LECTURE 30



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION



Wherein saints and sinners must differ.



1. Let it be distinctly remembered, that all unregenerate persons,

without exception, have one heart, that is, they are selfish. This is

their whole character. They are universally and only devoted to

self-gratification. Their unregenerate heart consists in this selfish

disposition, or in this selfish choice. This choice is the foundation of,

and the reason for, all their activity. One and the same ultimate

reason actuates them in all they do, and in all they omit, and that

reason is either presently or remotely, directly or indirectly, to gratify

themselves.



2. The regenerate heart is disinterested benevolence. In other

words, it is love to God and our neighbor. All regenerate hearts are

precisely similar. All true saints, whenever they have truly the heart of

the saints of God, are actuated by one and the same motive. They

have only one ultimate reason for all they do, and suffer, or omit. They

have one ultimate intention, one end. They live for one and the same

object, and that is the same end for which God lives.



3. The saint is governed by reason, the law of God, or the moral law;

in other words still, the law of disinterested and universal benevolence

is His law. This law is not only revealed and developed in his

intelligence, but it is written in his heart. So that the law of his intellect

is the law of his heart. He not only sees and acknowledges what he

ought to do and be, but he is conscious to himself, and gives evidence

to others, whether they receive it and are convinced by it or not, that

his heart, his will, or intention, is conformed to his convictions of duty. 

He sees the path of duty, and follows it. He knows what he ought to

will, intend, and do, and does it. Of this he is conscious. And of this

others may be satisfied, if they are observing, charitable, and candid.



4. The sinner is contrasted with this, in the most important and

fundamental respects. He is not governed by reason and principle,

but by feeling, desire, and impulse. Sometimes his feelings coincide

with the intelligence, and sometimes they do not. But when they do so

coincide, the will does not pursue its course out of respect or in

obedience to the law of the intelligence, but in obedience to the

impulse of the sensibility, which, for the time being, impels in the same

direction as does the law of the reason. But for the most part the

impulses of the sensibility incline him to worldly gratifications, and in

an opposite direction to that which the intelligence points out. This

leads him to a course of life that is too manifestly the opposite of

reason, to leave any room for doubt as to what his true character is.



5. The saint is justified, and he has the evidence of it in the peace of

his own mind. He is conscious of obeying the law of reason and of

love. Consequently he naturally has that kind and degree of peace

that flows from the harmony of his will with the law of his intelligence. 

He sometimes has conflicts with the impulses of feeling and desire. 

But unless he is overcome, these conflicts, though they may cause

him inwardly, and, perhaps audibly, to groan, do not interrupt his

peace. There are still the elements of peace within him. His heart and

conscience are at one, and while this is so, he has thus far the

evidence of justification in himself. That is, he knows that God cannot

condemn his present state. Conscious as he is of conformity of heart

to the moral law, he cannot but affirm to himself, that the Lawgiver is

pleased with his present attitude. But further, he has also within the

Spirit of God witnessing with his spirit, that he is a child of God,

forgiven, accepted, adopted. He feels the filial spirit drawing his heart

to exclaim, Father, Father. He is conscious that he pleases God, and

has God's smile of approbation.



He is at peace with himself, because he affirms his heart to be in

unison with the law of love. His conscience does not upbraid, but

smile. The harmony of his own being is a witness to himself, that this

is the state in which he was made to exist. He is at peace with God,

because he and God are pursuing precisely the same end, and by the

same means. There can be no collision, no controversy between

them. He is at peace with the universe, in the sense, that he has no

ill-will, and no malicious feelings or wish to gratify, in the injury of any

one of the creatures of God. He has no fear, but to sin against God. 

He is not influenced on the one hand by the fear of hell, nor on the

other by the hope of reward. He is not anxious about his own

salvation, but prayerfully and calmly leaves that question in the hands

of God, and concerns himself only to promote the highest glory of

God, and the good of being. "Being justified by faith, he has peace

with God through our Lord Jesus Christ" (Romans 5:1). "There is now

no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after

the flesh, but after the Spirit" (Romans 8:1).



6. The sinner's experience is the opposite of this. He is under

condemnation, and seldom can so far deceive himself, even in his

most religious moods, as to imagine that he has a consciousness of

acceptance either with his own conscience or with God. There is

almost never a time in which he has not a greater or less degree of

restlessness and misgiving within. Even when he is most engaged in

religion, as he supposes, he finds himself dissatisfied with himself. 

Something is wrong. There is a struggle and a pang. He may not

exactly see where and what the difficulty is. He does not, after all,

obey reason and conscience, and is not governed by the law and will

of God. In not having the consciousness of this obedience, his

conscience does not smile. He sometimes feels deeply, and acts as

he feels, and is conscious of being sincere in the sense of feeling what

he says, and acting in obedience to deep feeling. But this does not

satisfy conscience. He is more or less wretched after all. He has not

true peace. Sometimes he has a self-righteous quiet and enjoyment. 

But this is neither peace of conscience nor peace with God. He, after

all, feels uneasy and condemned, notwithstanding all his feeling, and

zeal, and activity. They are not of the right kind. Hence they do not

satisfy the conscience. They do not meet the demands of his

intelligence. Conscience does not approve. He has not, after all, true

peace. He is not justified; he cannot be fully and permanently satisfied

that he is.



7. Saints are interested in, and sympathize with, every effort to

reform mankind, and promote the interests of truth and righteousness

in the earth. The good of being is the end for which the saint really

and truly lives. This is not merely held by him as a theory, as an

opinion, as a theological or philosophical speculation. It is in his heart,

and precisely for this reason he is a saint. He is a saint just because

the theory, which is lodged in the head of both saint and sinner, has

also a lodgment and reigning power in his heart, and consequently in

his life.



As saints supremely value the highest good of being, they will, and

must, take a deep interest in whatever is promotive of that end. 

Hence, their spirit is necessarily that of the reformer. To the universal

reformation of the world they stand committed. To this end they are

devoted. For this end they live, and move, and have their being. 

Every proposed reform interests them, and naturally leads them to

examine its claims. The fact is, they are studying and devising ways

and means to convert, sanctify, reform mankind. Being in this state of

mind, they are predisposed to lay hold on whatever gives promise of

good to man. True saints love reform. It is their business, their

profession, their life to promote it; consequently, they are ready to

examine the claims of any proposed reform; candid and self-denying,

and ready to be convinced, however much self-denial it may call them

to. They have actually rejected self-indulgence, as the end for which

they live, and are ready to sacrifice any form of self-indulgence, for the

sake of promoting the good of men and the glory of God. The saint is

truly and greatly desirous and in earnest, to reform all sin out of the

world, and just for this reason is ready to hail with joy, and to try

whatever reform seems, from the best light he can get, to bid fair to

put down sin, and the evils that are in the world. Even mistaken men,

who are honestly endeavoring to reform mankind, and denying their

appetites, as many have done in dietetic reform, are deserving of the

respect of their fellow men. Suppose their philosophy to be incorrect,

yet they have intended well. They have manifested a disposition to

deny themselves, for the purpose of promoting the good of others. 

They have been honest and zealous in this. Now no true saint can

feel or express contempt for such reformers, however much mistaken

they may be. No: his natural sentiments and feelings will be, and must

be, the reverse of contempt or censoriousness in respect to them. If

their mistake has been injurious, h may mourn over the evil, but will

not, cannot, severely judge the honest reformer. War, slavery,

licentiousness, and all such like evils and abominations, are

necessarily regarded by the saint as great and sore evils, and he longs

for their complete and final overthrow. It is impossible that a truly

benevolent mind should not thus regard these abominations of

desolation.



The saints in all ages have been reformers. I know it is said, that

neither prophets, Christ, nor apostles, nor primitive saints and martyrs

declaimed against war and slavery, etc. But they did. The entire

instructions of Christ, and of apostles and prophets, were directly

opposed to these and all other evils. If they did not come out against

certain legalized forms of sin, and denounce them by name, and

endeavor to array public sentiment against them, it is plainly because

they were, for the most part, employed in a preliminary work. To

introduce the gospel as a divine revelation; to set up and organize the

visible kingdom of God on earth; to lay a foundation for universal

reform, was rather their business, than the pushing forward of

particular branches of reform. The overthrow of state idolatry, the

great and universal sin of the world in that age; the labor of getting the

world and the governments of earth to tolerate and receive the gospel

as a revelation from the one only living and true God; the controversy

with the Jews, to overthrow their objections to Christianity; in short, the

great and indispensable and preliminary work of gaining for Christ and

His gospel a hearing, and an acknowledgment of its divinity, was

rather their work, the pushing of particular precepts and doctrines of

the gospel to their legitimate results and logical consequences. This

work once done, has left it for later saints to bring the particular truths,

precepts, and doctrines of the blessed gospel to bear down every form

of sin. Prophets, Christ, and His apostles, have left on the pages of

inspiration no dubious testimony against every form of sin. The spirit

of the whole Bible breathes from every page blasting and annihilation

upon every unholy abomination, while it smiles upon everything of

good report that promises blessings to man and glory to God. The

saint is not merely sometimes a reformer; he is always so.



8. The sinner is never a reformer in any proper sense of the word. 

He is selfish and never opposed to sin, or to any evil whatever, from

any such motive as renders him worthy the name of reformer. He

sometimes selfishly advocates and pushes certain outward reforms;

but as certain as it is that he is an unregenerate sinner, so certain is it,

that he is not endeavoring to reform sin out of the world from any

disinterested love to God or to man. Many considerations of a selfish

nature may engage him at times in certain branches of reform. 

Regard to his reputation may excite his zeal in such an enterprise. 

Self-righteous considerations may also lead him to enlist in the army of

reformers. His relation to particular forms of vice may influence him to

set his face against them. Constitutional temperament and tendencies

may lead to his engaging in certain reforms. For example, his

constitutional benevolence, as phrenologists call it, may be such that

from natural compassion he may engage in reforms. But this is only

giving way to an impulse of the sensibility, and it is not principle that

governs him. His natural conscientiousness may modify his outward

character, and lead him to take hold of some branches of reform. But

whatever other motives he may have, sure it is that he is not a

reformer; for he is a sinner, and it is absurd to say that a sinner is truly

engaged in opposing sin as sin. No, it is not sin that he is opposing,

but he is seeking to gratify an ambitious, a self-righteous, or some

other spirit, the gratification of which is selfishness.



But as a general thing, it is easy to distinguish sinners, or deceived

professors from saints by looking steadfastly at their temper and

deportment in their relations to reform. They are self-indulgent, and

just for the reason that they are devoted to self-indulgence. 

Sometimes their self-indulgent spirit takes on one type, and

sometimes another. Of course they need not be expected to ridicule

or oppose every branch of reform, just because it is not every reformer

that will rebuke their favorite indulgences, and call them to reform their

lives. But as every sinner has one or more particular form of

indulgence to which he is wedded, and as saints are devising and

pushing reforms in all directions, it is natural that some sinners should

manifest particular hostility to one reform, and some to another. 

Whenever a reform is proposed that would reform them out of their

favorite indulgences, they will either ridicule it, and those that propose

it, or storm and rail, or in some way oppose or wholly neglect it. Not

so, and so it cannot be, with a true saint. He has no indulgence that

he values when put in competition with the good of being. Nay, he

holds his all and his life at the disposal of the highest good. Has he, in

ignorance of the evils growing out of his course, used ardent spirits,

wine, tobacco, ale, or porter? Has he held slaves; been engaged in

any traffic that is found to be injurious; has he favored war through

ignorance; or, in short, has he committed any mistake whatever? Let

but a reformer come forth and propose to discuss the tendency of

such things; let the reformer bring forth his strong reasons; and, from

the very nature of true religion, the saint will listen with attention, weigh

with candor, and suffer himself to be carried by truth, heart, and hand,

and influence with the proposed reform, if it be worthy of support, how

much soever it conflict with his former habits. This must be true, if he

has a single eye to the good of being, which is the very characteristic

of a saint.



9. The true saint denies himself. Self-denial must be his

characteristic, just for the reason that regeneration implies this. 

Regeneration, as we have seen, consists in turning away the heart or

will from the supreme choice of self-gratification, to a choice of the

highest well-being of God and of the universe. This is denying self. 

This is abandoning self-indulgence, and pursuing or committing the

will, and the whole being to an opposite end. This is the dethroning of

self, and the enthroning of God in the heart. Self-denial does not

consist, as some seem to imagine, in acts of outward austerity, in an

ascetic and penance-doing course of starvation, and mere legal, and

outward retrenchment, in wearing a coat with one button, and in

similar acts of "will worship and voluntary humility, and neglecting the

body"; but self-denial consists in the actual and total renunciation of

selfishness in the heart. It consists in ceasing wholly to live for self,

and can be exercised just as truly upon a throne, surrounded with the

paraphernalia of royalty, as in a cottage of logs, or as in rags, and in

caves and dens of the earth.



The king upon his throne may live and reign to please himself. He

may surround himself with all that can minister to his pleasure, his

ambition, his pride, his lusts, and his power. He may live to and for

himself. Self-pleasing, self-gratification, self-aggrandizement, may be

the end for which he lives. This is selfishness. But he may also live

and reign for God, and for his people. That is, he may be as really

devoted to God, and render this as a service to God, as well as

anything else. No doubt his temptation is great; but, nevertheless, he

may be perfectly self-denying in all this. He may not do what he does

for his own sake, nor be what he is, nor possess what he possesses

for his own sake, but, accommodating his state and equipage to his

relations, he may be as truly self-denying as others in the humbler

walks of life. This is not an impossible, though, in all probability, a rare

case. A man may as truly be rich for God as poor for him, if his

relations and circumstances make it essential to his highest usefulness

that he should possess a large capital. He is in the way of great

temptation; but if this is plainly his duty, and submitted to for God and

the world, he may have grace to be entirely self-denying in these

circumstances, and all the more commendable, for standing fast under

these circumstances.



So a poor man may be poor from principle, or from necessity. He

may be submissive and happy in his poverty. He may deny himself

even the comfort of life, and do all this to promote the good of being,

or he may do it to promote his own interest, temporal or eternal, to

secure a reputation for piety, to appease a morbid conscience, to

appease his fears, or to secure the favor of God. In all things he may

be selfish. He may be happy in this, because it may be real

self-denial: or he may be murmuring at his poverty, may complain, and

be envious at others who are not poor. He may be censorious, and

think everybody proud and selfish who dresses better, or possesses a

better house and equipage than he does. He may set up his views as

a standard, and denounce as proud and selfish all who do not square

their lives by his rule. This is selfishness, and these manifestations

demonstrate the fact. A man may forego the use of a coat, or a cloak,

or a horse, or a carriage, or any and every comfort and convenience of

life, and all this may proceed from either a benevolent or a selfish state

of mind. If it be benevolence and true self-denial, it will be cheerfully

and happily submitted to, without murmuring and repining, without

censoriousness, and without envy towards others, without insisting

that others shall do and be, just what be does and is. He will allow the

judge his ermine, the king his robes of state, and the merchant his

capital, and the husbandman his fields and his flocks, and will see the

reasonableness and propriety of all this.



But if it be selfishness and the spirit of self-gratification instead of

self-denial, he will be ascetic, caustic, sour, ill-natured, unhappy,

severe, censorious, envious, and disposed to complain of, and pick at,

the extravagance and self-indulgence of others.



Especially does the true saint deny his appetites and passions. His

artificial appetites he denies absolutely, whenever his attention is

called to the fact and the nature of the indulgence. The Christian is

such just because he has become the master of his appetites and

passions, has denied them, and consecrated himself to God. The

sinner is a sinner just because his appetites and passions and the

impulses of his desires are his masters, and he bows down to them,

and serves them. They are his masters instead of his servants, as

they are made to be. He is consecrated to them and not to God. But

the saint has ceased to live to gratify his lusts. Has he been a

drunkard, a rake, a tobacco user? Has he been in self-indulgent

habits of any kind? He is reformed: old things are past away, and

behold all things are become new. Has he still any habit the character

of which he has either mistaken or not considered; such as smoking,

chewing, or snuffing tobacco, using injurious stimulants of any kind,

high and unwholesome living, extravagant dressing or equipage,

retiring late at night and rising late in the morning, eating too much, or

between meals, or in short, has there been any form of self-indulgence

about him whatever? Only let his attention be called to it, he will listen

with candor, be convinced by reasonable evidence, and renounce his

evil habits without conferring with flesh and blood. All this is implied in

regeneration, and must follow from its very nature. This also the Bible

everywhere affirms to be true of the saints. "They have crucified the

flesh with its affections and lusts" (Gal. 5:24). It should be forever

remembered, that a self-indulgent Christian is a contradiction. 

Self-indulgence and Christianity are terms of opposition.



10. The sinner does not deny himself. He may not gratify all his

desires, because the desires are often contradictory, and he must

deny one for the sake of indulging another. Avarice may be so strong

as to forbid his indulging in extravagance in eating, drinking, dressing,

or equipage. His love of reputation may be so strong as to prevent his

engaging in anything disgraceful, and so on.



But self-indulgence is his law notwithstanding. The fear of hell, or

his desire to be saved, may forbid his outward indulgence in any

known sin. But still he lives, and moves, and has his being only for the

sake of indulging himself. He may be a miser, and starve and freeze

himself, and deny himself the necessaries of life; yet self-indulgence is

his law. Some lusts he may and must control, as they may be

inconsistent with others. But others he does not control. He is a

slave. He bows down to his lusts and serves them. He is enslaved by

his propensities, so that he cannot overcome them. This

demonstrates that he is a sinner and unregenerate, whatever his

station and profession may be. One who cannot, because he will not,

conquer himself and his lusts this is the definition of an unregenerate

sinner. He is one over whom some form of desire, or lust, or appetite,

or passion has dominion. He cannot, or rather will not, overcome it. 

This one is just as certainly in sin, as that sin is sin.



11. The truly regenerate soul overcomes sin.



Let the Bible be heard upon this subject. "And hereby we do know

that we know Him, if we keep His commandments. He that saith I

know Him, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar, and the truth

is not in him" (1 John 2:3, 4). "And every man that hath this hope in

him purifieth himself, even as He is pure. Whosoever committeth sin

transgresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law. And

ye know that He was manifested to take away our sins: and in Him is

no sin. Whosoever abideth in Him sinneth not: whosoever sinneth

hath not seen Him, neither known Him. Little children, let no man

deceive you: he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as He is

righteous. He that committeth sin, is of the devil; for the devil sinneth

from the beginning. For this purpose the Son of God was manifested,

that He might destroy the works of the devil. Whosoever is born of

God doth not commit sin; for His seed remaineth in him: and he cannot

sin, because he is born of God. In this the children of God are

manifest, and the children of the devil; whosoever doth not

righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother" (1

John 3:3-10). "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of

God, and every one that loveth Him that begat, loveth him also that is

begotten of Him. By this we know that we love the children of God,

when we love God and keep His commandments. For this is the love

of God, that we keep His commandments; and His commandments

are not grievous. For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the

world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith"

(1 John 5:1-4).



These passages, understood and pressed to the letter, would not

only teach, that all regenerate souls overcome and live without sin, but

also that sin is impossible to them. This last circumstance, as well as

other parts of scripture, forbid us to press this strong language to the

letter. But this much must be understood and admitted, that to

overcome sin is the rule with every one who is born of God, and that

sin is only the exception; that the regenerate habitually live without sin,

and fall into sin only at intervals, so few and far between, that in strong

language it may be said in truth they do not sin. This is surely the

least which can be meant by the spirit of these texts, not to press them

to the letter. And this is precisely consistent with many other passages

of scripture, several of which I have quoted; such as these: "Therefore,

if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed

away; behold, all things are become new" (2 Cor. 5:17). "For in Jesus

Christ, neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision; but

faith which worketh by love." (Gal. 6:6). "For in Christ Jesus neither

circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new

creature" (Gal. 6:15). "There is therefore now no condemnation to

them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after

the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me

free from the law of sin and death. For what the law could not do, in

that it was weak through the flesh, God sending His own Son in the

likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the

righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the

flesh, but after the Spirit" (Romans 8:1-4). "What shall we say then? 

Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. How

shall we that are dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not,

that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized

into His death? Therefore, we are buried with Him by baptism into

death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of

the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we

have been planted together in the likeness of His death, we shall be

also in the likeness of His resurrection: knowing this, that our old man

is crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that

henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from

sin. Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live

with Him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no

more; death hath no more dominion over Him. For in that He died, He

died unto sin once: but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God. Likewise

reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto

God, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Let not sin therefore reign in you

mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof. Neither yield

ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin: but yield

yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead, and your

members as instruments of righteousness unto God. For sin shall not

have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law but under grace"

(Romans 6:1-14).



The fact is, if God is true, and the Bible is true, the truly regenerate

soul has overcome the world, the flesh, and Satan, and sin, and is a

conqueror, and more than a conqueror. He triumphs over temptation

as a general thing, and the triumphs of temptation over him are so far

between, that it is said of him in the living oracles, that he does not,

cannot sin. He is not a sinner, but a saint. He is sanctified; a holy

person; a child and son of God. If at any time he is overcome, it is

only to rise again, and soon return like the weeping prodigal. "The

steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord: and he delighteth in his

way. Though he fall he shall not be utterly cast down: for the Lord

upholdeth him with his hand" (Psalms 37:23, 24).



12. The sinner is the slave of sin. The seventh of Romans is his

experience in his best estate. When he has the most hope of himself,

and others have the most hope of his good estate, he goes no further

than to make and break resolutions. His life is but a death in sin. He

has not the victory. He sees the right, but does it not. Sin is his

master, to whom he yields himself a servant to obey. He only tries, as

he says, to forsake sin, but does not in fact forsake it, in his heart. 

And yet because he is convicted, and has desires, and forms

resolutions of amendment, he hopes he is regenerated. O, what a

horrible delusion! Stop short with conviction, with the hope that he is

already a Christian! Alas! How many are already in hell who have

stumbled at this stumbling stone!



13. The subject of regeneration may know, and if honest he must

know, for what end he lives. There is, perhaps, nothing of which he

may be more certain than of his regenerate or unregenerate state; and

if he will keep in mind what regeneration is, it would seem that he can

hardly mistake his own character, so far as to imagine himself to be

regenerate when he is not. The great difficulty that has been in the

way of the regenerate soul's knowing his regeneration, and has led to

so much doubt and embarrassment upon this subject, is that

regeneration has been regarded as belonging to the sensibility, and

hence the attention has been directed to the ever-fluctuating feelings

for evidence of the change. No wonder that this has led conscientious

souls into doubt and embarrassment. But let the subject of

regeneration be disenthralled from false philosophy, and let it be

known that the new heart consists in supreme disinterested

benevolence, or in entire consecration to God, and then who cannot

know for what end he lives, or what is the supreme preference or

intention of his soul? If men can settle any question whatever beyond

all doubt by an appeal to consciousness, it would seem that this must

be the question. Hence the Bible enjoins it as an imperative duty to

know ourselves, whether we are Christians. We are to know each

other by our fruits. This is expressly given in the Bible as the rule of

judgment in the case. The question is not so much, What are the

man's opinions?, but, What does he live for? Does he manifest a

charitable state of mind? Does he manifest the attributes of

benevolence in the various circumstances in which he is placed? O,

shall the folly of judging men more by their opinions and feelings, by

the tenor of their lives cease? It seems difficult to rid men of the

prejudice that religion consists in feelings and in experiences in which

they are altogether passive. Hence they are continually prone to

delusion upon the most momentous of all questions. Nothing can

break this spell but the steady and thorough inculcation of the truth, in

regard to the nature of regeneration.

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LECTURE 31



NATURAL ABILITY



We next proceed to the examination of the question of man's ability

or inability to obey the commandments of God. This certainly must be

a fundamental question in morals and religion; and as our views are

upon this subject, so, if we are consistent, must be our views of God,

of His moral government, and of every practical doctrine of morals and

religion. This is too obvious to require proof. The question of ability

has truly been a vexed question. In the discussion of it, I shall

consider the elder President Edwards as the representative of the

common Calvinistic view of this subject, because he has stated it more

clearly than any other Calvinistic author with whom I am acquainted. 

When, therefore, I speak of the Edwardean doctrine of ability and

inability, you will understand me to speak of the common view of

Calvinistic theological writers, as stated, summed up, and defended by

Edwards. In discussing this subject I will endeavor to show:



President Edwards' notion of natural ability.



Edwards considers freedom and ability as identical. He defines

freedom or liberty to consist in the power, opportunity, or advantage,

that any one has, to do as he pleases. "Or, in other words, his being

free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in

any respect as he wills." Works, vol. 2, page 38.



Again, page 39, he says, "One thing more I should observe

concerning what is vulgarly called liberty; namely, that power and

opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his

choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the

word anything of the cause of that choice; or at all considering how the

person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some

external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by

some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a

cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something

foregoing, or not and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing

and exerting his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary

and common notion of freedom." In the preceding paragraph, he

says, "There are two things contrary to what is called liberty in

common speech. One is, constraint; which is a person's being

necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will: the other is, restraint,

which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to

his will."



Power, ability, liberty, to do as you will, are synonymous with this

writer. The foregoing quotations, with many like passages that might

be quoted from the same author, show that natural liberty, or natural

ability, according to him, consists in the natural and established

connection between volition and its effects. Thus he says in another

place, "Men are justly said to be able to do what they can do, if they

will." His definition of natural ability, or natural liberty, as he frequently

calls it, wholly excludes the power to will, and includes only the power

or ability to execute our volitions. Thus it is evident, that natural ability,

according to him, respects external action only, and has nothing to do

with willing. When there is no restraint or hindrance to the execution

of volition, when there is nothing interposed to disturb and prevent the

natural and established result of our volitions, there is natural ability

according to this school. It should be distinctly understood, that

Edwards, and those of his school, hold that choices, volitions, and all

acts of will, are determined, not by the sovereign power of the agent,

but are caused by the objective motive, and that there is the same

connection, or a connection as certain and as unavoidable between

motive and choice, as between any physical cause and its effect: "the

difference being," according to him, "not in the nature of the

connection, but in the terms connected." Hence, according to his

view, natural liberty or ability cannot consist in the power of willing or of

choice, but must consist in the power to execute our choices or

volitions. Consequently, this class of philosophers define free or moral

agency to consist in the power to do as one wills, or power to execute

one's purposes, choices, or volitions. That this is a fundamentally

false definition of natural liberty or ability, and of free or moral agency,

we shall see in due time. It is also plain, that the natural ability or

liberty of Edwards and his school, has nothing to do with morality or

immorality. Sin and holiness, as we have seen in a former lecture, are

attributes of acts of will only. But this natural ability respects, as has

been said, outward or muscular action only. Let this be distinctly

borne in mind as we proceed.



This natural ability is no ability at all.



We know from consciousness that the will is the executive faculty,

and that we can do absolutely nothing without willing. The power or

ability to will is indispensable to our acting at all. If we have not the

power to will, we have not power or ability to do anything. All ability or

power to do resides in the will, and power to will is the necessary

condition of ability to do. In morals and religion, as we shall soon see,

the willing is the doing. The power to will is the condition of obligation

to do. Let us hear Edwards himself upon this subject. Vol. 2. p. 156,

he says, "The will itself, and not only those actions which are the

effects of the will, is the proper object of precept or command. That is,

such a state or acts of men's wills, are in many cases properly

required of them by commands; and not only those alterations in the

state of their bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. 

This is most manifest; for it is the mind only that is properly and

directly the subject of precepts or commands; that only being capable

of receiving or perceiving commands. The motions of the body are

matters of command only as they are subject to the soul, and

connected with its acts. But the soul has no other faculty whereby it

can, in the most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply

with any command, but the faculty of the will; and it is by this faculty

only that the soul can directly disobey or refuse compliance; for the

very notions of consenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing,

rejecting, etc., are, according to the meaning of terms, nothing but

certain acts of will." Thus we see that Edwards himself held, that the

will is the executive faculty, and that the soul can do nothing except as

it wills to do it, and that for this reason a command to do is strictly a

command to will. We shall see by and by, that he held also that the

willing and the doing are identical, so far as moral obligation, morals,

and religion are concerned. For the present, it is enough to say,

whether Edwards or anybody else ever held it or not, that it is absurd

and sheer nonsense to talk of an ability to do when there is no ability

to will. Every one knows with intuitive certainty that he has no ability to

do what he is unable to will to do. It is, therefore, the vilest folly to talk

of a natural ability to do anything whatever, when we exclude from this

ability the power to will. If there is no ability to will, there is, and can 

be no ability to do; therefore, the natural ability of the Edwardean school

is no ability at all.



Let it be distinctly understood, that whatever Edwards held in

respect to the ability of man to do, ability to will entered not at all into

his idea and definition of natural ability or liberty. But according to him,

natural ability respects only the connection that is established by a law

of nature between volition and its sequents, excluding altogether the

inquiry how the volition comes to exist. This the foregoing quotations

abundantly show. Let the impression, then, be distinct, that the

Edwardean natural ability is no ability at all, and nothing but an empty

name, a metaphysico-theological fiction.



What constitutes natural inability according to this school.



Edwards, vol. 2. p. 35, says, "We are said to be naturally unable

to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most

commonly called nature, does not allow of it; or because of some

impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the

faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects." 

This quotation, together with much that might be quoted from this

author to the same effect, shows that natural inability, according to

him, consists in a want of power to execute our volitions. In the

absence of power to do as we will, if the willing exists and the effect

does not follow, it is only because we are unable to do as we will, and

this is natural inability. We are naturally unable, according to him, to

do what does not follow by a natural law from our volitions. If I will to

move my arm, and the muscles do not obey volition, I am naturally

unable to move my arm. So with anything else. Here let it be distinctly

observed, that natural inability, as well as natural ability, respects and

belongs only to outward action or doing. It has nothing to do with

ability to will. Whatever Edwards held respecting ability to will, which

will be shown in its proper place, I wish it to be distinctly understood

that his natural inability had nothing to do with willing, but only with the

effects of willing. When the natural effect of willing does not follow

volition, its cause, here is a proper natural inability.



This natural inability is no inability at all.



By this is intended that, so far as morals and religion are

concerned, the willing is the doing, and therefore where the willing

actually takes place, the real thing required or prohibited is already

done. Let us hear Edwards upon this subject. Vol. 2, p. 164, he says,

"If the will fully complies and the proposed effect does not prove,

according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the

man is perfectly excused; he has a natural inability to do the thing

required. For the will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be

directly and immediately required by command, and other things only

indirectly, as connected with the will. If, therefore, there be a full

compliance of will, the person has done his duty: and if other things do

not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not criminally owing

to him." Here, then, it is manifest, that the Edwardean notions of

natural ability and inability have no connection with moral law or moral

government, and, of course, with morals and religion. That the Bible

everywhere accounts the willing as the deed, is most manifest. Both

as it respects sin and holiness, if the required or prohibited act of the

will takes place, the moral law and the lawgiver regard the deed as

having been done, or the sin committed, whatever impediment may

have prevented the natural effect from following. Here, then, let it be

distinctly understood and remembered that Edwards' natural inability

is, so far as morals and religion are concerned, no inability at all. An

inability to execute our volitions, is in no case an inability to do our

whole duty, since moral obligation, and of course, duty, respect strictly

only acts of will. A natural inability must consist, as we shall see, in an

inability to will. It is truly amazing that Edwards could have written the

paragraph just quoted, and others to the same effect, without

perceiving the fallacy and absurdity of his speculation without seeing

that the ability or inability about which he was writing, had no

connection with morals or religion. How could he insist so largely that

moral obligation respects acts of will only, and yet spend so much time

in writing about an ability or inability to comply with moral obligation

that respects outward action exclusively? This, on the face of it, was

wholly irrelevant to the subject of morals and religion, upon which

subjects he was professedly writing.



Natural ability is identical with freedom or liberty of will.



It has been, I trust, abundantly shown in a former lecture, and is

admitted and insisted on by Edwards:



1. That moral obligation respects strictly only acts of will.



2. That the whole of moral obligation resolves itself into an

obligation to be disinterestedly benevolent, that is, to will the highest

good of being for its own sake.



3. That willing is the doing required by the true spirit of the moral

law. Ability, therefore, to will in accordance with the moral law, must

be natural ability to obey God. But:



4. This is and must be the only proper freedom of the will, so far as

morals and religion, or so far as moral law is concerned. That must

constitute true liberty of will that consists in the ability or power to will,

either in accordance with, or in opposition to the requirements of moral

law. Or in other words, true freedom or liberty of will must consist in

the power or ability to will in every instance either in accordance with,

or in opposition to, moral obligation. Observe, moral obligation

respects acts of will. What freedom or liberty of will can there be in

relation to moral obligation unless the will or the agent has power or

ability to act in conformity with moral obligation? To talk of a man's

being free to will, or having liberty to will, when he has not the power

or ability, is to talk nonsense. Edwards himself holds that ability to do,

is indispensable to liberty to do. But if ability to do be a sine qua non

of liberty to do, must not the same be true of willing? That is, must not

ability to will be essential to liberty to will? Natural ability and natural

liberty to will, must then be identical. Let this be distinctly

remembered, since many have scouted the doctrine of natural ability

to obey God, who have nevertheless been great sticklers for the

freedom of the will. In this they are greatly inconsistent. This ability is

called a natural ability, because it belongs to man as a moral agent, in

such a sense that without it he could not be a proper subject of

command, of reward or punishment. That is, without this liberty or

ability he could not be a moral agent, and a proper subject of moral

government. He must then either possess this power in himself as

essential to his own nature, or must possess power, or be able to avail

himself of power to will in every instance in accordance with moral

obligation. Whatever he can do, he can do only by willing; he must

therefore either possess the power in himself directly to will as God

commands, or he must be able by willing it to avail himself of power,

and to make himself willing. If he has power by nature to will directly

as God requires, or by willing to avail himself of power so to will, he is

naturally free and able to obey the commandments of God. Then let it

be borne distinctly in mind, that natural ability, about which so much

has been said, is nothing more nor less than the freedom or liberty of

the will of a moral agent. No man knows what he says or whereof he

affirms, who holds to the one and denies the other, for they are truly

and properly identical.



The human will is free, therefore men have power or ability to do all

their duty.



1. The moral government of God everywhere assumes and implies

the liberty of the human will, and the natural ability of men to obey

God. Every command, every threatening, every expostulation and

denunciation in the Bible implies and assumes this. Nor does the

Bible do violence to the human intelligence in this assumption; for:



2. The human mind necessarily assumes the freedom of the

human will as a first truth. First truths, let it be remembered, are those

that are necessarily assumed by every moral agent. They are

assumed always and necessarily by a law of the intelligence, although

they may seldom be the direct objects of thought or attention. It is a

universal law of the intelligence, to assume the truths of causality, the

existence and the infinity of space, the existence and infinity of

duration, and many other truths. These assumptions every moral

agent always and necessarily takes with him, whether these things are

matters of attention or not. And even should he deny any one or all of

these first truths, he knows them to be true notwithstanding, and

cannot but assume their truth in all his practical judgments. Thus,

should any one deny the law and the doctrine of causality, as some in

theory have done, he knows, and cannot but know, he assumes, and

cannot but assume, its truth at every moment. Without this

assumption he could not so much as intend, or think of doing, or of

any one else doing anything whatever. But a great part of his time, he

may not, and does not, make this law a distinct object of thought or

attention. Nor is he directly conscious of the assumption that there is

such a law. He acts always upon the assumption, and a great part of

his time is insensible of it. His whole activity is only the exercise of his

own causality, and a practical acknowledgment of the truth, which in

theory he may deny. Now just so it is with the freedom of the will, and

with natural ability. Did we not assume our own liberty and ability, we

should never think of attempting to do anything. We should not so

much as think of moral obligation, either as it respects ourselves or

others, unless we assumed the liberty of the human will. In all our

judgments respecting our own moral character and that of others, we

always and necessarily assume the liberty of the human will, or natural

ability to obey God. Although we may not be distinctly conscious of

this assumption, though we may seldom make the liberty of the human

will the subject of direct thought or attention, and even though we may

deny its reality, and strenuously endeavor to maintain the opposite,

we, nevertheless, in this very denial and endeavor, assume that we

are free. This truth never was, and never can be rejected in our

practical judgments. All men assume it. All men must assume it. 

Whenever they choose in one direction, they always assume, whether

conscious of the assumption or not, and cannot but assume, that they

have power to will in the opposite direction. Did they not assume this,

such a thing as election between two ways or objects would not be,

and could not be, so much as thought of. The very ideas of right and

wrong, of the praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness of human

beings, imply the assumption, on the part of those who have these

ideas, of the universal freedom of the human will, or of the natural

ability of men as moral agents to obey God. Were not this assumption

in the mind, it were impossible from its own nature and laws that it

should affirm moral obligation, right or wrong, praiseworthiness or

blameworthiness of men. I know that philosophers and theologians

have in theory denied the doctrine of natural ability or liberty, in the

sense in which I have defined it; and I know, too, that with all their

theorizing, they did assume, in common with all other men, that man is

free in the sense that he has liberty or power to will as God

commands. I know that, but for this assumption, the human mind

could no more predicate praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, right or

wrong of man, than it could of the motions of a windmill. Men have

often made the assumption in question without being aware of it, have

affirmed right and wrong of human willing without seeing and

understanding the conditions of this affirmation. But the fact is, that in

all cases the assumption has lain deep in the mind as a first truth, that

men are free in the sense of being naturally able to obey God: and this

assumption is a necessary condition of the affirmation that moral

character belongs to man.



What constitutes moral inability, according to Edwards and those

who hold with him.



I examine their views of moral inability first in order, because from

their views of moral inability we ascertain more clearly what are their

views of moral ability. Edwards regards moral ability and inability as

identical with moral necessity. Concerning moral necessity, he says,

vol. 2, pp. 32, 33, "And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that

necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such

moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives, and the

connection which there is in many cases between these and such

certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense that I shall use the

phrase moral necessity in the following discourse. By natural

necessity, as applied to men, I mean such necessity as men are under

through the force of natural causes, as distinguished from what are

called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and

moral motives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain

circumstances are the subjects of particular sensations by necessity. 

They feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects

presented before them in a clear light when their eyes are open: so

they assent to the truth of certain propositions as soon as the terms

are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white,

that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural

necessity men's bodies move downwards when there is nothing to

support them. But here several things may be noted concerning these

two kinds of necessity. 1. Moral necessity may be as absolute as

natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected

with its moral cause, natural effect is with its natural cause. Whether

the will is in every case necessarily determined by the strongest

motive, or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a

motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination or not; if

that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but

that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive

presented may be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly

and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias

are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going

against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still

greater. And therefore if more were still added to their strength up to a

certain degree, it might make the difficulty so great that it would be

wholly impossible to surmount it, for this plain reason, because

whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount

difficulties, yet that power is not infinite, and so goes not beyond

certain limits. If a certain man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of

this kind, with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of

strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty, yet if the difficulty be

increased to thirty, or a hundred, or to a thousand degrees, and his

strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to

surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed that there may

be such a thing as a sure and perfect connection between moral

causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of moral

necessity." Page 35, he says: "What has been said of natural and

moral necessity may serve to explain what is intended by natural and

moral inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing when

we cannot do it if we will, because of some impeding defect or

obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of

understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral inability

consists not in any of these things, but either in a want of inclination, or

the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of

the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both

these may be resolved into one, and it may be said in one word that

moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For

when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a

defect of motives or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing

as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the

prevalence of a contrary inclination in such circumstances, and under

the influence of such views."



From these quotations, and much more that might be quoted to the

same purpose, it is plain that Edwards, as the representative of his

school, holds moral inability to consist, either in an existing choice or

attitude of the will opposed to that which is required by the law of God,

which inclination or choice is necessitated by motives in view of the

mind, or in the absence of such motives as are necessary to cause or

necessitate the state of choice required by the moral law, or to

overcome an opposing choice. Indeed he holds these two to be

identical. Observe, his words are, "Or these may be resolved into one,

and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in

opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will

or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives. It is the same

thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the

prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances and under

the influence of such views," that is, in the presence of such motives. 

If there is a present prevalent contrary inclination, it is, according to

him: 1. Because there are present certain reasons that necessitate this

contrary inclination; and 2. Because there are not sufficient motives

present to the mind to overcome these opposing motives and

inclination, and to necessitate the will to determine or choose in the

direction of the law of God. By inclination Edwards means choice or

volition, as is abundantly evident from what he all along says in this

connection. This no one will deny who is at all familiar with his

writings. It was the object of the treatise from which the above

quotations have been made, to maintain that the choice invariably is

as the greatest apparent good is. And by the greatest apparent good

he means, a sense of the most agreeable. By which he means, as he

says, that the sense of the most agreeable, and choice or volition, are

identical. Vol. 2, page 20, he says, "And therefore it must be true in

some sense, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good is. It

must be observed in what sense I use the term `good,' namely, as of

the same import with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use

the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to

the mind." Again, pp. 21, 22, he says: "I have rather chosen to

express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent

good is, or as what appears most agreeable, than to say that the will is

determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most

agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind and the

mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech

be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action,

which is the immediate consequence of the mind's choice, is

determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the choice

itself." Thus it appears that the sense of the most agreeable, and

choice or volition, according to Edwards, are the same things. Indeed,

Edwards throughout confounds desire and volition, making them the

same thing. Edwards regarded the mind as possessing but two

primary faculties the will and the understanding. He confounded all

the states of the sensibility with acts of will. The strongest desire is

with him always identical with volition or choice, and not merely that

which determines choice. When there is a want of inclination or

desire, or the sense of the most agreeable, there is a moral inability

according to the Edwardean philosophy. This want of the strongest

desire, inclination, or sense of the most agreeable, is always owing; 1.

To the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite desire,

choice, etc. ; and 2. To the want of such objective motives as shall

awaken this required desire, or necessitate this inclination or sense of

the most agreeable. In other words, when volition or choice, in

consistency with the law of God, does not exist, it is, 1. Because an

opposite choice exists, and is necessitated by the presence of some

motive; and 2. For want of sufficiently strong objective motives to

necessitate the required choice or volition. Let it be distinctly

understood and remembered, that Edwards held that motive, and not

the agent, is the cause of all actions of the will. Will, with him, is

always determined in its choice by motives as really as physical effects

are produced by their causes. The difference with him in the

connection of moral and physical causes and effects "lies not in the

nature of the connection, but in the terms connected."



"That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently (by

what has already been proved) has a necessary connection with its

cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and

consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is

excited by some motive, which is manifest; because, if the mind, in

willing after the manner it does, is excited by no motive or inducement,

then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it

aims at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it

does not go after anything, or exert any inclination or preference

towards anything; which brings the matter to a contradiction; because

for the mind to will something, and for it to go after something by an

act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.



"But if every act of the will is excited by a motive, then that motive

is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by motives,

then motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the

same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of

the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives do

nothing, as motives or inducements, but by their influence; and so

much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the

notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence

of something else.



"And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they

are necessarily connected with their motives; every effect and event

being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is

the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest that

volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the

will." Vol. 2, pp. 86, 87. Moral inability, then, according to this school,

consists in a want of inclination, desire, or sense of the most

agreeable, or the strength of an opposite desire or sense of the most

agreeable. This want of inclination, etc., or this opposing inclination,

etc., are identical with an opposing choice or volition. This opposing

choice or inclination, or this want of the required choice, inclination, or

sense of the most agreeable is owing, according to Edwards, 1. To the

presence of such motives as to necessitate the opposing choice; and

2. To the absence of sufficient motives to beget or necessitate them. 

Here then we have the philosophy of this school. The will or agent is

unable to choose as God requires in all cases, when, 1. There are

present such motives as to necessitate an opposite choice; and, 2.

When there is not such a motive or such motives in the view of the

mind, as to determine or necessitate the required choice or volition;

that is, to awaken a desire, or to create an inclination or sense of the

agreeable stronger than any existing and opposing desire, inclination,

or sense of agreeable. This is the moral inability of the Edwardeans.



Their moral inability to obey God consists in real disobedience and

a natural inability to obey.



1. If we understand Edwardeans to mean that moral inability

consists:



(1.) In the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite

choice; and:



(2.) In the want or absence of sufficient motives to necessitate

choice or volition, or, which is the same thing, a sense of the most

agreeable, or an inclination, then their moral inability is a proper

natural inability. Edwards says, he "calls it a moral inability, because it

is an inability of will." But by his own showing, the will is the only

executive faculty. Whatever a man can do at all, he can accomplish

by willing, and whatever he cannot accomplish by willing he cannot

accomplish at all. An inability to will then must be a natural inability. 

We are, by nature, unable to do what we are unable to will to do. 

Besides, according to Edwards, moral obligation respects strictly only

acts of will, and willing is the doing that is prohibited or required by the

moral law. To be unable to will then, is to be unable to do. To be

unable to will as God requires, is to be unable to do what He requires,

and this surely is a proper, and the only proper natural inability.



2. But if we are to understand this school, as maintaining that moral

inability to obey God, consists in a want of the inclination, choice,

desire, or sense of the most agreeable that God requires, or in an

inclination or existing choice, volition, or sense of the most agreeable,

which is opposed to the requirement of God, this surely is really

identical with disobedience, and their moral inability to obey consists in

disobedience. For, be it distinctly remembered, that Edwards holds,

as we have seen, that obedience and disobedience, properly

speaking, can be predicated only of acts of will. If the required state of

the will exists, there is obedience. If it does not exist, there is

disobedience. Therefore, by his own admission and express holding,

if by moral inability we are to understand a state of the will not

conformed, or, which is the same thing, opposed to the law and will of

God, this moral inability is nothing else than disobedience to God. A

moral inability to obey is identical with disobedience. It is not merely

the cause of future or present disobedience, but really constitutes the

whole of present disobedience.



3. But suppose that we understand his moral inability to consist

both in the want of an inclination, choice, volition, etc., or in the

existence of an opposing state of the will, and also:



(1.) In the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite

choice, and:



(2.) In the want of sufficient motives to overcome the opposing

state, and necessitate the required choice, volition, etc., then his views

stand thus: moral inability to choose as God commands, consists in

the want of this choice, or in the existence of an opposite choice,

which want of choice, or, which is the same thing with him, which

opposite choice is caused:



(a.) By the presence of such motives as to necessitate the opposite

choice, and:



(b.) By the absence of such motives as would necessitate the

required choice. Understand him which way you will, his moral

inability is real disobedience, and is in the highest sense a proper

natural inability to obey. The cause of choice or volition he always

seeks, and thinks or assumes that he finds, in the objective motive,

and never for once ascribes it to the sovereignty or freedom of the

agent. Choice or volition is an event, and must have some cause. He

assumes that the objective motive was the cause, when, as

consciousness testifies, the agent is himself the cause. Here is the

great error of Edwards. Edwards assumed that no agent whatever,

not even God Himself, possesses a power of self determination, that

the will of God and of all moral agents is determined, not by

themselves, but by an objective motive. If they will in one direction or

another, it is not from any free and sovereign self-determination in

view of motives, but because the motives or inducements present to

the mind, inevitably produce or necessitate the sense of the most

agreeable, or choice. If this is not fatalism or natural necessity, what

is?



This pretended distinction between natural and moral inability is

nonsensical.



What does it amount to? Why this:



1. This natural inability is an inability to do as we will, or to execute

our volitions.



2. This moral inability is an inability to will.



3. This moral inability is the only natural inability that has, or can

have, anything to do with duty, or with morality and religion; or, as has

been shown:



4. It consists in disobedience itself. Present moral inability to obey

is identical with present disobedience, with a natural inability to obey! 

It is amazing to see how so great and good a man could involve

himself in a metaphysical fog, and bewilder himself and his readers to

such a degree, that an absolutely senseless distinction should pass

into the current phraseology, philosophy, and theology of the church,

and a score of theological dogmas be built upon the assumption of its

truth. This nonsensical distinction has been in the mouth of the

Edwardean school of theologians, from Edwards' day to the present. 

Both saints and sinners have been bewildered, and, I must say,

abused by it. Men have been told that they are as really unable to will

as God directs, as they were to create themselves; and when it is

replied that this inability excuses the sinner, we are directly silenced by

the assertion, that this is only a moral inability, or an inability of will,

and therefore, that it is so far from excusing the sinner, that it

constitutes the very ground, and substance, and whole of his guilt. 

Indeed! Men are under moral obligation only to will as God directs. 

But an inability thus to will, consisting in the absence of such motives

as would necessitate the required choice, or the presence of such

motives as to necessitate an opposite choice, is a moral inability, and

really constitutes the sinner worthy of an "exceeding great and eternal

weight" of damnation! Ridiculous! Edwards I revere; his blunders I

deplore. I speak thus of this Treatise on the Will, because, while it

abounds with unwarrantable assumptions, distinctions without a

difference, and metaphysical subtleties, it has been adopted as the

text-book of a multitude of what are called Calvinistic divines for scores

of years. It has bewildered the head, and greatly embarrassed the

heart and the action of the church of God. It is time, high time, that its

errors should be exposed, and so exploded, that such phraseology

should be laid aside, and the ideas which these words represent should

cease to be entertained.



What constitutes moral ability according to this school?



It is of course the opposite of moral inability. Moral ability,

according to them, consists in willingness, with the cause of it. That is,

moral ability to obey God consists in that inclination, desire, choice,

volition, or sense of the most agreeable, which God requires together

with its cause. Or it consists in the presence of such motives as do

actually necessitate the above-named state or determination of the

will. Or, more strictly, it consists in this state caused by the presence

of these motives. This is as exact a statement of their views as I can

make. According to this, a man is morally able to do as he does, and

is necessitated to do, or, he is morally able to will as he does will, and

as he cannot help willing. He is morally able to will in this manner,

simply and only because he is caused thus to will by the presence of

such motives as are, according to them, "indissolubly connected" with

such a willing by a law of nature and necessity. But this conducts us

to the conclusion:



Their moral ability to obey God is nothing else than real obedience

and a natural inability to disobey.



Strictly, this moral ability includes both the state of will required by

the law of God, and also the cause of this state, to wit, the presence of

such motives as necessitate the inclination, choice, volition, or sense

of the most agreeable, that God requires. The agent is able thus to

will because he is caused thus to will. Or more strictly, his ability, and

his inclination or willing, are identical. Or still further, according to

Edwards, his moral ability thus to will and his thus willing, and the

presence of the motives that cause this willing, are identical. This is a

sublime discovery in philosophy; a most transcendental speculation! I

would not treat these notions as ridiculous, were they not truly so, or if

I could treat them in any other manner, and still do them anything like

justice. If, where the theory is plainly stated, it appears ridiculous, the

fault is not in me, but in the theory itself. I know it is trying to you, as it

is to me, to connect anything ridiculous with so great and so revered a

name as that of President Edwards. But if a blunder of his has

entailed perplexity and error on the church, surely his great and good

soul would now thank the hand that should blot out the error from

under heaven.



Thus, when closely examined, this long established and venerated

fog-bank vanishes away; and this famed distinction between moral

and natural ability and inability, is found to be "a thing of nought"

(Isaiah 29:21).



I will state what I consider to be the fundamental errors of Edwards

and his school upon the subject of ability.



1. He denied that moral agents are the causes of their own actions. 

He started, of course, with the just assumption, that every event is an

effect, and must have some cause. The choices and volitions of moral

agents are effects of some cause. What is that cause? He assumed

that every act of will must have been caused by a preceding one, or by

the objective motive. By the reductio ad absurdum, he easily showed

the absurdity of the first hypothesis, and consequently assumed the

truth of the last. But how does he know that the sovereign power of

the agent is not the cause? His argument against self-determination

amounts to nothing; for it is, in fact, only a begging of the whole

question. If we are conscious of anything, we are of the affirmation

that we do, in fact, originate our own choices and volitions. Edwards,

as really as any other man, believed himself to originate and be the

proper cause of his own volitions. In his practical judgment he

assumed his own causality, and the proper causality of all moral

agents, or he never could have had so much as a conception of moral

agency and accountability. But in theory, he adopted the capital error

of denying the proper causality of moral agents. This error is

fundamental. Every definition of a moral agent that denies or

overlooks, his proper causality is radically defective. It drops out of the

definition the very element that we necessarily affirm to be essential to

liberty and accountability. Denying, as he did, the proper causality of

moral agents, he was driven to give a false definition of free agency,

as has been shown. Edwards rightly regarded the choices and

volitions of moral agents as effects, but he looks in the wrong direction

for the cause. Instead of heeding the affirmation of his own mind that

causality, or the power of self-determination, is a qua non of moral

agency, he assumed, in theorizing, the direct opposite, and sought for

the cause of choice and volition out of the agent, and in the objective

motive; thus, in fact, denying the validity of the testimony of the pure

reason, and reducing moral agents to mere machines. No wonder that

so capital an error, and defended with so much ability, should have led

one of his own sons into skepticism. But the piety of the president was

stronger than even his powerful logic. Assuming a false major

premise, his straightforward logic conducted him to the dogma of a

universal necessity. But his well-developed reason, and deep piety of

heart, controlled his practical judgment, so that few men have

practically held the doctrines of accountability and retribution with a

firmer grasp.



2. Edwards adopted the Lockean philosophy. He regarded the

mind as possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and

the will. He considered all the desires, emotions, affections, appetites,

and passions as voluntary, and as really consisting in acts of will. This

confounding of the states of the sensibility with acts of the will, I regard

as another fundamental error of his whole system of philosophy, so far

as it respects the liberty of the will, or the doctrine of ability. Being

conscious that the emotions, which he calls affections, the desires, the

appetites and passions, were so correlated to their appropriate

objects, that they are excited by the presence or contemplation of

them, and assuming them to be voluntary states of mind, or actions of

the will, he very naturally, and with this assumption, necessarily and

justly, concluded, that the will was governed or decided by the

objective motive. Assuming as he did that the mind has but two

faculties, understanding and will, and that every state of feeling and of

mind that did not belong to the understanding, must be a voluntary

state or act of will, and being conscious that his feelings, desires,

affections, appetites and passions, were excited by the contemplation

of their correlated objects, he could consistently come to no other

conclusion than that the will is determined by motives, and that choice

always is as the most agreeable is.



I will now present another scheme of inability and its philosophy.



1. This philosophy properly distinguishes between the will and the

sensibility. It regards the mind as possessing three primary

departments, powers, or susceptibilities, the intellect, the sensibility,

and the will. It does not always call these departments or

susceptibilities by these names, but if I understand them, the abetters

of this philosophy hold to their existence, by whatever name they may

call them.



2. This philosophy also holds, that the states of the intellect and of

the sensibility are passive and involuntary.



3. It holds that freedom of will is a condition of moral agency.



4. It also teaches that the will is free, and consequently that man is

a free moral agent.



5. It teaches that the will controls the outward life and the attention

of the intellect, directly, and many of the emotions, desires, affections,

appetites, and passions, or many states of the sensibility, indirectly.



6. It teaches that men have ability to obey God so far as acts of will

are concerned, and also so far as those acts and states of mind are

concerned that are under the direct or indirect control of the will.



7. But it holds that moral obligation may, and in the case of man at

least, does extend beyond moral agency and beyond the sphere of

ability; that ability or freedom of will is essential to moral agency, but

that freedom of will or moral agency does not limit moral obligation;
that moral agency and moral obligation are not coextensive;

consequently that moral obligation is not limited by ability or by moral

agency.



8. This philosophy asserts that moral obligation extends to those

states of mind that lie wholly beyond or without the sphere or control of

the will; that it extends not merely to voluntary acts and states,

together with all acts and states that come within the direct or indirect

control of the will but, as was said, it insists that those mental states

that lie wholly beyond the will's direct or indirect control, come within

the pale of moral legislation and obligation: and that therefore

obligation is not limited by ability.



9. This philosophy seems to have been invented to reconcile the

doctrine of original sin, in the sense of a sinful nature, or of

constitutional moral depravity, with moral obligation. Assuming that

original sin in this sense is a doctrine of divine revelation, it takes the

bold and uncompromising ground already stated, namely, that moral

obligation is not merely coextensive with moral agency and ability, but

extends beyond both into the region of those mental states that lie

entirely without the will's direct or indirect control.



10. This bold assertion the abetters of this philosophy attempt to

support by an appeal to the necessary convictions of men and to the

authority of the Bible. They allege that the instinctive judgments of

men, as well as the Bible, everywhere assume and affirm moral

obligation and moral character of the class of mental states in

question.



11. They admit that a physical inability is a bar to or inconsistent

with moral obligation: but they of course deny that the inability to which

they hold is physical.



This brings us to a brief consideration of the claims of this

philosophy of inability.



1. It is based upon a petition principii, or a begging of the question. 

It assumes that the instinctive or irresistible and universal judgments of

men, together with the Bible, assert and assume that moral obligation

and moral character extend to the states of mind in question. It is

admitted that the teachings of the Bible are to be relied upon. It is also

admitted that the first truths of reason, or what this philosophy calls the

instinctive and necessary judgments of all men, must be true. But it is

not admitted that the assertion in question is a doctrine of the Bible or

a first truth of reason. On the contrary both are denied. It is denied, at

least by me, that either reason or divine revelation affirms moral

obligation or moral character of any state of mind, that lies wholly

beyond both the direct and the indirect control of the will. Now this

philosophy must not be allowed to beg the question in debate. Let it

be shown, if it can be, that the alleged truth is either a doctrine of the

Bible or a first truth of reason. Both reason and revelation do assert

and assume, that moral obligation and moral character extend to acts

of will, and to all those outward acts or mental states that lie within its

direct or indirect control. "But further these deponents say not." Men

are conscious of moral obligation in respect to these acts and states of

mind, and of guilt when they fail, in these respects, to comply with

moral obligation. But who ever blamed himself for pain, when, without

his fault, he received a blow, or was seized with the toothache, or a fit

of bilious colic?



2. Let us inquire into the nature of this inability. Observe, it is

admitted by this school that a physical inability is inconsistent with

moral obligation in other words, that physical ability is a condition of

moral obligation. But what is a physical inability? The primary

definition of the adjective physical, given by Webster, is, "pertaining to

nature, or natural objects." A physical inability then, in the primary

sense of the term physical, is an inability of nature. It may be either a

material or a mental inability; that is, it may be either an inability of

body or mind. It is admitted by the school whose views we are

canvassing, that all human causality or ability resides in the will, and

therefore that there is a proper inability of nature to perform anything

that does not come within the sphere of the direct or indirect causality

of, or control of the will. It is plain, therefore, that the inability for which

they contend must be a proper natural inability, or inability of nature. 

This they fully admit and maintain. But this they do not call a physical

inability. But why do they not? Why, simply because it would, by their

own admissions, overthrow their favorite position. They seem to

assume that a physical inability must be a material inability. But where

is the authority for such an assumption? There is no authority for it. A

proper inability of nature must be a physical inability, as opposed to

moral inability, or there is no meaning in language. It matters not at all

whether the inability belongs to the material organism, or to the mind. 

If it be constitutional, and properly an inability of nature, it is nonsense

to deny that this is a physical inability, or to maintain that it can be

consistent with moral obligation. It is in vain to reply that this inability,

though a real inability of nature, is not physical but moral, because a

sinful inability. This is another begging of the question.



The school whose views I am examining, maintain, that this

inability is founded in the first sin of Adam. His first sin plunged

himself and his posterity, descending from him by a natural law, into a

total inability of nature to render any obedience to God. This first sin

of Adam entailed a nature on all his posterity "wholly sinful in every

faculty and part of soul and body." This constitutional sinfulness that

belongs to every faculty and part of soul and body, constitutes the

inability of which we are treating. But mark, it is not physical inability,

because it is a sinful inability! Important theological distinction! As

truly wonderful, surely, as any of the subtleties of the Jesuits. But if

this inability is sinful, it is important to inquire, Whose sin is it? Who is

to blame for it? Why to be sure, we are told that it is the sin of him

upon whom it is thus entailed by the natural law of descent from parent

to child without his knowledge or consent. This sinfulness of nature,

entirely irrespective of, and previous to any actual transgression,

renders its possessor worthy of and exposed to the wrath and curse of

God for ever. This sinfulness, observe, is transmitted by a natural or

physical law from Adam, but it is not a physical inability. It is

something that inheres in, and belongs to every faculty and part of

soul and body. It is transmitted by a physical law from parent to child. 

It is, therefore, and must be a physical thing. But yet we are told that it

cannot be a physical inability, because first, it is sinful, or sin itself;

and, secondly, because a physical inability is a bar to, or inconsistent

with, moral obligation. Here, then, we have their reasons for not

admitting this to be a physical inability. It would in this case render

moral obligation an impossibility; and, besides, if a bar to moral

obligation, it could not be sinful. But it is sinful, it is said, therefore it

cannot be physical. But how do we know that it is sinful? Why, we are

told, that the instinctive judgments f men, and the Bible everywhere

affirm and assume it. We are told, that both the instinctive judgments

of men and the Bible affirm and assume, both the inability in question

and the sinfulness of it: "that we ought to be able, but are not"; that is,

that we are so much to blame for this inability of nature entailed upon

us without our knowledge or consent, by a physical necessity, as to

deserve the wrath and curse of God for ever. We are under a moral

obligation not to have this sinful nature. We deserve damnation for

having it. To be sure, we are entirely unable to put it away, and had

no agency whatever in its existence. But what of that? We are told,

that "moral obligation is not limited by ability"; that our being as unable

to change our nature as we are to create a world, is no reason why we

should not be under obligation to do it, since "moral obligation does

not imply ability of any kind to do what we are under obligation to do!" 

I was about to expose the folly and absurdity of these assertions, but

hush! It is not allowable, we are told, to reason on this subject. We

shall deceive ourselves if we listen to the "miserable logic of our

understandings." We must fall back, then, upon the intuitive

affirmations of reason and the Bible. Here, then, we are willing to

lodge our appeal. The Bible defines sin to be a transgression of the

law. What law have we violated in inheriting this nature? What law

requires us to have a different nature from that which we possess? 

Does reason affirm that we are deserving of the wrath and curse of

God for ever, for inheriting from Adam a sinful nature?



What law of reason have we transgressed in inheriting this nature? 

Reason cannot condemn us, unless we have violated some law which

it can recognize as such. Reason indignantly rebukes such nonsense. 

Does the Bible hold us responsible for impossibilities? Does it require

of us what we cannot do by willing to do it? Nay, verily; but it

expressly affirms, that "if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted

according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not" (2

Cor. 8:12). The plain meaning of this passage is, that if one wills as

God directs, he has thereby met all his obligation; that he has done all

that is naturally possible to him, and therefore nothing more is

required. In this passage, the Bible expressly limits obligation by

ability. This we have repeatedly seen in former lectures. The law

also, as we have formerly seen, limits obligation by ability. It requires

only that we should love the Lord with all our strength, that is, with all

our ability, and our neighbor as ourselves.



Does reason hold us responsible for impossibilities, or affirm our

obligation to do, or be, what it is impossible for us to do and be? No

indeed! Reason never did and never can condemn us for our nature,

and hold us worthy of the wrath and curse of God for possessing it. 

Nothing is more shocking and revolting to reason, than such

assumptions as are made by the philosophy in question. This every

man's consciousness must testify.



But is it not true that some, at least, do intelligently condemn

themselves for their nature, and adjudge themselves to be worthy of

the wrath and curse of God for ever for its sinfulness? The framers of

the Westminster Confession of Faith made this affirmation in words, at

least; whether intelligently or unintelligently, we are left to inquire. The

reason of a moral agent condemning himself, and adjudging himself

worthy of the wrath and curse of God for ever, for possessing a nature

entailed on him by a natural law, without his knowledge or consent!

This can never be.



But is it not true, as is affirmed, that men instinctively and

necessarily affirm their obligation to be able to obey God, while they at

the same time affirm that they are not able? I answer, no. They affirm

themselves to be under obligation simply, and only, because deeply in

their inward being lies the assumption that they are able to comply

with the requirements of God. They are conscious of ability to will, and

of power to control their outward life directly, and the states of the

intellect and of their sensibility, either directly or indirectly, by willing. 

Upon this consciousness they found the affirmation of obligation, and

of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness in respect to these acts and

states of mind. But for the consciousness of ability, no affirmation of

moral obligation, or of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, were

possible.



But do not those who affirm both their inability and their obligation,

deceive themselves? I answer, yes. It is common for persons to

overlook assumptions that lie, so to speak, at the bottom of their

minds. This has been noticed in former lectures, and need not be

here repeated. It is true indeed that God requires of men, especially

under the gospel, what they are unable to do directly in their own

strength. Or more strictly speaking, He requires them to lay hold on

His strength, or to avail themselves of His grace, as the condition of

being what He requires them to be. With strict propriety, it cannot be

said that in this, or in any case, He requires directly any more than we

are able directly to do. The direct requirement in the case under

consideration, is to avail ourselves of, or to lay hold upon His strength. 

This we have power to do. He requires us to lay hold upon His grace

and strength, and thereby to rise to a higher knowledge of Himself,

and to a consequent higher state of holiness than would be otherwise

possible to us. The direct requirement is to believe, or to lay hold

upon His strength, or to receive the Holy Spirit, or Christ, who stands

at the door, and knocks, and waits for admission. The indirect

requirement is to rise to a degree of knowledge of God, and to spiritual

attainments that are impossible to us in our own strength. We have

ability to obey the direct command directly, and the indirect command

indirectly. That is, we are able by virtue of our nature, together with

the proffered grace of the Holy Spirit, to comply with all the

requirements of God. So that in fact there is no proper inability about

it.



But are not men often conscious of there being much difficulty in

the way of rendering to God all that we affirm ourselves under

obligation to render? I answer, yes. But strictly speaking, they must

admit their direct or indirect ability, as a condition of affirming their

obligation. This difficulty, arising out of their physical depravity, and

the power of temptation from without, is the foundation or cause of the

spiritual warfare of which the Scriptures speak, and of which all

Christians are conscious. But the Bible abundantly teaches, that

through grace we are able to be more than conquerors. If we are able

to be this through grace, we are able to avail ourselves of the

provisions of grace, so that there is no proper inability in the case. 

However great the difficulties may be, we are able through Christ to

overcome them all. This we must and do assume as the condition of

the affirmation of obligation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 32



GRACIOUS ABILITY



Grace is unmerited favor. Its exercise consists in bestowing that

which, without a violation of justice, might be withheld.



Ability to obey God, as we have seen, is the possession of power

adequate to the performance of that which is required. If, then, the

terms are used in the proper sense, by a gracious ability must be

intended that the power which men at present possess to obey the

commands of God, is a gift of grace relatively to the command; that is,

the bestowment of power adequate to the performance of the thing

required, is a matter of grace as opposed to justice.



I will show what is intended by the term gracious ability.



The abettors of this scheme hold that by the first sin of Adam, he,

together with all his posterity, lost all natural power and all ability of

every kind to obey God; that therefore they were, as a race, wholly

unable to obey the moral law, or to render to God any acceptable

service whatever; that is, that they became, as a consequence of the

sin of Adam, wholly unable to use the powers of nature in any other

way than to sin. They were able to sin or to disobey God, but entirely

unable to obey Him; that they did not lose all power to act, but that

they had power to act only in one direction, that is, in opposition to the

will and law of God. By a gracious ability they intend, that in

consequence of the atonement of Christ, God has graciously restored

to man ability to accept the terms of mercy, or to fulfil the conditions of

acceptance with God; in other words, that by the gracious aid of the

Holy Spirit which, upon condition of the atonement, God has given to

every member of the human family, all men are endowed with a

gracious ability to obey God. By a gracious ability is intended, then,

that ability or power to obey God, which all men now possess, not by

virtue of their own nature or constitutional powers, but by virtue of the

indwelling and gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, gratuitously

bestowed upon man in consequence of the atonement of Christ. The

inability, or total loss of all natural power to obey God into which men

as a race fell by the first sin of Adam, they call original sin; perhaps

more strictly, this inability is a consequence of that original sin into

which man fell; which original sin itself consisted in the total corruption

of man's whole nature. They hold, that by the atonement Christ made

satisfaction for original sin, in such a sense that the inability resulting

from it is removed, and that now men are by gracious aid able to obey

and accept the terms of salvation. That is, they are able to repent and

believe the gospel. In short, they are able, by virtue of this gracious

ability, to do their duty, or to obey God. This, if I understand these

theologians, is a fair statement of their doctrine of gracious ability.



This doctrine of a gracious ability is an absurdity.



The question is not whether, as a matter of fact, men ever do obey

God without the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit. I hold that they

do not. So the fact of the Holy Spirit's gracious influence being

exerted in every case of human obedience, is not a question in debate

between those who maintain, and those who deny the doctrine of

gracious ability, in the sense above explained. The question in debate

is not whether men do, in any case, use the powers of nature in the

manner that God requires, without the gracious influence of the Holy

Spirit, but whether they are naturally able so to use them. Is the fact,

that they never do so use them without a gracious divine influence, to

be ascribed to absolute inability, or to the fact that, from the beginning,

they universally and voluntarily consecrate their powers to the

gratification of self, and that therefore they will not, unless they are

divinely persuaded, by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, in any

case turn and consecrate their powers to the service of God? If this

doctrine of natural inability and of gracious ability be true, it inevitably

follows:



1. That but for the atonement of Christ, and the consequent

bestowment of a gracious ability, no one of Adam's race could ever

have been capable of sinning. For in this case the whole race would

have been wholly destitute of any kind or degree of ability to obey

God. Consequently they could not have been subjects of moral

government, and of course their actions could have had no moral

character. It is a first truth of reason, a truth everywhere and by all

men necessarily assumed in their practical judgments, that a subject

of moral government must be a moral agent, or that moral agency is a

necessary condition of any one's being a subject of a moral

government. And in the practical judgment of men, it matters not at all

whether a being ever was a moral agent, or not. If by any means

whatever he has ceased to be a moral agent, men universally and

necessarily assume, that it is impossible for him to be a subject of

moral government any more than a horse can be such a subject. 

Suppose he has by his own fault made himself an idiot or a lunatic; all

men know absolutely, and in their practical judgment assume, that in

this state he is not, and cannot be a subject of moral government. 

They know that in this state, moral character cannot justly be

predicated of his actions. His guilt in thus depriving himself of moral

agency may be exceeding great, and his guilt in thus depriving himself

of moral agency may equal the sum of all the default of which it is the

cause, but be a moral agent, be under moral obligation, in this state

of dementation or insanity, he cannot. This is a first truth of reason,

irresistibly and universally assumed by all men. If therefore Adam's

posterity had by their own personal act cast away and deprived

themselves of all ability to obey God, in this state they would have

ceased to be moral agents, and consequently they could have sinned

no more. But the case under consideration is not the one just

supposed, but is one where moral agency was not cast away by the

agent himself. It is one where moral agency was never, and never

could have been possessed. In the case under consideration, Adam's

posterity, had he ever had any, would never have possessed any

power to obey God, or to do anything acceptable to him. 

Consequently, they never could have sustained to God the relation of

subjects of His moral government. Of course they never could have

had moral character; right or wrong, in a moral sense, never could

have been predicated of their actions.



2. It must follow from this doctrine of gracious ability and natural

inability, that mankind lost their freedom, or the liberty of will in the first

sin of Adam; that both Adam himself, and all his posterity would and

could have sustained to God only the relation of necessary, as

opposed to free, agents, had not God bestowed upon them a gracious

ability.



But that either Adam or his posterity lost their freedom or free

agency by the first sin of Adam, is not only a sheer but an absurd

assumption. To be sure Adam fell into a state of total alienation from

the law of God, and lapsed into a state of supreme selfishness. His

posterity have unanimously followed his example. He and they have

become dead in trespasses and sins. Now that this death in sin either

consists in, or implies, the loss of free agency, is the very thing to be

proved. But this cannot be proved. I have so fully discussed the

subject of human moral depravity or sinfulness on a former occasion,

as to render it unnecessary to enlarge upon it here.



3. Again, if it be true, as these theologians affirm, that men have

only a gracious ability to obey God, and that this gracious ability

consists in the presence and gracious agency of the Holy Spirit, it

follows that, when the Holy Spirit is withdrawn from man, he is no

longer a free agent, and from that moment he is incapable of moral

action and of course can sin no more. Hence, should he live any

number of years after this withdrawal, neither sin nor holiness, virtue

nor vice, praiseworthiness nor blameworthiness could be predicated of

his conduct. The same will and must be true of all his future eternity.



4. If the doctrine in question be true, it follows, that from the

moment of the withdrawal of the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit,

man is no longer a subject of moral obligation. It is from that moment

absurd and unjust to require the performance of any duty of him. Nay

to conceive of him as being any longer a subject of duty; to think or

speak of duty as belonging to him, is as absurd as to think or speak of

the duty of a mere machine. He has, from the moment of the

withholding of a gracious ability, ceased to be a free and become a

necessary agent, having power to act but in one direction. Such a

being can by no possibility be capable of sin or holiness. Suppose he

still possesses power to act contrary to the letter of the law of God;

what then? This action can have no moral character, because, act in

some way he must, and he can act in no other way. It is nonsense to

affirm that such action can be sinful in the sense of blameworthy. To

affirm that it can, is to contradict a first truth of reason. Sinners, then,

who have quenched the Holy Spirit, and from whom he is wholly

withdrawn, are no longer to be blamed for their enmity against God,

and for all their opposition to Him. They are, according to this

doctrine, as free from blame as are the motions of a mere machine.



5. Again, if the doctrine in question be true, there is no reason to

believe that the angels that fell from their allegiance to God ever

sinned but once. If Adam lost his free agency by the fall, or by his first

sin, there can be no doubt that the angels did so too. If a gracious

ability had not been bestowed upon Adam, it is certain, according to

the doctrine in question, that he never could have been the subject of

moral obligation from the moment of his first sin, and consequently,

could never again have sinned. The same must be true of devils. If

by their first sin they fell into the condition of necessary agents, having

lost their free agency, they have never sinned since. That is, moral

character cannot have been predicable of their conduct since that

event, unless a gracious ability has been bestowed upon them. That

this has been done cannot, with even a show of reason, be pretended. 

The devils, then, according to this doctrine, are not now to blame for

all they do to oppose God and to ruin souls. Upon the supposition in

question, they cannot help it; and you might as well blame the winds

and the waves for the evils which they sometimes do, as blame Satan

for what he does.



6. If this doctrine be true, there is not, and never will be, any sin in

hell, for the plain reason, that there are no moral agents there. They

are necessary agents, unless it be true, that the Holy Spirit and a

gracious ability be continued there. This is not, I believe, contended

for by the abettors of this scheme. But if they deny to the inhabitants

of hell freedom of the will, or, which is the same thing, natural ability to

obey God, they must admit, or be grossly inconsistent, that there is no

sin in hell, either in men or devils. But is this admission agreeable

either to reason or revelation? I know that the abettors of this scheme

maintain, that God may justly hold both men, from whom a gracious

ability is withdrawn, and devils, responsible for their conduct, upon the

ground that they have destroyed their own ability. But suppose this

were true that they had rendered themselves idiots, lunatics, or

necessary as opposed to free agents, could God justly, could

enlightened reason still regard them as moral agents, and as morally

responsible for their conduct? No, indeed! God and reason may justly

blame, and render them miserable, for annihilating their freedom or

their moral agency, but to hold them still responsible for present

obedience, were absurd.



7. We have seen that the ability of all men of sane mind to obey

God, is necessarily assumed as a first truth, and that this assumption

is from the very laws of mind, the indispensable condition of the

affirmation, or even the conception, that they are subjects of moral

obligation; that, but for this assumption, men could not so much as

conceive the possibility of moral responsibility, and of praiseworthiness

and blameworthiness. If the laws of mind remain unaltered, this is and

always will be so. In the eternal world and in hell, men and devils must

necessarily assume their own freedom or ability to obey God, as the

condition of their obligation to do so, and, consequently of their being

capable of sin or holiness. Since revelation informs us that men and

devils continue to sin in hell, we know that there also it must be

assumed as a first truth of reason, that they are free agents, or that

they have natural ability to obey God.



8. But that a gracious ability to do duty or to obey God is an

absurdity, will further appear, if we consider that it is a first truth of

reason, that moral obligation implies moral agency, and that moral

agency implies freedom of will; or in other words, it implies a natural

ability to comply with obligation. This ability is necessarily regarded by

the intelligence as the sine qua non of moral obligation, on the ground

of natural and immutable justice. A just command always implies an

ability to obey it. A command to perform a natural impossibility would

not, and could not, impose obligation. Suppose God should command

human beings to fly without giving them power; could such a

command impose moral obligation? No, indeed! But suppose He

should give them power, or promise them power, upon the

performance of a condition within their reach; then He might in justice

require them to fly, and a command to do so would be obligatory. But

relatively to the requirement, the bestowment of power would not be

grace, but justice. Relatively to the results or the pleasure of flying,

the bestowment of power might be gracious. That is, it might be grace

in God to give me power to fly, that I might have the pleasure and

profit of flying; so that relatively to the results of flying, the giving of

power might be regarded as an act of grace. But, if God requires me

to fly as a matter of duty, He must in justice supply the power or ability

to fly. This would in justice be a necessary condition of the command

imposing moral obligation.



Nor would it at all vary the case if I had ever possessed wings, and

by the abuse of them had lost the power to fly. In this case,

considered relatively to the pleasure, and profit, and results of flying,

the restoring of the power to fly might and would be an act of grace. 

But if God would still command me to fly, He must, as a condition of

my obligation, restore the power. It is vain and absurd to say, as has

been said, that in such a case, although I might lose the power of

obedience, this could not alter the right of God to claim obedience. 

This assertion proceeds upon the absurd assumption that the will of

God makes or creates law, instead of merely declaring and enforcing

the law of nature. We have seen in former lectures, that the only law

or rule of action that is, or can be obligatory on a moral agent, is the

law of nature, or just that course of willing and acting, which is for the

time being, suitable to his nature and relations. We have seen that

God's will never makes or creates law, that it only declares and

enforces it. If therefore, by any means whatever, the nature of a moral

agent should be so changed that his will is no longer free to act in

conformity with, or in opposition to, the law of nature, if God would

hold him still obligated to obey, He must in justice, relatively to His

requirement, restore His liberty or ability. Suppose one had by the

abuse of his intellect lost the use of it, and become a perfect idiot,

could he by any possibility be still required to understand and obey

God? Certainly not. So neither could he be required to perform

anything else that had become naturally impossible to him. Viewed

relatively to the pleasure and results of obedience, the restoring of

power would be an act of grace. But viewed relatively to his duty or to

God's command, the restoring of power to obey is an act of justice and

not of grace. To call this grace were to abuse language, and confound

terms.



In what sense is a gracious ability possible?



1. Not, as we have just seen, in the sense that the bestowment of

power to render obedience to a command possible, can be properly a

gift of grace. Grace is undeserved favor, something not demanded by

justice, that which under the circumstances might be withholden

without injustice. It never can be just in any being to require that which

under the circumstances is impossible. As has been said, relatively to

the requirement and as a condition of its justice, the bestowment of

power adequate to the performance of that which is commanded, is an

unalterable condition of the justice of the command. This I say is a

first truth of reason, a truth everywhere by all men necessarily

assumed and known. A gracious ability to obey a command, is an

absurdity and an impossibility.



2. But a gracious ability considered relatively to the advantages to

result from obedience is possible. Suppose, for example, that a

servant who supports himself and his family by his wages, should by

his own fault render himself unable to labor and to earn his wages. 

His master may justly dismiss him, and let him go with his family to the

poor-house. But in this disabled state his master cannot justly exact

labor of him. Nor could he do so if he absolutely owned the servant. 

Now suppose the master to be able to restore to the servant his former

strength. If he would require service of him, as a condition of the

justice of this requirement, he must restore his strength so far at least

as to render obedience possible. This would be mere justice. But

suppose he restored the ability of the servant to gain support for

himself and his family by labor. This, viewed relatively to the good of

the servant, to the results of the restoration of his ability to himself and

to his family, is a matter of grace. Relatively to the right of the master

in requiring the labor of the servant, the restoration of ability to obey is

an act of justice. But relatively to the good of the servant, and the

benefits that result to him from this restoration of ability, and making it

once more possible for him to support himself and his family, the

giving of ability is properly an act of grace.



Let this be applied to the case under consideration. Suppose the

race of Adam to have lost their free agency by the first sin of Adam,

and thus to have come into a state in which holiness and consequent

salvation were impossible. Now, if God would still require obedience

of them, He must in justice restore their ability. And viewed relatively

to His right to command, and their duty to obey, this restoration is

properly a matter of justice. But suppose He would again place them

in circumstances to render holiness and consequent salvation possible

to them: viewed relatively to their good and profit, this restoration of

ability is properly a matter of grace.



A gracious ability to obey, viewed relatively to the command to be

obeyed, is impossible and absurd. But a gracious ability to be saved,

viewed relatively to salvation, is possible. There is no proof that

mankind ever lost their ability to obey, either by the first sin of Adam,

or by their own sin. For this would imply, as we have seen, that they

had ceased to be free, and had become necessary agents. But if they

had, and God had restored their ability to obey, all that can be justly

said in this case, is, that so far as his right to command is concerned,

the restoration of their ability was an act of justice. But so far as the

rendering of salvation possible to them is concerned, it was an act of

grace.



3. But it is asserted, or rather assumed by the defenders of the

dogma under consideration, that the Bible teaches the doctrine of a

natural inability, and of a gracious ability in man to obey the

commands of God. I admit, indeed, that if we interpret scripture

without regard to any just rules of interpretation, this assumption may

find countenance in the word of God, just as almost any absurdity

whatever may do, and has done. But a moderate share of attention to

one of the simplest and most universal and most important rules of

interpreting language, whether in the Bible or out of it, will strip this

absurd dogma of the least appearance of support from the word of

God. The rule to which I refer is this, "That language is always to be

interpreted in accordance with the subject matter of discourse."



When used of acts of will, the term "cannot," interpreted by this

rule, must not be understood to mean a proper impossibility. If I say, I

cannot take five dollars for my watch, when it is offered to me, every

one knows that I do not and cannot mean to affirm a proper

impossibility. So when the angel said to Lot, "Haste thee, for I cannot

do anything until thou be come thither" (Gen. 19:22), who ever

understood him as affirming a natural or any proper impossibility? All

that he could have meant was, that he was not willing to do anything

until Lot was in a place of safety. Just so when the Bible speaks of our

inability to comply with the commands of God, all that can be intended

is, that we are so unwilling that, without divine persuasion, we, as a

matter of fact, shall not and will not obey. This certainly is the sense in

which such language is used in common life. And in common

parlance, we never think of such language, when used of acts of will,

as meaning anything more than unwillingness, a state in which the will

is strongly committed in an opposite direction.



When Joshua said to the children of Israel, "Ye cannot serve the

Lord, for He is a holy God" (Joshua 24:19), the whole context, as well

as the nature of the case, shows that he did not mean to affirm a

natural, nor indeed any kind of impossibility. In the same connection,

he requires them to serve the Lord, and leads them solemnly to pledge

themselves to serve Him. He undoubtedly intended to say, that with

wicked hearts they could not render Him an acceptable service, and

therefore insisted on their putting away the wickedness of their hearts,

by immediately and voluntarily consecrating themselves to the service

of the Lord. So it must be in all cases where the term "cannot," and

such-like expressions which, when applied to muscular action, would

imply a proper impossibility, are used in reference to acts of will; they

cannot, when thus used, be understood as implying a proper

impossibility, without doing violence to every sober rule of interpreting

language. What would be thought of a judge or an advocate at the bar

of an earthly tribunal, who should interpret the language of a witness

without any regard to the rule, "That language is to be understood

according to the subject-matter of discourse." Should an advocate in

his argument to the court or jury, attempt to interpret the language of a

witness in a manner that made "cannot," when spoken of an act of will,

mean a proper impossibility, the judge would soon rebuke his stupidity,

and remind him that he must not talk nonsense in a court of justice;

and might possibly add, that such nonsensical assertions were

allowable only in the pulpit. I say again, that it is an utter abuse and

perversion of the laws of language, so to interpret the Bible as to make

it teach a proper inability in man to will as God directs. The essence of

obedience to God consists in willing. Language, then, used in

reference to obedience must, when properly understood, be

interpreted in accordance with the subject-matter of discourse. 

Consequently, when used in reference to acts of will, such expressions

as "cannot," and the like, can absolutely mean nothing more than a

choice in an opposite direction.



But it may be asked, Is there no grace in all that is done by the

Holy Spirit to make man wise unto salvation? Yes, indeed, I answer. 

And it is grace, and great grace, just because the doctrine of a natural

inability in man to obey God is not true. It is just because man is well

able to render obedience, and unjustly refuses to do so, that all the

influence that God brings to bear upon him to make him willing, is a

gift and an influence of grace. The grace is great, just in proportion to

the sinner's ability to comply with God's requirements, and the

strength of his voluntary opposition to his duty. If man were properly

unable to obey, there could be no grace in giving him ability to obey,

when the bestowment of ability is considered relatively to the

command. But let man be regarded as free, as possessing natural

ability to obey all the requirements of God, and all his difficulty as

consisting in a wicked heart, or, which is the same thing, in an

unwillingness to obey, then an influence on the part of God designed

and tending to make him willing, is grace indeed. But strip man of his

freedom, render him naturally unable to obey, and you render grace

impossible, so far as his obligation to obedience is concerned.



But it is urged in support of the dogma of natural inability and of a

gracious ability, that the Bible everywhere represents man as

dependent on the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit for all holiness,

and consequently for eternal life. I answer, it is admitted that this is

the representation of the Bible, but the question is, in what sense is he

dependent? Does his dependence consist in a natural inability to

embrace the gospel and be saved? Or does it consist in a voluntary

selfishness in an unwillingness to comply with the terms of salvation? 

Is man dependent on the Holy Spirit to give him a proper ability to

obey God or is he dependent only in such a sense that, as a matter of

fact, he will not embrace the gospel unless the Holy Spirit makes him

willing? The latter, beyond reasonable question, is the truth. This is

the universal representation of scripture. The difficulty to be overcome

is everywhere in the Bible represented to be the sinner's unwillingness

alone. It cannot possibly be anything else; for the willingness is the

doing required by God. "If there is first a willing mind, it is accepted

according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not" (2

Cor. 8:12).



But it is said, if man can be willing of himself, what need of divine

persuasion or influence to make him willing? I might ask, suppose a

man is able but unwilling to pay his debts, what need of any influence

to make him willing? Why, divine influence is needed to make a sinner

willing, or to induce him to will as God directs, just for the same reason

that persuasion, entreaty, argument, or the rod, is needed to make our

children submit their wills to ours. The fact therefore that the Bible

represents the sinner as in some sense dependent upon divine

influence for a right heart, no more implies a proper inability in the

sinner, than the fact that children are dependent for their good

behavior, oftentimes, upon the thorough and timely discipline of their

parents, implies a proper inability in them to obey their parents without

chastisement.



The Bible everywhere, and in every way, assumes the freedom of

the will. This fact stands out in strong relief upon every page of divine

inspiration. But this is only the assumption necessarily made by the

universal intelligence of man. The strong language often found in

scripture upon the subject of man's inability to obey God, is designed

only to represent the strength of his voluntary selfishness and enmity

against God, and never to imply a proper natural inability. It is,

therefore, a gross and most injurious perversion of scripture, as well

as a contradiction of human reason, to deny the natural ability, or

which is the same thing, the natural free agency of man, and to

maintain a proper natural inability to obey God, and the absurd dogma

of a gracious ability to do our duty.



1. The question of ability is one of great practical importance. To

deny the ability of man to obey the commandments of God, is to

represent God as a hard master, as requiring a natural impossibility of

His creatures on pain of eternal damnation. This necessarily begets in

the mind that believes it hard thoughts of God. The intelligence cannot

be satisfied with the justice of such a requisition. In fact, so far as this

error gets possession of the mind and gains assent, just so far it

naturally and necessarily excuses itself for disobedience, or for not

complying with the commandments of God.



2. The moral inability of Edwards is a real natural inability, and so it

has been understood by sinners and professors of religion. When I

entered the ministry, I found the persuasion of an absolute inability on

the part of sinners to repent and believe the gospel, almost universal. 

When I urged sinners and professors of religion to do their duty

without delay, I frequently met with stern opposition from sinners,

professors of religion, and ministers. They desired me to say to

sinners, that they could not repent, and that they must wait God's time,

that is, for God to help them. It was common for the classes of

persons just named to ask me, if I thought sinners could be Christians

whenever they pleased, and whether I thought that any class of

persons could repent, believe, and obey God without the strivings and

new-creating power of the Holy Spirit. The church was almost

universally settled down in the belief of a physical moral depravity,

and, of course, in a belief in the necessity of a physical regeneration,

and also of course in the belief, that sinners must wait to be

regenerated by divine power while they were passive. Professors also

must wait to be revived, until God, in mysterious sovereignty, came

and revived them. As to revivals of religion, they were settled down in

the belief to a great extent, that man had no more agency in producing

them than in producing showers of rain. To attempt to effect the

conversion of a sinner, or to promote a revival, was an attempt to take

the work out of the hands of God, to go to work in your own strength,

and to set sinners and professors to do the same. The vigorous use of

means and measures to promote a work of grace, was regarded by

many as impious. It was getting up an excitement of animal feeling,

and wickedly interfering with the prerogative of God. The abominable

dogmas of physical moral depravity, or a sinful constitution, with a

consequent natural, falsely called moral, inability, and the necessity of

a physical and passive regeneration, had chilled the heart of the church,

and lulled sinners into a fatal sleep. This is the natural tendency of

such doctrines.



3. Let it be distinctly understood before we close this subject, that

we do not deny, but strenuously maintain, that the whole plan of

salvation, and all the influences, both providential and spiritual, which

God exerts in the conversion, sanctification, and salvation, of sinners,

is grace from first to last, and that I deny the dogma of a gracious

ability, because it robs God of His glory. It really denies the grace of

the gospel. The abettors of this scheme, in contending for the grace of

the gospel, really deny it. What grace can there be, that should

surprise heaven and earth, and cause "the angels to desire to look into

it" (1 Peter 1:12), in bestowing ability on those who never had any,

and, of course, who never cast away their ability to obey the

requirements of God? According to them all men lost their ability in

Adam, and not by their own act. God still required obedience of them

upon pain of eternal death. Now He might, according to this view of

the subject, just as reasonably command all men, on pain of eternal

death, to fly, or to undo all that Adam had done, or perform any other

natural impossibility, as to command them to be holy, to repent and

believe the gospel. Now, I ask again, what possible grace was there,

or could there be, in His giving them power to obey Him? To have

required the obedience without giving the power had been infinitely

unjust. To admit the assumption, that men had really lost their ability

to obey in Adam, and call this bestowment of ability for which they

contend, grace, is an abuse of language, an absurdity and a denial of

the true grace of the gospel not to be tolerated. I reject the dogma of

a gracious ability, because it involves a denial of the true grace of the

gospel. I maintain that the gospel, with all its influences, including the

gift of the Holy Spirit, to convict, convert, and sanctify the soul, is a

system of grace throughout. But to maintain this, I must also maintain,

that God might justly have required obedience of men without making

these provisions for them. And to maintain the justice of God in

requiring obedience, I must admit and maintain that obedience was

possible to man.



Let it not be said then, that we deny the grace of the glorious

gospel of the blessed God, nor that we deny the reality and necessity

of the influences of the Holy Spirit to convert and sanctify the soul, nor

that this influence is a gracious one; for all these we most strenuously

maintain. But I maintain this upon the ground, that men are able to do

their duty, and that the difficulty does not lie in a proper inability, but in

a voluntary selfishness, in an unwillingness to obey the blessed

gospel. I say again, that I reject the dogma of a gracious ability, as I

understand its abettors to hold it, not because I deny, but solely

because it denies the grace of the gospel. The denial of ability is

really a denial of the possibility of grace in the affair of man's salvation. 

I admit the ability of man, and hold that he is able, but utterly unwilling

to obey God. Therefore I consistently hold that all the influences

exerted by God to make him willing, are of free grace abounding

through Christ Jesus.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 33



THE NOTION OF INABILITY



I have represented ability, or the freedom of the will, as a first truth

of consciousness, a truth necessarily known to all moral agents. The

inquiry may naturally arise, How then is it to be accounted for, that so

many men have denied the liberty of the will, or ability to obey God? A

recent writer thinks this denial a sufficient refutation of the affirmation,

that ability is a first-truth of consciousness. It is important that this

denial should be accounted for. That mankind affirm their obligation

upon the real, though often latent and unperceived assumption of

ability, there is no reasonable ground of doubt. I have said that first

truths are frequently assumed, and certainly known without being

always the direct object of thought or attention; and also that these

truths are universally held in the practical judgments of men, while

they sometimes in theory deny them. They know them to be true, and

in all their practical judgments assume their truth, while they reason

against them, think they prove them untrue, and not infrequently

affirm, that they are conscious of an opposite affirmation. For

example, men have denied, in theory, the law of causality, while they

have at every moment of their lives acted upon the assumption of its

truth. Others have denied the freedom of the will, who have, every

hour of their lives, assumed, and acted, and judged, upon the

assumption that the will is free. The same is true of ability, which, in

respect to the commandments of God, is identical with freedom. Men

have often denied the ability of man to obey the commandments of

God, while they have always, in their practical judgments of

themselves and of others, assumed their ability, in respect to those

things that are really commanded by God. Now, how is this to be

accounted for?



1. Multitudes have denied the freedom of the will, because they

have loosely confounded the will with the involuntary powers with the

intellect and the sensibility. Locke, as is well known, regarded the

mind as possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and

the will. President Edwards, as was said in a former lecture, followed

Locke, and regarded all the states of the sensibility as acts of the will. 

Multitudes, nay the great mass of Calvinistic divines, with their

hearers, have held the same views. This confounding of the sensibility

with the will has been common for a long time. Now everybody is

conscious, that the states of the sensibility, or mere feelings, cannot

be produced or changed by a direct effort to feel thus or thus. 

Everybody knows from consciousness that the feelings come and go,

wax and wane, as motives are presented to excite them. And they

know also that these feelings are under the law of necessity and not of

liberty; that is, that necessity is an attribute of these feelings, in such a

sense, that under the circumstances, they will exist in spite of

ourselves, and that they cannot be controlled by a direct effort to

control them. Everybody knows that our feelings, or the states of our

sensibility can be controlled only indirectly, that is by the direction of

our thoughts. By directing our thoughts to an object calculated to

excite certain feelings, we know that, when the excitability is not

exhausted, feelings correlated to that object will come into play, of

course and of necessity. So when any class of feelings exist, we all

know that by diverting the attention from the object that excites them,

they subside of course, and give place to a class correlated to the new

object that at present occupies the attention. Now, it is very manifest

how the freedom of the will has come to be denied by those who

confound the will proper with the sensibility. These same persons

have always known and assumed, that the actions of the will proper

were free. Their error has consisted in not distinguishing in theory

between the action of the proper will, and the involuntary states of the

sensibility. In their practical judgments, and in their conduct, they have

recognized the distinction which they have failed to recognize in their

speculations and theories. They have every hour been exerting their

own freedom, have been controlling directly their attention and their

outward life, by the free exercise of their proper will. They have also,

by the free exercise of the same faculty, been indirectly controlling the

states of their sensibility. They have all along assumed the absolute

freedom of the will proper, and have always acted upon the

assumption, or they would not have acted at all, or even attempted to

act. But since they did not in theory distinguish between the sensibility

and the will proper, they denied in theory the freedom of the will. If the

actions of the will be confounded with desires and emotions, as

President Edwards confounded them, and as has been common, the

result must be a theoretical denial of the freedom of the will. In this

way we are to account for the doctrine of inability, as it has been

generally held. It has not been clearly understood that moral law

legislates directly, and, with strict propriety of speech, only over the will

proper, and over the involuntary powers only indirectly through the will. 

It has been common to regard the law and the gospel of God, as

directly extending their claims to the involuntary powers and states of

mind; and, as was shown in a former lecture, many have regarded, in

theory, the law as extending its claims to those states that lie wholly

beyond, either the direct or indirect control of the will. Now, of course,

with these views of the claims of God, ability is and must be denied. I

trust we have seen in past lectures, that, strictly and properly

speaking, the moral law restricts its claims to the actions of the will

proper, in such a sense that, if there be a willing mind, it is accepted

as obedience; that the moral law and the lawgiver legislate over

involuntary states only indirectly, that is, through the will; and that the

whole of virtue, strictly speaking, consists in good will or disinterested

benevolence. Sane minds never practically deny, or can deny, the

freedom of the will proper, or the doctrine of ability, when they make

the proper discriminations between the will and the sensibility, and

properly regard moral law as legislating directly only over the will. It is

worthy of all consideration, that those who have denied ability, have

almost always confounded the will and the sensibility; and that those

who have denied ability, have always extended the claims of moral law

beyond the pale of proper voluntariness; and many of them even

beyond the limits of either the direct or the indirect control of the will.



But the inquiry may arise, how it comes to pass that men have so

extensively entertained the impression, that the moral law legislates

directly over those feelings, and over those states of mind which they

know to be involuntary? I answer, that this mistake has arisen out of a

want of just discrimination between the direct and indirect legislation of

the law, and of the lawgiver. It is true that men are conscious of being

responsible for their feelings and for their outward actions, and even

for their thoughts. And it is really true that they are responsible for

them, in so far as they are under either the direct or indirect control of

the will. And they know that these acts and states of mind are possible

to them, that is, that they have an indirect ability to produce them. 

They, however, loosely confound the direct and indirect ability and

responsibility. The thing required by the law directly and presently is

benevolence or goodwill. This is what, and all that, the law strictly,

presently or directly requires. It indirectly requires all those outward

and inward acts and states that are connected directly and indirectly

with this required act of will, by a law of necessity; that is, that those

acts and states should follow as soon as by a natural and necessary

law they will follow from a right action of the will. When these feelings,

and states, and acts do not exist, they blame themselves, generally

with propriety, because the absence of them is in fact owing to a want

of the required act of the will. Sometimes, no doubt, they blame

themselves unjustly, not considering that, although the will is right, of

which they are conscious, the involuntary state or act does not follow,

because of exhaustion, or because of some disturbance in the

established and natural connection between the acts of the will and its

ordinary sequents. When this exhaustion or disturbance exists, men

are apt, loosely and unjustly, to write bitter things against themselves. 

They often do the same in hours of temptation, when Satan casts his

fiery darts at them, lodging them in the thoughts and involuntary

feelings. The will repels them, but they take effect, for the time being,

in spite of one's self, in the intellect and sensibility. Blasphemous

thoughts are suggested to the mind, unkind thoughts of God are

suggested, and in spite of one's self, these abominable thoughts

awaken their correlated feelings. The will abhors them and struggles

to suppress them, but for the time being, finds itself unable to do

anything more than to fight and resist.



Now, it is very common for souls in this state to write the most bitter

accusations against themselves. But should it be hence inferred that

they really are as much in fault as they assume themselves to be? 

No, indeed! But why do ministers, of all schools, unite in telling such

tempted souls, You are mistaken, my dear brother or sister, these

thoughts and feelings, though exercises of your own mind, are not

yours in such a sense that you are responsible for them? The

thoughts are suggested by Satan, and the feelings are a necessary

consequence. Your will resists them, and this proves that you are

unable, for the time being, to avoid them. You are therefore not

responsible for them while you resist them with all the power of your

will, any more than you would be guilty of murder should a giant

overpower your strength, and use your hand against your will to shoot

a man. In such cases it is, so far as I know, universally true, that all

schools admit that the tempted soul is not responsible or guilty for

those things which it cannot help. The inability is here allowed to be a

bar to obligation; and such souls are justly told by ministers, you are

mistaken in supposing yourself guilty in this case. It is just as absurd,

in the one case as in the other, to infer real responsibility from a

feeling or persuasion of responsibility. To hold that men are always

responsible, because they loosely think themselves to be so, is

absurd. In cases of temptation, such as that just supposed, as soon

as the attention is directed to the fact of inability to avoid those

thoughts and feelings, and the mind is conscious of the will's resisting

them, and of being unable to banish them, it readily rests in the

assurance that it is not responsible for them. Its own irresponsibility in

such cases appears self-evident to the mind, the moment the proper

inability is considered, and the affirmation of irresponsibility attended

to. Now if the soul naturally and truly regarded itself as responsible,

when there is a proper inability ad impossibility, the instructions above

referred to could not relieve the mind. It would say, To be sure I know

that I cannot avoid having these thoughts and feelings, any more than

I can cease to be the subject of consciousness, yet I know I am

responsible notwithstanding. These thoughts and feelings are states

of my own mind, and no matter how I come by them, or whether I can

control or prevent them or not. Inability, you know, is no bar to

obligation; therefore, my obligation and my guilt remain. Woe is me,

for I am undone. The idea, then, of responsibility, when there is in fact

real inability, is a prejudice of education, a mistake.



The mistake, unless strong prejudice of education has taken

possession of the mind, lies in overlooking the fact of a real and proper

inability. Unless the judgment has been strongly biased by education,

it never judges itself bound to perform impossibilities, nor even

conceives of such a thing. Who ever held himself bound to undo what

is past, to recall past time, or to substitute holy acts and states of mind

in the place of past sinful ones? No one ever held himself bound to do

this; first, because he knows it to be impossible; and secondly,

because no one that I have heard of ever taught or asserted any such

obligation; and therefore none have received so strong a bias from

education as loosely to hold such an opinion. But sometimes the bias

of education is so great, that the subjects of it seem capable of

believing almost anything, however inconsistent with the intuitions of

the reason, and consequently in the face of the most certain

knowledge. For example, President Edwards relates of a young

woman in his congregation, that she was deeply convicted of being

guilty for Adam's first sin, and deeply repented of it. Now suppose that

this and like cases should be regarded as conclusive proof that men

are guilty of that sin, and deserve the wrath and curse of God for ever

for that sin; and that all men will suffer the pains of hell forever, except

they become convinced of their personal guilt for that sin, and repent

of it in dust and ashes! President Edwards' teaching on the subject of

the relation of all men to Adam's first sin, it is well known, was

calculated in a high degree to pervert the judgment upon that subject;

and this sufficiently accounts for the fact above alluded to. But apart

from education, no human being ever held himself responsible for, or

guilty of, the first or any other sin of Adam, or of any other being, who

existed and died before he himself existed. The reason is that all

moral agents naturally know, that inability or a proper impossibility is a

bar to moral obligation and responsibility; and they never conceive to

the contrary, unless biased by a mystifying education that casts a fog

over their primitive and constitutional convictions.



2. Some have denied ability because they have strangely held, that

the moral law requires sinners to be, in all respects, what they might

have been had they never sinned. That is, they maintain that God

requires of them just as high and perfect a service as if their powers

had never been abused by sin; as if they had always been developed

by the perfectly right use of them. This they admit to be a natural

impossibility; nevertheless they hold that God may justly require it, and

that sinners are justly bound to perform this impossible service, and

that they sin continually in coming short of it. To this sentiment I

answer, that it might be maintained with as much show of reason, and

as much authority from the Bible, that God might and does require of

all sinners to undo all their acts of sin, and to substitute holy ones in

their places, and that He holds them as sinning every moment by the

neglect to do this. Why may not God as well require one as the other? 

They are alike impossibilities originating in the sinner's own act or

fault. If the sinner's rendering himself unable to obey in one case does

not set aside the right of God to command, so does it not for the same

reason in the other. If an inability resulting from the sinner's own act

cannot bar the right of God to make the requisition in the one case,

neither can it for the same reason in the other. But every one can see

that God cannot justly require the sinner to recall past time, and to

undo past acts. But why? No other reason can be assigned than that

it is impossible. But the same reason, it is admitted, exists in its full

extent in the other case. It is admitted that sinners, who have long

indulged in sin, or who have sinned at all, are really as unable to

render as high a degree of service as they might have done had they

never sinned, as they are to recall past time, or to undo all their past

acts of sin. On what ground, then, of reason or revelation does the

assertion rest, that in one case an impossibility is a bar to obligation,

and not in the other? I answer, there is no ground whatever for the

assertion in question. It is a sheer and an absurd assumption,

unsupported by any affirmation of reason, or any truth or principle of

revelation.



But to this assumption I reply again, as I have done on a former

occasion, that if it be true, it must follow, that no one on earth or in

heaven who has ever sinned will be able to render as perfect a service

as the law demands; for there is no reason to believe, that any being

who has abused his powers by sin will ever in time or eternity be able

to render as legal a service as he might have done had he at every

moment duly developed them by perfect obedience. If this theory is

true, I see not why it does not follow that the saints will be guilty in

heaven of the sin of omission. A sentiment based upon an absurdity

in the outset, and resulting in such consequences as this, must be

rejected without hesitation.



3. A consciousness of the force of habit, in respect to all the acts

and states of body and mind, has contributed to the loose holding of

the doctrine of inability. Every one who is at all in the habit of

observation and self-reflection is aware, that for some reason we

acquire a greater and greater facility in doing anything by practice or

repetition. We find this to be true in respect to acts of will as really as

in respect to the involuntary states of mind. When the will has been

long committed to the indulgence of the propensities, and in the habit

of submitting itself to their impulse, there is a real difficulty of some

sort in the way of changing its action. This difficulty cannot really

impair the liberty of the will. If it could, it would destroy, or so far

impair, moral agency and accountability. But habit may, and, as every

one knows, does interpose an obstacle of some sort in the way of right

willing, or, on the other hand, in the way of wrong willing. That is, men

both obey and disobey with greatest facility from habit. Habit strongly

favors the accustomed action of the will in any direction. This, as I

said, never does or can properly impair the freedom of the will, or

render it impossible to act in a contrary direction: for if it could and

should, the actions of the will, in that case, being determined by a law

of necessity in one direction, would have no moral character. If

benevolence became a habit so strong that it were utterly impossible

to will in an opposite direction, or not to will benevolently, benevolence

would cease to be virtuous. So, on the other hand, with selfishness. If

the will came to be determined in that direction by habit grown into a

law of necessity, such action would and must cease to have moral

character. But, as I said, there is a real conscious difficulty of some

sort in the way of obedience, when the will has been long accustomed

to sin. This is strongly recognized in the language of inspiration and in

devotional hymns, as well as in the language of experience by all men. 

The language of scripture is often so strong upon this point, that, but

for a regard to the subject-matter of discourse, we might justly infer a

proper inability. For example, "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or

the leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, that are

accustomed to do evil" (Jerem. 13:23). This and similar passages

recognize the influence of habit. "Then may ye who are accustomed

to do evil," custom or habit is to be overcome, and, in the strong

language of the prophet, this is like changing the Ethiopian's skin or

the leopard's spots. But to understand the prophet as here affirming a

proper inability were to disregard one of the fundamental rules of

interpreting language, namely, that it is to be understood by reference

to the subject of discourse. The latter part of the seventh chapter of

Romans affords a striking instance and an illustration of this. It is, as

has just been said, a sound and most important rule of interpreting all

language, that due regard be had to the subject-matter of discourse. 

When "cannot," and such like terms, that express an inability are

applied to physical or involuntary actions or states of mind, they

express a proper natural inability; but when they are used in reference

to actions of free will, they express not a proper impossibility, but only

a difficulty arising out of the existence of a contrary choice, or the law

of habit, or both.



Much question has been made about the seventh of Romans in its

relation to the subject of ability and inability. Let us, therefore, look a

little into this passage, "For that which I do, I allow not; for what I

would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. If then I do that which I

would not, I consent unto the law that it is good. Now then it is no

more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me

(that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with

me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that

I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do

that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I

find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. 

For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another

law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing

me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members" (Romans

7:15-23). Now what did the apostle mean by this language? Did he

use language here in the popular sense, or with strictly philosophical

propriety? He says he finds himself able to will, but not able to do. Is

he then speaking of a mere outward or physical inability? Does he

mean merely to say, that the established connection between volition

and its sequents was disturbed, so that he could not execute his

volitions? This language, literally interpreted, and without reference to

the subject-matter of discourse, and without regard to the manifest

scope and design of the writer, would lead us to conclude. But who

ever contended for such an interpretation? The apostle used popular

language, and was describing a very common experience. Convicted

sinners and backslidden saints often make legal resolutions, and

resolve upon obedience under the influence of legal motives, and

without really becoming benevolent, and changing the attitude of their

wills. They, under the influence of conviction, purpose selfishly to do

their duty to God and man, and, in the presence of temptation, they

constantly fail of keeping their resolutions. It is true, that with their

selfish hearts, or in the selfish attitude of their wills, they cannot keep

their resolutions to abstain from those inward thoughts and emotions,

nor from those outward actions that result by a law of necessity from a

selfish state or attitude of the will. These legal resolutions the apostle

popularly calls willings. "To will is present with me, but how to do good

I find not. When I would do good, evil is present with me, so that the

good I would I do not, and the evil I would not, that I do. If then I do

the evil I would not, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in

me. I delight in the law of God after the inner man. But I see another

law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing

me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members," etc. Now,

this appears to me to be descriptive of a very familiar experience of

every deeply convicted sinner or backslider. The will is committed to

the propensities, to the law in the members, or to the gratification of

the impulses of the sensibility. Hence, the outward life is selfish. 

Conviction of sin leads to the formation of resolutions of amendment,

while the will does not submit to God. These resolutions constantly fail

of securing the result contemplated. The will still abides in a state of

committal to self-gratification; and hence resolutions to amend in

feeling or the outward life, fail of securing those results.



Nothing was more foreign from the apostle's purpose, it seems to

me, than to affirm a proper inability of will to yield to the claims of God. 

Indeed, he affirms and assumes the freedom of his will. "To will," he

says, "is present with me"; that is, to resolve. But resolution is an act

of will. It is a purpose, a design. He purposed, designed to amend. 

To form resolutions was present with him, but how to do good he

found not. The reason why he did not execute his purposes was, that

they were selfishly made; that is, he resolved upon reformation without

giving his heart to God, without submitting his will to God, without

actually becoming benevolent. This caused his perpetual failure. This

language, construed strictly to the letter, would lead to the conclusion,

that the apostle was representing a case where the will is right, but

where the established and natural connection between volition and its

sequents is destroyed, so that the outward act did not follow the action

of the will. In this case all schools would agree that the act of the will

constitutes real obedience. The whole passage, apart from the

subject-matter of discourse, and from the manifest design and scope

of the writer, might lead us to conclude, that the apostle was speaking

of a proper inability, and that he did not therefore regard the failure as

his own fault. "It is no more I, but sin that dwelleth in me. O wretched

man that I am," etc. Those who maintain that the apostle meant to

assert a proper inability to obey, must also admit that he represented

this inability as a bar to obligation, and regarded his state as

calamitous, rather than as properly sinful. But the fact is, he was

portraying a legal experience, and spoke of finding himself unable to

keep selfish resolutions of amendment in the presence of temptation. 

His will was in a state of committal to the indulgence of the

propensities. In the absence of temptation, his convictions, and fears,

and feelings were the strongest impulses, and under their influence he

would form resolutions to do his duty, to abstain from fleshly

indulgences, etc. But as some other appetite or desire came to be

more strongly excited, he yielded to that of course, and broke his

former resolution. Paul writes as if speaking of himself, but was

doubtless speaking as the representative of a class of persons already

named. He found the law of selfish habit exceedingly strong, and so

strong as to lead him to cry out, "O wretched man," etc. But this is not

affirming a proper inability of will to submit to God.



4. All men who seriously undertake their own reformation find

themselves in great need of help and support from the Holy Spirit, in

consequence of the physical depravity of which I have formerly

spoken, and because of the great strength of their habit of

self-indulgence. They are prone, as is natural, to express their sense

of dependence on the Divine Spirit in strong language, and to speak of

this dependence as if it consisted in a real inability, when, in fact, they

do not really consider it as a proper inability. They speak upon this

subject just as they do upon any and every other subject, when they

are conscious of a strong inclination to a given course. They say in

respect to many things, "I cannot," when they mean only "I will not,"

and never think of being understood as affirming a proper inability. 

The inspired writers expressed themselves in the common language of

men upon such subjects, and are doubtless to be understood in the

same way. In common parlance, "cannot" often means "will not," and

perhaps is used as often in this sense as it is to express a proper

inability. Men do not misinterpret this language, and suppose it to

affirm a proper inability, when used in reference to acts of will, except

on the subject of obedience to God; and why should they assign a

meaning to language when used upon this subject which they do not

assign to it anywhere else?



But, as I said in a former lecture, under the light of the gospel, and

with the promises in our hands, God does require of us what we

should be unable to do and be, but for these promises and this

proffered assistance. Here is a real inability to do directly in our own

strength all that is required of us, upon consideration of the proffered

aid. We can only do it by strength imparted by the Holy Spirit. That is,

we cannot know Christ, and avail ourselves of His offices and

relations, and appropriate to our own souls His fullness, except as we

are taught by the Holy Spirit. The thing immediately and directly

required, is to receive the Holy Spirit by faith to be our teacher and

guide, to take of Christ's and show it to us. This confidence we are

able to exercise. Who ever really and intelligently affirmed that he had

not power or ability to trust or confide in the promise and oath of God?



Much that is said of inability in poetry, and in the common language

of the saints, respects not the subjection of the will to God, but those

experiences, and states of feeling that depend on the illuminations of

the Spirit just referred to. The language that is so common in prayer

and in the devotional dialect of the church, respects generally our

dependence upon the Holy Spirit for such divine discoveries of Christ,

as to charm the soul into a steadfast abiding in Him. We feel our

dependence upon the Holy Spirit so to enlighten us, as to break up for

ever the power of sinful habit, and draw us away from our idols entirely

and for ever.



In future lectures I shall have occasion to enlarge much upon the

subject of our dependence upon Christ and the Holy Spirit. But this

dependence does not consist in a proper inability to will as God

directs, but, as I have said, partly in the power of sinful habit, and

partly in the great darkness of our souls in respect to Christ and His

mediatorial work and relations. All these together do not constitute a

proper inability, for the plain reason, that through the right action of our

will which is always possible to us, these difficulties can all be directly

or indirectly overcome. Whatever we can do or be, directly or

indirectly, by willing, is possible to us. But there is no degree of

spiritual attainment required of us, that may not be reached directly or

indirectly by right willing. Therefore, these attainments are possible. 

"If any man," says Christ, "will do His will," that is, has an obedient will,

"he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God" (John 7:17). "If

thine eye be single," that is, if the intention or will is right, "thy whole

body shall be full of light" (Matt. 6:22). "If any man love Me, he will

keep My words, and My Father will love him, and we will come and

make our abode with him" (John 14:23). The scriptures abound with

assurances of light and instruction, and of all needed grace and help,

upon condition of a right will or heart, that is, upon condition of our

being really willing to obey the light, when and as fast as we receive it. 

I have abundantly shown on former occasions, that a right state of the

will constitutes, for the time being, all that, strictly speaking, the moral

law requires. But I said, that it also, though in a less strict and proper

sense, requires all those acts and states of the intellect and sensibility

which are connected by a law of necessity with the right action of the

will. Of course, it also requires that cleansing of the sensibility, and all

those higher forms of Christian experience that result from the

indwelling of the Holy Spirit. That is the law of God requires that these

attainments shall be made when the means are provided and enjoyed,

and as soon as, in the nature of the case, these attainments are

possible. But it requires no more than this. For the law of God can

never require absolute impossibilities. That which requires absolute

impossibilities, is not and cannot be moral law. For, as was formerly

said, moral law is the law of nature, and what law of nature would that

be that should require absolute impossibilities? This would be a

mockery of a law of nature. What! A law of nature requiring that which

is impossible to nature, both directly and indirectly! Impossible.

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LECTURE 34



REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE



In the discussion of this subject I shall show:



What repentance is not.



1. The Bible everywhere represents repentance as a virtue, and as

constituting a change of moral character; consequently, it cannot be a

phenomenon of the intelligence: that is, it cannot consist in conviction

of sin, nor in any intellectual apprehension of our guilt or ill-desert. All

the states or phenomena of the intelligence are purely passive states

of mind, and of course moral character, strictly speaking, cannot be

predicated of them.



2. Repentance is not a phenomenon of the sensibility: that is, it

does not consist in a feeling of regret or remorse, of compunction or

sorrow for sin, or of sorrow in view of the consequences of sin to self

or to others, nor in any feelings or emotions whatever. All feelings or

emotions belong to the sensibility, and are, of course, purely passive

states of mind, and consequently can have no moral character in

themselves.



It should be distinctly understood, and always borne in mind, that

repentance cannot consist in any involuntary state of mind, for it is

impossible that moral character, strictly speaking, should pertain to

passive states.



What repentance is.



There are two Greek words which are translated by the English

word, repent.



1. Metamelomai, "to care for," or to be concerned for one's self;

hence to change one's course. This term seems generally to be used

to express a state of the sensibility, as regret, remorse, sorrow for sin,

etc. But sometimes it also expresses a change of purpose as a

consequence of regret, or remorse, or sorrow; as in, "He answered

and said, I will not; but afterwards he repented and went" (Matt.

21:29). It is used to represent the repentance of Judas, which

evidently consisted of remorse and despair.



2. Metanoeo, "to take an after view": or more strictly, to change

one's mind as a consequence of, and in conformity with, a second and

more rational view of the subject. This word evidently expresses a

change of choice, purpose, intention, in conformity with the dictates of

the intelligence. This is no doubt the idea of evangelical repentance. 

It is a phenomenon of will, and consists in the turning or change of the

ultimate intention from selfishness to benevolence. The term

expresses the act of turning; the changing of the heart, or of the ruling

preference of the soul. It might with propriety be rendered by the

terms "changing the heart." The English word "repentance" is often

used to express regret, remorse, sorrow, etc., and is used in so loose

a sense as not to convey a distinct idea, to the common mind, of the

true nature of evangelical repentance. A turning from sin to holiness,

or more strictly, from a state of consecration to self to a state of

consecration to God, is and must be the turning, the change of mind,

or the repentance that is required of all sinners. Nothing less can

constitute a virtuous repentance, and nothing more can be required.



What is implied in repentance.



1. Such is the correlation of the will to the intellect, that repentance

must imply reconsideration or after thought. It must imply

self-reflection, and such an apprehension of one's guilt as to produce

self-condemnation. That selfishness is sin, and that it is right and duty

to consecrate the whole being to God and His service, are first truths,

necessarily assumed by all moral agents. They are, however, often

unthought of, not reflected upon. Repentance implies the giving up of

the attention to the consideration and self-application of these first

truths, and consequently implies conviction of sin, and guilt, and

ill-desert, and a sense of shame and self-condemnation. It implies an

intellectual and a hearty justification of God, of His law, of His moral

and providential government, and of all His works and ways.



It implies an apprehension of the nature of sin, that it belongs to the

heart, and does not essentially consist in, though it leads to, outward

conduct; that it is an utterly unreasonable state of mind, and that it

justly deserves the wrath and curse of God forever.



It implies an apprehension of the reasonableness of the law and

commands of God, and of the folly and madness of sin. It implies an

intellectual and a hearty giving up of all controversy with God upon all

and every point.



It implies a conviction that God is wholly right and the sinner wholly

wrong, and a thorough and hearty abandonment of all excuses and

apologies for sin. It implies an entire and universal acquittal of God

from every shade and degree of blame, a thorough taking of the entire

blame of sin to self. It implies a deep and thorough abasement of self

in the dust, a crying out of soul against self, and a most sincere and

universal, intellectual, and hearty exaltation of God.



2. Such, also, is the connection of the will and the sensibility, that

the turning of the will, or evangelical repentance, implies sorrow for sin

as necessarily resulting from the turning of the will, together with the

intellectual views of sin which are implied in repentance. Neither

conviction of sin, nor sorrow for it, constitutes repentance. Yet from

the correlation which is established between the intelligence, the

sensibility, and the will, both conviction of sin, and sorrow for it, are

implied in evangelical repentance, the one as necessarily preceding,

and the other as often preceding, and always and necessarily resulting

from repentance. During the process of conviction, it often happens,

that the sensibility is hardened and unfeeling; or, if there is much

feeling, it is often only regret, remorse, agony, and despair. But when

the heart has given away, and the evangelical turning has taken place,

it often happens that the fountain of the great deep in the sensibility is

broken up, the sorrows of the soul are stirred to the very bottom, and

the sensibility pours forth its gushing tides like an irresistible torrent. 

But it frequently happens, too, in minds less subject to deep emotion,

that the sorrows do not immediately flow in deep and broad channels,

but are mild, melting, tender, tearful, silent, subdued.



Self-loathing is another state of the sensibility implied in evangelical

repentance. This state of mind may and often does, exist where

repentance is not, just as outward morality does. But, like outward

morality, it must exist where true repentance is. Self-loathing is a

natural and a necessary consequence of those intellectual views of

self that are implied in repentance. While the intelligence apprehends

the utter, shameful guilt of self, and the heart yields to the conviction,

the sensibility necessarily sympathizes, and a feeling of self-loathing

and abhorrence is the inevitable consequence.



It implies a loathing and abhorrence of the sins of others, a most

deep and thorough feeling of opposition to sin to all sin, in self and

everybody else. Sin has become, to the penitent soul, the abominable

thing which it hates. It implies a holy indignation toward all sin and all

sinners, and a manifest opposition to every form of iniquity.



3. Repentance also implies peace of mind. The soul that has full

confidence in the infinite wisdom and love of God, in the atonement of

Christ, and in His universal providence, cannot but have peace. And

further, the soul that has abandoned all sin, and turned to God, is no

longer in a state of warfare with itself and with God. It must have

peace of conscience, and peace with God. It implies

heart-complacency in God, and in all the holy. This must follow from

the very nature of repentance. It implies confession of sin to God and

to man, as far as sin has been committed against men. If the heart

has thoroughly renounced sin, it has become benevolent, and is of

course disposed, as far as possible, to undo the wrong it has

committed, to confess sin, and humble self on count of it, before God

and our neighbor, whom we have injured. Repentance implies

humility, or a willingness to be known and estimated according to our

real character. It implies a disposition to do right, and to confess our

faults to God and man, as far as man has a right to know them. Let no

one who has refused, and still refuses or neglects to confess his sins

to God, and those sins to men that have been committed against

them, profess repentance unto salvation; but let him remember that

God has said, "He that covereth his sins shall not prosper; but whoso

confesseth and forsaketh them shall find mercy" (Prov. 28:13), and

again, "Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another,

that ye may be healed" (James 5:16).



Repentance implies a willingness to make restitution, and the

actual making of it as far as ability goes. He is not just, and of course

is not penitent, who has injured his neighbor in his person, reputation,

property, or in anything, and is unwilling to make restitution. And he is

unwilling to make restitution who neglects to do so whenever he is

able. It is impossible that a soul truly penitent should neglect to make

all practicable restitution, for the plain reason that penitence implies a

benevolent and just attitude of the will, and the will controls the

conduct by a law of necessity.



Repentance implies reformation of outward life. This follows from

reformation of heart by a law of necessity. It is naturally impossible

that a penitent soul, remaining penitent, should indulge in any known

sin. If the heart be reformed, the life must be as the heart is.



It implies a universal reformation of life, that is, a reformation

extending to all outward sin. The penitent does not, and remaining

penitent, cannot, reform in respect to some sins only. If penitent at all,

he must have repented of sin as sin, and of course of all sin. If he has

turned to God, and consecrated himself to God, he has of course

ceased from sin, from all sin as such. Sin, as we have seen on a

former occasion, is a unit, and so is holiness. Sin consists in

selfishness, and holiness disinterested benevolence: it is therefore

sheer nonsense to say that repentance can consist with indulgence in

some sins. What are generally termed little, as well as what are

termed great sins, are alike rejected and abhorred by the truly penitent

soul, and this from a law of necessity, he being truly penitent.



4. It implies faith or confidence in God in all things. It implies, not

only the conviction that God is wholly right in all His controversy with

sinners, but also that the heart has yielded to this conviction, and has

come fully over to confide most implicitly in Him in all respects, so that

it can readily commit all interests for time and eternity to His hands. 

Repentance is a state of mind that implies the fullest confidence in all

the promises and threatenings of God, and in the atonement and

grace of Christ.



What impenitence is not.



1. It is not a negation, or the mere absence of repentance. Some

seem to regard impenitence as a nonentity, as the mere absence of

repentance; but this is a great mistake.



2. It is not mere apathy in the sensibility in regard to sin, and a

mere want of sorrow for it.



3. It is not the absence of conviction of sin, nor the consequent

carelessness of the sinner in respect to the commandments of God.



4. It is not an intellectual self-justification, nor does it consist in a

disposition to cavil at truth and the claims of God. These may and

often do result from impenitence, but are not identical with it.



5. It does not consist in the spirit of excuse-making, so often

manifested by sinners. This spirit is a result of impenitence, but does

not constitute it.



6. Nor does it consist in the love of sin for its own sake, nor in the

love of sin in any sense. It is not a constitutional appetite, relish, or

craving for sin. If this constitutional craving for sin existed, it could

have no moral character, inasmuch as it would be a wholly involuntary

state of mind. It could not be the crime of impenitence.



What impenitence is.



1. It is everywhere in the Bible represented as a heinous sin, as in:

"Then began He to upbraid the cities wherein most of His mighty

works were done, because they repented not. Woe unto thee,

Chorazin! Woe unto thee, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works which

were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have

repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I say unto you, it shall

be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment than for

you. And thou Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be

brought down to hell; for if the mighty works which have been done in

thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. 

But I say unto you, that it shall be more tolerable for the land of

Sodom, in the day of judgment, than for thee" (Matt. 11:20-24). Here,

as elsewhere, impenitence is represented as most aggravated

wickedness.



2. Impenitence is a phenomenon of the will, and consists in the

will's cleaving to self-indulgence under light. It consists in the will's

pertinacious adherence to the gratification of self, in despite of all the

light with which the sinner is surrounded. It is not, as has been said, a

passive state nor a mere negation, nor the love of sin for its own sake;

but it is an active and obstinate state of the will, a determined holding

on to that course of self-seeking which constitutes sin, not from a love

to sin, but for the sake of the gratification. This, under light, is of

course, aggravated wickedness. Considered in this view, it is easy to

account for all the woes and denunciations that the Saviour uttered

against it. When the claims of God are revealed to the mind, it must

necessarily yield to them, or strengthen itself in sin. It must, as it were,

gird itself up, and struggle to resist the claims of duty. This

strengthening self in sin under light is the particular form of sin which

we call impenitence. All sinners are guilty of it, because all have some

light, but some are vastly more guilty of it than others.



Notice some things that are implied in impenitence.



As it essentially consists in a cleaving to self-indulgence under

light, it implies:



1. That the impenitent sinner obstinately prefers his own petty and

momentary gratification to all the other and higher interests of God and

the universe; that because these gratifications are his own, or the

gratification of self, he therefore gives them the preference over all the

infinite interests of all other beings.



2. It implies the deliberate and actual setting at naught, not only of

the interests of God and of the universe, as of no value, but it implies

also a total disregard, and even contempt, of the rights of all other

beings. It is a practical denial that they have any rights or interests to

be promoted.



3. It implies a rejection of the authority of God, and contempt for it,

as well as a spurning of His law and gospel.



4. It implies a present justification of all past sin. The sinner who

holds on to his self-indulgence, in the presence of the light of the

gospel, really in heart justifies all his past rebellion.



5. Consequently present impenitence, especially under the light of

the glorious gospel, is a heart-justification of all sin. It is taking sides

deliberately with sinners against God, and is a virtual endorsing of all

sins of earth and hell. This principle is clearly implied in Christ's

teaching: "Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise

men, and scribes; and some of them ye shall kill and crucify; and

some of them shall ye scourge in your synagogues, and persecute

them from city to city; that upon you may come all the righteous blood

shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood

of Zacharias, son of Berechiah, whom ye slew between the temple

and the altar. Verily, I say unto you, All these things shall come upon

this generation" (Matt. 23:34-36).



6. Present impenitence, under all the light and experience which

the sinner now has, involves the guilt of all his past sin. If he still holds

on to it, he in heart justifies it. If he in heart justifies it, he virtually

recommits it. If in the presence of accumulated light, he still persists in

sin, he virtually endorses, recommits, and is again guilty of all past sin.



It implies a total want of confidence in God; want of confidence in

His character and government; in His works and ways. It virtually

charges God with usurpation, falsehood, and selfishness in all their

odious forms. It is a making war on every moral attribute of God, and

is utter enmity against Him. It is mortal enmity, and would of course

always manifest itself in sinners, as it did when Christ was upon the

earth. When He poured the light upon them, they hardened

themselves until they were ripe for murdering Him. This is the true

nature of impenitence. It involves the guilt of a mortal enmity against

God.



Notice some of the characteristics or evidences of impenitence.



1. A manifested indifference to the sins of men is evidence of an

impenitent and sin-justifying state of mind. It is impossible that a

penitent soul should not be deeply and heartily opposed to all sin; and

if heartily opposed to it, it is impossible that he should not manifest this

opposition, for the heart controls the life by a law of necessity.



2. Of course a manifest heart complacency in sin or in sinners is

sure evidence of an impenitent state of mind. "He that will be the

friend of the world is the enemy of God" (James 4:4). 

Heart-complacency in sinners is that friendship with the world that is

enmity against God.



3. A manifest want of zeal in opposing sin and in promoting

reformation is a sure indication of an impenitent state of mind. The

soul that has been truly convinced of sin, and turned from sin to the

love and service of God, cannot but manifest a deep interest in every

effort to expel sin out of the world. Such a soul cannot but be zealous

in opposing sin, and in building up and establishing righteousness in

the earth.



4. A manifest want of sympathy with God in respect to His

government, providential and moral, is an evidence of impenitence of

heart. A penitent soul, as has been said, will and must of course

justify God in all his ways. This is implied in genuine repentance. A

disposition to complain of the strictness and rigor of God's

commandments to speak of the providence of God in a complaining

manner, to murmur at its allotments, and repine at the circumstances

in which it has placed a soul is to evince an impenitent and rebellious

state of mind.



5. A manifest want of confidence in the character, faithfulness, and

promises of God, is also sure evidence of an impenitent state of mind. 

A distrust of God in any respect cannot consist with a penitent state of

heart.



6. The absence of peace of mind is sure evidence of an impenitent

state. The penitent soul must have peace of conscience, because

penitence is a state of conscious rectitude. It also must have peace

with God, in view of, and through confidence in, the atonement of

Christ. Repentance is the turning from an attitude of rebellion against

God, to a state of universal submission to His will, and approbation of

it as wise and good. This must of course bring peace to the soul. 

When therefore there is a manifest want of peace, there is evidence of

impenitence of heart.



7. Every unequivocal manifestation of selfishness is a conclusive

evidence of present impenitence. Repentance, as we have seen,

consists in the turning of the soul from selfishness to benevolence. It

follows of course that the presence of selfishness, or a spirit of

self-indulgence, is conclusive evidence of an impenitent state of mind. 

Repentance implies the denial of self; the denial or subjection of all the

appetites, passions, and propensities to the law of the intelligence. 

Therefore a manifest spirit of self-indulgence, a disposition to seek the

gratification of the appetites and passions, such as the subjection of

the will to the use of tobacco, of alcohol, or to any of the natural or

artificial appetites, under light, and in opposition to the law of the

reason, is conclusive evidence of present impenitence. I say, "under

light, and in opposition to the law of the reason." Such articles as

those just named, are sometimes used medicinally, and because they

are regarded as useful, and even indispensable to health under certain

circumstances. In such cases their use may be a duty. But they are

more frequently used merely to gratify appetite, and in the face of a

secret conviction that they are not only unnecessary, but absolutely

injurious. This is indulgence that constitutes sin. It is impossible that

such indulgence should consist with repentance. Such a mind must

be in impenitence, or there is no such thing as impenitence.



8. A spirit of self-justification is another evidence of impenitence. 

This manifestation must be directly the opposite of that which the truly

penitent soul will make.



9. A spirit of excuse-making for neglect of duty is also a conclusive

evidence of an impenitent heart. Repentance implies the giving up of

all excuses for disobedience, and a hearty obedience in all things. Of

course, where there is a manifest disposition to make excuses for not

being what and all God requires us to be, it is certain that there is, and

must be an impenitent state of mind. It is war with God.



10. A want of candor upon any moral subject relating to self, also

betrays an impenitent heart. A penitent state of the will is committed

to know and to embrace all truth. Therefore a prejudiced, uncandid

state of mind must be inconsistent with penitence, and a manifestation

of prejudice must evince present impenitence. An unwillingness to be

searched, and to have all our words and ways brought into the light of

truth, and to be reproved when we are in error, is a sure indication of

an impenitent state of mind. "Every one that doeth evil hateth the light,

neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved. But he

that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made

manifest, that they are wrought in God" (John 3:20-21).



11. Only partial reformation of life, also indicates that the heart has

not embraced the whole will of God. When there is a disposition

manifested to indulge in some sin, no matter how little, it is sure

evidence of impenitence of heart. The penitent soul rejects sin as sin;

of course every kind or degree of iniquity is put away, loathed, and

abhorred. "Whoso keepeth the whole law and yet offend in one point,

is guilty of all" (James 2:10), that is, if a man in one point unequivocally

sins or disobeys God, it is certain that he truly from the heart obeys

Him in nothing. He has not an obedient state of mind. If he really had

supreme respect to God's authority, he could not but obey Him in all

things. If therefore it be found, that a professor of penitence does not

manifest the spirit of universal obedience; if in some things he is

manifestly self-indulgent, it may be known that he is altogether yet in

sin, and that he is still "in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of

iniquity" (Acts 8:23).



12. Neglect or refusal to confess and make restitution, so far as

opportunity and ability are enjoyed, is also a sure indication of an

unjust and impenitent state of mind. It would seem impossible for a

penitent soul not at once to see and be impressed with the duty of

making confession and restitution to those who have been injured by

him. When this is refused or neglected, there must be impenitence. 

The heart controls the life by a law of necessity; when, therefore, there

is a heart that confesses and forsakes sin, it is impossible that this

should not appear in outward confession and restitution.



13. A spirit of covetousness, or grasping after the world, is a sure

indication of impenitence. "Covetousness is idolatry." It is a hungering

and thirsting after, and devotion to this world. Acquisitiveness

indulged must be positive proof of an impenitent state of mind. If any

man love the world, how dwelleth the love of God in him?



14. A want of interest in, and compassion for, sinners, is a sure

indication of impenitence. If one has seen his own guilt and ruin, and

has found himself sunk in the horrible pit and miry clay of his own

abominations, and has found the way of escape, to feel deeply for

sinners, to manifest a great compassion and concern for them, and a

zeal for their salvation, is as natural as to breathe. If this sympathy

and zeal are not manifested, we may rely upon it that there is still

impenitence. There is a total want of that love to God and souls that is

always implied in repentance. Seest thou a professed convert to

Christ whose compassions are not stirred, and whose zeal for the

salvation of souls is not awakened? Be assured that you behold a

hypocrite.



15. Spiritual sloth or indolence is another evidence of an impenitent

heart. The soul that thoroughly turns to God, and consecrates itself to

Him, and wholly commits itself to promote His glory in the building up

of His kingdom, will be, must be, anything but slothful. A disposition to

spiritual idleness, or to lounging or indolence of any kind, is an

evidence that the heart is impenitent. I might pursue this subject to an

indefinite length; but what has been said must suffice for this course of

instruction, and is sufficient to give you the clue by which you may

detect the windings and delusions of the impenitent heart.

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LECTURE 35



FAITH AND UNBELIEF



What evangelical faith is not.



1. The term faith, like most other words, has diverse significations,

and is manifestly used in the Bible sometimes to designate a state of

the intellect, in which case it means an undoubting persuasion, a firm

conviction, an unhesitating intellectual assent. This, however, is not its

evangelical sense. Evangelical faith cannot be a phenomenon of the

intellect, for the plain reason that, when used in an evangelical sense,

it is always regarded as a virtue. But virtue cannot be predicated of

intellectual states, because these are involuntary, or passive states of

mind. Faith is a condition of salvation. It is something which we are

commanded to do upon pain of eternal death. But if it be something to

be done a solemn duty, it cannot be a merely passive state, a mere

intellectual conviction. The Bible distinguishes between intellectual

and saving faith. There is a faith of devils, and there is a faith of

saints. James clearly distinguishes between them, and also between

an antinomian and a saving faith. "Even so faith, if it hath not works, is

dead, being alone. Yea, a man may say, thou hast faith, and I have

works: show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my

faith by my works. Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest

well: the devils also believe, and tremble. But wilt thou know, O vain

man, that faith without works is dead? Was not Abraham our father

justified by works, when he had offered Isaac his son upon the altar? 

Seest thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith

made perfect? And the scripture was fulfilled which saith, Abraham

believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness; and he

was called the friend of God. Ye see then how that by works a man is

justified, and not by faith only. Likewise also was not Rahab the harlot

justified by works, when she had received the messengers, and had

sent them out another way? For as the body without the spirit is dead,

so faith without works is dead also" (James 2:17-26). The distinction

is here clearly marked, as it is elsewhere in the Bible, between

intellectual and saving faith. One produces good works or a holy life;

the other is unproductive. This shows that one is a phenomenon of

the intellect merely, and does not of course control the conduct. The

other must be a phenomenon of the will, because it manifests itself in

the outward life. Evangelical faith, then, is not a conviction, a

perception of truth. It does not belong to the intellect, though it implies

intellectual conviction, yet the evangelical or virtuous element does not

consist in it.



2. It is not a feeling of any kind; that is, it does not belong to, and is

not a phenomenon of, the sensibility. The phenomena of the

sensibility are passive states of mind, and therefore have no moral

character in themselves. Faith, regarded as a virtue, cannot consist in

any involuntary state of mind whatever. It is represented in the Bible

as an active and most efficient state of mind. It works, and "works by

love." It produces "the obedience of faith." Christians are said to be

sanctified by the faith that is in Christ. Indeed the Bible, in a great

variety of instances and ways, represents faith in God and in Christ as

a cardinal form of virtue, and as the mainspring of an outwardly holy

life. Hence, it cannot consist in any involuntary state or exercise of

mind whatever.



What evangelical faith is.



Since the Bible uniformly represents saving or evangelical faith as

a virtue, we know that it must be a phenomenon of the will. It is an

efficient state of mind, and therefore it must consist in the embracing

of the truth by the heart or will. It is the will's closing in with the truths

of the gospel. It is the soul's act of yielding itself up, or committing

itself to the truths of the evangelical system. It is a trusting in Christ, a

committing of the soul and the whole being to Him, in His various

offices and relations to men. It is a confiding in Him, and in what is

revealed of Him, in His word and providence, and by His Spirit.



The same word that is so often rendered faith in the New

Testament is also rendered commit; as in, "But Jesus did not commit

Himself unto them, because He knew all men" (John 2:24). "If,

therefore, ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who

will commit to your trust the true riches?" (Luke 16:11). In these

passages the word rendered commit is the same word as that which is

rendered faith. It is a confiding in God and in Christ, as revealed in the

Bible and in reason. It is a receiving of the testimony of God

concerning Himself, and concerning all things of which He has spoken. 

It is a receiving of Christ for just what He is represented to be in His

gospel, and an unqualified surrender of the will, and of the whole being

to Him.



What is implied in evangelical faith?



1. It implies an intellectual perception of the things, facts, and truths

believed. No one can believe that which he does not understand. It is

impossible to believe that which is not so revealed to the mind, that the

mind understands it. It has been erroneously assumed, that faith did

not need light, that is, that it is not essential to faith that we understand

the doctrines or facts that we are called upon to believe. This is a

false assumption; for how can we believe, trust, confide, in what we do

not understand? I must first understand what a proposition, a fact, a

doctrine, or a thing is, before I can say whether I believe, or whether I

ought to believe, or not. Should you state a proposition to me in an

unknown tongue, and ask me if I believe it, I must reply, I do not, for I

do not understand the terms of the proposition. Perhaps I should

believe the truth expressed, and perhaps I should not; I cannot tell,

until I understand the proposition. Any fact or doctrine not understood

is like a proposition in an unknown tongue; it is impossible that the

mind should receive or reject it, should believe or disbelieve it, until it is

understood. We can receive or believe a truth, or fact, or doctrine no

further than we understand it. So far as we do understand it, so far we

may believe it, although we may not understand all about it. For

example: I can believe in both the proper divinity and humanity of

Jesus Christ. That He is both God and man, is a fact that I can

understand. Thus, far I can believe. But how his divinity and humanity

are united I cannot understand. Therefore, I only believe the fact that

they are united; the quo modo of their union I know nothing about, and

I believe no more than I know. So I can understand that the Father,

Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. That the Father is God, that the

Son is God, that the Holy Spirit is God; that these three are Divine

persons, I can understand as a fact. I can also understand that there

is no contradiction or impossibility in the declared fact, that these three

are one in their substratum of being; that is that they are one in a

different sense from that in which they are three; that they are three in

one sense, and one in another. I understand that this may be a fact,

and therefore I can believe it. But the quo modo of their union I neither

understand nor believe: that is, I have no theory, no idea, no data on

the subject, have no opinion, and consequently no faith, as to the

manner in which they are united. Faith, then, in any fact or doctrine,

implies that the intellect has an idea, or that the soul has an

understanding, an opinion of that which the heart embraces or

believes.



2. Evangelical faith implies the appropriation of the truths of the

gospel to ourselves. It implies an acceptance of Christ as our wisdom,

righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. The soul that truly

believes, believes that Christ tasted death for every man, and of

course for it. It apprehends Christ as the Savior of the world, as

offered to all, and embraces and receives Him for itself. It

appropriates His atonement, and His resurrection, and His

intercession, and His promises to itself. Christ is thus presented in the

gospel, not only as the Savior of the world, but also to the individual

acceptance of men. He is embraced by the world no further than He is

embraced by individuals. He saves the world no further than He saves

individuals. He died for the world, because He died for the individuals

that compose the race. Evangelical faith, then, implies the belief of the

truths of the Bible, the apprehension of the truths just named, and a

reception of them, and a personal acceptance and appropriation of

Christ to meet the necessities of the individual soul.



3. Evangelical faith implies an evangelical life. This would not be

true if faith were merely an intellectual state or exercise. But since, as

we have seen, faith is of the heart, since it consists in the committal of

the will to Christ, it follows, by a law of necessity, that the life will

correspond with the faith. Let this be kept in perpetual remembrance.



4. Evangelical faith implies repentance towards God. Evangelical

faith particularly respects Jesus Christ and His salvation. It is an

embracing of Christ and His salvation. Of course it implies repentance

towards God, that is, a turning from sin to God. The will cannot be

submitted to Christ, it cannot receive Him as He is presented in the

gospel, while it neglects repentance toward God; while it rejects the

authority of the Father, it cannot embrace and submit to the Son.



5. Disinterested benevolence, or a state of good will to being, is

implied in evangelical faith; for that is the committal of the soul to God

and to Christ in all obedience. It must, therefore, imply fellowship or

sympathy with Him in regard to the great end upon which His heart is

set, and for which He lives. A yielding up of the will and the soul to

Him, must imply the embracing of the same end that He embraces.



6. It implies a state of the sensibility corresponding to the truths

believed. It implies this, because this state of the sensibility is a result

of faith by a law of necessity, and this result follows necessarily upon

the acceptance of Christ and His gospel by the heart.



7. Of course it implies peace of mind. In Christ the soul finds its full

and present salvation. It finds justification, which produces a sense of

pardon and acceptance. It finds sanctification, or grace to deliver from

the reigning power of sin. It finds all its wants met, and all needed

grace proffered for its assistance. It sees no cause for disturbance,

nothing to ask or desire that is not treasured up in Christ. It has

ceased to war with God with itself. It has found its resting-place in

Christ, and rests in profound peace under the shadow of the Almighty.



8. It must imply the existence in the soul of every virtue, because it

is a yielding up of the whole being to the will of God. Consequently, all

the phases of virtue required by the gospel must be implied as

existing, either in a developed or in an undeveloped state, in every

heart that truly receives Christ by faith. Certain forms or modifications

of virtue may not in all cases have found the occasions of their

development, but certain it is, that every modification of virtue will

manifest itself as its occasion shall arise, if there be a true and a living

faith in Christ. This follows from the very nature of faith.



9. Present evangelical faith implies a state of present sinlessness. 

Observe, faith is the yielding and committal of the whole will, and of

the whole being to Christ. This, and nothing short of this, is

evangelical faith. But this comprehends and implies the whole of

present, true obedience to Christ. This is the reason why faith is

spoken of as the condition, and as it were, the only condition, of

salvation. It really implies all virtue. Faith may be contemplated either

as a distinct form of virtue, and as an attribute of love, or as

comprehensive of all virtue. When contemplated as an attribute of

love, it is only a branch of sanctification. When contemplated in the

wider sense of universal conformity of will to the will of God, it is then

synonymous with entire present sanctification. Contemplated in either

light, its existence in the heart must be inconsistent with present sin

there. Faith is an attitude of the will, and is wholly incompatible with

present rebellion of will against Christ. This must be true, or what is

faith?



10. Faith implies the reception and the practice of all known or

perceived truth. The heart that embraces and receives truth as truth,

and because it is truth, must of course receive all known truth. For it is

plainly impossible that the will should embrace some truth perceived

for a benevolent reason, and reject other truth perceived. All truth is

harmonious. One truth is always consistent with every other truth. 

The heart that truly embraces one, will, for the same reason, embrace

all truth known. If out of regard to the highest good of being, any one

revealed truth is truly received, that state of mind continuing, it is

impossible that all truth should not be received as soon as known.



What unbelief is not.



1. It is not ignorance of truth. Ignorance is a blank; it is the

negation or absence of knowledge. This certainly cannot be the

unbelief everywhere represented in the Bible as a heinous sin. 

Ignorance may be a consequence of unbelief, but cannot be identical

with it. We may be ignorant of certain truths as a consequence of

rejecting others, but this ignorance is not, and, we shall see, cannot be

unbelief.



2. Unbelief is not the negation or absence of faith. This were a

mere nothing a nonentity. But a mere nothing is not that abominable

thing which the scriptures represent as a great and a damning sin.



3. It cannot be a phenomenon of the intellect, or an intellectual

skepticism. This state of the intellect may result from the state of mind

properly denominated unbelief, but it cannot be identical with it. 

Intellectual doubt or unbelief often results from unbelief properly so

called, but unbelief, when contemplated as a sin, should never be

confounded with theoretic or intellectual infidelity. They are as entirely

distinct as any two phenomena of mind whatever.



4. It cannot consist in feelings or emotions of incredulity, doubt, or

opposition to truth. In other words, unbelief as a sin cannot be a

phenomenon of the sensibility. The term unbelief is sometimes used

to express or designate a state of the intellect, and sometimes of the

sensibility. It sometimes is used to designate a state of intellectual

incredulity, doubt, distrust, skepticism. But when used in this sense,

moral character is not justly predicable of the state of mind which the

term unbelief represents.



Sometimes the term expresses a mere feeling of incredulity in

regard to truth. But neither has this state of mind moral character; nor

can it have, for the very good reason that it is involuntary. In short, the

unbelief that is so sorely denounced in the Bible, as a most

aggravated abomination, cannot consist in any involuntary state of

mind whatever.



What unbelief is.



The term, as used in the Bible, in those passages that represent it

as a sin, must designate a phenomenon of will. It must be a voluntary

state of mind. It must be the opposite of evangelical faith. Faith is the

will's reception, and unbelief is the will's rejection, of truth. Faith is the

soul's confiding in truth and in the God of truth. Unbelief is the soul's

withholding confidence from truth and the God of truth. It is the heart's

rejection of evidence, and refusal to be influenced by it. It is the will in

the attitude of opposition to truth perceived, or evidence presented. 

Intellectual skepticism or unbelief, where light is proffered, always

implies the unbelief of the will or heart. For if the mind knows, or

supposes, that light may be had, on any question of duty, and does

not make honest efforts to obtain it, this can be accounted for only by

ascribing it to the will's reluctance to know the path of duty. In this

case light is rejected. The mind has light so far as to know that more

is proffered, but this proffered light is rejected. This is the sin of

unbelief. All infidelity is unbelief in this sense, and infidels are so, not

for want of light, but, in general, they have taken much pains to shut

their eyes against it. Unbelief must be a voluntary state or attitude of

the will, as distinguished from a mere volition, or executive act of the

will. Volition may, and often does, give forth, through words and

deeds, expressions and manifestations of unbelief. But the volition is

only a result of unbelief, and not identical with it. Unbelief is a deeper

and more efficient and more permanent state of mind than mere volition.

It is the will in its profoundest opposition to the truth and will of God.



Conditions of both faith and unbelief.



1. A revelation in some way to the mind, of the truth and will of

God, must be a condition of faith and of unbelief. Be it remembered,

that neither faith nor unbelief is consistent with total ignorance. There

can be unbelief no further than there is light.



2. In respect to that class of truths which are discerned only upon

condition of divine illumination, such illumination must be a condition

both of faith and unbelief. It should be remarked, that when a truth

has been once revealed by the Holy Spirit to the soul, the continuance

of the divine light is not essential to the continuance of unbelief. The

truth, once known and lodged in the memory, may continue to be

resisted, when the agent that revealed it is withdrawn.



3. Intellectual perception is a condition of the heart's unbelief. The

intellect must have evidence of truth as the condition of a virtuous

belief of it. So the intellect must have evidence of the truth, as a

condition of a wicked rejection of it. Therefore, intellectual light is the

condition, both of the heart's faith and unbelief. By the assertion, that

intellectual light is a condition of unbelief is intended, not that the

intellect should at all times admit the truth in theory; but that the

evidence must be such, that by virtue of its own laws, the mind or

intellect could justly admit the truth rejected by the heart. It is a very

common case, that the unbeliever denies in words, and endeavors to

refute in theory, that which he nevertheless assumes as true, in all his

practical judgments.



The guilt and ill-desert of unbelief.



We have seen, on a former occasion, that the guilt of sin is

conditionated upon, and graduated by, the light under which it is

committed. The amount of light is the measure of guilt, in every case

of sin. This is true of all sin. But it is peculiarly manifest in the sin of

unbelief; for unbelief is the rejection of light; it is selfishness in the

attitude of rejecting truth. Of course, the amount of light rejected, and

the degree of guilt in rejecting it, are equal. This is everywhere

assumed and taught in the Bible, and is plainly the doctrine of reason.



The guilt of unbelief under the light of the gospel must be

indefinitely greater, than when merely the light of nature is rejected. 

The guilt of unbelief, in cases where special divine illumination has

been enjoyed, must be vastly and incalculably greater, than where the

mere light of the gospel has been enjoyed, without a special

enlightening of the Holy Spirit.



The guilt of unbelief in one who has been converted, and has

known the love of God, must be greater beyond comparison, than that

of an ordinary sinner. Those things that are implied in unbelief show

that it must be one of the most provoking abominations to God in the

universe. It is the perfection of all that is unreasonable, unjust,

ruinous. It is infinitely slanderous and dishonorable to God, and

destructive to man, and to all the interests of the kingdom of God.



Natural and governmental consequences of both faith and unbelief.



By natural consequences are intended consequences that flow

from the constitution and laws of mind, by a natural necessity. By

governmental consequences are intended those that result from the

constitution, laws, and administration of moral government.



1. One of the natural consequences of faith is peace of conscience. 

When the will receives the truth, and yields itself up to conformity with

it, the conscience is satisfied with its present attitude, and the man

becomes at peace with himself. The soul is then in a state to really

respect itself, and can, as it were, behold its own face without a blush. 

But faith in truth perceived is the unalterable condition of a man's

being at peace with himself.



A governmental consequence of faith is peace with God:



(1.) In the sense that God is satisfied with the present obedience of

the soul. It is given up to be influenced by all truth, and this is

comprehensive of all duty. Of course God is at peace with the soul, so

far as its present obedience is concerned.



(2.) Faith governmentally results in peace with God, in the sense of

being a condition of pardon and acceptance. That is, the penalty of

the law for past sins is remitted upon condition of true faith in Christ. 

The soul not only needs present and future obedience, as a necessary

condition of peace with self; but it also needs pardon and acceptance

on the part of the government for past sins, as a condition of peace

with God. But since the subject of justification or acceptance with God

is to come up as a distinct subject for consideration, I will not enlarge

upon it here.



2. Self-condemnation is one of the natural consequences of

unbelief. Such are the constitution and laws of mind, that it is naturally

impossible for the mind to justify the heart's rejection of truth. On the

contrary, the conscience necessarily condemns such rejection, and

pronounces judgment against it.



Legal condemnation is a necessary governmental consequence of

unbelief. No just government can justify the rejection of known truth. 

But, on the contrary, all just governments must utterly abhor and

condemn the rejection of truths, and especially those truths that relate

to the obedience of the subject, and the highest well-being of the

rulers and ruled. The government of God must condemn and utterly

abhor all unbelief, as a rejection of those truths that are indispensable

to the highest well-being of the universe.



3. A holy or obedient life results from faith by a natural or

necessary law. Faith is an act of will which controls the life by a law of

necessity. It follows of course that, when the heart receives or obeys

the truth, the outward life must be conformed to it.



4. A disobedient and unholy life results from unbelief also by a law

of necessity. If the heart rejects the truth, of course the life will not be

conformed to it.



5. Faith will develop every form of virtue in the heart and life, as

their occasions shall arise. It consists in the committing of the will to

truth and to the God of truth. Of course as different occasions arise,

faith will secure conformity to all truth on all subjects, and then every

modification of virtue will exist in the heart, and appear in the life, as

circumstances in the providence of God shall develop them.



6. Unbelief may be expected to develop resistance to all truth upon

all subjects that conflict with selfishness; and hence nothing but

selfishness in some form can restrain its appearing in any other and

every other form possible or conceivable. It consists, be it

remembered, in the heart's rejection of truth, and of course implies the

cleaving to error. The natural result of this must be the development in

the heart, and the appearance in the life, of every form of selfishness

that is not prevented by some other form. For example, avarice may

restrain amativeness, intemperance, and many other forms of

selfishness.



7. Faith, governmentally results in obtaining help of God. God may

and does gratuitously help those who have no faith. But this is not a

governmental result or act in God. But to the obedient He extends His

governmental protection and aid.



8. Faith lets God into the soul to dwell and reign there. Faith

receives, not only the atonement and mediatorial work of Christ as a

redeemer from punishment, but it also receives Christ as king to set up

His throne, and reign in the heart. Faith secures to the soul

communion with God.



9. Unbelief shuts God out of the soul, in the sense of refusing His

reign in the heart. It also shuts the soul out from an interest in Christ's

mediatorial work. This results not from an arbitrary appointment, but is

a natural consequence. Unbelief shuts the soul out from communion

with God.



These are hints at some of the natural and governmental

consequences of faith and unbelief. They are designed not to exhaust

the subject, but merely to call attention to topics which any one who

desires may pursue at his pleasure. It should be here remarked, that

none of the ways, commandments, or appointments of God are

arbitrary. Faith is a naturally indispensable condition of salvation,

which is the reason of its being made a governmental condition. 

Unbelief renders salvation naturally impossible: it must, therefore,

render it governmentally impossible.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 36



JUSTIFICATION



Christ is represented in the gospel as sustaining to men three

classes of relations.



1. Those which are purely governmental.



2. Those which are purely spiritual.



3. Those which unite both these.



We shall at present consider Him as Christ our justification. I shall

show:



What gospel justification is not.



There is scarcely any question in theology that has been

encumbered with more injurious and technical mysticism than that of

justification.



Justification is the pronouncing of one just. It may be done in

words, or, practically, by treatment. Justification must be, in some

sense, a governmental act; and it is of importance to a right

understanding of gospel justification, to inquire whether it be an act of

the judicial, the executive, or the legislative department of government;

that is, whether gospel justification consists in a strictly judicial or

forensic proceeding, or whether it consists in pardon, or setting aside

the execution of an incurred penalty, and is therefore properly either

an executive or a legislative act. We shall see that the settling of this

question is of great importance in theology; and as we view this

subject, so, if consistent, we must view many important and highly

practical questions in theology. This leads me to say:



That gospel justification is not to be regarded as a forensic or

judicial proceeding. Dr. Chalmers and those of his school hold that it

is. But this is certainly a great mistake, as we shall see. The term

forensic is from forum, "a court." A forensic proceeding belongs to the

judicial department of government, whose business it is to ascertain

the facts and declare the sentence of the law. This department has no

power over the law, but to pronounce judgment, in accordance with its

true spirit and meaning. Courts never pardon, or set aside the

execution of penalties. This does not belong to them, but either to the

executive or to the lawmaking department. Oftentimes, this power in

human governments is lodged in the head of the executive

department, who is, generally at least, a branch of the legislative

power of government. But never is the power to pardon exercised by

the judicial department. The ground of a judicial or forensic

justification invariably is, and must be, universal obedience to law. If

but one crime or breach of law is alleged and proved, the court must

inevitably condemn, and can in no such case justify, or pronounce the

convicted just. Gospel justification is the justification of sinners; it is,

therefore, naturally impossible, and a most palpable contradiction, to

affirm that the justification of a sinner, or of one who has violated the

law, is a forensic or judicial justification. That only is or can be a legal

or forensic justification, that proceeds upon the ground of its appearing

that the justified person is guiltless, or, in other words, that he has not

violated the law, that he has done only what he had a legal right to do. 

Now it is certainly nonsense to affirm, that a sinner can be pronounced

just in the eye of law; that he can be justified by deeds of law, or by the

law at all. The law condemns him. But to be justified judicially or

forensically, is to be pronounced just in the judgment of law. This

certainly is an impossibility in respect to sinners. The Bible is as

express as possible on this point. "Therefore by the deeds of the law

there shall no flesh be justified in His sight: for by the law is the

knowledge of sin" (Romans 3:20).



It is proper to say here, that Dr. Chalmers and those of his school

do not intend that sinners are justified by their own obedience to law,

but by the perfect and imputed obedience of Jesus Christ. They

maintain that, by reason of the obedience to law which Christ rendered

when on earth, being set down to the credit of elect sinners, and

imputed to them, the law regards them as having rendered perfect

obedience in Him, or regards them as having perfectly obeyed by

proxy, and therefore pronounces them just, upon condition of faith in

Christ. This they insist is properly a forensic or judicial justification. 

But this subject will come up more appropriately under another head.



What is gospel justification?



It consists not in the law pronouncing the sinner just, but in his

being ultimately governmentally treated as if he were just; that is, it

consists in a governmental decree of pardon or amnesty in arresting

and setting aside the execution of the incurred penalty of law in

pardoning and restoring to favor those who have sinned, and those

whom the law had pronounced guilty, and upon whom it had passed

the sentence of eternal death, and rewarding them as if they had been

righteous. In proof of this position, I remark:



1. That this is most unequivocally taught in the Old Testament

scriptures. The whole system of sacrifices taught the doctrine of

pardon upon the conditions of atonement, repentance, and faith. This,

under the old dispensation, is constantly represented as a merciful

acceptance of the penitents, and never as a forensic or judicial

acquittal or justification of them. The mercy-seat covered the law in

the ark of the covenant. Paul informs us what justification was in the

sense in which the Old Testament saints understood it, in: "Even also

as David describeth the blessedness of the man to whom God

imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose

iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the

man to whom the Lord will not impute sin" (Romans 4:6-8). This

quotation from David shows both what David and what Paul

understood by justification, to wit, the pardon and acceptance of the

penitent sinner.



2. The New Testament fully justifies and establishes this view of

the subject, as we shall abundantly see under another head.



3. Sinners cannot possibly be just in any other sense. Upon certain

conditions they may be pardoned and treated as just. But for sinners

to be forensically pronounced just, is impossible and absurd.



Conditions of justification



In this discussion I use the term condition in the sense of a sine

qua non, a "not without which." This is its philosophical sense. A

condition as distinct from, a ground of justification, is anything without

which sinners cannot be justified, which, nevertheless, is not the

procuring cause or fundamental reason of their justification. As we

shall see, there are many conditions, while there is but one ground, of

the justification of sinners. The application and importance of this

distinction we shall perceive as we proceed.



As has been already said, there can be no justification in a legal or

forensic sense, but upon the ground of universal, perfect, and

uninterrupted obedience to law. This is of course denied by those who

hold that gospel justification, or the justification of penitent sinners, is

of the nature of a forensic or judicial justification. They hold to the

legal maxim, that what a man does by another he does by himself, and

therefore the law regards Christ's obedience as ours, on the ground

that He obeyed for us. To this I reply:



1. The legal maxim just repeated does not apply, except in cases

where one acts in behalf of another by his own appointment, which

was not the case with the obedience of Christ; and:



2. The doctrine of an imputed righteousness, or that Christ's

obedience to the law was accounted as our obedience, is founded on

a most false and nonsensical assumption; to wit, that Christ owed no

obedience to the law in His own person, and that therefore His

obedience was altogether a work of supererogation, and might be

made a substitute for our own obedience; that it might be set down to

our credit, because He did not need to obey for Himself.



I must here remark, that justification respects the moral law; and

that it must be intended that Christ owed no obedience to the moral

law, and therefore His obedience to this law, being wholly a work of

supererogation, is set down to our account as the ground of our

justification upon condition of faith in Him. But surely this is an obvious

mistake. We have seen, that the spirit of the moral law requires good

will to God and the universe. Was Christ under no obligation to do

this? Nay, was He not rather under infinite obligation to be perfectly

benevolent? Was it possible for Him to be more benevolent than the

law requires God and all beings to be? Did He not owe entire

consecration of heart and life to the highest good of universal being? 

If not, then benevolence in Him were no virtue, for it would not be a

compliance with moral obligation. It was naturally impossible for Him,

and is naturally impossible for any being, to perform a work of

supererogation, that is, to be more benevolent than the moral law

requires Him to be. This is and must be as true of God as it is of any

other being. Would not Christ have sinned had He not been perfectly

benevolent? If He would, it follows that He owed obedience to the law,

as really as any other being. Indeed, a being that owed no obedience

to the moral law must be wholly incapable of virtue, for what is virtue

but obedience to the moral law?



But if Christ owed personal obedience to the moral law, then His

obedience could no more than justify Himself. It can never be imputed

to us. He was bound for Himself to love God with all His heart, and

soul, and mind, and strength, and His neighbor as Himself. He did no

more than this. He could do no more. It was naturally impossible,

then, for Him to obey in our behalf.



There are, however, valid grounds and valid conditions of

justification.



l. The vicarious suffering or atonement of Christ is a condition of

justification, or of the pardon and acceptance of penitent sinners. It

has been common either to confound the conditions with the ground of

justification, or purposely to represent the atonement and work of

Christ as the ground, as distinct from and opposed to a condition of

justification. In treating this subject, I find it important to distinguish

between the ground and conditions of justification and to regard the

atonement and work of Christ not as a ground, but only as a condition

of gospel justification. By the ground I mean the moving, procuring

cause; that in which the plan of redemption originated as its source,

and which was the fundamental reason or ground of the whole

movement. This was the benevolence and merciful disposition of the

whole Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This love made the

atonement, but the atonement did not beget this love. The Godhead

desired to save sinners, but could not safely do so without danger to

the universe, unless something was done to satisfy public, not

retributive justice. The atonement was resorted to as a means of

reconciling forgiveness with the wholesome administration of justice. 

A merciful disposition in the Godhead was the source, ground,

mainspring, of the whole movement, while the atonement was only a

condition or means, or that without which the love of God could not

safely manifest itself in justifying and saving sinners.



Failing to make this distinction, and representing the atonement as

the ground of the sinner's justification, has been a sad occasion of

stumbling to many. Indeed, the whole questions of the nature, design,

extent, and bearings of the atonement turn upon, and are involved in,

this distinction. Some represent the atonement as not demanded by,

nor as proceeding from the love or merciful disposition, but from the

inexorable wrath of the Father, leaving the impression that Christ was

more merciful, and more the friend of sinners than the Father. Many

have received this impression from pulpit and written representations,

as I well know.



Others, regarding the atonement as the ground as opposed to a

condition of justification, have held the atonement to be the literal

payment of the debt of sinners, and of the nature of a commercial

transaction: a quid pro quo, a valuable consideration paid down by

Christ, by suffering the same amount as was deserved by the whole

number of the elect; thus negativing the idea of a merciful disposition

in the Father, and representing Him as demanding pay for discharging

and saving sinners. Some of this class have held, that since Christ

has died, the elect sinner has a right to demand his justification, on the

ground of justice, that he may present the atonement and work of

Christ, and say to the Father, "Here is the price; I demand the

commodity." This class, of course, must hold to the limited nature of

the atonement, or be universalists.



While others again, assuming that the atonement was the ground

of justification in the sense of the literal payment of the debt of sinners,

and that the scriptures represent the atonement as made for all men,

have very consistently become universalists. Others again have given

up, or never held the view that the atonement was of the nature of the

literal payment of a debt, and hold that it was a governmental

expedient to reconcile the pardon of sin with a wholesome

administration of justice: that it was sufficient for all as for a part of

mankind: that it does not entitle those for whom it was made to a

pardon on the score of justice, but that men are justified freely by

grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, and yet they

inconsistently persist in representing the atonement as the ground,

and not merely as a condition of justification.



Those who hold that the atonement and obedience of Christ were

and are the ground of the justification of sinners, in the sense of the

payment of their debt, regard all the grace in the transaction as

consisting in the atonement and obedience of Christ, and exclude

grace from the act of justification. Justification they regard as a

forensic act. I regard the atonement of Christ as the necessary

condition of safely manifesting the benevolence of God in the

justification and salvation of sinners. A merciful disposition in the

whole Godhead was the ground, and the atonement a condition of

justification. Mercy would have saved without an atonement, had it

been possible to do so.



That Christ's sufferings, and especially His death, were vicarious,

has been abundantly shown in treating the subject of atonement. I

need not repeat here what I said there. Although Christ owed perfect

obedience to the moral law for Himself, and could not therefore obey

as our substitute, yet since He perfectly obeyed, He owed no suffering

to the law or to the Divine government on His own account. He could

therefore suffer for us. That is, He could, to answer governmental

purposes, substitute His death for the infliction of the penalty of the law

on us. He could not perform works of supererogation, but He could

endure sufferings of supererogation, in the sense that He did not owe

them for Himself. The doctrine of substitution, in the sense just

named, appears everywhere in both Testaments. It is the leading

idea, the prominent thought, lying upon the face of the whole

scriptures. Let the few passages that follow serve as specimens of the

class that teach this doctrine:



"For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you

upon the altar, to make all atonement for your souls; for it is the blood

that maketh an atonement for the soul" (Levit. 17:11).



"But He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for

our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and with

His stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we

have turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on Him

the iniquity of us all. He shall see of the travail of His soul, and shall

be satisfied; by His knowledge shall My righteous servant justify many;

for He shall bear their iniquities" (Isaiah 53:5, 6, 11).



"Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to

minister, and to give His life a ransom for many" (Matt. 20:18).



"For this is My blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many

for the remission of sins" (Matt. 26:28).



"And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so

must the Son of man be lifted up: That whosoever believeth in Him

should not perish, but have eternal life" (John 3:14-15).



"I am the living bread which came down from heaven; if any man

eat of this bread, he shall live for ever; and the bread that I will give is

My flesh, which I will give for the life of the world" (John 6:51).



"Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock over the

which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church of

God, which He hath purchased with His own blood" (Acts 20:28).



"Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is

in Christ Jesus. Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through

faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness for the remission of

sins that are past, through the forbearance of God. To declare, I say

at this time His righteousness; that He might be just, and the justifier of

him which believeth in Jesus" (Romans 3:24-26).



"For when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for

the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet

peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. But God

commandeth His love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners,

Christ died for us. Being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved

from wrath through Him. And not only so, but we also joy in God,

through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the

atonement. Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon

all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free

gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's

disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one

shall many be made righteous" (Romans 5:6-9, 11, 18-19).



"For even Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us" (1 Cor. 5:7).



"Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures" (1 Cor. 15:3). 



"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a

curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a

tree. That the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles

through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the Spirit

through faith" (Gal. 3:13-14).



"But now, in Christ Jesus, ye who sometimes were far off, are

made nigh by the blood of Christ" (Eph. 2:13).



"Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by His own blood,

He entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal

redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the

ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of

the flesh; How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the

eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge your

conscience from dead works to serve the living God? And almost all

things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood

is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the patterns of things

in the heavens should be purified with these; but the heavenly things

themselves with better sacrifices than these.  For Christ is not entered

into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true:

but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us;

Nor yet that He should offer Himself often, as the high priest entereth

into the holy place every year with blood of others; For then must He

often have suffered since the foundation of the world; but now once in

the end of the world hath He appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice

of Himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this

the judgment; So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many"

(Heb. 9:12-14, 22-29).



"Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible

things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by

tradition from your fathers: But with the precious blood of Christ" (1

Peter 1:18-19).



"Who His own self bare our sins in His own body on the tree, that

we being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness; by whose

stripes ye are healed" (1 Peter 2:24).



"But if we walk in the light, we have fellowship one with another,

and the blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin" (1

John 1:7).



"In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that

God sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live

through Him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved

us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins" (1 John

4:9-10).



These and many such like passages establish the fact beyond

question, that the vicarious atonement of Christ is a condition of our

pardon and acceptance with God.



2. Repentance is also a condition of our justification. Observe, I

here also use the term condition, in the sense of a "not without which,"

and not in the sense of a "that for the sake of which" the sinner is

justified. It must be certain that the government of God cannot pardon

sin without repentance. This is as truly a doctrine of natural as of

revealed religion. It is self-evident that, until the sinner breaks off from

sins by repentance or turning to God, he cannot be justified in any

sense. This is everywhere assumed, implied, and taught in the Bible. 

No reader of the Bible can call this in question, and it were a useless

occupation of time to quote more passages.



3. Faith in Christ is, in the same sense, another condition of

justification We have already examined into the nature and necessity

of faith. I fear that there has been much of error in the conceptions of

many upon this subject. They have talked of justification by faith, as if

they supposed that, by an arbitrary appointment of God, faith was the

condition, and the only condition of justification. This seems to be the

antinomian view. The class of persons alluded to speak of justification

by faith; as if it were by faith, and not by Christ through faith, that the

penitent sinner is justified; as if faith, and not Christ, were our

justification. They seem to regard faith not as a natural, but merely as

a mystical condition of justification; as bringing us into a covenant and

mystical relation to Christ, in consequence of which His righteousness

or personal obedience is imputed to us. It should never be forgotten

that the faith that is the condition of justification, is the faith that works

by love. It is the faith through and by which Christ sanctifies the soul. 

A sanctifying faith unites the believer to Christ as His justification; but

be it always remembered, that no faith receives Christ as a

justification, that does not receive Him as a sanctification, to reign

within the heart. We have seen that repentance, as well as faith, is a

condition of justification. We shall see that perseverance in obedience

to the end of life is also a condition of justification. Faith is often

spoken of in scripture as if it were the sole condition of salvation,

because, as we have seen, from its very nature it implies repentance

and every virtue.



That faith is a naturally necessary condition of justification, we have

seen. Let the following passages of scripture serve as examples of

the manner in which the scriptures speak upon this subject.



"And He said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the

gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized, shall be

saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned" (Mark 14:15-16).



"As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the

sons of God, even to them that believe on His name" (John 1:12).



"For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son,

that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have

everlasting life. He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and

he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God

abideth on him" (John 3:16, 36).



"Then said they unto Him, What shall we do, that we might work

the works of God? Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the

work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent. This is the

will of Him that sent Me, that every one which seeth the Son, and

believeth on Him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at

the last day" (John 6:28-29, 40).



"If ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins. Ye are of

your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do; he was a

murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth; because

there is no truth in him. He that is of God, heareth God's words; ye

therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God" (John 8:24, 44,

47).



"Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life; he that

believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; And

whosoever liveth, and believeth in Me, shall never die" (John 11:25,

26).



"To him give all the prophets witness, that through His name,

whosoever believeth in Him shall receive remission of sins" (Acts

10:43).



"Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved, and thy

house" (Acts 16:31).



"But to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the

ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness" (Romans 4:5).



"For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that

believeth" (Romans 10:4).



"Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by

the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that

we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the

law; for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified" (Gal. 2:16).



"Without faith it is impossible to please Him; for he that cometh to

God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that

diligently seek Him" (Heb. 2:6).



"He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself;

he that believeth not God hath made Him a liar, because he believeth

not the record that God gave of His Son. And this is the record, that

God hath given to us eternal life; and this life is in His Son. He that

hath the Son hath life; and he that hath not the Son of God, hath not

life. These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of

the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye

may believe on the name of the Son of God" (1 John 5:10-13).



4. Present sanctification, in the sense of present full consecration

to God, is another condition, not ground, of justification. Some

theologians have made justification a condition of sanctification,

instead of making sanctification a condition of justification. But this we

shall see is an erroneous view of the subject. The mistake is founded

in a misapprehension of the nature both of justification and of

sanctification. To sanctify is to set apart, to consecrate to a particular

use. To sanctify anything to God is to set apart to His service, to

consecrate it to Him. To sanctify one's self is voluntarily to set one's

self apart, to consecrate one's self to God. To be sanctified is to be

set apart, to be consecrated to God. Sanctification is an act or state of

being sanctified, or set apart to the service of God. It is a state of

consecration to Him. This is present obedience to the moral law. It is

the whole of present duty, and is implied in repentance, faith,

regeneration, as we have abundantly seen. Sanctification is

sometimes used to express a permanent state of obedience to God, or

of consecration. In this sense it is not a condition of present

justification, or of pardon and acceptance. But it is a condition of

continued and permanent acceptance with God. It certainly cannot be

true, that God accepts and justifies the sinner in his sins. The Bible

everywhere represents justified persons as sanctified, and always

expressly, or impliedly, conditionates justification upon sanctification,

in the sense of present obedience to God. "And such were some of

you: but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in

the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God" (1 Cor.

6:11). This is but a specimen of the manner in which justified persons

are spoken of in the Bible. Also, "There is therefore now no

condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after

the flesh, but after the Spirit" (Romans 8:1). They only are justified

who walk after the Spirit. Should it e objected, as it may be, that the

scripture often speaks of saints, or truly regenerate persons, as

needing sanctification, and of sanctification as something that comes

after regeneration, and as that which the saints are to aim at attaining,

I answer, that when sanctification is thus spoken of, it is doubtless

used in the higher sense already noticed; to wit, to denote a state of

being settled, established in faith, rooted and grounded in love, being

so confirmed in the faith and obedience of the gospel, as to hold on in

the way steadfastly, unmovably, always abounding in the work of the

Lord. This is doubtless a condition of permanent justification, as has

been said, but not a condition of present justification. By sanctification

being a condition of justification, the following things are intended:



(1.) That present, full, and entire consecration of heart and life to

God and His service, is an unalterable condition of present pardon of

past sin, and of present acceptance with God.



(2.) That the penitent soul remains justified no longer than this

full-hearted consecration continues. If he falls from his first love into

the spirit of self-pleasing, he falls again into bondage to sin and to the

law, is condemned, and must repent and do his "first work," must

return to Christ, and renew his faith and love, as a condition of his

salvation. This is the most express teaching of the Bible, as we shall

fully see.



5. Perseverance in faith and obedience, or in consecration to God,

is also an unalterable condition of justification, or of pardon and

acceptance with God. By this language in this connection, you will of

course understand me to mean, that perseverance in faith and

obedience is a condition, not of present, but of final or ultimate

acceptance and salvation. Those who hold that justification by

imputed righteousness is a forensic proceeding, take a view of final or

ultimate justification, according with their view of the nature of the

transaction. With them, faith receives an imputed righteousness, and

a judicial justification. The first act of faith, according to them,

introduces the sinner into this relation, and obtains for him a perpetual

justification. They maintain that after this first act of faith it is

impossible for the sinner to come into condemnation; that, being once

justified, he is always thereafter justified, whatever he may do; indeed

that he is never justified by grace, as to sins that are past, upon

condition that he ceases to sin; that Christ's righteousness is the

ground, and that his own present obedience is not even a condition of

his justification, so that, in fact, his own present or future obedience to

the law of God is, in no case, and in no sense, a sine qua non of his

justification, present or ultimate.



Now this is certainly another gospel from the one I am inculcating. 

It is not a difference merely upon some speculative or theoretic point. 

It is a point fundamental to the gospel and to salvation, if any one can

be. Let us therefore see which of these is the true gospel. I object to

this view of justification:



1. That it is antinomianism. Observe, they hold that upon the first

exercise of faith, the soul enters into such a relation to Christ, that with

respect to it the penalty of the divine law is for ever set aside, not only

as it respects all past, but also as it respects all future acts of

disobedience; so that sin does not thereafter bring the soul under the

condemning sentence of the law of God. But a precept without a

penalty is no law. Therefore, if the penalty is in their case permanently

set aside or repealed, this is, and must be, a virtual repeal of the

precept, for without a penalty it is only counsel, or advice, and no law.



2. But again: it is impossible that this view of justification should be

true; for the moral law did not originate in the arbitrary will of God, and

He cannot abrogate it either as to its precept or its penalty. He may

for good and sufficient reasons dispense in certain cases with the

execution of the penalty. But set it aside in such a sense, that sin

would not incur it, or that the soul that sins shall not be condemned by

it, he cannot it is naturally impossible! The law is as unalterable and

unrepealable, both as to its precept and its penalty, as the nature of

God. It cannot but be, in the very nature of things, that sin in any

being, in any world, and at any time, will and must incur the penalty of

the moral law. God may pardon as often as the soul sins, repents and

believes, but to prevent real condemnation where there is sin, is not at

the option of any being.



3. But again; I object to the view of justification in question, that it is

of course inconsistent with forgiveness or pardon. If justified by

imputed righteousness, why pardon him whom the law accounts as

already and perpetually, and perfectly righteous? Certainly it were

absurd and impossible for the law and the law-giver judicially to justify

a person on the ground of the perfect obedience of His substitute, and

at the same time pardon him who is thus regarded as perfectly

righteous. Especially must this be true of all sin committed

subsequently to the first and justifying act of faith. If when once the

soul has believed, it can no more come into condemnation, it certainly

can no more be forgiven. Forgiveness implies previous

condemnation, and consists in setting aside the execution of an

incurred penalty.



4. If the view of justification I am opposing be true, it is altogether

out of place for one who has once believed, to ask for the pardon of

sin. It is a downright insult to God, and apostasy from Christ. It

amounts according to their view of justification, to a denial of perpetual

justification by imputed righteousness, and to an acknowledgment of

being condemned. It must therefore imply a falling from grace, to pray

for pardon after the soul has once believed.



5. But this view of justification is at war with the whole Bible. This

everywhere represents Christians as condemned when they

sin teaches them to repent, confess, and pray for pardon to betake

themselves afresh to Christ as their only hope. The Bible, in almost

every variety or manner, represents perseverance in faith, and

obedience to the end, as a condition of ultimate justification and final

salvation. Let the following passages serve as examples of the

manner in which the Bible represents this subject:



"But when the righteous turneth away from His righteousness, and

committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the abominations that

the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath

done shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath trespassed,

and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die" (Ezek. 18:24).



"When I shall say to the righteous, that he shall surely live; if he

trust to his own righteousness, and commit iniquity, all his

righteousness shall not be remembered; but for his iniquity that he

hath committed, he shall die for it" (Ezek. 33:13).



"And ye shall be hated of all men for My name's sake; but he that

endureth to the end shall be saved" (Matt. 10:22, Matt. 24:13).



"But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest that by

any means when I have preached to others, I myself should be a

castaway" (1 Cor. 9:27).



"Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall"

(1 Cor. 10:12).



"We then, as workers together with Him, beseech you also that ye

receive not the grace of God in vain" (2 Cor. 6:1).



"If ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be not moved

away from the hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, and which

was preached to every creature which is under heaven; whereof I Paul

am made a minister" (Col. 1:23).



"Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of entering into

his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. Let us labor

therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the same

example of unbelief" (Heb. 4:1, 11).



"Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling

and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall" (2 Peter

1:10).



"Fear none of those things which thou shalt suffer. Behold, the

devil shall cast some of you into prison, that ye may be tried; and ye

shall have tribulation ten days. Be thou faithful unto death, and I will

give thee a crown of life. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the

Spirit saith unto the churches; He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of

the second death. To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the

hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, and in the stone a new

name written, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it. And

he that overcometh, and keepeth My words unto the end, to him will I

give power over the nations; And he shall rule them with a rod of iron;

as the vessels of a potter shall they be broken to shivers; even as I

received of My Father" (Rev. 2:10, 16, 17, 26, 27).



Observe, I am not here calling in question the fact, that all true

saints do persevere in faith and obedience to the end; but am showing

that such perseverance is a condition of salvation, or ultimate

justification. The subject of the perseverance of the saints will come

under consideration in its proper place.



6. The view of justification which I am opposing is contradicted by

the consciousness of the saints. I think I may safely affirm that the

saints in all time are very conscious of condemnation when they fall

into sin. This sense of condemnation may not subject them to the

same kind and degree of fear which they experienced before

regeneration, because of the confidence they have that God will

pardon their sin. Nevertheless, until they repent, and by a renewed

act of faith lay hold on pardon and fresh justification, their remorse,

shame, and consciousness of condemnation, do in fact, if I am not

much deceived, greatly exceed, as a general thing, the remorse,

shame, and sense of condemnation experienced by the impenitent. 

But if it be true, that the first act of faith brings the soul into a state of

perpetual justification, so that it cannot fall into condemnation

thereafter, do what it will, the experience of the saints contradicts

facts, or, more strictly, their consciousness of condemnation is a

delusion. They are not in fact condemned by the moral law as they

conceive themselves to be.



7. If I understand the framers of the Westminster Confession of

Faith, they regarded justification as a state resulting from the relation

of an adopted child of God, which state is entered into by faith alone,

and held that justification is not conditionated upon obedience for the

time being, but that a person in this state may, as they hold that all in

this life in fact do, sin daily, and even continually, yet without

condemnation by the law, their sin bringing them only under his

fatherly displeasure, and subjecting them to the necessity of

repentance, as a condition of his fatherly favor, but not as a condition

of pardon or of ultimate salvation. They seem to have regarded the

child of God as no longer under moral government, in such a sense

that sin was imputed to him, this having been imputed to Christ, and

Christ's righteousness so literally imputed to him that, do what he may,

after the first act of faith he is accounted and treated in his person as

wholly righteous. If this is not antinomianism, I know not what is; since

they hold that all who once believe will certainly be saved, yet that their

perseverance in holy obedience to the end is, in no case, a condition

of final justification, but that this is conditionated upon the first act of

faith alone. They support their positions with quotations from scripture

about as much in point as is common for them. They often rely on

proof-texts that, in their meaning and spirit, have not the remotest

allusion to the point in support of which they are quoted. I have tried

to understand the subject of justification as it is taught in the Bible,

without going into labored speculations or to theological technicalities. 

If I have succeeded in understanding it, the following is a succinct and

a true account of the matter:



The Godhead, in the exercise of His adorable love and

compassion, sought the salvation of sinners, through and by means of

the mediatorial death and work of Christ. This death and work of

Christ were resorted to, not to create, but, as a result of, the merciful

disposition of God and as a means of securing the universe against a

misapprehension of the character and design of God in forgiving and

saving sinners. To Christ, as Mediator between the Godhead and

man, the work of justifying and saving sinners is committed. He is

made unto sinners "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and

redemption" (1 Cor. 1:30). In consideration of Christ's having by His

death for sinners secured the subjects of the divine government

against a misconception of His character and designs, God does,

upon the further conditions of a repentance and faith that imply a

renunciation of their rebellion and a return to obedience to His laws,

freely pardon past sin, and restore the penitent and believing sinner to

favor, as if he had not sinned, while he remains penitent and believing,

subject however to condemnation and eternal death, unless he holds

the beginning of his confidence steadfast unto the end. The doctrine

of a literal imputation of Adam's sin to all his posterity, of the literal

imputation of all the sins of the elect to Christ, and of His suffering for

them the exact amount due to the transgressors, of the literal

imputation of Christ's righteousness or obedience to the elect, and the

consequent perpetual justification of all that are converted from the

first exercise of faith, whatever their subsequent life may be I say I

regard these dogmas as fabulous, and better befitting a romance than

a system of theology.



But it is said, that the Bible speaks of the righteousness of faith. 

"What shall we say then? That the Gentiles, which followed not after

righteousness, have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness

which is of faith." "And be found in Him, not having mine own

righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of

Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith" (Romans 1:30). 

These and similar passages are relied upon, as teaching the doctrine

of an imputed righteousness; and such as these: "The Lord our

righteousness" (Phil. 3:9): "Surely, shall one say, in the Lord have I

righteousness and strength" (Isaiah 45:24). By "the Lord our

righteousness," we may understand, either that we are justified, that is,

that our sins are atoned for, and that we are pardoned and accepted

by, or on account of the Lord, that is Jesus Christ; or we may

understand that the Lord makes us righteous, that is, that He is our

sanctification, or working in us to will and to do of His good pleasure;

or both, that is, He atones for our sins, brings us to repentance and

faith, works sanctification or righteousness in us, and then pardons our

past sins, and accepts us. By the righteousness of faith, or of God by

faith, I understand the method of making sinners holy, and of securing

their justification or acceptance by faith, as opposed to mere works of

law or self-righteousness. Dikaiosune, rendered righteousness, may

be with equal propriety, and often is, rendered justification. So

undoubtedly it should be rendered in: "But of Him are ye in Christ

Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and

sanctification, and redemption" (1 Cor. 1:30). The meaning here

doubtless is, that He is the author and finisher of that scheme of

redemption, whereby we are justified by faith, as opposed to

justification by our own works. "Christ our righteousness" is Christ the

author or procurer of our justification. But this does not imply that He

procures our justification by imputing His obedience to us.



The doctrine of a literal imputation of Christ's obedience or

righteousness is supported by those who hold it, by such passages as

the following: "But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that

justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. Even as

David also describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God

imputeth righteousness without works, saying, `Blessed are they

whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is

the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin'" (Romans 4:5-8). But

here justification is represented only as consisting in forgiveness of

sin, or in pardon and acceptance. Again, "To wit, that God was in

Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their

trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of

reconciliation. For He hath made Him to be sin for us who knew no

sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him" (2 Cor.

5:19, 21). Here again the apostle is teaching only his much loved

doctrine of justification by faith, in the sense that upon condition or in

consideration of the death and mediatorial interference and work of

Christ, penitent believers in Christ are forgiven and rewarded as if they

were righteous.



Foundation of the justification of penitent believers in Christ. What

is the ultimate ground or reason of their justification?



1. It is not founded in Christ's literally suffering the exact penalty of

the law for them, and in this sense literally purchasing their justification

and eternal salvation. The Westminster Confession of Faith affirms as

follows: chapter on Justification, section 3 "Christ by His obedience

and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus

justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to His

Father's justice in their behalf. Yet, inasmuch as He was given by the

Father for them, and His obedience and satisfaction accepted in their

stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is

only of free grace, that both the exact justice and rich grace of God

might be glorified in the justification of sinners." If the framers of this

confession had made the distinction between the grounds and

conditions of justification, so as to represent the gracious disposition

that gave the Son, and that accepted His obedience and satisfaction in

their stead, as the ground or moving cause, and the death and work of

Christ as a condition or a means, as "that without which" the

benevolence of God could not wisely justify sinners, their statement

had been much improved. As it stands, the transaction is represented

as a proper quid pro quo, a proper full payment of the debt of the

justified. All the grace consisted in giving His Son, and consenting to

the substitution. But they deny that there is grace in the act of

justification itself. This proceeds upon the ground of "exact justice." 

There is then according to this, no grace in the act of pardon and

accepting the sinner as righteous. This is "exact justice," because the

debt is fully canceled by Christ. Indeed, "Christian, what do you think

of this?" God has, in the act of giving His Son and in consenting to the

substitution, exercised all the grace He ever will. Now your

forgiveness and justification are, according to this teaching, placed on

the ground of "exact justice." You have now only to believe and

demand "exact justice." One act of faith places your salvation on the

ground of "exact justice." Talk no more of the grace of God in

forgiveness! But stop, let us see. What is to be understood here by

exact justice, and by a real, full satisfaction to His Father's justice? I

suppose all orthodox Christians to hold, that every sinner and every

sin, strictly on the score of justice, deserves eternal death or endless

suffering. Did the framers of this confession hold that Christ bore the

literal penalty of the law for each of the saints? Or did they hold that

by virtue of His nature and relations, His suffering, though indefinitely

less in amount than was deserved by the transgressors, was a full

equivalent to public justice, or governmentally considered, for the

execution of the literal penalty upon the transgressors? If they meant

this latter, I see no objection to it. But if they meant the former,

namely, that Christ suffered in His own person the full amount strictly

due to all the elect, I say, 



(1.) That it was naturally impossible.



(2.) That His nature and relation to the government of God was

such as to render it wholly unnecessary to the safe forgiveness of sin,

that He should suffer precisely the same amount deserved by sinners.



(3.) That if, as their substitute, Christ suffered for them the full

amount deserved by them, then justice has no claim upon them, since

their debt is fully paid by the surety, and of course the principal is, in

justice, discharged. And since it is undeniable that the atonement was

made for the whole posterity of Adam, it must follow that the salvation

of all men is secured upon the ground of "exact justice." This is the

conclusion to which Huntington and his followers came. This doctrine

of literal imputation, is one of the strongholds of universalism, and

while this view of atonement and justification is held they cannot be

driven from it.



(4.) If He satisfied justice for them, in the sense of literally and

exactly obeying for them, why should His suffering be imputed to them

as a condition of their salvation? Surely they could not need both the

imputation of His perfect obedience to them, so as to be accounted in

law as perfectly righteous, and also the imputation of His sufferings to

them, as if He had not obeyed for them. Is God unrighteous? Does

He exact of the surety, first, the literal and full payment of the debt,

and secondly, perfect personal obedience for and in behalf of the

sinner? Does He first exact full and perfect obedience, and then the

same amount of suffering as if there had been no obedience? And

this, too, of His beloved Son?



(5.) What Christian ever felt, or can feel in the presence of God,

that he has a right to demand justification in the name of Christ, as due

to him on the ground of "exact justice?" Observe, the framers of the

Confession just quoted, studiously represent all the grace exercised in

the justification of sinners, as confined to the two acts of giving His

Son and accepting the substitution. This done, Christ fully pays the

debt, fully and exactly satisfies His Father's justice. You now need

not, must not conceive of the pardon of sin as grace or favor. To do

this is, according to the teaching of this Confession, to dishonor Christ. 

It is to reject His righteousness and salvation. What think you of this? 

One act of grace in giving His Son, and consenting to the substitution,

and all forgiveness, all accepting and trusting as righteous, is not

grace, but "exact justice." To pray for forgiveness, as an act of grace,

is apostasy from Christ. Christian! Can you believe this? No; in your

closet, smarting under the sting of a recently committed sin, or broken

down and bathed in tears, you cannot find it in your heart to demand

"exact justice" at the hand of God, on the ground that Christ has fully

and literally paid your debt. To represent the work and death of Christ

as the ground of justification in this sense, is a snare and a

stumbling-block. This view that I have just examined, contradicts the

necessary convictions of every saint on earth. For the truth of this

assertion I appeal to the universal consciousness of saints.



2. Our own works, or obedience to the law or to the gospel, are not

the ground or foundation of our justification. That is neither our faith,

nor repentance, nor love, nor life, nor anything done by us or wrought

in us, is the ground of our justification. These are conditions of our

justification, in the sense of a "not without which," but not the ground

of it. We are justified upon condition of our faith, but not for our faith;

upon condition of our repentance, love, obedience, perseverance to

the end, but not for these things. These are the conditions, but not the

reason, ground, or procuring cause of our justification. We cannot be

justified without them, neither are we or can we be justified by them. 

None of these things must be omitted on pain of eternal damnation. 

Nor must they be put in the place of Christ, upon the same penalty. 

Faith is so much insisted on in the gospel as the sine qua non of our

justification, that some seem disposed, or at least to be in danger of

substituting faith in the place of Christ; of making faith instead of Christ

the Savior.



3. Neither is the atonement, nor anything in the mediatorial work of

Christ, the foundation of our justification, in the sense of the source,

moving, or procuring cause. This, that is the ground of our

justification, lies deep in the heart of infinite love. We owe all to that

merciful disposition that performed the mediatorial work, and died the

accursed death to supply an indispensable condition of our justification

and salvation. To stop short in the act which supplied the condition,

instead of finding the depths of a compassion as fathomless as infinity,

as the source of the whole movement, is to fail in discrimination. The

work, and death, and resurrection, and advocacy of Christ are

indispensable conditions, are all-important, but not the fundamental

reason of our justification.



4. Nor is the work of the Holy Spirit in converting and sanctifying

the soul, the foundation of our justification. This is only a condition or

means of bringing it about, but is not the fundamental reason.



5. But the disinterested and infinite love of God, the Father, Son,

and Holy Spirit, is the true and only foundation of the justification and

salvation of sinners. God is love, that is, He is infinitely benevolent. 

All He does, or says, or suffers, permits or omits, is for one and the

same ultimate reason, namely, to promote the highest good of

universal being.



6. Christ, the second person in the glorious Trinity, is represented

in scripture, as taking so prominent a part in this work, that the number

of offices and relations which He sustains to God and man in it are

truly wonderful. For example, He is represented as being King, Judge,

Mediator, Advocate, Redeemer, surety, wisdom, righteousness,

sanctification, redemption, Prophet, Priest Passover, or Lamb of

God the bread and water of life true God and eternal life our

life our all in all as the repairer of the breach as dying for our

sins as rising for our justification as the resurrection and the

life bearing our griefs and carrying our sorrows as He, by whose

stripes we are healed as the head of His people as the bridegroom

or husband of His church as the shepherd of His flock as the door

by which they enter as the way to salvation as our salvation as

the truth as being made sin for us that we are made the

righteousness of God in Him that in Him dwells all the fullness of the

Godhead that in Him all fullness dwells all power in heaven and

earth are said to be given to Him the true light that lighteth every

man that cometh into the world Christ in us the hope of glory the

true vine of which we are the branches our

brother Wonderful Counselor the mighty God the everlasting

Father the prince of peace the captain of salvation the captain of

the Lord's host.



These are among the official relations of Christ to His people, and

to the great work of our justification. I shall have frequent occasion to

consider Him in some of these relations, as we proceed in this course

of study. Indeed, the offices, relations, and works of Christ, are among

the most important topics of Christian theology.



Christ is our Justification, in the sense that He carries into

execution the whole scheme of redemption devised by the adorable

Godhead. To Him the scriptures everywhere direct the eyes of our

faith and of our intelligence also. The Holy Spirit is represented not as

glorifying Himself, but as speaking of Jesus, as taking of the things of

Christ and showing them to His people, as glorifying Christ Jesus, as

being sent by Christ, as being the Spirit of Christ, as being Christ

Himself dwelling in the hearts of His people. But I must forbear at

present. This subject of Christ's relations needs elucidation in future

lectures.



Remarks



The relations of the old school view of justification to their view of

depravity is obvious. They hold, as we have seen, that the constitution

in every faculty and part is sinful. Of course, a return to personal,

present holiness, in the sense of entire conformity to the law, cannot

with them be a condition of justification. They must have a justification

while yet at least in some degree of sin. This must be brought about

by imputed righteousness. The intellect revolts at a justification in sin. 

So a scheme is devised to divert the eye of the law and of the lawgiver

from the sinner to his substitute, who has perfectly obeyed the law. 

But in order to make out the possibility of his obedience being imputed

to them, it must be assumed, that He owed no obedience for Himself;

than which a greater absurdity cannot be conceived. Constitutional

depravity or sinfulness being once assumed, physical regeneration,

physical sanctification, physical divine influence, imputed

righteousness and justification, while personally in the commission of

sin, follow of course.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 37



SANCTIFICATION



I will remind you of some points that have been settled in this

course of study.



1. The true intent and meaning of the law of God has been, as I

trust, ascertained in the lectures on moral government. Let this point if

need be, be examined by reference to those lectures.



2. We have also seen, in those lectures, what is not, and what is

implied in entire obedience to the moral law.



3. In those lectures, and also in the lectures on justification and

repentance, it has been shown that nothing is acceptable to God, as a

condition of justification, and of consequent salvation, but a

repentance that implies a return to full obedience to the moral law.



4. It has also been shown, that nothing is holiness short of full

obedience, for the time being, to the moral law.



5. It has also been shown, that regeneration and repentance

consist in the heart's return to full obedience, for the time being, to this

law.



6. We have also examined the doctrine of depravity, and seen, that

moral depravity, or sin, consists in selfishness, and not at all in the

constitution of men; that selfishness does not consist in the involuntary

appetites, passions, and propensities, but that it consists alone in the

committal of the will to the gratification of the propensities.



7. We have seen that holiness consists, not at all in the constitution

of body or mind; but that it belongs, strictly, only to the will or heart,

and consists in obedience of will to the law of God, as it lies revealed

in the intellect; that it is expressed in one word, love; that this love is

identical with the entire consecration of the whole being to the glory of

God, and to the highest well-being of the universe; or in other words,

that it consists in disinterested benevolence.



8. We have seen that all true saints, while in a state of acceptance

with God, do actually render, for the time being, full obedience to all

the known requirements of God; that is, that they do for the time being

their whole duty all that God, at this time, requires of them.



9. We have seen that this obedience is not rendered independent

of the grace of God, but is induced by the indwelling spirit of Christ

received by faith, and reigning in the heart. This fact will be more fully

elucidated in this discussion than it has been in former lectures. A

former lecture was devoted to it; but a fuller consideration of it remains

to be entered upon hereafter.



Define the principal terms to be used in this discussion.



Here let me remark, that a definition of terms, in all discussions, is

of prime importance. Especially is this true of this subject. I have

observed that almost without an exception, those who have written on

this subject dissenting from the views entertained here, do so upon the

ground that they understand and define the terms sanctification and

Christian perfection differently from what we do. Every one gives his

own definition, varying materially from others, and from what we

understand by the terms; and then he goes on professedly opposing

the doctrine as inculcated here. Now this is not only utterly unfair, but

palpably absurd. If I oppose a doctrine inculcated by another man, I

am bound to oppose what he really holds. If I misrepresent his

sentiments, "I fight as one that beateth the air" (1 Cor. 9:26). I have

been amazed at the diversity of definitions that have been given for

the terms Christian perfection, sanctification, etc.; and to witness the

diversity of opinion as to what is, and what is not, implied in these

terms. One objects wholly to the use of the term Christian perfection,

because, in his estimation, it implies this, and that, and the other thing,

which I do not suppose are at all implied in it. Another objects to our

using the term sanctification, because that implies, according to his

understanding of it, certain things that render its use improper. Now it

is no part of my design to dispute about the use of words. I must

however use some terms; and I ought to be allowed to use Bible

language in its scriptural sense, as I understand it. And if I should

sufficiently explain my meaning, and define the sense in which I use

the terms, and the sense in which the Bible manifestly uses them, this

ought to suffice. And I beg, that nothing more or less may be

understood by the language I use, than I profess to mean by it. Others

may, if they please, use the same terms, and give a different definition

of them. But I have a right to hope and expect, if they feel called upon

to oppose what I say, that they will bear in mind my definition of the

terms, and not pretend, as some have done, to oppose my views,

while they have only differed from me in their definition of the terms

used, giving their own definition varying materially and, I might say,

infinitely from the sense in which I use the same terms, and then

arraying their arguments to prove, that according to their definition of

it, sanctification is not really attainable in this life, when no one here or

anywhere else, that I ever heard of pretended that, in their sense of

the term, it ever was or ever will be, attainable in this life, and I might

add, or in that which is to come.



Sanctification is a term of frequent use in the Bible. Its simple and

primary meaning is a state of consecration to God. To sanctify is to

set apart to a holy use to consecrate a thing to the service of God. 

This is plainly both the Old and the New Testament use of the term. 

The Greek word hagiazo means to sanctify, to consecrate, or devote a

person or thing to a particular, especially to a sacred, use. This word

is synonymous with the Hebrew kaudash. This last word is used in the

Old Testament to express the same thing that is intended by the

Greek hagiazo, namely, to consecrate, devote, set apart, sanctify,

purify, make clean or pure. Hagiasmos, a substantive from hagiazo,

means sanctification, devotion, consecration, purity, holiness.



From the Bible use of these terms it is most manifest:



1. That sanctification does not imply any constitutional change,

either of soul or body. It consists in the consecration or devotion of the

constitutional powers of body and soul to God, and not in any change

wrought in the constitution itself.



2. It is also evident from the scriptural use of the term, that

sanctification is not a phenomenon, or state of the intellect. It belongs

neither to the reason, conscience, nor understanding. In short, it

cannot consist in any state of the intellect whatever. All the states of

this faculty are purely passive states of mind; and of course, as we

have abundantly seen, holiness is not properly predicable of them.



3. It is just as evident that sanctification, in the scriptural and proper

sense of the term, is not a mere feeling of any kind. It is not a desire,

an appetite, a passion, a propensity, an emotion, nor indeed any kind

or degree of feeling. It is not a state or phenomenon of the sensibility. 

The states of the sensibility are, like those of the intellect, purely

passive states of mind, as has been repeatedly shown. They of

course can have no moral character in themselves.



4. The Bible use of the term, when applied to persons, forbids the

understanding of it, as consisting in any involuntary state or attitude of

mind whatever.



5. The inspired writers evidently used the terms which are

translated by the English word sanctify, to designate a phenomenon of

the will, or a voluntary state of mind. They used the term hagiazo in

Greek, and kaudash in Hebrew, to represent the act of consecrating

one's self, or anything else to the service of God, and to the highest

well-being of the universe. The term manifestly not only represents an

act of the will, but an ultimate act or choice, as distinguished from a

mere volition, or executive act of the will. Thus, the terms rendered

sanctified are used as synonymous with loving God with all the heart,

and our neighbor as ourselves. The Greek hagiasmos, translated by

the word sanctification, is evidently intended to express a state or

attitude of voluntary consecration to God, a continued act of

consecration; or a state of choice as distinct from a mere act of choice,

an abiding act or state of choice, a standing and controlling preference

of mind, a continuous committal of the will to the highest well-being of

God and of the universe. Sanctification, as a state differing from a

holy act, is a standing, ultimate intention, and exactly synonymous or

identical with a state of obedience, or conformity to the law of God. 

We have repeatedly seen that the will is the executive or controlling

faculty of the mind. Sanctification consists in the will's devoting or

consecrating itself and the whole being, all we are and have, so far as

powers, susceptibilities, possessions are under the control of the will,

to the service of God, or, which is the same thing, to the highest

interests of God and of being. Sanctification, then, is nothing more nor

less than entire obedience, for the time being, to the moral law.



Sanctification may be entire in two senses: (1.) In the sense of

present, full obedience, or entire consecration to God; and (2.) In the

sense of continued, abiding consecration or obedience to God. Entire

sanctification, when the terms are used in this sense, consists in being

established, confirmed, preserved, continued in a state of

sanctification or of entire consecration to God.



In this discussion, then, I shall use the term entire sanctification to

designate a state of confirmed, and entire consecration of body, soul,

and spirit, or of the whole being to God confirmed, not in the sense,

(1.) That a soul entirely sanctified cannot sin, but that as a matter of

fact, he does not, and will not sin. (2.) Nor do I use the term entire

sanctification as implying that the entirely sanctified soul is in no such

danger of sinning as to need the thorough use and application of all

the means of grace to prevent him from sinning, and to secure his

continued sanctification. (3.) Nor, do I mean by entire sanctification, a

state in which there will be no further struggle or warfare with

temptation, or in which the Christian warfare will cease. This certainly

did not cease in Christ to the end of life, nor will it with any being in the

flesh. (4.) Nor do I use the term as implying a state in which no further

progress in holiness is possible. No such state is, or ever will be,

possible to any creature, for the plain reason, that all creatures must

increase in knowledge; and increase of knowledge implies increase of

holiness in a holy being. The saints will doubtless grow in grace or

holiness to all eternity. (5.) Nor do I mean by the term entire

sanctification, that the entirely sanctified soul will no longer need the

continual grace and indwelling Spirit of Christ to preserve it from sin,

and to secure its continuance in a state of consecration to God. It is

amazing that such men as Dr. Beecher and others should suppose,

that a state of entire consecration implies that the entirely sanctified

soul no longer needs the grace of Christ to preserve it. Entire

sanctification, instead of implying no further dependence on the grace

of Christ, implies the constant appropriation of Christ by faith as the

sanctification of the soul.



But since entire sanctification, as I understand the term, is identical

with entire and continued obedience to the law of God, and since I

have in lectures on moral government fully shown what is not, and

what is, implied in full obedience to the law of God, to avoid much

repetition in this place, I must refer you to what I have there said upon

the topics just named.



Show what the real question now at issue is.



1. It is not whether a state of present full obedience to the divine

law is attainable in this life. For this has, I trust, been clearly

established in former lectures.



2. It is not whether a state of permanent, full obedience has been

attained by all, or by any of the saints on earth.



3. But the true question at issue is, Is a state of entire, in the sense

of permanent sanctification, attainable in this life?



If in this discussion I shall insist upon the fact, that this state has

been attained, let it be distinctly understood, that the fact that the

attainment has been made, is only adduced in proof of the attainability

of this state; that it is only one of the arguments by which the

attainability of this state is proved. Let it also be distinctly borne in

mind, that if there should be in the estimation of any one a defect in

the proof, that this state has been attained, still the integrity and

conclusiveness of the other arguments in support of the attainability

will not thereby be shaken. It is no doubt true, that the attainability of

this state in this life may be abundantly established, entirely

irrespective of the question whether this state has ever been attained.



The true question is, Is a state of entire, established, abiding

consecration to God attainable in this life, in such a sense, that we

may rationally expect or hope to become thus established in this life? 

Are the conditions of attaining this established state in the grace and

love of God, such that we may rationally expect or hope to fulfil them,

and thus become established, or entirely sanctified in this life? This is

undoubtedly the true and the greatly important question to be settled.



That entire sanctification is attainable in this life.



1. It is self-evident, that entire obedience to God's law is possible

on the ground of natural ability. To deny this, is to deny that a man is

able to do as well as he can. The very language of the law is such as

to level its claims to the capacity of the subject, however great or small

that capacity may be. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy

heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength"

(Deut. 6:5). Here then it is plain, that all the law demands, is the

exercise of whatever strength we have, in the service of God. Now, as

entire sanctification consists in perfect obedience to the law of God,

and as the law requires nothing more than the right use of whatever

strength we have, it is, of course, forever settled, that a state of entire

sanctification is attainable in this life, on the ground of natural ability.



This is generally admitted by those who are called moderate

Calvinists. Or, perhaps I should say, it generally has been admitted by

them, though at present some of them seem inclined to give up the

doctrine of natural ability, and to take refuge in constitutional depravity,

rather than admit the attainableness of a state of entire sanctification

in this life. But let men take refuge where they will, they can never

escape from the plain letter, and spirit, and meaning of the law of God. 

Mark with what solemn emphasis it says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy

God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all

thy strength" (Deut. 6:5). This is its solemn injunction, whether it be

given to an angel, a man, or a child. An angel is bound to exercise an

angel's strength; a man, the strength of a man; and a child, the

strength of a child. It comes to every moral being in the universe, just

as he is, where he is, and requires, not that he should create new

powers, or possess other powers than he has, but that such as his

powers are, they should all be used with the utmost perfection and

constancy for God.



2. The provisions of grace are such as to render its actual

attainment in this life, the object of reasonable pursuit. It is admitted,

that the entire sanctification of the church is to be accomplished. It is

also admitted, that this work is to be accomplished, "through the

sanctification of the Spirit and the belief of the truth" (2 Thess. 2:13). It

is also universally agreed, that this work must be begun here; and also

that it must be completed before the soul can enter heaven. This then

is the inquiry, Is this state attainable as a matter of fact before death?



Bible argument



I come now to consider the question directly, and wholly as a Bible

question, whether entire sanctification is in such a sense attainable in

this life, as to make its attainment an object of rational pursuit.



1. It is evident from the fact, expressly stated, that abundant means

are provided for the accomplishment of this end. "He that descended

is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that he might

fill all things. And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and

some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting

of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of

Christ; till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of

the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of

the fullness of Christ; that we henceforth be no more children tossed to

and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of

men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive; but

speaking the truth in love, may grow up into Him in all things, which is

the head, even Christ; from whom the whole body fitly joined together

and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the

effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the

body, unto the edifying of itself in love" (Eph. 4:15-19). Upon this

passage I remark:



(1.) That what is here spoken of is plainly applicable only to this life. 

It is in this life that the apostles, evangelists, prophets, and teachers,

exercise their ministry. These means therefore are applicable, and so

far as we know, only applicable to this life.


(2.) The apostle here manifestly teaches, that these means are

designed and adequate to perfecting the whole church as the body of

Christ, "till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of

the Son of God, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of

Christ" (Eph. 4:13). Now observe:



(3.) These means are for the perfecting of the saints, till the whole

church, as a perfect man, "has come to the measure of the stature of

the fullness of Christ." If this is not entire sanctification, what is? That

this is to take place in this world is evident from what follows. For the

apostle adds, "that we henceforth be no more tossed to and fro, and

carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and

cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive" (Eph. 4:14).



(4.) It should be observed, that this is a very strong passage in

support of the doctrine, inasmuch as it asserts that abundant means

are provided for the sanctification of the church in this life. And as the

whole includes all its parts, there must be sufficient provision for the

sanctification of each individual.



(5.) If the work is ever to be effected, it is by these means. But

these means are used only in this life. Entire sanctification then must

take place in this life.



(6.) If this passage does not teach a state of entire sanctification,

such a state is nowhere mentioned in the Bible. And if believers are

not here said to be wholly sanctified by these means, and of course in

this life, I know not that it is anywhere taught that they shall be

sanctified at all.



(7.) But suppose this passage to be put into the language of a

command, how should we understand it? Suppose the saints

commanded to be perfect, and to "grow up to the measure of the

stature of the fullness of Christ" (Eph. 4:13), could anything less than

entire sanctification be understood by such requisitions? Then by

what rule of sober criticism, I would inquire, can this language, used in

this connection, mean anything less than I have supposed it to mean?



2. But let us look into some of the promises. It is not my design to

examine a great number of scripture promises, but rather to show, that

those which I do examine, fully sustain the positions I have taken. 

One is sufficient, if it be full and its application just, to settle this

question for ever. I might occupy many pages in the examination of

the promises, for they are exceedingly numerous, and full, and in

point. But my design is at present to examine somewhat critically a

few only out of the many. This will enable you to apply the same

principles to the examination of the scripture promises generally.



(1.) I begin by referring you to the law of God, as given in: "And

now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the

Lord thy God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the

Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul?" (Deut. 10:12). 

Upon this passage I remark:



(a.) It professedly sums up the whole duty of man to God to fear

and love Him with all the heart and all the soul.



(b.) Although this is said of Israel, yet it is equally true of all men. It

is equally binding upon all, and is all that God requires of any man in

regard to Himself.



(c.) Continued obedience to this requirement is entire

sanctification, in the sense in which I use those terms.



"And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of

thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy

soul, that thou mayest live" (Deut. 30:6). Here we have a promise

couched in the same language as the command just quoted. Upon

this passage I remark:



It promises just what the law requires. If the law requires a state of

entire sanctification, or if that which the law requires is a state of entire

sanctification, then this is a promise of entire sanctification. As the

command is universally binding upon all and applicable to all, so this

promise is universally applicable to all who will lay hold upon it. Faith

is an indispensable condition of the fulfillment of this promise. It is

entirely impossible that we should love God with all the heart, without

confidence in Him. God begets love in man in no other way than by so

revealing Himself as to inspire confidence, that confidence which

works by love.



Now here there is no perceivable reason why we should not

understand the language of the promise as meaning as much as the

language of the command. This promise appears to have been

designed to cover the whole ground of the requirement. Suppose the

language in this promise to be used in a command, or suppose that

the form of this promise were changed into that of a command;

suppose God should say as He does elsewhere, "Thou shalt love the

Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul" (Deut. 6:5), who

would doubt that God designed to require a state of entire

sanctification or consecration to Himself? How then are we to

understand it when used in the form of a promise? If His bountifulness

equals His justice, His promises of grace must be understood to mean

as much as the requirements of His justice. If He delights in giving as

much as in receiving, His promises must mean as much as the

language of His requirements.



This promise is designed to be fulfilled in this life. The language

and connection imply this: "I will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of

thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy

soul."  This in some sense takes place in regeneration, but more than

simple regeneration seems here to be promised. It is plain, I think,

that this promise relates to a state of mind, and not merely to an

exercise.



This promise as it respects the church, at some day, must be

absolute and certain. So that God will undoubtedly, at some period,

beget this state of mind in the church. But to what particular

individuals and generation this promise will be fulfilled, must depend

upon their faith in the promise.



(2.) "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new

covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah; not

according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that

I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the land of Egypt, (which

My covenant they brake, although I was a husband unto them, saith

the Lord;) but this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house

of Israel: After those days, saith the Lord, I will put My law in their

inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and I will be their God, and

they shall be My people. And they shall teach no more every man his

neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for they

shall all know Me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them,

saith the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their

sin no more" (Jerem. 31:31-34). Upon this passage, I mark:



(a.) It was to become due, or the time when its fulfillment might be

claimed and expected, was at the advent of Christ. This is

unequivocally settled in Heb 8:8-12, where this passage is quoted at

length, as being applicable to the gospel day.



(b.) This is undeniably a promise of entire sanctification. It is a

promise that the "law shall be written in the heart." It means that the

very temper and spirit required by the law shall be begotten in the

soul. Now, if the law requires entire sanctification or perfect holiness,

this is certainly a promise of it; for it is a promise of all that the law

requires. To say that this is not a promise of entire sanctification, is

the same absurdity as to say, that perfect obedience to the law is not

entire sanctification; and this last is the same absurdity as to say, that

something more is our duty than what the law requires: and this again

is to say, that the law is imperfect and unjust.



(c.) A permanent state or entire sanctification is plainly implied in

this promise. The reason for setting aside the first covenant was, that

it was broken: "Which My covenant they brake." One grand design of

the new covenant is, that it shall not be broken, for then it would be no

better than the first. Permanency is implied in the fact, that it is to be

engraved in the heart. Permanency is plainly implied in the assertion,

that God will remember their sin no more. In  Jerem. 32:39, 40,

where the same promise is in substance repeated, you will find it

expressly stated, that the covenant is to be "everlasting," and that He

will so "put His fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from Him." 

Here permanency is as expressly promised as it can be.



Suppose the language of this promise to be thrown into the form of

a command. Suppose God to say, "Let My law be within your hearts,

and let it be in your inward parts, and let My fear be so within your

hearts, that you shall not depart from Me. Let your covenant with Me

be everlasting." If this language were found in a command, would any

man in his senses doubt that it meant to require perfect and

permanent sanctification? If not, by what rule of sober interpretation

does he make it mean anything else, when found in a promise? It

appears to be profane trifling, when such language is found in a

promise, to make it mean less than it does when found in a command.



This promise as it respects the church, at some period of its

history, is unconditional, and its fulfillment certain. But in respect to

any particular individuals or generation of the church, its fulfillment is

necessarily conditionated upon their faith. The church, as a body,

have certainly never received this new covenant. Yet, doubtless,

multitudes in every age of the Christian dispensation have received it. 

And God will hasten the time when it shall be so fully accomplished,

that there shall be no need for one man to say to his brother, "Know

the Lord, for all shall know Him from the least to the greatest" ( Heb.

8:11).



It should be understood, that this promise was made to the

Christian church, and not at all to the Jewish church. The saints under

the old dispensation had no reason to expect the fulfillment of this and

kindred promises to themselves, because their fulfillment was

expressly deferred until the commencement of the Christian

dispensation.



It has been said, that nothing more is here promised than

regeneration. But were not the Old Testament saints regenerated? 

Yet it is expressly said, that they received not the promises. "These all

died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them

afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and

confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth." "And

these all, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the

promise; God having provided some better thing for us, that they

without us should not be made perfect" (Heb. 11:13, 39, 40). Here we

see that these promises were not received by the Old Testament

saints. Yet they were regenerated.



It has also been said, that the promise implies no more than the

final perseverance of the saints. But I would inquire, did not the Old

Testament saints persevere? And yet we have just seen, that the Old

Testament saints did not receive these promises in their fulfillment.



(3.) I will next examine the promise in: "Then will I sprinkle clean

water upon you, and ye shall be clean; from all your filthiness, and

from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you,

and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony

heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will

put My Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in My statutes, and ye

shall keep My judgments and do them" (Ezek. 36:25-17). Upon this I

remark:



(a.) It was written within nineteen years after that which we have

just examined in Jeremiah. It plainly refers to the same time, and is a

promise of the same blessing.



(b.) It seems to be admitted, nor can it be denied, that this is a

promise of entire sanctification. The language is very definite and full. 

"Then," referring to some future time, when it should become due, "will

I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean." Mark, the first

promise, "ye shall be clean." If to be "clean" does not mean entire

sanctification, what does it mean?



The second promise is, "From all your filthiness and from all your

idols will I cleanse you." If to be cleansed "from all filthiness and all

idols," be not a state of entire sanctification, what is?



The third promise is, "A new heart also will I give you, and a new

spirit will I put within you; I will take away the stony heart out of your

flesh, and will give you an heart of flesh." If to have a "clean heart," a

"new heart," a "heart of flesh," in opposition to a "heart of stone," be

not entire sanctification, what is?



The fourth promise is, "I will put My Spirit within you, and cause

you to walk in My statutes, and ye shall keep My judgments, and do

them."



(c.) Let us turn the language of these promises into that of

command, and understand God as saying, "Make you a clean heart, a

new heart, and a new spirit; put away all your iniquities, all your

filthiness, and all your idols; walk in My statutes, and keep My

judgments, and do them." Now what man, in the sober exercise of his

reason, would doubt whether God meant to require a state of entire

sanctification in such commands as these? The rules of legitimate

interpretation would demand that we should so understand Him.



If this is so, what is the fair and proper construction of this

language, when found in a promise? I do not hesitate to say, that to

me it is amazing, that any doubt should be left on the mind of any man

whether, in these promises, God means as much as in His commands,

couched in the same language: for example, see: "Repent, and turn

yourselves from all your transgressions; so iniquity shall not be your

ruin. Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby ye have

transgressed and make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will

ye die, O house of Israel?" (Ezek. 18:30-31). Now, that the language

in the promise under consideration, should mean as much as the

language of this command, is demanded by every sober rule of

interpretation. And who ever dreamed, that when God required His

people to put away all their iniquities, He only meant that they should

put away a part of them.



(d.) This promise respects the church, and it cannot be pretended,

that it has ever been fulfilled, according to its proper import, in any

past age of the church.



(e.) As it regards the church, at a future period of its history, this

promise is absolute, in the sense that it certainly will be fulfilled.



(f.) It was manifestly designed to apply to Christians under the new

dispensation, rather than to the Jews under the old dispensation. The

sprinkling of clean water, and the outpouring of the Spirit, seems

plainly to indicate, that the promise belonged more particularly to the

Christian dispensation. It undeniably belongs to the same class of

promises with that in Jerem. 26:31-34; Joel 2:28, and many others,

that manifestly look forward to the gospel-day as the time when they

shall become due. As these promises have never been fulfilled, in

their extent and meaning, their complete fulfillment remains to be

realized by the church as a body. And those individuals, and that

generation, will take possession of the blessing, who understand, and

believe, and appropriate them to their own case.



(4.) I will next examine the promise in: "And the very God of peace

sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and

body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus

Christ. Faithful is He that calleth you, who also will do it" (1 Thess.

5:23, 24). Upon this I remark:



(a.) It is admitted, that this is a prayer for, and a promise of, entire

sanctification.



(b.) The very language shows, that both the prayer and the

promise refer to this life, as it is a promise, yet for the sanctification of

the body as well as the soul; also that they might be preserved, not

after, but unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.



(c.) This is a prayer of inspiration, to which is annexed an express

promise that God will do it.



(d.) Its fulfillment is, from the nature of the case, conditionated

upon our faith, as sanctification without faith is naturally impossible.



(e.) Now, if this promise, with those that have already been

examined, does not, honestly interpreted, fully settle the question of

the attainability of entire sanctification in this life, it is difficult to

understand how anything can be settled by an appeal to scripture.



There are great multitudes of promises of the same import, to

which I might refer you, and which, if examined in the light of the

foregoing rules of interpretation, would be seen to heap up

demonstration upon demonstration, that this is a doctrine of the Bible. 

Only examine them in the light of these plain, self-evident principles,

and it seems to me, that they cannot fail to produce conviction.



Having examined a few of the promises in proof of the position that

a state of entire sanctification is attainable in this life, I will now

proceed to mention other considerations, in support of this doctrine.



3. The apostles evidently expected Christians to attain this state in

this life. "Epaphras, who is one of you, a servant of Christ, saluteth

you, always laboring fervently for you in prayers, that we may stand

perfect and complete in all the will of God" (Col. 3:12). Upon this

passage I remark:



(1.) It was the object of the efforts of Epaphras, and a thing which

he expected to effect, to be instrumental in causing those Christians to

be "perfect and complete in all the will of God."



(2.) If this language does not describe a state of entire, in the

sense of permanent, sanctification, I know of none that would. If "to be

perfect and complete in all the will of God," be not Christian perfection,

what is?



(3.) Paul knew that Epaphras was laboring to this end, and with this

expectation; and he informed the church of it, in a manner that

evidently showed his approbation of the views and conduct of

Epaphras.



That the apostles expected Christians to attain this state is further

manifest, from: "Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let

us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit,

perfecting holiness in the fear of God" (2 Cor. 7:1).



Now, does not the apostle speak in this passage, as if he really

expected those to whom he wrote, "to perfect holiness in the fear of

God?" Observe how strong and full the language is: "Let us cleanse

ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." If "to cleanse

ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh, and all filthiness of the spirit,

and to perfect holiness," be not entire sanctification, what is? That he

expected this to take place in this life, is evident from the fact, that he

requires them to be cleansed from all filthiness of the flesh as well as

of the spirit. This passage plainly contemplates a state as

distinguished from an act of consecration or sanctification, that is, it

evidently expresses the idea of entire, in the sense of continued,

sanctification.



4. All the intermediate steps can be taken; therefore, the end can

be reached. There is certainly no point in our progress towards entire

sanctification, where it can be said we can go no further. To this it has

been objected, that though all the intermediate steps can be taken, yet

the goal can never be reached in this life, just as five may be divided

by three ad infinitum, without exhausting the fraction. Now this

illustration deceives the mind that uses it, as it may the minds of those

who listen to it. It is true, that you can never exhaust the fraction in

dividing five by three, for the plain reason, that the division may be

carried on ad infinitum. There is no end. You cannot, in this case,

take all the intermediate steps, because they are infinite. But in the

case of entire sanctification, all the intermediate steps can be taken:

for there is an end, or state of entire sanctification, and that too at a

point infinitely short of infinite.



5. That this state may be attained in this life, I argue from the fact,

that provision is made against all the occasions of sin. Men sin only

when they are tempted, either by the world, the flesh, or the devil. And

it is expressly asserted, that, in every temptation, provision is made for

our escape. Certainly, if it is possible for us to escape without sin,

under every temptation, then a state of entire and permanent

sanctification is attainable.



Full provision is made for overcoming the three great enemies of

our souls, the world, the flesh, and the devil.



(1.) The world "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even

your faith" (1 John 5:4). "Who is he that overcometh the world, but he

that believeth that Jesus is the Christ" (1 John 5:5).



(2.) The flesh "If ye walk in the Spirit, ye shall not fulfill the lusts of

the flesh" (Gal. 5:16).



(3.) Satan "The shield of faith shall quench all the fiery darts of

the wicked" (Eph. 6:16). And, "God shall bruise Satan under your feet

shortly" (Romans 16:20).



6. God is able to perform this work in and for us. "For this cause I

bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the

whole family in heaven and earth is named, that He would grant you

according to the riches of His glory, to be strengthened with might by

His Spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by

faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to

comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth,

and height; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge,

that ye might be filled with all the fullness of God" (Eph. 3:14-19). 

Upon this passage I remark:



(1.) Paul evidently prays here for the entire sanctification of

believers in this life. It is implied in our being "rooted and grounded in

love," and being "filled with all the fullness of God," that we be as

perfect in our measure and according to our capacity, as He is. If to

be filled with the fullness of God, does not imply a state of entire

sanctification, what does?



(2.) That Paul did not see any difficulty in the way of God's

accomplishing this work, is manifest from what he says in: "Now unto

Him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or

think, according to the power that worketh in us" (Eph. 3:20), etc.



7. The Bible nowhere represents death as the termination of sin in

the saints, which it could not fail to do, were it true, that they cease not

to sin until death. It has been the custom of the church for a long time,

to console individuals, in view of death, by the consideration, that it

would be the termination of all their sin. And how almost universal has

been the custom in consoling the friends of deceased saints, to

mention this as a most important fact, that now they had ceased from

sin! Now, if death is the termination of sin in the saints, and if they

never cease to sin until they pass into eternity, too much stress never

has been or can be laid upon that circumstance; and it seems utterly

incredible, that no inspired writer should ever have noticed the fact 

The representations of scripture are all directly opposed to this idea. It

is said, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord, for they rest from

their labors, and their works do follow them" (Rev. 14:13). Here it is

not intimated that they rest from their sins, but from their good works in

this life; such works as shall follow, not to curse, but to bless them. 

The representations of scripture are, that death is the termination of

the saint's sufferings and labors of love in this world, for the good of

men and the glory of God. But nowhere in the Bible is it intimated, that

the death of a saint is the termination of his serving the devil.



The Bible representations of death are utterly inconsistent with its

being an indispensable means of sanctification. Death is represented

in the Bible as an enemy. But if death is the only condition upon which

men are brought into a state of entire sanctification, its agency is as

important and as indispensable as the influence of the Holy Ghost. 

When death is represented in the Bible as any thing else than an

enemy, it is because it cuts short the sufferings of the saints, and

introduces them into a state of eternal glory not because it breaks

them off from communion with the devil! How striking is the contrast

between the language of the church and that of inspiration on this

subject! The church is consoling the Christian in view of death, that it

will be the termination of his sins that he will then cease to serve the

devil and his own lusts. The language of inspiration, on the other

hand, is, that he will cease, not from wicked, but from good works, and

labors and sufferings for God in this world. The language of the

church is, that then he will enter upon a life of unalterable

holiness that he shall then, and not till then, be entirely sanctified. 

The language of inspiration is, that because he is sanctified, death

shall be an entrance into a state of eternal glory.



8. Ministers are certainly bound to set up some definite standard, to

which, as the ministers of God, they are to insist upon complete

conformity. And now I would ask, what other standard can they and

dare they set up than this? To insist upon any thing less than this, is

to turn pope and grant an indulgence to sin. But to set up this

standard, and then inculcate that conformity to it is not, as a matter of

fact, attainable in this life, is as absolutely to take the part of sin

against God, as it would be to insist upon repentance in theory, and

then avow what in practice it is not attainable. And here let me ask

Christians what they expect ministers to preach? Do you think they

have a right to connive at any sin in you, or to insist upon any thing

else as a practicable fact, than that you should abandon every

iniquity? I ask, by what authority can a minister preach any thing less? 

And how shall any minister dare to inculcate the duty as a theory, and

yet not insist upon it as a practical matter, as something to be

expected of every subject of God's kingdom.



9. A denial of this doctrine has the natural tendency to beget the

very apathy witnessed in the church. Professors of religion go on in

sin, without much conviction of its wickedness. Sin unblushingly stalks

abroad even in the church of God, and does not fill Christians with

horror, because they expect its existence as a thing of course. Tell a

young convert that he must expect to backslide, and he will do so of

course, and with comparatively little remorse, because he looks upon

it as a kind of necessity. And being led to expect it, you find him, in a

few months after his conversion, away from God, and not at all

horrified with his state. Just so, inculcate the idea among Christians,

that they are not expected to abandon all sin, and they will of course

go on in sin with comparative indifference. Reprove them for their sin,

and they will say, "Oh, we are imperfect creatures; we do not pretend

to be perfect, nor do we expect we ever shall be in this world." Many

such answers as these will slow you at once the God-dishonoring and

soul-ruining tendency of a denial of this doctrine.



10. A denial of this doctrine prepares the minds of ministers to

temporize, and wink at great iniquity in their churches. Feeling, as

they certainly must, if they disbelieve this doctrine, that a great amount

of sin in all believers is to be expected as a thing of course, their whole

preaching, and spirit, and demeanor, will be such as to beget a great

degree of apathy among Christians, in regard to their abominable sins.



11. If this doctrine is not true, how profane and blasphemous is the

covenant of every church of every evangelical denomination. Every

church requires its members to make a solemn covenant with God and

with the church, in the presence of God and angels, and with their

hands upon the emblems of the broken body and shed blood of the

blessed Jesus, "to abstain from all ungodliness and every worldly lust,

to live soberly, righteously, and Godly, in this present world" (Titus

2:12). Now, if the doctrine of the attainability of entire sanctification in

this life is not true, what profane mockery is this covenant! It is a

covenant to live in a state of entire sanctification, made under the most

solemn circumstances, enforced by the most awful sanctions, and

insisted upon by the minister of God distributing the bread and wine. 

Now what right has any minister on earth to require less than this? 

And again, what right has any minister on earth to require this, unless

it is a practicable thing, and unless it is expected of him who makes

the vow?



Suppose, when this covenant was proposed to a convert about to

unite with the church, he should take it to his closet, and spread it

before the Lord, and inquire whether it would be right for him to make

such a covenant, and whether the grace of the gospel can enable him

to fulfil it? Do you suppose the Lord Jesus would reply, that if he

made that covenant, he certainly would, and must, as a matter of

course, live in the habitual violation of it as long as he lives, and that

his grace was not sufficient to enable him to keep it? Would he, in

such a case, have any right to take upon himself this covenant? No,

no more than he would have a right to lie to the Holy Ghost.



It has long been maintained by orthodox divines, that a person is

not a Christian who does not aim at living without sin that unless he

aims at perfection, he manifestly consents to live in sin; and is

therefore impenitent. It has been said, and I think truly, that if a man

does not, in the fixed purpose of his heart, aim at total abstinence from

sin, and at being wholly conformed to the will of God, he is not yet

regenerated, and does not so much as mean to cease from abusing

God. In Barnes' Notes upon 2 Cor. 8:1, we have the following:



"The unceasing and steady aim of every Christian should be

perfection in all things in the love of God, of Christ, of

man; perfection of heart, and feeling, and emotion; perfection in his

words, and plans, and dealings with men; perfection in his prayers,

and in his submission to the will of God. No man can be a Christian

who does not sincerely desire it, and who does not constantly aim at it. 

No man is a friend of God who can acquiesce in a state of sin, and

who is satisfied and contented that he is not as holy as God is holy. 

And any man who has no desire to be perfect as God is, and who

does not make it his daily and constant aim to be as perfect as God,

may set it down as demonstrably certain that he has no true religion."



Now if this is so, I would ask how a person can aim at, and intend

to do, what he knows to be impossible. Is it not a contradiction to say

that a man can intend to do what he knows he cannot do? To this it

has been objected, that if true, it proves too much that it would prove

that no man ever was a Christian who did not believe in this doctrine. 

To this I reply:



A man may believe in what is really a state of entire sanctification,

and aim at attaining it, although he may not call it by that name. This I

believe to be the real fact with Christians; and they would much more

frequently attain what they aim at, did they know how to appropriate

the grace of Christ to their own circumstances. Mrs. President

Edwards, for example, firmly believed that she could attain a state of

entire consecration. She aimed at, and manifestly attained it, and yet,

such were her views of constitutional depravity, that she did not call

her state one of entire sanctification. It has been common for

Christians to suppose, that a state of entire consecration is attainable;

but while they believe in the sinfulness of their natures, they would not

of course call even entire consecration, entire sanctification. Mrs.

Edwards believed in, aimed at, and attained, entire consecration. She

aimed at what she believed to be attainable, and she could aim at

nothing more. She called it by the same name with her husband, who

was opposed to the doctrine of Christian perfection, as held by the

Wesleyan Methodists, manifestly on the ground of his notions of

physical depravity. I care not what this state is called, if the thing be

fully explained and insisted upon, together with the conditions of

attaining it. Call it what you please, Christian perfection, heavenly

mindedness, the full assurance of faith or hope, or a state of entire

consecration; by all these I understand the same thing. And it is

certain, that by whatever name it is called, the thing must be aimed at

to be attained. The practicability of its attainment must be admitted, or

it cannot be aimed at. And now I would humbly inquire, whether to

preach any thing short of this is not to give countenance to sin?



12. Another argument in favor of this doctrine is, that the gospel, as

a matter of fact, has often, not only temporarily, but permanently and

perfectly, overcome every form of sin, in different individuals. Who

has not seen the most beastly lusts, drunkenness, lasciviousness, and

every kind of abomination, long indulged and fully ripe, entirely and

forever slain by the power of the grace of God? Now how was this

done? Only by bringing this sin fully into the light of the gospel, and

showing the individual the relation which the death of Christ sustained

to that sin.



Nothing is wanting to slay any and every form of sin, but for the

mind to be fully baptized into the death of Christ, and to see the

bearings of one's own sins upon the sufferings, and agonies, and

death of the blessed Jesus. Let me state a fact to illustrate my

meaning. An habitual and most inveterate smoker of tobacco, of my

acquaintance, after having been plied with almost every argument to

induce him to break the power of the habit and relinquish its use, in

vain, on a certain occasion lighted his pipe, and was about to put it to

his mouth, when the inquiry was started, Did Christ die to purchase

this vile indulgence for me? The perceived relation of the death of

Christ to this sin instantly broke the power of the habit, and from that

day he has been free. I could relate many other facts more striking

than this, where a similar view of the relation of a particular sin to the

atonement of Christ, has, in a moment, not only broken the power of

the habit, but destroyed entirely and forever, the appetite for similar

indulgences. And in multitudes of cases when the appetite has not

been entirely slain, the will has been endowed with abundant and

abiding efficiency effectually to control it. If the most inveterate habits

of sin, and even those that involve physical consequences, and have

deeply debased the physical constitution, and rendered it a source of

overpowering temptation to the mind, can be, and often have been,

utterly broken up, and forever slain by the grace of God, why should it

be doubted, that by the same grace a man can triumph over all sin,

and that forever?



13. If this doctrine is not true, what is true upon the subject? It is

certainly of great importance that ministers should be definite in their

instructions; and if Christians are not expected to be wholly conformed

to the will of God in this life, how much is expected of them? Who can

say, Hitherto canst thou, must thou come, but no further? It is

certainly absurd, not to say ridiculous, for ministers to be forever

pressing Christians up to higher and higher attainments, saying at

every step, you can and must go higher, and yet all along informing

them, that they are expected to fall short of their whole duty, that they

can as a matter of fact, be better than they are, far better, indefinitely

better; but still it is not expected that they will do their whole duty. I

have often been pained to hear men preach, who were afraid to

commit themselves in favor of the whole truth; and who were yet

evidently afraid of falling short in their instructions, of insisting that men

should stand "perfect and complete in all the will of God" (Col. 4:12). 

To be consistent they are evidently perplexed, and well they may be;

for in truth there is no consistency in their views and teachings. If they

do not inculcate, as a matter of fact, that men ought to do, and are

expected to do, their whole duty, they are sadly at a loss to know what

to inculcate. They have evidently many misgivings about insisting

upon less than this, and still they fear to go to the full extent of

apostolic teaching on this subject. And in their attempts to throw in

qualifying terms and caveats, to avoid the impression, that they

believe in the doctrine of entire sanctification, they place themselves in

a truly awkward position. Cases have occurred in which ministers

have been asked, how far we may go, must go, and are expected to

go, in dependence upon the grace of Christ, and how holy men may

be, and are expected to be, and must be, in this life. They could give

no other answer to this, than that they can be a great deal better than

they are. Now this indefiniteness is a great stumbling block to the

church. It cannot be according to the teachings of the Holy Ghost.



14. The tendency of a denial of this doctrine is, to my mind,

conclusive proof that the doctrine itself must be true. Many

developments in the recent history of the church throw light upon this

subject. Who does not see that the facts developed in the temperance

reformation have a direct and powerful bearing upon this question? It

has been ascertained, that there is no possibility of completing the

temperance reformation, except by adopting the principle of total

abstinence from all intoxicating drinks. Let a temperance lecturer go

forth as an evangelist, to promote revivals on the subject of

temperance let him inveigh against drunkenness, while he admits

and defends the moderate use of alcohol, or insinuates, at least, that

total abstinence is not expected or practicable. In this stage of the

temperance reformation, every one can see that such a man can

make no progress; that he would be employed like a child in building

dams of sand to obstruct the rushing of mighty waters. It is as certain

as that causes produce their effects, that no permanent reformation

could be effected, without adopting and insisting on the total

abstinence principle.



And now, if this is true, as it respects the temperance reformation,

how much more so when applied to the subjects of holiness and sin. 

A man might, by some possibility, even in his own strength, overcome

his habits of drunkenness, and retain what might be called the

temperate use of alcohol. But no such thing is possible in a

reformation from sin. There is no temperate indulgence in sin. Sin, as

a matter of fact, is never overcome by any man in his own strength. If

he admits into his creed the necessity of any degree of sin, or if he

allows in practice any degree of sin, he becomes impenitent, consents

to live in sin, and of course grieves the Holy Spirit, the certain result of

which is a relapsing into a state of legal bondage to sin. And this is

probably a true history of many professed Christians in the church. It

is just what might be expected from the views and practice of the

church upon this subject.



The secret of backsliding is, that reformations are not carried deep

enough. Christians are not set with all their hearts to aim at a speedy

deliverance from all sin, but on the contrary are left, and in many

instances taught, to indulge the expectation that they shall sin as long

as they live. I probably never shall forget the effect produced on my

mind by reading, when a young convert, in the diary of David Brainerd,

that he never expected to make any considerable attainments in

holiness in this life. I can now easily see that this was a natural

inference from the theory of physical sinfulness which he held. But not

perceiving this at the time, I doubt not that this expression of his views

had a very injurious effect upon me for many years. It led me to

reason thus: if such a man as David Brainerd did not expect to make

much advancement in holiness in this life, it is vain for me to expect

such a thing.



The fact is, if there be anything that is important to high attainments

in holiness, and to the progress of the work of sanctification in this life,

it is the adoption of the principle of total abstinence from sin. Total

abstinence from sin must be every man's motto, or sin will certainly

sweep him away as with a flood. That cannot possibly be a true

principle in temperance, that leaves the causes which produce

drunkenness to operate in their full strength. Nor can that be true in

regard to holiness which leaves the root unextracted, and the certain

causes of spiritual decline and backsliding at work in the very heart of

the church. And I am fully convinced that until evangelists and pastors

adopt, and carry out in practice, the principle of total abstinence from

all sin, they will as certainly find themselves, every few months, called

to do their work over again, as a temperance lecturer would who

should admit the moderate use of alcohol.



Again, who does not know that to call upon sinners to repent, and

at the same time to inform them that they will not, and cannot, and are

not expected to repent, would for ever prevent their repentance? 

Suppose you say to a sinner, "You are naturally able to repent; but it is

certain that you never will repent in this life, either with or without the

Holy Spirit." Who does not see that such teaching would prevent his

repentance as surely as he believed it? To say to a professor of

religion, "You are naturally able to be wholly conformed to the will of

God; but it is certain that you never will be, in this life, either in your

own strength, or by the grace of God"; if this teaching be believed, it

will just as certainly prevent his sanctification, as the other teaching

would the repentance of the sinner. I can speak from experience on

this subject. While I inculcated the common views, I was often

instrumental in bringing Christians under great conviction, and into a

state of temporary repentance and faith. But falling short of urging

them up to a point where they would become so acquainted with

Christ as to abide in Him, they would of course soon relapse again into

their former state. I seldom saw, and can now understand that I had

no reason to expect to see, under the instructions which I then gave,

such a state of religious principle, such steady and confirmed walking

with God among Christians, as I have seen since the change in my

views and instructions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LECTURE 38



SANCTIFICATION, PAUL ENTIRELY SANCTIFIED



I might urge a great many other considerations, and as I have said,

fill a book with scriptures, and arguments, and demonstrations, of the

attainability of entire sanctification in this life.



But I forbear, and will present only one more consideration a

consideration which has great weight in some minds. It is a question

of great importance, whether any actually ever did attain this state. 

Some who believe it attainable, do not consider it of much importance

to show that it has actually been attained. Now I freely admit, that it

may be attainable, even if it never has been attained. Yet it appears to

me that as a source of encouragement to the church, it is of great

importance whether, as a matter of fact, a state of entire and

continued holiness has been attained in this life. This question covers

much ground. But for the sake of brevity, I design to examine but one

case, and see whether there is not reason to believe that, in one

instance at least, it has been attained. The case to which I allude is

that of the apostle Paul. And I propose to take up and examine the

passages that speak of him, for the purpose of ascertaining whether

there is evidence that he ever attained to this state in this life.



And here let me say that, to my own mind, it seems plain, that Paul

and John, to say nothing of the other apostles, designed and expected

the church to understand them as speaking from experience, and as

having received of that fullness which they taught to be in Christ and in

His gospel.



And I wish to say again and more expressly, that I do not rest the

practicability of attaining a state of entire and continued holiness at all

upon the question, whether any ever have attained it, any more than I

would rest the question, whether the world ever will be converted,

upon the fact whether it ever has been converted. I have been

surprised, when the fact that a state of entire holiness has been

attained, is urged as one argument among a great many to prove its

attainability, and that too, merely as an encouragement to Christians to

lay hold upon this blessing that objectors and reviewers fasten upon

this, as the doctrine of sanctification, as if by calling this particular

question into doubt, they could overthrow all the other proof of its

attainability. Now this is utterly absurd. When, then, I examine the

character of Paul with this object in view, if it should not appear clear

to you that he did attain this state, you are not to overlook the fact, that

its attainability is settled by other arguments, on grounds entirely

independent of the question, whether it has been attained or not; and

that I merely use this as an argument, simply because to me it

appears forcible, and fitted to afford great encouragement to

Christians to press after this state.



I will first make some remarks in regard to the manner in which the

language of Paul, when speaking of himself, should be understood;

and then proceed to an examination of the passages which speak of

his Christian character.



His character, as revealed in his life, demands that we should

understand him to mean all that he says, when speaking in his own

favor. The Spirit of inspiration would guard him against speaking too

highly of himself. No man ever seemed to possess greater modesty,

and to feel more unwilling to exalt his own attainments. If he

considered himself as not having attained a state of entire

sanctification, and as often, if not in all things, falling short of his duty,

we may expect to find him acknowledging this in the deepest

self-abasement. If he is charged with living in sin, and with being

wicked in anything, we may expect him, when speaking under

inspiration, not to justify, but unequivocally to condemn himself in

those things, if he was really guilty.



Now, in view of these facts, let us examine those scriptures in

which he speaks of himself, and is spoken of by others.



"Ye are witnesses, and God also, how holy, and justly, and

unblamably, we behaved ourselves among you that believe" (1 Thess.

2:10). There he unqualifiedly asserts his own holiness. This language

is very strong, "How holy, justly, and unblamably." If to be holy, just,

and unblamable, be not entire sanctification, what is? He appeals to

the heart-searching God for the truth of what he says, and to their own

observation, calling on God and on them also to bear witness, that he

had been holy and without blame. Here we have the testimony of an

inspired apostle, in the most unqualified language, asserting his own

entire sanctification. Was he deceived? Can it be that he knew

himself all the time to have been living in sin? If such language as this

does not amount to an unqualified assertion, that he had lived among

them without sin, what can be known by the use of human language?



"Giving no offence in anything, that the ministry be not blamed; but

in all things approving ourselves as the ministers of God, in much

patience, in afflictions, in necessity, in distresses, in stripes, in

imprisonments, in tumults, in labors, in watchings, in fastings; by

pureness, by knowledge, by long-suffering, by kindness, by the Holy

Ghost, by love unfeigned, by the word of truth, by the power of God,

by the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left" (2

Cor. 6:3-7). Upon these verses I remark: Paul asserts that he gave no

offence in anything, but in all things approved himself as a minister of

God. Among other things, he did this "by pureness, by the Holy

Ghost, by love unfeigned," and "by the armor of righteousness on the

right hand and on the left." How could so modest a man as Paul

speak of himself in this manner, unless he knew himself to be in a

state of entire sanctification, and thought it of great importance that the

church should know it?



"For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in

simplicity and Godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace

of God, we have had our conversation in the world, and more

abundantly to you ward" (2 Cor. 1:12). This passage plainly implies the

same thing, and was manifestly said for the same purpose to declare

the greatness of the grace of God as manifested in himself.



"And herein do I exercise myself to have always a conscience void

of offence toward God, and toward men" (Acts 24:16), Paul doubtless

at this time had an enlightened conscience. If an inspired apostle

could affirm, that he "exercised himself to have always a conscience

void of offence toward God and toward men," must he not have been

in a state of entire sanctification?



"I thank God, whom I serve from my forefathers with a pure

conscience, that without ceasing I have remembrance of thee in my

prayers night and day" (2 Tim. 1:3). Here again he affirms that he

serves God with a pure conscience. Could this be, if he was often,

and perhaps every day, as some suppose, violating his conscience?



"I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ

liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith

of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me" (Gal.

2:20). This does not assert, but strongly implies, that he lived without

sin, and also that he regarded himself as dead to sin in the sense of

being permanently sanctified.



"But God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord

Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the

world" (Gal. 6:14). This text also affords the same inference as above.



"For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain" (Phil. 1:21). Here the

apostle affirms that for him to live was as if Christ lived in the church,

that is, by his doctrine illustrated by his life, it was as if Christ lived

again and preached His own gospel to sinners and to the church; or

for him to live was to make Christ known as if Christ lived to make

Himself known. How could he say this, unless his example, and

doctrine, and spirit, were those of Christ?



"Wherefore I take you to record this day, that I am pure from the

blood of all men" (Acts 20:26). This passage, taken in its connection,

shows clearly the impression that Paul desired to make upon the

minds of those to whom he spake. It is certain that he could in no

proper sense be "pure from the blood of all men," unless he had done

his whole duty. If he had been sinfully lacking in any grace, or virtue,

or labor, could he have said this? Certainly not.



"Wherefore, I beseech you, be ye followers of me. For this cause

have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son, and faithful in

the Lord, who shall bring you into remembrance of my ways which be

in Christ, as I teach everywhere in every church" (1 Cor. 2:16-17). 

Here Paul manifestly sets himself up as an example to the church. 

How could he do this if he were living in sin? He sent Timotheus to

them to refresh their memories in regard to his doctrine and practice;

implying that what he taught in every church he himself practiced.



"Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ" (1 Cor. 11:1). 

Here Paul commands them to follow him "as he followed Christ"; not

so far as he followed Christ, as some seem to understand it, but to

follow him because he followed Christ. How could he, in this

unqualified manner, command the church to copy his example, unless

he knew himself to be blameless?



"Brethren, be followers together of me, and mark them which walk

so as ye have us for an example. For our conversation is in heaven,

from whence we also look for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ" (Phil.

3:17, 20). Here again, Paul calls upon the church to follow him, and

particularly to notice those that copied his example, and assigns as the

reason, "for our conversation is in heaven."



"Those things, which ye have both learned and received, and

heard, and seen in me, do; and the God of peace shall be with you"

(Phil. 3:9), the Philippians were commanded to "do those things which

they had learned, and received, and seen in him." And then he adds,

that if they do those things, the God of peace shall be with them. Now

can it be, that he meant that they should understand anything less,

than that he lived without sin among them?



I will next examine those passages which are supposed by some to

imply that Paul was not in a state of entire sanctification.



"And some days after, Paul said unto Barnabas, Let us go again

and visit our brethren in every city where we have preached the word

of the Lord, and see how they do. And Barnabas determined to take

with them John whose surname was Mark. But Paul thought not good

to take him with them, who departed from them from Pamphylia, and

went not with them to the work. And the contention was so sharp

between them, that they departed asunder one from the other; and so

Barnabas took Mark, and sailed to Cyprus; and Paul chose Silas, and

departed, being recommended by the brethren unto the grace of God"

(Acts 15:36-40).



This contention between Paul and Barnabas arose out of the fact,

that John, who was a nephew of Barnabas, had once abruptly left

them in their travels, it would seem, without any justifiable reason, and

had returned home. It appears that the confidence of Barnabas in his

nephew was restored. But Paul was not as yet satisfied of the stability

of his character, and thought it dangerous to trust him as a traveling

companion and fellow laborer. It is not intimated, nor can it fairly be

inferred, that either of them sinned in this contention. If either was to

be blamed, it seems that Barnabas was in fault, rather than Paul,

inasmuch as he determined to take John with him, without having

consulted Paul. And he persisted in this determination until he met

with such firm resistance on the part of Paul, that he took John and

sailed abruptly for Cyprus; while Paul choosing Silas as his

companion, was recommended by the brethren to the grace of God,

and departed. Now certainly there is nothing that we can discover in

this transaction, that Paul, or any good man, or an angel, under the

circumstances, needs to have been ashamed of. It does not appear,

that Paul ever acted more from a regard to the glory of God and the

good of religion, than in this transaction. And I would humbly inquire,

what spirit is that which finds sufficient evidence in this case to charge

an inspired apostle with rebellion against God?



"And Paul, earnestly beholding the council, said, Men and brethren,

I have lived in all good conscience before God until this day. And the

high priest Ananias commanded them that stood by him to smite him

on the mouth. Then said Paul unto him, God shall smite thee, thou

whited wall: for sittest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest

me to be smitten contrary to the law? And they that stood by said,

Revilest thou God's high priest? Then said Paul, I wist not, brethren,

that he was the high priest: for it is written, Thou shalt not speak evil of

the ruler of thy people" (Acts 23:1-5). In this case sinful anger has

been imputed to Paul; but, so far as I can see, without any just reason. 

To my mind it seems plain, that the contrary is to be inferred. It

appears, that Paul was not personally acquainted with the then

officiating high priest. And he manifested the utmost regard to the

authority of God in quoting from the Old Testament, "Thou shalt not

speak evil of the ruler of thy people"; implying, that notwithstanding the

abuse he had received, he should not have made the reply, had he

known him to be the high priest.



Romans 7:14-25 has by many been supposed to be an epitome of

Paul's experience at the time he wrote the epistle. Upon this I remark:



1. The connection and drift of Paul's reasoning show, that the case

of which he was speaking, whether his own or the case of some one

else, was adduced by him to illustrate the influence of the law upon the

carnal mind. This is a case in which sin had the entire dominion, and

overcame all his resolutions of obedience.



2. That his use of the singular pronoun, and in the first person,

proves nothing in regard to the point, whether or not he was speaking

of himself, for this is common with him, and with other writers, when

using illustrations. He keeps up the personal pronoun, and passes

into the eighth chapter; at the beginning of which, he represents

himself, or the person of whom he is speaking, as being not only in a

different, but in an exactly opposite state of mind. Now, if the seventh

chapter contains Paul's experience, whose experience is this in the

eighth chapter? Are we to understand them both as the experience of

Paul? If so, we must understand him as first speaking of his

experience before, and then after he was sanctified. He begins the

eighth chapter by saying, "There is therefore now no condemnation to

them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after

the Spirit" (Romans 8:1), and assigns as a reason, that "The law of the

Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and

death" (Romans 8:2). The law of sin and death was that law in his

members, or the influence of the flesh, of which he had so bitterly

complained in the seventh chapter. But now, it appears, that he has

passed into a state in which he is made free from this influence of the

flesh, is emancipated and dead to the world and to the flesh, and in a

state in which "there is no condemnation." Now, if there was no

condemnation in the state in which he then was, it must have been,

either because he did not sin, or, if he did sin, because the law did not

condemn him; or because the law of God was repealed or abrogated. 

Now, if the penalty of the law was so set aside in his case, that he

could sin without condemnation, this is a real abrogation of the law. 

But as the law was not, and could not be set aside, its penalty was not

and could not be so abrogated, as not to condemn every sin. If Paul

lived without condemnation, it must be because he lived without sin.



To me it does not appear that Paul speaks of his own experience in

the seventh chapter of Romans, but that he merely supposes a case

by way of illustration, and speaks in the first person, and in the present

tense, simply because it was convenient and suitable to his purpose. 

His object manifestly was, in this and in the beginning of the eighth

chapter, to contrast the influence of the law and of the gospel to

describe in the seventh chapter the state of a man who was living in

sin, and every day condemned by the law, convicted and constantly

struggling with his own corruptions, but continually overcome, and in

the eighth chapter to exhibit a person in the enjoyment of gospel

liberty, where the righteousness of the law was fulfilled in the heart by

the grace of Christ. The seventh chapter may well apply either to a

person in a backslidden state, or to a convicted person who had never

been converted. The eighth chapter can clearly be applicable to none

but to those who are in a state of entire sanctification.



I have already said, that the seventh chapter contains the history of

one over whom sin has dominion. Now, to suppose that this was the

experience of Paul when he wrote the epistle, or of any one who was

in the liberty of the gospel, is absurd and contrary to the experience of

every person who ever enjoyed gospel liberty. And further, this is as

expressly contradicted in the sixth chapter as it can be. As I said, the

seventh chapter exhibits one over whom sin has dominion: but God

says, "For sin shall not have dominion over you; for ye are not under

the law, but under grace" (Romans 6:14). I remark finally upon this

passage, that if Paul was speaking of himself in the seventh chapter of

Romans, and really giving a history of his own experience, it proves

nothing at all in regard to his subsequent sanctification; for the eighth

chapter shows conclusively, that it was not his experience at the time

he wrote the epistle. The fact that the seventh and eighth chapters

have been separated since the translation was made, as I have before

said, has led to much error in the understanding of this passage. 

Nothing is more certain, than that the two chapters were designed to

describe not only different experiences, but experiences opposite to

each other. And that both these experiences should belong to the

same person at the same time, is manifestly impossible. If therefore

Paul is speaking in this connection of his own experience, we are

bound to understand the eighth chapter as describing his experience

at the time he wrote the epistle; and the seventh chapter as descriptive

of a former experience.



Now, therefore, if any one understands the seventh chapter as

describing a Christian experience, he must understand it as giving the

exercises of one in a very imperfect state; and the eighth chapter as

descriptive of a soul in a state of entire sanctification. So that this

epistle, instead of militating against the idea of Paul's entire

sanctification, upon the supposition that he was speaking of himself,

fully establishes the fact that he was in that state. What do those

brethren mean who take the latter part of the seventh chapter as

entirely disconnected from that which precedes and follows it, and

make it tell a sad story on the subject of the legal and sinful bondage

of an inspired apostle? What cannot be proved from the Bible in this

way? Is it not a sound and indispensable rule of biblical interpretation,

that a passage is to be taken in its connection, and that the scope and

leading intention of the writer is to be continually borne in mind, in

deciding upon the meaning of any passage? Why then, I pray, are the

verses that precede, and those that immediately follow in the eighth

chapter, entirely overlooked in the examination of this important

passage?



"That I may know Him, and the power of His resurrection, and the

fellowship of His sufferings, being made conformable unto His death; if

by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead. Not as

though I had already attained, either were already perfect; but I follow

after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of

Christ Jesus. Brethren, I count not myself to have apprehended; but

this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and

reaching forth unto those things which are before. I press toward the

mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us

therefore as many as be perfect, be thus minded: and if in anything ye

be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you" (Phil.

3:10-15).



Here is a plain allusion to the Olympic games, in which men ran for

a prize, and were not crowned until the end of the race, however well

they might run. Paul speaks of two kinds of perfection here, one of

which he claims to have attained, and the other he had not. The

perfection which he had not attained, was that which he did not expect

to attain until the end of His race, nor indeed until he had attained the

resurrection from the dead. Until then he was not, and did not expect

to be, perfect, in the sense that he should "apprehend all that for which

he was apprehended of Christ Jesus." But all this does not imply that

he was not living without sin, any more than it implies that Christ was

living in sin when he said, "I must walk today and tomorrow, and the

third day I shall be perfected." Here Christ speaks of a perfection

which He had not attained.



Now it is manifest, that it was the glorified state to which Paul had

not attained, and which perfection he was pressing after. But in the

fifteenth verse, he speaks of another kind of perfection, which he

professed to have attained. "Let us therefore," he says, "as many as

be perfect, be thus minded; that is, let us be pressing after this high

state of perfection in glory, if by any means we may attain unto the

resurrection of the dead." The figure of the games should be kept

continually in mind in the interpretation of this passage. The prize in

those races was the crown. This was given only at the end of the

race. And besides, a man was not crowned except he ran lawfully,

that is, according to rule. Paul was running for the prize, that is the

crown; not, as some suppose, for entire sanctification, but for a crown

of glory. This he did not expect until he had completed his race. He

exhorts those who were perfect, that is, those who were running

lawfully or according to rule, to forget the things that were behind, and

press to the mark, that is, the goal, for the prize, or the crown of glory,

which the Lord the righteous judge, who was witnessing his race to

award the crown to the victor, would give him at that day.



Now it is manifest to my mind, that Paul does not in this passage,

teach expressly nor impliedly, that he was living in sin, but the direct

opposite that he meant to say, as he had said in many other places,

that he was unblamable in respect to sin, but that he was aspiring after

higher attainments, and meant to be satisfied with nothing short of

eternal glory.



Again, "Not that I speak in respect of want: for I have learned, in

whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content. I know both how to be

abased, and I know how to abound: everywhere, and in all things, I am

instructed, both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound and to

suffer need. I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth

me" (Phil. 4:11-13). Here Paul undoubtedly meant to affirm, not

merely his abstract ability to do all his duty, but that he had learned by

experience, that as a matter of fact and reality, he found himself able

to do all things required of him.



In relation to the character of Paul, let me say: If Paul was not

sinless, he was an extravagant boaster, and such language used by

any minister in these days would be considered as the language of an

extravagant boaster. This setting himself up as an example so

frequently and fully, without any caution or qualification, was highly

dangerous to the interests of the church, if he was not in a state of

entire sanctification.



His language in appealing to God, that in life and heart he was

blameless, was blasphemous, unless he was really what he professed

to be; and if he was what he professed to be, he was in a state of

entire sanctification. It is doing dishonor to God, to maintain, under

these circumstances, that Paul had not attained the blessing of entire

sanctification. He nowhere confesses sin after he became an apostle,

but invariably justifies himself, appealing to man and to God, for his

entire integrity and blamelessness of heart and life. To maintain the

sinfulness of this apostle, is to deny the grace of the gospel, and

charge God foolishly. And I cannot but inquire, why is this great effort

in the church to maintain that Paul lived in sin, and was never wholly

sanctified till death?



Two things have appeared wonderful to me:



1. That so many professed Christians should seem to think

themselves highly honoring God in extending the claims of the law,

and yet denying that the grace of the gospel is equal to the demands

of the law.



2. That so many persons seem to have an entirely self-righteous

view of the subject of sanctification. With respect to the first of these

opinions, much pains has been taken to extend to the utmost the

claims of the law of God. Much has been said of its exceeding and

infinite strictness, and the great length, and breadth, and height, and

depth of its claims. Multitudes are engaged in defending the claims of

the law, as if they greatly feared that the purity of the law would be

defiled, its strictness and spirituality overlooked, and its high and holy

claims set aside, or frittered down somehow to the level of human

passion and selfishness. But while engaged in their zeal to defend the

law, they talk and preach, and write, as if they supposed it

indispensable, in order to sustain the high claims of the law, to deny

the grace and power of the gospel, and its sufficiency to enable human

beings to comply with the requisitions of the law. Thus they seem to

me, unwittingly to enter the lists against the grace of Christ, and with

the utmost earnestness and even vehemence, to deny that the grace

of Christ is sufficient to overcome sin, and to fulfil in us the

righteousness of the law. Yes, in their zeal for the law they appear to

me either to overlook, or flatly to deny, the grace of the gospel.



Now let the law be exalted. Let it be magnified and made

honorable. Let it be shown to be strict, and pure, and perfect, as its

Author; spread its claims over the whole field of human and angelic

accountability; carry it like a blaze of fire to the deepest recess of

every human heart; exalt it as high as heaven; and thunder its

authority and claims to the depths of hell; stretch out its line upon the

universe of mind; and let it, as it well may, and as it ought, thunder

death and terrible damnation against every kind and degree of iniquity. 

Yet let it be remembered for ever, that the grace of the gospel is

coextensive with the claims of the law. Let no man, therefore, in his

strife to maintain the authority of the law, insult the Savior, exercise

unbelief himself, or fritter away and drown the faith of the church, by

holding out the profane idea, that the glorious gospel of the blessed

God, sent home and rendered powerful by the efficacious application

of the Holy Spirit, is not sufficient to fulfil in us "the righteousness of

the law," and cause us "to stand perfect and complete in all the will of

God."



With respect to the second thing which appears wonderful to me,

namely, that so many seem to have an entirely self-righteous view of

the doctrine of sanctification, let me say, that they seem afraid to

admit, that any are entirely and perfectly sanctified in this life, lest they

should flatter human pride, seeming to take it for granted, that, if any

are entirely sanctified, they have whereof to glory, as if they had done

something, and were in themselves better than others. Whereas, the

doctrine of entire sanctification utterly abhors the idea of human merit,

disclaims and repudiates it as altogether an abomination to God, and

to the sanctified soul. This doctrine, as taught in the Bible, and as I

understand it, is as far as possible from conniving in the least degree

at the idea of anything naturally good in saints or sinners. It ascribes

the whole of salvation and sanctification from first to last, not only till

the soul is sanctified, but at every moment while it remains in that

state, to the indwelling spirit, and influence, and grace of Christ.

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LECTURE 39



SANCTIFICATION, CONDITIONS OF THIS ATTAINMENT 



The conditions of this attainment.



 1. A state of entire sanctification can never be attained by an

indifferent waiting of God's time.



 2. Nor by any works of law, or works of any kind, performed in your own

strength, irrespective of the grace of God. By this I do not mean, that,

were you disposed to exert your natural powers aright, you could not at

once obey the law in the exercise of your natural strength, and continue

to do so. But I do mean, that as you are wholly indisposed to use your

natural powers aright, without the grace of God, no efforts that you will

actually make in your own strength, or independent of His grace, will ever

result in your entire sanctification.



 3. Not by any direct efforts to feel right. Many spend their time in vain

efforts to force themselves into a right state of feeling. Now, it should be

for ever understood, that religion does not consist in a mere feeling,

emotion, or involuntary affection of any kind. Feelings do not result from

a direct effort to feel. But, on the contrary, they are the spontaneous

actings of the mind, when it has under its direct and deep consideration

the objects, truths, facts, or realities, that are correlated to these

involuntary emotions. They are the most easy and natural state of mind

possible under such circumstances. So far from its requiring an effort to

put them forth, it would rather, require an effort to prevent them, when the

mind is intensely considering those objects and considerations which

have a natural tendency to produce them. This is so true, that when

persons are in the exercise of such affections, they feel no difficulty at all

in their exercise, but wonder how any one can help feeling as they do. 

It seems to them so natural, so easy, and, I may say, so almost

unavoidable, that they often feel and express astonishment, that any one

should find it difficult to exercise the feelings of which they are conscious. 

The course that many persons take on the subject of religion, has often

appeared wonderful to me. They make themselves, their own state and

interests, the central point, around which their own minds are continually

revolving. Their selfishness is so great, that their own interests,

happiness, and salvation, fill their whole field of vision. And with their

thoughts and anxieties, and whole souls, clustering around their own

salvation, they complain of a hard heart, that they cannot love God, that

they do not repent, and cannot believe. They manifestly regard love to

God, repentance, faith, and all religion, as consisting in mere feelings. 

Being conscious that they do not feel right, as they express it, they are

the more concerned about themselves, which concern but increases their

embarrassment, and the difficulty of exercising what they call right

affections. The less they feel, the more they try to feel the greater efforts

they make to feel right without success, the more are they confirmed in

their selfishness, and the more are their thoughts glued to their own

interests; and they are, of course, at a greater and greater distance from

any right state of mind. And thus their selfish anxieties beget ineffectual

efforts, and these efforts but deepen their anxieties. And if, in this state,

death should appear in a visible form before them, or the last trumpet

sound, and they should be summoned to the solemn judgment, it would

but increase their distraction, confirm, and almost give omnipotence to

their selfishness, and render their sanctification morally impossible. It

should never be forgotten, that all true religion consists in voluntary

states of mind, and that the true and only way to attain to true religion, is

to look at and understand the exact thing to be done, and then to put

forth at once the voluntary exercise required.



 4. Not by any efforts to obtain grace by works of law.



 Should the question be proposed to a Jew, "What shall I do that I may

work the work of God?" he would answer, "Keep the law, both moral and

ceremonial; that is, keep the commandments."



 To the same inquiry an Arminian would answer, "Improve common

grace, and you will obtain converting grace; that is, use the means of

grace according to the best light you have, and you will obtain the grace

of salvation." In this answer it is not supposed, that the inquirer already

has faith; but that he is in a state of unbelief, and is inquiring after

converting grace. The answer, therefore, amounts to this; you must get

converting grace by your impenitent works; you must become holy by

your hypocrisy; you must work out sanctification by sin. To this question,

most professed Calvinists would make in substance the same reply. 

They would reject the language, while they retained the idea. Their

direction would imply, either that the inquirer already has faith, or that he

must perform some works to obtain it, that is, that he must obtain grace

by works of law.



 A late Calvinistic writer admits that entire and permanent sanctification

is attainable, although he rejects the idea of the actual attainment of such

a state in this life. He supposes the condition of attaining this state or the

way to attain it, is by a diligent use of the means of grace, and that the

saints are sanctified just so far as they make a diligent use of the means

of sanctification. But as he denies, that any saints ever did or will use all

the means with suitable diligence, he denies also, of course, that entire

sanctification ever is attained in this life. The way of attaining it,

according to his teaching, is by the diligent use of means. If then this

writer were asked, "what shall I do that I may work the works of God?" 

Or in other words what shall I do to obtain entire and permanent

sanctification? His answer, it seems, would be: "Use diligently all the

means of grace"; that is, you must get grace by works, or, with the

Arminian, improve common grace, and you will secure sanctifying grace. 

Neither an Arminian, nor a Calvinist, would formally direct the inquirer to

the law, as the ground of justification. But nearly the whole church would

give directions that would amount to the same thing. Their answer would

be a legal and not a gospel answer. For whatever answer is given to this

question, that does not distinctly recognize faith as the condition of

abiding holiness in Christians, is legal. Unless the inquirer is made to

understand, that this is the first, grand, fundamental duty, without the

performance of which all virtue, all giving up of sin, all acceptable

obedience, is impossible, he is misdirected. He is led to believe that it is

possible to please God without faith, and to obtain grace by works of law. 

There are but two kinds of works of law, and works of faith. Now, if the

inquirer has not the "faith that works by love" (Gal. 2:16), to set him upon

any course of works to get it, is certainly to set him to get faith by works

of law. Whatever is said to him that does not clearly convey the truth,

that both justification and sanctification are by faith, without works of law,

is law, and not gospel. Nothing before or without faith, can possibly be

done by any one, but works of law. His first duty, therefore, is faith; and

every attempt to obtain faith by unbelieving works, is to lay works at the

foundation, and make grace a result. It is the direct opposite of gospel

truth.



 Take facts as they arise in every day's experience to show that what I

have stated is true of almost all professors and non-professors. 

Whenever a sinner begins in good earnest to agitate the question, "What

shall I do to be saved?" (Acts 16:30), he resolves as a first duty, to break

off from his sins, that is, in unbelief. Of course, his reformation is only

outward. He determines to do better to reform in this, that, and the other

thing, and thus prepare himself to be converted. He does not expect to

be saved without grace and faith, but he attempts to get grace by works

of law. The same is true of multitudes of anxious Christians, who are

inquiring what they shall do to overcome the world, the flesh, and the

devil. They overlook the fact, that "this is the victory that overcometh the

world, even our faith" (1 John 5:4), that it is with "the shield of faith" they

are "to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked" (Eph. 6:16). They ask,

Why am I overcome by sin? Why can I not get above its power? Why

am I thus the slave of my appetites and passions, and the sport of the

devil? They cast about for the cause of all this spiritual wretchedness

and death. At one time, they think they have discovered it in the neglect

of one duty; and at another time in the neglect of another. Sometimes

they imagine they have found the cause to lie in yielding to one

temptation, and sometimes in yielding to another. They put forth efforts

in this direction, and in that direction, and patch up their righteousness on

one side, while they make a rent in the other side. Thus, they spend

years in running round in a circle, and making dams of sand across the

current of their own habitudes and tendencies. Instead of at once

purifying their hearts by faith, they are engaged in trying to arrest the

overflowing of the bitter waters of their own propensities. Why do I sin? 

They inquire; and casting about for the cause, they come to the sage

conclusion, It is because I neglect such a duty, that is, because I do sin. 

But how shall I get rid of sin? Answer: By doing my duty, that is, by

ceasing from sin. Now the real inquiry is, Why do they neglect their duty? 

Why do they commit sin at all? Where is the foundation of all this

mischief? Will it be replied, the foundation of all this wickedness is the

force of temptation in the weakness of our hearts in the strength of our

evil propensities and habits? But all this only brings us back to the real

inquiry again, How are these things to be overcome? I answer, by faith

alone. No works of law have the least tendency to overcome our sins;

but rather to confirm the soul in self-righteousness and unbelief.



 The great and fundamental sin, which is at the foundation of all other

sin, is unbelief. The first thing is, to give up that to believe the word of

God. There is no breaking off from one sin without this. "Whatsoever is

not of faith is sin" (Romans 14:23). "Without faith it is impossible to

please God" (Heb. 11:6). Thus we see, that the backslider and convicted

sinner, when agonizing to overcome sin, will almost always betake

themselves to works of law to obtain faith. They will fast, and pray, and

read, and struggle, and outwardly reform, and thus endeavor to obtain

grace. Now all this is vain and wrong. Do you ask, shall we not fast, and

pray, and read, and struggle? Shall we do nothing but sit down in

antinomian security and inaction? I answer, you must do all that God

commands you to do; but begin where He tells you to begin, and do it in

the manner in which He commands you to do it; that is, in the exercise

of that faith that works by love. Purify your hearts by faith. Believe in the

Son of God. And say not in your heart, "Who shall ascend into heaven,

that is to bring Christ down from above; or who shall descend into the

deep, that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead. But what saith it? 

The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that is, the

word of faith which we preach" (Romans 10:7-8). Now these facts show,

that even under the gospel, almost all professors of religion, while they

reject the Jewish notion of justification by works of law, have after all

adopted a ruinous substitute for it, and suppose, that in some way they

are to obtain grace by their works.



 5. A state of entire sanctification cannot be attained by attempting to

copy the experience of others. It is very common for convicted sinners,

or for Christians inquiring after entire sanctification, in their blindness, to

ask others to relate their experience, to mark minutely the detail of all

their exercises, and then set themselves to pray for, and make direct

efforts to attain the same class of exercises, not seeming to understand,

that they can no more exercise feelings in the detail like others, than they

can look like others. Human experiences differ as human countenances

differ. The whole history of a man's former state of mind, comes in of

course to modify his present and future experience; so that the precise

train of feelings which may be requisite in your case, and which will

actually occur, if you are ever sanctified, will not in all its details coincid

with the exercises of any other human being. It is of vast importance for

you to understand, that you can be no copyist in any true religious

experience; and that you are in great danger of being deceived by Satan,

whenever you attempt to copy the experience of others. I beseech you

therefore to cease from praying for, or trying to obtain, the precise

experience of any person whatever. All truly Christian experiences are,

like human countenances, in their outline so much alike as to be readily

known as the lineaments of the religion of Jesus Christ. But no further

than this are they alike, any more than human countenances are alike.



 But here let it be remembered, that sanctification does not consist in

the various affections or emotions of which Christians speak, and which

are often mistaken for, or confounded with, true religion; but that

sanctification consists in entire consecration, and consequently it is all out

of place for any one to attempt to copy the feelings of another, inasmuch

as feelings do not constitute religion. The feelings of which Christians

speak do not constitute true religion, but often result from a state of heart. 

These feelings may properly enough be spoken of as Christian

experience, for although involuntary states of mind, they are experienced

by true Christians. The only way to secure them is to set the will right,

and the emotions will be a natural result.



 6. Not by waiting to make preparations before you come into this state. 

Observe, that the thing about which you are inquiring, is a state of entire

consecration to God. Now do not imagine that this state of mind must be

prefaced by a long introduction of preparatory exercises. It is common

for persons, when inquiring upon this subject with earnestness, to think

themselves hindered in this progress by a want of this, or that, or the

other exercise or state of mind. They look everywhere else but at the

real difficulty. They assign any other, and every other but the true

reason, for their not being already in a state of sanctification. The true

difficulty is voluntary selfishness, or voluntary consecration to self-interest

and self-gratification. This is the difficulty, and the only difficulty, to be

overcome.



 7. Not by attending meetings, asking the prayers of other Christians, or

depending in any way upon the means of getting into this state. By this

I do not intend to say, that means are unnecessary, or that it is not

through the instrumentality of truth, that this state of mind is induced. But

I do mean, that while you are depending upon any instrumentality

whatever, your mind is diverted from the real point before you, and you

are never likely to make this attainment.



 8. Not by waiting for any particular views of Christ. When persons in

the state of mind of which I have been speaking, hear those who live in

faith describe their views of Christ, they say, Oh, if I had such views, I

could believe; I must have these before I can believe. Now you should

understand, that these views are the result and effect of faith in the

promise of the Spirit, to take of the things of Christ and show them to you. 

Lay hold of this class of promises, and the Holy Spirit will reveal Christ to

you, in the relations in which you need Him from time to time. Take hold,

then, on the simple promise of God. Take God at His word. Believe that

He means just what He says; and this will at once bring you into the state

of mind after which you inquire.



 9. Not in any way which you may mark out for yourself. Persons in an

inquiring state are very apt, without seeming to be aware of it, to send

imagination on before them, to stake out the way, and set up a flag where

they intend to come out. They expect to be thus and thus exercised to

have such and such peculiar views and feelings when they have attained

their object. Now, there probably never was a person who did not find

himself disappointed in these respects. God says, "I will bring the blind

by a way that they know not. I will lead them in paths that they have not

known: I will make darkness light before them, and crooked things

straight. These things will I do unto them, and not forsake them" (Isaiah

42:16). This suffering your imagination to mark out your path is a great

hindrance to you, as it sets you upon making many fruitless, and worse

than fruitless attempts to attain this imaginary state of mind, wastes much

of your time, and greatly wearies the patience and grieves the Spirit of

God. While He is trying to lead you right to the point, you are hauling off

from the course, and insisting, that this which your imagination has

marked out is the way, instead of that in which He is trying to lead you. 

And thus in your pride and ignorance you are causing much delay, and

abusing the long-suffering of God. He says, "This is the way, walk ye in

it" (Isaiah 30:21). But you say, no this is the way. And thus you stand

and parley and banter, while you are every moment in danger of grieving

the Spirit of God away from you, and of losing your soul.



 If there is anything in your imagination that has fixed definitely upon any

particular manner, time, or place, or circumstance, you will, in all

probability, either be deceived by the devil, or be entirely disappointed in

the result. You will find, in all these particular items on which you had laid

any stress, that the wisdom of man is foolishness with God that your

ways are not His ways, nor your thoughts His thoughts. "For as the

heavens are higher than the earth, so are His ways higher than your

ways and His thoughts higher than your thoughts" (Isaiah 55:9). But:



 10. This state is to be attained by faith alone. Let it be for ever

remembered, that "without faith it is impossible to please God" (Heb.

11:6), and "whatsoever is not of faith, is sin" (Romans 14:23). Both

justification and sanctification are by faith alone. "Seeing it is one God

who shall justify the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through

faith" (Romans 3:30); and, "Therefore, being justified by faith, we have

peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ" (Romans 5:1). Also,

"What shall we say then? That the Gentiles, who followed not after

righteousness, have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness

which is of faith. But Israel, who followed after the law of righteousness,

hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefore? Because they

sought it not by faith, but, as it were, by the works of the law" (Romans

9:30-31).



 But let me by no means be understood as teaching sanctification by

faith, as distinct from and opposed to sanctification by the Holy Spirit, or

Spirit of Christ, or which is the same thing, by Christ our sanctification,

living and reigning in the heart. Faith is rather the instrument or

condition, than the efficient agent that induces a state of present and

permanent sanctification. Faith simply receives Christ, as king, to live

and reign in the soul. It is Christ, in the exercise of His different offices,

and appropriated in His different relations to the wants of the soul, by

faith, who secures our sanctification. This He does by Divine discoveries

to the soul of His Divine perfections and fullness. The aim of these

discoveries is faith and obedience. He says, "He that hath My

commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth Me; and he that

loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him, and will

manifest Myself to him. Judas saith unto Him, (not Iscariot), Lord, how

is it that Thou wilt manifest Thyself unto us, and not unto the world? 

Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love Me, he will keep My

words: and My Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and

make our abode with him" (John 14:21-23).



 To ascertain the conditions of entire sanctification in this life, we must

consider what the temptations are that overcome us. When first

converted, we have seen, that the heart or will consecrates itself and the

whole being to God. We have also seen, that this is a state of

disinterested benevolence, or a committal of the whole being to the

promotion of the highest good. We have also seen, that all sin is

selfishness, or that all sin consists in the will's seeking the indulgence or

gratification of self; that it consists in the will's yielding obedience to the

propensities, instead of obeying God, as His law is revealed in the

reason. Now, who cannot see what needs to be done to break the power

of temptation, and let the soul go free? The fact is, that the department

of our sensibility that is related to objects of time and sense, has received

an enormous development, and is tremblingly alive to all its correlated

objects, while, by reason of the blindness of the mind to spiritual objects,

it is scarcely developed at all in its relations to them. Those objects are

seldom thought of by the carnal mind, and when they are, they are only

thought of. They are not clearly seen, and of course they are not felt. 

The thought of God, of Christ, of sin, of holiness, of heaven, and hell,

excites little or no emotion in the carnal mind. The carnal mind is alive

and awake to earthly and sensible objects, but dead to spiritual realities. 

The spiritual world needs to be revealed to the soul. The soul needs to

see and clearly apprehend its own spiritual condition, relations, wants. 

It needs to become acquainted with God and Christ, to have spiritual and

eternal realities made plain, and present, and all-absorbing realities to the

soul. It needs such discoveries of the eternal world, of the nature and

guilt of sin, and of Christ, the remedy of the soul, as to kill or greatly

mortify lust, or the appetites and passions in their relations to objects of

time and sense, and thoroughly to develop the sensibility, in its relations

to sin and to God, and to the whole circle of spiritual realities. This will

greatly abate the frequency and power of temptation to self-gratification,

and break up the voluntary slavery of the will. The developments of the

sensibility need to be thoroughly corrected. This can only be done by the

revelation to the inward man, by the Holy Spirit, of those great, and

solemn, and overpowering realities of the "spirit land," that lie concealed

from the eye of flesh.



 We often see those around us whose sensibility is so developed, in

some one direction, that they are led captive by appetite and passion in

that direction, in spite of reason and of God. The inebriate is an example

of this. The glutton, the licentious, the avaricious man, are examples of

this kind. We sometimes, on the other hand, see, by some striking

providence, such a counter development of the sensibility produced, as

to slay and put down those particular tendencies, and the whole direction

of the man's life seems to be changed; and outwardly, at least, it is so. 

From being a perfect slave to his appetite for strong drink, he cannot,

without the utmost loathing and disgust, so much as hear the name of his

once loved beverage mentioned. From being a most avaricious man he

becomes deeply disgusted with wealth, and spurns and despises it. 

Now, this has been effected by a counter development of the sensibility;

for, in the case supposed, religion has nothing to do with it. Religion

does not consist in the states of the sensibility, nor in the will's being

influenced by the sensibility; but sin consists in the will's being thus

influenced. One great thing that needs to be done, to confirm and settle

the will in the attitude of entire consecration to God, is to bring about a

counter development of the sensibility, so that it will not draw the will

away from God. It needs to be mortified or crucified to the world, to

objects of time and sense, by so deep and clear, and powerful a

revelation of self to self, and of Christ to the soul, as to awaken and

develop all its susceptibilities in their relations to Him, and to spiritual and

divine realities. This can easily be done through and by the Holy Spirit,

who takes of the things of Christ and shows them to us. He so reveals

Christ, that the soul receives Him to the throne of the heart, to reign

throughout the whole being. When the will, the intellect, and the

sensibility are yielded to Him, He develops the intelligence, and the

sensibility by clear revelations of Himself, in all His offices and relations

to the soul, confirms the will, mellows and chastens the sensibility, by

these divine revelations to the intelligence.



 We need the light of the Holy Spirit to teach us the character of God,

the nature of His government, the purity of His law, the necessity and fact

of atonement to teach us our need of Christ in all His offices and

relations, governmental, spiritual, and mixed. We need the revelation of

Christ to our souls, in such power as to induce in us that appropriating

faith, without which Christ is not, and cannot be, our salvation. We need

to know Christ, for example, in such relations as the following:



 1. As King, to set up His government and write His law in our hearts; to

establish His kingdom within us; to sway His scepter over our whole

being. As King He must be spiritually revealed and received.



 2. As our Mediator, to stand between the offended justice of God and

our guilty souls, to bring about a reconciliation between our souls and

God. As mediator He must be known and received.



 3. As our Advocate or paracletos, our next or best friend, to plead our

cause with the Father, our righteous and all prevailing advocate to secure

the triumph of our cause at the bar of God. In this relation He must be

apprehended and embraced.



 4. As our Redeemer, to redeem us from the curse of the law, and from

the power and dominion of sin; to pay the price demanded by public

justice for our release, and to overcome and break up forever our

spiritual bondage. In this relation also we must know and appreciate Him

by faith.



 5. As the propitiation for our sins, to offer Himself as a propitiatory or

offering for our sins. The apprehension of Christ as making an

atonement for our sins seems to be indispensable to the entertaining of

a healthy hope of eternal life. It certainly is not healthy for the soul to

apprehend the mercy of God, without regarding the conditions of its

exercise. It does not sufficiently impress the soul with a sense of the

justice and holiness of God, with the guilt and desert of sin. It does not

sufficiently awe the soul and humble it in the deepest dust, to regard God

as extending pardon, without regard to the sternness of His justice, as

evinced in requiring that sin should be recognized in the universe, as

worthy of the wrath and curse of God, as a condition of its forgiveness. 

It is remarkable, and well worthy of all consideration, that those who deny

the atonement make sin a comparative trifle, and seem to regard God's

benevolence or love as good nature, rather than, as it is, "a consuming

fire" (Deut. 4:24), to all the workers of iniquity. Nothing does or can

produce that awe of God, that fear and holy dread of sin, that

self-abasing, God-justifying spirit, that a thorough apprehension of the

atonement of Christ will do. Nothing like this can beget that spirit of

self-renunciation, of cleaving to Christ, of taking refuge in His blood. In

these relations Christ must be revealed to us, and apprehended and

embraced by us, as the condition of our entire sanctification. It is the

work of the Holy Spirit thus to reveal His death in its relations to our

individual sins, and as related to our sins as individuals. The soul needs

to apprehend Christ as crucified for us. It is one thing for the soul to

regard the death of Christ merely as the death of a martyr, and an

infinitely different thing, as every one knows, who has had the

experience, to apprehend his death as a real and veritable vicarious

sacrifice for our sins, as being truly a substitute for our death. The soul

needs to apprehend Christ as suffering on the cross for it, or as its

substitute; so that it can say, That sacrifice is for me, that suffering and

that death are for my sins; that blessed Lamb is slain for my sins. If thus

fully to apprehend and to appropriate Christ cannot kill sin in us, what

can?



 6. We also need to know Christ as risen for our justification. He arose

and lives to procure our certain acquittal, or our complete pardon and

acceptance with God. That He lives, and is our justification we need to

know, to break the bondage of legal motives, and to slay all selfish fear;

to break and destroy the power of temptation from this source. The

clearly convinced soul is often tempted to despondency and unbelief, to

despair of its own acceptance with God, and it would surely fall into the

bondage of fear, were it not for the faith of Christ as a risen, living,

justifying Savior. In this relation, the soul needs clearly to apprehend and

fully to appropriate Christ in His completeness, as a condition of abiding

in a state of disinterested consecration to God.



 7. We need also to have Christ revealed to us as bearing our griefs and

as carrying our sorrows. The clear apprehension of Christ, as being

made sorrowful for us, and as bending under sorrows and griefs which

in justice belonged to us tends at once to render sin unspeakably odious,

and Christ infinitely precious to our souls. The idea of Christ our

substitute, needs to be thoroughly developed in our minds. And this

relation of Christ needs to be so clearly revealed to us, as to become an

everywhere present reality to us. We need to have Christ so revealed as

to so completely ravish and engross our affections, that we would sooner

die at once than sin against Him. Is such a thing impossible? Indeed it

is not. Is not the Holy Spirit able, and willing, and ready thus to reveal

Him, upon condition of our asking it in faith? Surely He is. We need to

apprehend Christ as the one by whose stripes we are healed. We need

to know Him as relieving our pains and sufferings by His own, as

preventing our death by His own, as sorrowing that we might eternally

rejoice, as grieving that we might be unspeakably and eternally glad, as

dying in unspeakable agony that we might die in deep peace and in

unspeakable triumph.



 8. "As being made sin for us" (2 Cor. 5:21). We need to apprehend

Him as being treated as a sinner, and even as the chief of sinners on our

account, or for us. This is the representation of scripture, that Christ on

our account was treated as if He were a sinner. He was made sin for us,

that is, He was treated as a sinner, or rather as being the representative,

or as it were the embodiment of sin for us. O! This the soul needs to

apprehend the holy Jesus treated as a sinner, and as if all sin were

concentrated in Him, on our account! We procured this treatment of Him. 

He consented to take our place in such a sense as to endure the cross,

and the curse of the law for us. When the soul apprehends this, it is

ready to die with grief and love. O, how infinitely it loathes self under

such an apprehension as this! In this relation He must not only be

apprehended, but appropriated by faith.



 We also need to apprehend the fact that "He was made sin for us, that

we might be made the righteousness of God in Him" (2 Cor. 5:21); that

Christ was treated as a sinner, that we might be treated as righteous; that

we might also be made personally righteous by faith in Him; that we

might inherit and be made partakers of God's righteousness, as that

righteousness exists and is revealed in Christ; that we might in and by

Him be made righteous as God is righteous. It needs to embrace and lay

hold by faith upon that righteousness of God, which is brought home to

saints in Christ, through the atonement and indwelling Spirit.



 9. We also need Christ revealed to the inward being, as "head over all

things to the church" (Eph. 1:22). All these relations are of no avail to our

sanctification, only in so far forth as they are directly, and inwardly, and

personally revealed to the soul by the Holy Spirit. It is one thing to have

thoughts, and ideas, and opinions concerning Christ, and an entirely

different thing to know Christ, as He is revealed by the Holy Spirit. All the

relations of Christ imply corresponding necessities in us. When the Holy

Spirit has revealed to us the necessity, and Christ as exactly suited to

fully meet that necessity, and urged his acceptance in that relation, until

we have appropriated Him by faith, a great work is done. But until we are

thus revealed to ourselves, and Christ is thus revealed to us and

accepted by us, nothing is done more than to store our heads with

notions or opinions and theories, while our hearts are becoming more

and more, at every moment, like an adamant stone. I have often feared,

that many professed Christians knew Christ only after the flesh; that is,

they have no other knowledge of Christ than what they obtain by reading

and hearing about Him, without any special revelation of Him to the

inward being by the Holy Spirit. I do not wonder, that such professors

and ministers should be totally in the dark, upon the subject of entire

sanctification in this life. They regard sanctification as brought about by

the formation of holy habits, instead of resulting from the revelation of

Christ to the soul in all His fullness and relations, and the soul's

renunciation of self and appropriation of Christ in these relations. Christ

is represented in the Bible as the head of the church. The church is

represented as His body. He is to the church what the head is to the

body. The head is the seat of the intellect, the will, and in short, of the

living soul. Consider what the body would be without the head, and you

may understand what the church would be without Christ. But as the

church would e without Christ, so each believer would be without Christ. 

But we need to have our necessities in this respect clearly revealed to us

by the Holy Spirit, and this relation of Christ made plain to our

apprehension. The utter darkness of the human mind in regard to its

own spiritual state and wants, and in regard to the relations and fullness

of Christ, is truly wonderful. His relations, as mentioned in the Bible, are

overlooked almost entirely until our wants are discovered. When these

are made known, and the soul begins in earnest to inquire after a

remedy, it needs not inquire in vain. "Say not in thine heart, who shall

ascend up to heaven? That is, to bring Christ down from above; or who

shall descend into the deep? That is, to bring Christ again from the dead. 

But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy

heart" (Romans 10:8).



 O how infinitely blind he is to the fullness and glory of Christ, who does

not know himself and Christ as both are revealed by the Holy Spirit. 

When we are led by the Holy Spirit to look down into the abyss of our

own emptiness to behold the horrible pit and miry clay of our own habits

and fleshly, and worldly, and infernal entanglements; when we see in the

light of God, that our emptiness and necessities are infinite; then, and not

till then, are we prepared wholly to cast off self, and to put on Christ. The

glory and fullness of Christ are not discovered to the soul, until it

discovers its need of Him. But when self, in all its loathsomeness and

helplessness, is fully revealed, until hope is utterly extinct, as it respects

every kind and degree of help in ourselves; and when Christ, the all and

in all, is revealed to the soul as its all-sufficient portion and salvation,

then, and not until then, does the soul know its salvation. This

knowledge is the indispensable condition of appropriating faith, or of that

act of receiving Christ, or that committal of all to Him, that takes Christ

home to dwell in the heart by faith, and to preside over all its states and

actions. O, such a knowledge and such a reception and putting on of

Christ is blessed. Happy is he who knows it by his own experience.



 It is indispensable to a steady and implicit faith, that the soul should

have a spiritual apprehension of what is implied in the saying of Christ,

that all power was delivered unto Him. The ability of Christ to do all, and

even exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, is what the

soul needs clearly to apprehend, in a spiritual sense that is, to apprehend

it, not merely as a theory or as a proposition, but to see the true spiritual

import of this saying. This is also equally true of all that is said in the

Bible about Christ, of all His offices and relations. It is one thing to

theorize, and speculate, and opine, about Christ, and an infinitely

different thing to know Him as He is revealed by the Holy Spirit. When

Christ is fully revealed to the soul by the Comforter, it will never again

doubt the attainability and reality of entire sanctification in this life.



 When we sin, it is because of our ignorance of Christ. That is,

whenever temptation overcomes us, it is because we do not know and

avail ourselves of the relation of Christ that would meet our necessities. 

One great thing that needs to be done is, to correct the developments of

our sensibility. The appetites and passions are enormously developed

in their relations to earthly objects. In relation to things of time and

sense, our propensities are greatly developed and are alive; but in

relation to spiritual truths and objects, and eternal realities, we are

naturally as dead as stones. When first converted, if we knew enough of

ourselves and of Christ thoroughly to develop and correct the action of

the sensibility, and confirm our wills in a state of entire consecration, we

should not fall. In proportion as the law-work preceding conversion has

been thorough, and the revelation of Christ at, or immediately

subsequent to, conversion, full and clear, just in that proportion do we

witness stability in converts. In most, if not in all instances, however, the

convert is too ignorant of himself, and of course knows too little about

Christ, to be established in permanent obedience. He needs renewed

conviction of sin, to be revealed to himself, and to have Christ revealed

to him, and be formed in him the hope of glory, before he will be

steadfast, always abounding in the work of the Lord.

 It must not be inferred, that the knowledge of Christ in all these

relations is a condition of our coming into a state of entire consecration

to God, or of present sanctification. The thing insisted on is, that the soul

will abide in this state in the hour of temptation only so far forth as it

betakes itself to Christ in such circumstances of trial, and apprehends

and appropriates Him by faith from time to time in those relations that

meet the present and pressing necessities of the soul. The temptation

is the occasion of revealing the necessity, and the Holy Spirit is always

ready to reveal Christ in the particular relation suited to the

newly-developed necessity. The perception and appropriation of Him in

this relation, under these circumstances of trial, is the sine qua non of our

remaining in the state of entire consecration.



 The foregoing are some of the relations which Christ sustains to us as

to our salvation. I could have enlarged greatly, as you perceive, upon

each of these, and easily have swelled this part of our course of study to

a large volume. I have only touched upon these relations, as specimens

of the manner in which He is presented for our acceptance in the Bible,

and by the Holy Spirit. Do not understand me as teaching, that we must

first know Christ in all these relations, before we can be sanctified. The

thing intended is, that coming to know Christ in these relations is a

condition, or is the indispensable means, of our steadfastness or

perseverance in holiness under temptation that, when we are tempted,

from time to time nothing can secure us against a fall, but the revelation

of Christ to the soul in these relations one after another, and our

appropriation of Him to ourselves by faith. The gospel has directly

promised, in every temptation to open a way of escape, so that we shall

be able to bear it. The spirit of this promise pledges to us such a

revelation of Christ, as to secure our standing, if we will lay hold upon

Him by faith, as revealed. Our circumstances of temptation render it

necessary, that at one time we should apprehend Christ in one relation,

and at another time in another. For example, at one time we are tempted

to despair by Satan's accusing us of sin, and suggesting that our sins are

too great to be forgiven. In this case we need a revelation and an

appropriation of Christ, as having been made sin for us; that is, as having

atoned for our sins as being our justification or righteousness. This will

sustain the soul's confidence and preserve its peace.



 At another time we are tempted to despair of ever overcoming our

tendencies to sin, and to give up our sanctification as a hopeless thing. 

Now we need a revelation of Christ as our sanctification, etc.



 At another time the soul is harassed with the view of the great subtlety

and sagacity of its spiritual enemies, and greatly tempted to despair on

that account. Now it needs to know Christ as its wisdom.

 Again, it is tempted to discouragement on account of the great number

and strength of its adversaries. On such occasions it needs Christ

revealed as the Mighty God, as its strong tower, its hiding place, its

munition of rocks.



 Again, the soul is oppressed with a sense of the infinite holiness of

God, and the infinite distance there is between us and God, on account

of our sinfulness and His infinite holiness, and on account of His infinite

abhorrence of sin and sinners. Now the soul needs to know Christ as its

righteousness, and as a mediator between God and man.



 Again, the Christian's mouth is closed with a sense of guilt, so that he

cannot look up, nor speak to God of pardon and acceptance. He

trembles and is confounded before God. He lies along on his face, and

despairing thoughts roll a tide of agony through his soul. He is

speechless, and can only groan out his self-accusations before the Lord. 

Now as a condition of rising above this temptation to despair, he needs

a revelation of Christ as his advocate, as his high priest, as ever living to

make intercession for him. This view of Christ will enable the soul to

commit all to Him in this relation, and maintain its peace and hold on to

its steadfastness.



 Again, the soul is led to tremble in view of its constant exposedness to

besetments on every side, oppressed with such a sense of its own utter

helplessness in the presence of its enemies, as almost to despair. Now

it needs to know Christ as the good shepherd, who keeps a constant

watch over the sheep, and carries the lambs in His bosom. He needs to

know Him as a watchman and a keeper.



 Again, it is oppressed with the sense of its own utter emptiness, and is

forced to exclaim, I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good

thing. It sees that it has no life, or unction, or power, or spirituality in

itself. Now it needs to know Christ as the true vine, from which it may

receive constant and abundant spiritual nourishment. It needs to know

Him as the fountain of the water of life, and in those relations that will

meet its necessities in this direction. Let these suffice, as specimens to

illustrate what is intended by entire or permanent sanctification being

conditionated on the revelation and appropriation of Christ in all the

fullness of His official relations.

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