibly as it expresses the duration

of the future happiness of the righteous. I will here introduce, without

comment, some passages of scripture confirmatory of this last remark. 

"The hope of the righteous shall be gladness: but the expectation of

the wicked shall perish" (Prov. 10:28). "When a wicked man dieth, his

expectation shall perish; and the hope of unjust men perisheth" (Prov.

11:7). "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall

awake; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting

contempt" (Daniel 12:2). "Then shall He say also unto them on the left

hand, Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the

devil and his angels: for I was an hungered, and ye gave Me no meat:

I was thirsty, and ye gave Me no drink. And these shall go away into

everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal" (Matt.

25:41, 42, 46). "And if thy hand offend thee, cut, it off: it is better for

thee to enter into life maimed than having two hands to go into hell,

into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not,

and the fire is not quenched" (Mark 9:43, 44). "Whose fan is in His

hand, and He will thoroughly purge His floor; and will gather the wheat

into His garner; but the chaff He will burn with fire unquenchable"

(Luke 3:17). "And besides all this, between us and you there is a great

gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you, cannot;

neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence" (Luke

16:26). "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that

believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth

on him" (John 3:36). "And to you who are troubled, rest with us, when

the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with His mighty angels,

in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that

obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished

with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from

the glory of His power" (2 Thess. 1:7-9). "And the angels which kept

not their first estate, but left their own habitation, He hath reserved in

everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great

day. Even as Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities about them, in like

manner, giving themselves over to fornication, and going after strange

flesh, are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal

fire. Raging waves of the sea, foaming out their own shame;

wandering stars, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness

forever" (Jude:6, 7, 13). "And the third angel followed them, saying

with a loud voice, If any man worship the beast and his image, and

receive his mark in his forehead, or in his hand, the same shall drink of

the wine of the wrath of God which is poured out without mixture into

the cup of His indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and

brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of

the Lamb: and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and

ever: and they have no rest day nor night, who worship the beast and

his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name" (Rev.

14:9-11). "And the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of

fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and

shall be tormented day and night forever and ever" (Rev. 20:10). But

there is scarcely any end to the multitude of passages that teach

directly, or by inference, both the fact and the endlessness of the

future punishment of the wicked.

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